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Abstract_____________________________________
By making use of various social science research methods, in particular semi-structured 
interviews, this thesis reveals the main features of the Serbia's 15-year long transition 
experience, which took place against a background of frequent constitutional changes over 
the period 1989 to 2004. Serbia's transition began in December 1989 with the Markovic 
programme, while the Republic was a constitutive part of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY). The study confirms that the SRFY was the first country to start 
transition from a socialist to a market economy, but that this advanced position was lost due 
to a lack of political consensus, and the dissolution of the country in 1991.
As part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) which was formed in 1992, 
Serbia during the 1990s went through the most devastating period in its modern (economic) 
history, experiencing the second highest and the second longest hyperinflation ever registered 
(1992-1994). The battle against (hyper)inflation and economic recovery took the form of the 
Avramovic programme of January 1994, but failed to deliver any prolonged stabilisation and 
growth. Additionally, during the period of FRY, when Slobodan Milosevic was in power, an 
extensive regime of economic and non-economic sanctions were imposed on Serbia by the 
international community (1991-2000). Moreover, in 1999, the country was faced with the 
seriousness of the Kosovo conflict and NATO bombing, and the concomitant impact of these 
events on economic life. As a result of all this, Serbia's transition process was stillborn 
throughout much of the 1990s and public confidence in the state institutions, including the 
National Bank of Serbia (NBS), was entirely lost.
Transition resumed in 2001, following the 'bulldozer revolution' of 5 October 2000, 
and has since followed the main postulates of the transition blueprint which was based on the 
so-called "Washington Consensus". The exchange-rate based stabilisation programme 
brought positive results as early as 2002 and 2003, notably in bringing down inflation. The 
combination of a de facto fixed exchange rate regime (formally announced as a managed 
float) and gloomy prospects of an ever-raising current account deficit and public debt, 
however, gave rise to a wide-ranging debate on the role of exchange rate and monetary 
policy in the overall process of economic recovery. Our analysis reveals that there is space, 
although limited due to the high "euroisation" of the Serbian economy, for a more active 
monetary policy. This would allow a substantial depreciation of the real dinar exchange rate, 
of importance given the demands of WTO and EU membership, namely full capital account 
liberalisation.
Since February 2003, Serbia again changed its constitutional robe by becoming a 
member state of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Following this constitutional 
change in June 2003, after a decade-long delay, Serbia's central bank reform was eventually 
initiated and the new NBS Law was enacted. The evidence contained in this work suggests 
that the NBS's legal independence perfectly matches the transitional average, but that the 
actual NBS's independence is a cause for concern. So as to prevent the inclusion of the 
'systemic error' into the new Serbian constitution - by which a single person (i.e. the 
governor) is the sole source of monetary policymaking - the study proposes several 
principles which may guide the drafting process. Additionally, the thesis points to provisions 
of the current NBS Law which need to be adapted in line with the EMU acquis. The study 
concludes by rising the question of how the NBS's credibility can be restored, proposing a 
new NBS's approach to transparency as a possible solution.
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On 1 May 2004, the European Union (EU) experienced the biggest enlargement 
by opening its doors to ten new member countries: the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Apart form Malta and 
Cyprus, the rest of these countries were ex-socialist and, in terms of their economic 
results, ex-transitional countries. This work is inspired by these countries' 15-year long 
journey towards what they perceived to be a better life, as well as the rich experience they 
gained along that way. Summarising by words the deeds these countries vividly 
experienced contributes only modestly to the learning of the world. However, it may be 
of significance to those still marching along that path, that is, to the Western Balkan 
countries. 1
The Western Balkans is the only European region considerably lacking behind the 
rest of Europe in both, socio-political and economic terms. Traditionally, it has been 
perceived as a violent and primitive region according to those that specialise in 
formulating the patterns of historical evolution, the normative historians (see Mazower, 
2000). It is even often said that the peoples of the Balkans suffer from a surfeit of history. 
History, as a critical and controllable science, however, is repeatedly in the Balkans 
confused with the past that is "designed to control individuals, or motivates societies, or 
inspire classes" (Plumb, 1969)2 . Serbia makes no exception. Economically speaking, 
though, Serbia has gone through the most turbulent transitional experience of all and is, 
for this reason, taken as a case study. Serbia at the end of 2004 lagged most behind the 
prominent reformer countries and its regional partners, even though the country was at 
the forefront of the transition process back in 1989.
1 Western Balkan as a region placed in the southeastern part of European continent composes of five 
countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro.
2 Quoted by Pavlowitch (2002, p. viii).
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Besides, Serbia during the last 15 years has been exposed to some severe 
exogenous and endogenous (non-)economic shocks, which have significantly slowed 
down the process of its democratisation and economic recovery. This study attempts to 
analyse the economic shocks more carefully. Its main intention is to build on the 
transitional experience of ex-transitional countries and to explore the applicability of 
solutions employed in those countries in the Western Balkan and Serbia in particular. In 
order to achieve the proclaimed aims, the study places its investigation within the context 
of the central-planning legacy of ex-socialist countries of Europe. Bearing in mind, 
though, that Serbia had never exhibited the features of a classical socialist economy as 
described by McKinnon (1991), this work additionally explores the applicability of the 
general transition monetary policy rules in Serbia during the period 1989-2005.
A modest contribution of this thesis is the evidence it offers in relation to the 
National Bank of Serbia's (NBS) legal and actual independence and, relatedly, on the 
NBS's institutional framework in light of anticipated European Monetary Union (EMU) 
membership. Additionally, our work appends the existing perceptions about the NBS's 
roles and monetary policy in transition through an identification of its phases and 
corresponding results. It does this by analysing the pre-transition period as well as the 
country's economic and monetary transformation by focusing on the central bank 
institutional achievements from mid-1989 to mid-2003. The result should be better 
understanding of economic and monetary factors, which stood behind the protracted 
secular decline that Serbia experienced during the 1990s (see Palairet, 2001).
Consequently, an originality of this study lies in its scope. While other existing 
studies relate to specific aspects of monetary transformation period, analysing only 
isolated episodes (e.g. Petrovic and Mladenovic, 2000), they fail to offer a global view. 
On the other hand, many studies analyse the entire reform of the financial or banking 
system in transition, but do not explore the specifics of transitional monetary and central 
bank institutional issues (e.g. Thorne, 1993). As in the context of development 
economics, sound monetary policy and accompanied transparent central banking are seen 
as the main prerequisites for an increase in public confidence and secured price stability. 
Without these two elements, neither Serbia nor the Western Balkans will ever achieve 
growth and prosperity (see Gligorov, 2000).
1.2. Rationale of the Study: Old Lessons for New Challenges
Sustained economic growth has been the main driving force behind many 
institutional or even constitutional changes in different parts of the world. One could 
argue that, in economic terms, the probability of achieving higher sustained growth was 
the most compelling feature of the market-oriented economies of Western Europe, which 
attracted the previously centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe, to begun their 
respective transition. The transition started once the communist parties faced a downfall 
of their system and their rules, symbolically associated with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989. 3
In its narrow sense, the term transition is defined as "the process or a period of 
changing from one state or condition to another" (Hornby, 1995, p. 1270). In relation to 
the historic economic changes, which took place during the 1990s in the countries of the 
ex-Soviet block, the term transition is generally used to mark the process of 
transformation from centrally planned to market economy. Similarly, Calvo and Frenkel 
(1991, p. 269) use the term to define the transition period during which "the old central 
planning system is dismantled (or collapsing), while the new market system (and its 
associated institutions and policies) is still not in place". Some authors4 do question the 
appropriateness of such a term in situations in which not even a basic institutional 
infrastructure known to market economies had existed in previously centrally planned 
economies. In such cases, these would need transforming, like in the case of capital 
markets. To those authors, the term 'building' seems to describe the reality more 
correctly.
The countries that embarked on the path of transition were many, and they have 
been differently grouped by various authors and institutions due to their geographical 
position, historical connections or economic performance. For the purpose of our thesis, 
and based on principle of regionalism, 27 transition countries are grouped as follows:
3 Lipton and Sachs (1990, p. 87) argue that "the collapse of communist one-party rule was the sine qua non 
for an effective transition to a market economy. If one proposition has been tested by history, it is that the 
communist parties of Eastern Europe would not lead a process of radical reform sufficiently deep to create 
a real market economy".
4 See Zee and Zivkovic (1997, p. 123).
- Central East European (CEE) countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia;
- Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania;
Commonwealth and Independent States (CIS): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan;
South East European (SEE) countries: Bulgaria, Rumania and the Western
Balkan, and
Western Balkan: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and
Serbia and Montenegro.
All these countries and regions had reached different stages of economic 
transformation by 2004 and some of them had even completed their transition processes. 5 
Namely, all CEE and Baltic States, by entering the EU, should have attained the status of 
market economies.6 The argument behind this reasoning is that these countries were 
asked to fulfil the so-called 'Copenhagen criteria' before joining the Union. The 
Copenhagen criteria were set by the EU heads of governments at a meeting in 
Copenhagen in 1993 and laid down the basic conditions for EU membership:
Existence of a stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, respect for 
and protection of human rights and minorities;
Existence of a functioning market economy, capacity to cope with market forces 
and competitive pressures within the EU [auth. remark], and
- Ability to take on the obligations of membership, including economic and 
monetary union (Pelkmans, 2001, p. 383).
5 See Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser (2000, p. 3).
6 See Pelkmans (2001, p. 383).
Having in mind, though, that EU membership also depends on many political 
considerations, the economic and institutional achievements of those countries can be put 
under query. Nevertheless, we are ready to assign to interpretation advocating that the 
transition in these countries is over, based on criteria suggested by Sahay and Vegh 
(1995, p. 19). According to them, the transition ends once the pressures arising from 
structural inefficiencies and constraints, which they impose on monetary and fiscal 
policies, are removed, as they have been in those countries.
Additionally, one could argue that those countries need no prolonged transition 
period, but an enduring convergence period in order to align their economic performance 
to the so-called 'Maastricht criteria' or to the EU level of per capita income. The latter is 
an argument forwarded by Kohler and Wes (1999, p. 11) who argue that the real 
convergence in terms of per capita income "is likely to take much longer than meeting the 
Maastricht criteria". Nevertheless, the Maastricht criteria, established by the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1992, remain the main formalised convergence criteria for further European 
monetary integration:
1. Price stability: the rate of inflation, observed over a period of one year before the 
examination, may not exceed the average rates of inflation of the three EU 
member states with the lowest inflation by more than 1.5 per cent;
2. Interest rates: long-term interest rates shall not vary by more than 2 per cent in 
relation to the average interest rates of the three EU member states with the lowest 
interest rates;
3. Deficits: national budget deficits must be close or below 3 per cent of GDP;
4. Debt: debt is not explicitly mentioned in the document, but it is considered that 
public debt may not exceed 60 per cent of GDP;
5. Exchange rate stability: a national currency shall not devalue during the two 
previous years and must have remained within the Exchange-Rate Mechanism II 
(ERM) ±15 per cent margin of fluctuation (El-Agraa, 2001, p. 143).
It should be stressed, though, that these criteria do not represent a precondition for 
EMU membership7 . Rather, they are seen as an indicative set of macroeconomic policy 
guidelines for some existing and possible future EU member states, including the SEE 
countries wishing to join the EMU. Even thought ambiguous, the significance of these 
criteria stays strong and ostentatious. The importance of the Maastricht criteria for our 
study lies in the fact that those criteria frame the scope of monetary (and fiscal) policy 
choices of any prospective government that would wish to take Serbia into the EU.
Starting from the proclaimed aim of the SEE countries that their ultimate goal is 
to become an E(M)U member, and that the EU represents the biggest trading and
n
economic partner for all transition countries remaining outside the EU , there is no doubt 
that the Copenhagen and Maastricht criteria set up by the EU will continue to influence 
these countries' transition processes in the years ahead. Therefore, any investigation over 
the various modalities of achieving stated monetary and fiscal objectives during the 
upcoming years of transition of the SEE and Western Balkan countries should be 
welcomed, as it could reduce the possibility of failure.
Within the mentioned scope of subjects, however, further elucidation of monetary 
issues and its accompanying central bank institutional developments deserve particular 
attention, as they pose an immediate, but also a continuous challenge to the domestic 
authorities. Thus, our work pays particular attention to these two features. The theoretical 
background for exploration of the monetary and central bank institutional themes is 
given, at least, by the following several academic disciplines: transitional economics, 
development economics, (new) institutional economics, (new) political economy, and 
monetary economics. Consequently, our work is mostly, though not entirely, framed by 
theories belonging to these academic approaches.
7 "Although participation in EMU is not a formal requirement for EU membership, candidates for accession 
will be expected to adopt the acquis communautaire of Stage 2 of EMU, including convergence toward 
EMU reference values and adherence to the new exchange rate mechanism (ERM2) created for non- 
participating EU members" (Kopits, 1999, p. 37).
8 According to Bishev (2000, p. 29) "the countries of South-East Europe belong to Europe not only in 
normative terms but also in economic terms. The European Union is the largest trading partner for the 
region as a whole as well as for each particular country. Trade with the EU-15 accounts for 30.7 per cent of 
the region's GDP or 53.8 per cent of its total world trade".
Transitional Economics, probably, is the most broad among them. From the point 
of view of transitional economics, the role of monetary policy in transition has been 
recognised at the outset of that process. Early works by Lipton and Sachs (1990), 
McKinnon (1991), Calvo and Frenkel (1991), Fischer and Gelb (1991) and others, 
however, only anticipated monetary policy as a part of a broader set of macroeconomic 
measures needed to support the more profound structural changes of economies in 
transition. The reasons underlining this approach lie in the inherited macroeconomic 
imbalances of former socialist economies and in the passive roles which money and 
credit played within that political setting. Consequently, at the beginning of transition, the 
emphasis was placed on macroeconomic stabilisation, as a set of immediate interventions 
in monetary, exchange rate and fiscal spheres. The theoretical foundation for such an 
approach toward the transitional economics is found in the 'Washington consensus', a 
term coined by Williamson (1990).
Originally, the Washington consensus referred to a minimum agreement over 
economic policy reforms, as proposed by "Washington" toward the Latin American 
countries during the 1980s. According to Williamson (1990, p. 1) "the Washington of this 
paper is both the political Washington of Congress and senior members of the 
administration and the technocratic Washington of the international financial institutions, 
the economic agencies of the US government, the Federal Reserve Board, and the think 
thanks." The consensus includes the following ten economic policy instruments:
  "Fiscal discipline
  A redirection of public expenditure priorities towards fields offering both high economic returns 
and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health care, primary 
education, and infrastructure
  Tax reform (to lower marginal tax rates and broaden the tax base)
  Interest rate liberalization
  A competitive exchange rate
  Trade liberalization
  Liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investments
  Privatization
  Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit)
  Secure property rights" (Williamson, 2000, p. 252).
Both, the term and the concept of the Washington consensus have been extensively 
debated during the 1990s (see, for example, Stiglitz, 1998, and Kodolko, 1999). 
Consequently, Williamson on many occasions revisited the subject. 9 The proposed set of 
policy instruments Williamson (1999, p. 1) alone qualified as the set of reforms aiming at 
"macroeconomic stabilisation, microeconomic liberalization, and opening to the outside 
world". Many others, however wrongly or rightly, have used the term Washington 
consensus as a synonymous to 'neoliberalism', 'globalisation', 'market fundamentalism' 
and 'new (American) imperialism'.
While the transition economics literature has been more concerned with questions 
like what and how is to be transformed, the Development Economics opus has been 
approaching the issue of transition as a means of achieving sustainable growth in CEE, 
arguing that it is a precondition for development. Indeed, the Washington consensus has 
most often been questioned on the grounds of neglected development goals that could be 
achieved through the introduction of sound financial regulation, competition policy, 
transfer of technology and the encouragement of transparency (see Stiglitz, 1998).
From the monetary point of view, however, the restoration of growth can only be 
achieved after a reduction in interest rates, which measures the cost of price stability. 
Additionally, according to Bishev (2000, p. 22), cuts in interest rates seem feasible only 
when institutional confidence is established and when the low rates of inflation became 
permanent. As a result, the strengthening of the institutional (monetary) set up of 
transitional economies came under the scrutiny of the New Institutional Economics10 
theoreticians soon after the period of transition stabilisation was over. Their concerns rest 
with the 'informal constraints' underlying transition process. 11
9 See Williamson (1999, 2000, 2002 and 2004).
10 Douglass C. North, who is considered to be one of the founders of the new institutional economics, 
defines institutions as follows: "Institutions are the rules of the game in a society; more formally, they are 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. [...] A set of political and economic 
institutions that provides low-cost transacting and credible commitment makes possible the efficient factor 
and product markets underlying economic growth" (North, 1997, p. 2).
11 This is how North (1997, p. 16) perceives the situation in transition economies: "The Eastern European 
demise of communism in 1989 reflected a collapse of the perceived legitimacy of the existing belief system 
and consequent weakening of the support organizations. The result was the destruction of most of the 
formal institutional framework, but the survival of many of the informal constraints. Policy makers were 
confronted not only with restructuring an entire society, but also with the blunt instrument that is inherited 
in policy changes that can only alter the formal rules but cannot alter the accompanying norms and even 
have had only limited success in inducing enforcement of policies".
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The New Political Economy^ 2 scholars hinge on institutional issues, 
notwithstanding the fact that they engage heavily in the debate on the speed of 
transition 13 . Some of the main themes of this economic discipline are distributional 
considerations, institutions, and asymmetric information, which play an important role in 
public policy choices. Along these lines of research, the new political economy has 
devoted special attention to "motives and constraints of the monetary policymaking 
authorities, which are often (though not exclusively) central banks" (Cukierman, 1992, p. 
1). Central bank independence, credibility, transparency and accountability are subjects 
placed at the core of this school. By using sophisticated game theory models, economists 
could eventually talk about the central banking problems in an analytical way.
All along the transition process, Monetary Economics has also played a role in 
explaining the mechanisms behind the monetary and central bank transformation of the 
ex-socialist countries. Studies of interest rates, exchanges rates, monetary aggregates, 
monetary policy, and the actions of central banks, banks and other financial institutions, 
have proved to be equally intriguing for transition economies as they have been for the 
developed economies. Its main theories have been searching for monetary models that 
would support both: the economic longings of transition countries towards the desired 
EMU monetary model and enduring monetary stability such as euroisation, currency 
board arrangements, etc. 14
Engaging in an extensive literature review in the course of our research has 
strengthened our belief that it would be naive to expect any complex subject such as the 
transition from a centrally planed to a market economy, or any of the sub-topics deriving 
from it, to be explained exclusively, by just one of the many existing economic theories. 
Although we have chosen to present them separately, it is beyond question that all these
12 "The feature that distinguishes the new political economy from its older counterpart [Political Economy, 
auth. remark] is mostly methodological. In both instances economic and political behaviour are studied 
jointly, and the two-way interaction between them is put at center stage. But the new political economy 
utilizes modern tools and concepts from economic theory, game theory, and econometrics and merges them 
with recent insights from political science" (Cukierman, 1993, p. i).
13 Roland (1994) provides a comprehensive overview of political economy arguments and political 
constraints affecting the speed and sequencing of transitional reform.
14 For example, Masson (1999, p. 2) notes that "even before joining the EU, countries negotiating accession 
may feel that they can improve their chances of a successful outcome through showing that they are good 
Europeans by pegging to the euro, or in any case orienting their monetary policies around a euro-based 
exchange rate target.
theoretic approaches and different scientific disciplines frequently interact, relying on 
each other's findings. It is for this particular reason, that this work is framed by the 
several theoretical approaches mentioned above. The institutional developments of the 
monetary policy framework in Serbia during the transition, as the main subject of this 
work is, nevertheless, also bounded by the formal Copenhagen and Maastricht criteria 
mentioned earlier. It is these two sets of academic and regulatory features that establish 
the context for our further analysis and respective conclusions.
New 
The process of transition from a centrally planned to a market-based economy is 
an extraordinary socio-political and economic event. As such, the transition process has 
been catching the attention of economists, both academics and practitioners, from all 
around the world. Pioneering works, as we shall document in the following chapter, have 
mainly dealt with general transitional issues such as the scope and speed of transition. 
Later works, however, provoked numerous researchers to attach importance to various 
aspects of the transformation process such as privatisation, financial system 
transformation, trade liberalisation, labour relations, etc. Within the framework of each 
particular topic, scholars further opted to investigate the subject either in the case of a 
particular country (country studies), or on a certain group of countries (comparative 
studies), or to take a more general approach.
Unfortunately, mainly due to political reasons, Serbia was left out of the opus of 
transitional economics for many years as a transitional country. The country was neither 
treated as a case study, nor was it included in comparative studies. Three events have 
contributed greatly to this occurrence: (i) the quarrelsome break-up of the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the end of the 1980s and the first half of the 
1990s, (ii) economic and other sanctions that were imposed on the country by the 
international community in the period between 1992 and 2000, and (ii) the NATO foray, 
which followed the Kosovo conflict that took place in 1999. As a result of these political 
episodes, Serbia experienced some other country-specific events.
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The first, economic one, was a hyperinflation of 1992-1994, of a magnitude not 
known to other European transitional economies. 15 The second, political one, was the 
democratic revolution of 5 October 2000; a delayed dismissal of an autocratic and 
totalitarian regime like those that ceased to exist in other transitional countries during the 
1990s. 16 Still, Serbia's troublesome monetary record during the transition years appears 
to be the major economic specificity of the country, though not the only one. From a 
phenomenological point of view, we find it interesting to analyse how a country with a 
long tradition of central banking 17 had lost its historical advantage and fall into such 
severe crisis at the end of the 20th century. The political and economic episodes that we 
have already mentioned played a role in the country's poor economic performance during 
the 1990s (see Palairet, 2001). We also believe that the causality between these elements
1 Q
may explain why a country which first started the transition is 15 years after left behind 
by other countries by so much.
Among particular questions to be answered in the study are: (1) what are the main 
features of the transition process in Serbia; (2) how have the transition countries, 
including Serbia, developed their monetary policy framework as a policy response to 
transition; (3) how well have been the applied monetary policy frameworks of transition
15 Petrovic el al. (1999, p. 336) note the following: "The Yugoslav [Serbian, auth. remark] hyperinflation of 
1992-1994 was historically unique and significant due to its extreme peak and duration. At its peak, in 
January 1994, the monthly inflation rate reached 313 million percent, thus becoming the second highest 
recorded rate of inflation after the Hungarian hyperinflation of 1945-1946. In addition, the Yugoslav 
hyperinflation lasted 24 months so that, after the Russian hyperinflation in the 1920s which lasted 26 
months (Cagan, 1956), it is the second longest ever recorded".
16 "Tough it was an authoritarian state, Yugoslavia [Serbia, too, auth. remark] had had no shortage of 
competitive elections since the collapse of communism in the late 1980s" (Birch, 2002, p. 500).
17 The National Bank of Serbia started operating for the first time on 2 July 1884 (see Sevic, 1996, p. 8). 
Apart form the oldest Bulgarian National Bank established in 1879 and National Bank of Romania 
established in 1880, the National Bank of Serbia was among the first central banks in Eastern Europe.
18 Gros and Steinherr (1995, pp. 316 and 319) argue that "the first comprehensive and innovative 
programme for stabilisation and reform was the Polish ('Balcerowicz') plan of 1 January 1990" and that 
"Yugoslavia's stabilisation plan of 1 December 1989 was much less comprehensive as Yugoslavia already 
enjoyed a more decentralised economy". The authors diminish the importance of the Yugoslav stabilisation 
programme on the following grounds: "At any rate it [the stabilisation programme, auth. remark] was 
quickly aborted by republican disputes", an argument, which, although true, does not seem to be entirely 
relevant. On the other hand, Sahay and Vegh (1995, p. 34) recognise the right order of appearance of 
stabilisation programmes: "The two earliest exchange rate based programmes were that of the former 
Yugoslavia (December 1989) and Poland (January 1990)". Bruno (1993, p. 209) also notes the following: 
"The comprehensive programme that was finally launched in December 1989 included a wide set of 
measures in the area of fiscal, monetary, trade, payments, and income policies, as well as a currency reform 
(four digits were struck off the old dinar) and the beginnings of structural reform in the enterprise and 
banking sectors".
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countries in relation to their anticipated E(M)U membership; (4) what are the specific 
institutional determinants underlying the central banking transitional experience of Serbia 
and other transitional countries, and (5) how the monetary policy framework should 
develop in the future if Serbia and other SEE countries are to join the E(M)U. To put it 
simply, the central question that this study poses relates to institutional considerations, 
which have determined the choice of monetary policy framework in transition economies 
of Eastern Europe in general, and of Serbia in particular, in the light of their subsequent 
E(M)U membership. Within this research context, this thesis pays special attention to the 
NBS' independence, as an element of institutional central banking structure, and its 
relation (if any) to the economic policymaking.
Therefore, the significance of this study lies in the fact that it brings together 
Serbia's 15-year transitional monetary experience and the latest findings on the central 
banking independence issue, enabling an "insight into a prime influence on the systems' 
decision-making", as Houben (2000, p. 1) puts it. Theoretically, the study represents a 
contribution to transitional economics literature from the (new) institutional economics 
and (new) political economy perspective. As a remarkable case study with respective 
remarkable monetary policy episodes, Serbia's transitional monetary policy and 
corresponding central bank institutional achievements, which we deal with in this study, 
may offer something more to the theories that come under the headings of various 
academic disciplines. The study will certainly bring Serbia back into the researcher's 
focus where, as a transition country, belongs.
More practically, we believe that this work may serve individuals and institutions 
interested in understanding the transition process in Serbia, whether they be academic or 
business oriented. The analysis may also inspire further research in the area of 
institutional central banking developments, either within a single-country or within the 
bounds of a broader regional model. Additionally, we hope that this study shall provide 
monetary policy makers with a specific analytical tool in the formulation of their 
decisions and policy actions. Finally, this work may become a channel for rising public 
awareness over delicate issues such as central bank independence, accountability, 
credibility and transparency.
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In principle, the literature on transition may be divided in two parts. On the one 
side, there exist numerous empirical, econometrical studies. On the other side, there are 
various analytical, qualitatively oriented works. From the point of view of social science, 
both of these collections are considered equally valuable in relation to the contribution 
they make to understanding the transition process and its accompanying effects. These 
two groups of studies, however, differ in the methodology they use and, consequently, in 
the type of data which they employ; the empirical studies are based on quantitative, 
statistical data, while qualitative works rely on the descriptive, qualitative data. 19 One 
should be aware, however, that the quantitative data on ex-socialist economies and their 
performance cannot be taken at face value. Lipton and Sachs (1990) were among the first 
to stress this.20 The situation with the statistical data in Serbia does not deviate from this 
general picture. Therefore, we opt to use qualitative data, even though we are aware that 
this exhibits certain drawbacks, as well. According to Arksey and Knight (1999, p. 6), 
"qualitative data are notoriously hard to analyse and the conclusions drawn from the data 
are more obviously open to criticism than those from quantitative surveys", and 
qualitative data "cannot be easily put into categories or simplified".
19 For a more profound explanation between the two types of data see Arksey and Knight (1999, p. 6).
20 What Lipton and Sachs (1990, p. 78) call 'the tyranny of misleading data' describes the following few 
cases. Firstly, it relates to the cases when there is a lack of high-quality statistical data, either because this 
data was faked for some reason by the communist regimes, or due to applied inadequate methodologies. 
Secondly, according to the authors, the term also describes the situation of a shortage economy, which was 
the case for all socialist economies, where "measures of living standards [...] are likely to contain a serious 
upward bias" (Lipton and Sachs, 1990, p. 79). In other words, what can be a fall in the standard of living in 
a market economy due to a fall in real wages, it can also mean a rise in leaving standards in a shortage 
economy due to the queues elimination, as fewer customers chase the same amount of goods. Thirdly, there 
is also a bias towards heavy industry, since the output produced does not represent real economic value, but 
rather just an input for further production. The main problem with the 'misleading data', however, 
according to the authors is that this data can produce unnecessary pressure on policy makers, thereby 
influencing their economic agenda. To all this, one may also add the fact that during transition process the 
very statistics authorities of transition countries also go through the stage of reorganisation and reformation 
of maintaining statistic records, and calculating certain macroeconomic and other parameters, something 
that they did not do before. The most obvious example is that statistics offices of former socialist 
economies were not 'used to' measure the private sector share in the output, since this sector was almost 
inexistent in the planned economies. There is also another problem; mistakes in grasping the unofficial 
economy, residing in the so-called 'grey' (legal), or 'black' (illegal) zones.
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In particular, this study relies on a wide range of primary and secondary 
qualitative data collected until end-July 2005. The secondary data was gathered from 
various books, journals, reports, periodical bulletins and magazines of specialised 
financial institutions and organisations, most of which were found in libraries and archive 
centres, but also in private collections21 . A majority of those works are written in English,
/*** _
but relevant Serbian studies were also consulted during the analysis. For the purpose of 
this thesis, the primary data was congregated from a set of semi-structured interviews, 
which we held over a four-year period, from 2002 to 2005. The one-to-one interviews 
that we had conducted were based on a specific thematic agenda and relevant key 
questions, which were pursued during the interviews. Keeping in mind that the semi- 
structured interviews are not suitable for wide coverage, we focused on a detailed work 
with a fewer interviewees.
Our sample size, thus, included only a limited number of Serbian high 
government officials like the finance minister, minister for privatisation, minister for 
international economic relations, assistant ministers and other senior officials such the 
National Bank governor, vice-governors and members of the securities commission. Our 
qualitative approach endeavoured to collect the interviewees' personal opinions about 
certain monetary and exchange rate policy issues, as well as other institutional and 
organisational central bank themes. The primary and secondary data that we collected 
during our field research are presented in a continuous, narrative manner throughout the 
study. As a result, some of the secondary data are disclosed in various tables and figures 
presented in this work. In such way, we put the data in the function of supporting the 
findings of this work, using it as a building block for our analysis and a constituent 
component of all our conclusions. Nonetheless, some of our data collection is also given 
in the appendices at the very end of this thesis.
21 An example of such private collection is the one belonging to Ms. Aleksandra Drecun, the Secretary 
General of the Presidency of the Republic of Serbia (2004-date) and the former Sectretary General of the 
Ministry of Finance.
22 Most of the Anglo-Saxon literature was obtained from the London School of Economics Library, the 
British Library, the University of Greenwich Library and the University of Exeter Library, during several 
few-months visits, which were paid to the United Kingdom. Our fieldwork in Belgrade, Serbia, included 
numerous visits to the National Bank of Serbia Library, the Economic Institute Library, the Parliament of 
the State Union Library and the republic government's archive.
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Even though we are aware of the fact that any transition also has its political and 
social elements, we believe that one study cannot grasp all the details of such a complex 
process. Our work, therefore, analyses exclusively the economic aspects of the transition 
process, with a special reference to monetary policy issues. The scope of this subject is 
potentially enormous, given the important interrelationships between monetary, fiscal and 
external policies and between the central bank as a major player in financial markets and 
banks or other non-banking financial institutions. Therefore, the study deliberately 
ignores, or treats only cursorily, issues like financial system reform, banking reform, 
central bank supervision and other related subjects that would merit separate and more 
detailed studies of their own. The emphasis is, instead, put on the institutional features of 
central bank and monetary policy reform in the process of economic transformation of a 
socialist system into a market-based system in general, and in the case of Serbia in 
particular.
The study is conducted on the basis of an ensuing plan. Following this 
introductory chapter, Chapter II reviews the transition literature in general and presents 
the academic papers on monetary and central bank issues in particular. The chapter also 
encompasses papers in the area of E(M)U membership requirements and corresponding 
theoretical models of accession. For the sake of clarity, papers are presented separately, 
as a combination of authors and topics' reviews, whereas the conclusions are drawn 
through a cross-reference basis for each particular section. The main conclusions are that 
a broad political and social consensus about the global reform strategy is essential if the 
transition is to be successful and less costly, that the credibility of programmes and 
institutions is fundamental for a lucrative transition, and that an adequate legal framework 
remains the main mechanism for channelling the discretionary policies of economic 
decision makers.
Chapter III brings the most interesting and the most relevant features of Serbia's 
constitutional and economic legacy between 1947 and 2004, paying particular attention to 
the stabilisation programmes pursued in the period from 1989 to 2004 (e.g. the Markovic 
and Avramovic programmes). The chapter discloses the stop-and-go character of Serbia's 
transition, since December 1989. The lessons drawn are that: (i) real instead nominal 
democracy is needed for substantial reforms to be implemented, (ii) a complex
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constitutional structure of a country does not necessarily represent an impediment to 
reforms if there exists a real domestic political and international support to reforms, and 
(iii) times of extraordinary politics, outside the scope of the collapse of communism, may 
serve as a catalyst for difficult reform tasks, though these periods remain relatively short.
Chapter IV looks at the role of monetary policy during a transition, underlying 
certain propositions, commonly accepted among economists, on what monetary policy 
can and cannot do in general. In relation to that, the chapter examines the use of nominal 
anchor(s) during the transition and raises the question of monetary policy conduct and the 
choice of monetary policy instruments during transition. Moreover, the chapter offers an 
analysis of the European prospects for the remaining ex-socialist countries of Europe by 
looking at the possible monetary policy framework that would be in line with envisaged 
macroeconomic convergence towards the Maastricht requirements. Finally, the chapter 
analyses different models of monetary policy strategy, which can be applied on the way 
to EMU (currency board arrangements and euroisation).
Having in mind the importance of an appropriate institutional set-up for monetary 
policy, Chapter V looks at the specific issues of central banking in Serbia in transition 
times (1989-2003). An analytical discussion is carried out with respect to the central 
banks' legal frameworks as a prerequisite for their institutional, personal, functional and 
financial independence. Most importantly, however, is that this chapter offers some 
evidence on the legal and actual National Bank of Serbia independence, thereby placing 
it into the broader historical and transitional context. Equally important is that the chapter 
develops an argument against the constitutional solution establishing a single-person 
central bank governing body, and an argument for institutionalised model of central bank 
transparency, as a means of increased central bank accountability and credibility.
By summarising the main finding of this thesis, Chapter VI concludes that the 
pure political scrutiny of central banking should immediately be replaced by an adequate 
systemic and analytical approach, in an attempt to restore the credibility of some of the 
oldest central banks in Europe, such as that existing in Serbia.
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Transition, as a concept deployed in our thesis, is clearly not an exclusive 
category reserved for European countries. China, being an Asian country, for example, 
has also undertaken a specific transitional experiment in the last several decades. 
Additionally, Latin American countries have tried to reform their economic systems over 
the last few decades, too. Still, we cannot say that the transition in Eastern Europe has 
fully followed these examples. The reason for this is that the Eastern European transition 
has been different from transition elsewhere. The question, then, is why has the transition 
in Eastern European countries differed from transition elsewhere?
Fischer and Gelb (1991, pp. 92 and 98) consider China's case as, indeed, a 
distinctive and very interesting. However, the authors doubt that China's rural reform, 
which stands as the most successful example of property rights resolution among socialist 
countries, could easily have been applied in the European transition countries. This was 
due to the fact that the Eastern European countries were heavily industrialised at the 
beginning of transition, while retaining a large proportion of agricultural sector.
Similarly, Fischer (1993, p. 392) argues that the transition in China is different 
from the transition in Eastern Europe due to the following four reasons: (i) the 
transformation in China started from the agricultural sector through the partial 
privatisation of 'communes' after 1978, (ii) industrial growth in China derived from 
newly established firms, not from state-owned restructured firms, (iii) macroeconomic 
stability was maintained throughout the transformation process, and (iv) political 
situation was kept stable, even though the regime was authoritarian. With respect to that, 
the author argues that the European transition countries differed in every respect from 
their Chinese rival since the countries in Eastern Europe had large industrial state-owned 
enterprises and small agricultural sectors, unstable macroeconomic settings, and much 
greater political instability due to the dissolution of their authoritarian regimes.
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Regarding the Latin American countries, Bruno (1993, p. 203) recognises that 
there are certain similarities in the objectives and the means applied during the reform 
processes in both, the European and the Latin American countries. These similarities, 
according to the author, are twofold. Firstly, both groups of counties had an objective to 
open up towards the world and to adjust their distorted and controlled prices to world 
prices. The establishment and maintenance of macroeconomic stabilisation and internal 
and external balances appear to be another common objective. However, Bruno (1993, p. 
204) concludes that the Latin American countries "differ from their Eastern Europe 
analogues in that their underlying structure is none the less largely market-oriented and 
private property rights are reasonably well defined".
Obviously, even though these historic examples might have not been fully 
applicable in transition in Europe, they exhibited certain elements, which could and have 
been used in the Eastern European countries during the transformation process. This was 
especially the case at the beginning of transition, during the stabilisation phase, when 
many lessons from Latin American stabilisation programmes were used in the 
formulation of the appropriate anti-inflation strategies of former socialist economies. 1
2.2. 
Gros and Suhrcke (2000, p. 17) find that the transition countries of Europe are 
special because they happen to be, even after ten years of transition, still characterised by 
a high proportion of industrial sector in the overall structure of their economies, a high 
level of energy usage compared to their per capita income, an extensive physical 
infrastructure, and a high proportion of secondary and tertiary educated individuals in 
their overall population. Most of these features of transition economies date from the 
socialist period. Therefore, the early works on economics of transition, as it will be 
demonstrated on the following pages, dealt with the inherited conditions as a context for 
the establishment and implementation of adequate transition strategies.
1 See the explanation about the Washington consensus in Chapter I of this thesis on page 7.
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2.2.1. Socialist economies prior to transformation
According to Gros and Steinherr (1995, p. 41), the Socialist economic design was 
partly inspired by Marxist theory, and partly supported by the communists' decision to 
stay in power via the establishment of an institutional design based on the following three 
policy choices: national self-sufficiency, collective ownership, and rapid growth. Out of 
these three top policy priorities, growth acted as the paramount plan of the socialist 
economic blueprint, because only very high growth rates of output could secure the 
positions of countries' leaders promising to overtake the West in its economic 
performance.
At the same time, however, the central planners did not exercise any control over 
aggregate demand, the liquidity of the system, the distribution of revenues or the 
exchange rate. The authors argue that the limited role of money under socialism was 
inherited in the Marxist view of monetary exchange, which criticises the capitalist 
economy relaying on investments and profits, while it encourages the socialist economy 
advocating direct allocation and exchange of goods without monetary mediation. 
However, even though Marxist theory proposes that money should not be used, in reality, 
the "socialist countries have remained monetised" (Gros and Steinherr, 1995, p. 51). As a 
result, the transition inception period was characterised by a huge monetary overhang.
Gros and Steinherr (1995, p. 156) define money overhang within the concept of 
'forced savings', as an amount that equals to an excess stock of cash or savings deposits. 
Even though there appear to be two aspects of forced savings - microeconomic and 
macroeconomic - it is only rational to talk about 'forced savings' from a macroeconomic 
(i.e. aggregate) point of view. Since in a centrally planned economy demand for goods is 
higher than the supply of those goods, on an aggregate level people are 'forced' to save, 
as they actually do not have enough goods to spend money on. Therefore, a mismatch 
between the wages and goods available for consumption appears to be the main cause of 
monetary overhang, the volume of which appeared to be quite difficult to estimate. The 
implications of such wrong estimations are of particular importance during the first years 
of transition, when price liberalisation takes a high place on the reformers' agenda.
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Namely, it was important at the outset of transition to have numerical estimates of 
an expected jump in a price level after the price reform in order to be able to adequately 
accommodate the money supply. Bruno (1993, p. 219) finds that in the case of Poland 
and Czechoslovakia the forecasted price shock was 45 and 25 per cent respectively, 
whereas the actual price shock was 80 and 40 percent. Gros and Steinherr (1995) find that 
mistakes derived from the fact that the ratio of money to income, i.e. velocity of money, 
in transition economies, is quite variable and changes rather quickly.
The authors further explain that in terms of monetary flows, the socialist 
economic system was divided between a cash and a non-cash sector, where individuals 
and households used cash, while enterprises had only been using it occasionally, to meet 
payroll. Notably, cash was used for goods purchases in the majority of cases, while all
^
transactions between the government, firms and central bank contributed to the 
functioning of a non-cash sector. Under the scenario presented by the authors, money 
failed to represent a 'universal means of exchange', as it exhibited 'internal non- 
convertibility', which prevented the free flow of money between different sub-accounts 
of the same enterprise. Figuring such an integrated financial system with one public 
sector embodying all other sectors (government, central bank and firms)3 , Gros and 
Steinherr (1995, pp. 53 and 55) demonstrate another feature of a socialist economy; the 
net wealth of a socialist economy equals to net money supply held by households.4
Moreover, apart from the direct restrictions on free money flow in the case of 
micro-units, i.e. enterprises, in command economies there also existed indirect 
restrictions on money flow. Those are visible in the case of interest rates, which had not 
played a role in the allocation of financial resources within a socialist economy. As long 
as money just accommodated targets in the real sector of the economy, and financial 
flows just helped achieve these targets through the central credit plan, interest rates could 
have not been used as a policy instrument. The conclusion then emerges that money 
under socialism was not a policy instrument.
2 Central bank under socialism also performed a function of a commercial bank by allocating credits to 
firms and keeping the firms' accounts.
3 The aggregation is made on the presumption of a classical socialist economy in which government owns 
all the firms and regulates the functioning of the so-called 'monobank' system.
4 In a capitalist society, as a contrast, net wealth equals to money supply and government debt held by 
households and firms.
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Lipton and Sachs (1990) were among the first to examine the structural aspects of 
the shortage economy of socialist countries and its implications on the anticipated reform 
strategies through the model of repressed inflation. They also touched upon the issues of 
Stalinist legacy and the sources of excess demand, as well as the inherited economic 
conditions in different transition countries and the transition strategy in general, and 
examined the case of Poland in particular.
According to these two authors, the main legacy of the Stalinist regime is the 
social ownership structure, which implies that a state owns the majority of industrial 
production and service sector, and that the private ownership is negligible. At the same 
time, the structure of socialist economies was such that it favoured heavy industry and 
neglected light industry and the service sector. This was due to the obsession with growth 
and intense trade relation with the Soviet Union as the main exporter of raw materials to 
Eastern European countries.
As a consequence, the business behaviour of state-owned enterprises in the 
socialist setting appeared to be problematic. The enterprises set wages on a basis of 
relaxed rules and were thus prone to pay excessive wages, while in the process of 
investment policy-making the enterprises' managers longed for large investments without 
a fear for investment failure. Such a situation was backed by the fact that the socialist 
system lacked adequate entry and exit procedures for enterprises. The investment 
initiatives were agreed directly between the enterprises, ministries and relevant planning 
authorities implying that the credit and capital markets in socialist economies did not 
perform an allocation function. Thus, the socialist economies suffered from distorted 
relative prices, which due to overvalued exchange rates led to high effective prices of 
imported goods.
The result was that all socialist economies exhibited a chronic excess demand. 
Excess demand was manifested in the form of a shortage of consumer goods at official 
prices, as too many people chased too few goods. At the enterprise level, excess demand 
was evident in shortages of basic inputs at official prices. However, a degree of excess 
demand was not the same for all socialist countries: in Yugoslavia the shortages of goods 
at official prices were far lesser than, for example, in Bulgaria, Poland or Romania 
(Lipton and Sachs, 1990, p. 85).
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The authors attempted to explain the sources of excess demand by applying the 
model of repressed inflation. They argue that a rooted belief that monetary overhang was 
the main source of excess demand in socialist countries did not provide an adequate 
explanation since it deals with the stock component and can explain only part of the 
process. Other part of explanation derives from the flow effect, which means that the 
origins of chronic excess demand are deeply inherited in the socialist systems and 
include: obsession with the growth, the existence of soft budget constraints5 , 'autarkic 
production strategy',6 etc.
The model of repressed inflation also emphases the following implications of a 
shortage economy. Firstly, it shows that in a demand-driven system real income and 
utility are directly proportionate, while in an excess demand economy this relationship is 
indirectly proportionate, i.e. rise of real income leads to a fall in utility. Secondly, the 
model demonstrates that excess demand leads to hoarding, increased corruption and 
distortions of a trading system. Thirdly, it shows that "the sine qua non of currency 
convertibility is the elimination of excess demand" (Lipton and Sachs, 1990, p. 96).
Consequently, the authors argue that such systemic distortions at the beginning of 
transition called for a rapid approach to reforms. They believe that the transformation 
should include three steps: (i) elimination of excess demand through macroeconomic 
adjustments, (ii) establishment of market competition via price deregulation, trade and 
private sector liberalisation, and (iii) privatisation. However, the authors underline that all 
these phases should be accompanied by the introduction of adequate labour market 
policies, new rules of wage and investments settings, and debt restructuring. It should be 
noted, though, that their work was greatly inspired by Kornai's (1990) learning.
5 The concept of 'soft budget constraint' was firstly introduced in 1980 by a Hungarian economist Janos 
Kornai in his work Economics of Shortage. Later on, in his paper The Soft Budget Constraint published in 
1986, Kornai further cleared the meaning of the concept. In particular, Kornai (1986, p. 4) said: "The 
'softening' of the budget constraint appears when the strict relationship between expenditure and earnings 
has been relaxed, because excess expenditure over earnings will be paid by some other institution, typically 
by the State". Kornai (1986, p. 9) deliberately avoided "an overly pedantic definition" of soft budget 
constraint, but rather referred to the notion of the soft budget constraint as to "a trend in modern society: 
the relaxation of financial discipline, the weakening of the feeling that spending, survival, expansion 
depend on earning capability and not on external assistance". According to him, soft budget constraints 
may take different forms: soft subsidies, soft taxation, soft credit, soft administrative prices and other, 
which are not mutually exclusive (Kornai, 1986, p. 6).
6 Autarkic production strategy implies that all components for the production of a final good are produced 
by the same enterprise, thereby evading specialisation.
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McKinnon (1991) systematically presents the basic monetary and fiscal 
mechanisms of a classical socialist economy, which operated on the following four 
fundamental prepositions: (1) government owns all industrial and agricultural property, 
(2) government determines the output via production plans, (3) government determines 
the prices, and (4) government limits wage claims. As a consequence, the system of 
taxation under socialism was largely implicit and uncodified, while the system of money 
and credit was entirety passive (McKinnon, 1991, p. 108).
The fiscal system worked on the basis of direct allocating enterprises' cash 
surpluses to state budget and the indirect taxation of households through the mechanism 
of workers' wage limits. Similarly, the monetary system functioned on a basis of 
carefully monitored enterprises' deposits held in state bank accounts, and households' 
currency in circulation that, nominally, were used freely. However, by an explicit control 
of enterprises' accounts and cash in circulation, the conversion of money from enterprises 
to households was controlled too, thereby complementing the system of wage controls.
McKinnon (1991) believes that in a transition it is necessary to introduce a new 
tax regime based on a value-added tax and personal income tax, and a new tax 
administration capable of administering such a novel system. The author bases his 
argument on the grounds that once liberalisation is initiated and government starts 
rescinding control over its enterprises, the tax base begins eroding. However, since 
immediate privatisation is not feasible at the outset of transition, a broad classification of 
enterprises according to their degree of liberalisation in a transition appears crucial: (1) 
transitional enterprises with remaining prices and output controls, (2) state-owned 
liberalised enterprises with freely set output and input, but with government control over 
wages, and (3) private liberalised enterprises with no direct government restraints.
Accordingly, McKinnon (1991) proposes a new system of money and credit 
consistent with the introduction of a new tax regime. His plan includes a two-stage 
process of financing liberalised enterprises. Stage one relies on enterprises' self-financing 
and the prohibition of bank lending to liberalised firms, thereby encouraging newly 
liberalised firms to use monetary assets as a store of value rather than physical assets, and 
helping the development of non-bank capital markets. A consecutive second stage relates 
to fully collateralised bank lending to the liberalised sector under commercial conditions.
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Sahay and Vegh (1995, p. iv) strongly argue that the most beneficial way to 
understanding the inflationary pressures of countries in transition is to examine the 
"inherited nominal instabilities of planned economies". Indeed, by applying their model 
they show that a Soviet-type command economy is characterised by the endogenous 
money supply and that the system as such is over determined. Money supply appears to be 
endogenous to the system since the current period money supply determines the next 
period money supply, under the assumption that the planned wage costs do not alter 
between periods. On the other side, the system happened to be overdetermined since 
there were two nominal anchors, i.e. planners set both prices and wages. Analogously, 
Sahay and Vegh (1995, p. 3) conclude that monetary stability rests on the equality 
between the wage bill and the consumption of goods bought at official prices.
It follows that any change in the price or wage levels would lead to inflationary 
pressures. Namely, since any increase in wages could be fully accommodated by simply 
printing money, money supply would increase too, producing higher inflation. Moreover, 
by adjusting their model to different scenarios, the authors find that any temporary 
increase in nominal wages led to a permanent increase in the money supply and to a 
permanent monetary overhang. Similarly, any permanent increase in the level of nominal 
wages induced an 'ever-increasing' money supply and, consequently, an 'ever- 
increasing' monetary overhang. Thus, stabilisation in command economies could have 
only been achieved through a combination of monetary reform (a reduction in the stock 
of money) and an upward adjustment in official wages. In particular, by affecting the 
level of wages by either allowing direct credits to the state enterprises via the state bank, 
or by granting subsidies via the state budget, money supply was regulated too. By using 
these mechanisms, the socialist economies managed to eliminate monetary overhang 
immediately. However, when the transition process triggered the price liberalisation - 
introduced after a period of repressed inflation - the result was a price level 
overshooting1, only then followed by a period of price stability. Yet, the mechanism 
worked only in cases in which wages remained as a nominal anchor. In situations in 
which neither prices nor wages were used as nominal anchors, the economy as a whole 
turned to be highly unstable (Sahay and Vegh, 1995, p. 16).
The term overshooting implies a depreciation of exchange rate due to the price and trade liberalisation.
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2.2.2. Theory of economic transition
In theoretical terms, Kornai (1990) paved the way to a wide debate on the 
transformation of socialist command economies into the capitalist8 market economies. 
His work "The Road to A Free Economy" inspired many (see, for example, Lipton and 
Sachs, 1990) to start scrutinising this topic further. Kornai (1990), however, build the 
theory of economic transition around the issues of ownership structure, macroeconomic 
stabilisation and political considerations relating to it.
Regarding private ownership, Kornai (1990) sets forth six preconditions for the 
development of private sector: (1) whole and true liberalisation, (2) law enforcement, (3) 
security of private property, (4) encouraging tax system, (5) amplified credits, and (6) 
increased social respect for private entrepreneurs and investors. On top of these formal 
attempts aiming at liberalisation, which depend on the state administration, the private 
sector appears to develop by itself, spontaneously, along the lines of the market (see 
Kornai, p. 36). However, the author underlines that these changes do not happen 
overnight, and that time is needed for the gradual development of private sector to 
actually take place.
In the meantime, until the private sector develops, the state sector remains 
dominant. But, it should not, according to Kornai (1990, p. 62), be equally liberalised. On 
the contrary, he argues that the state sector should be controlled even more tightly. The 
spheres of authority in which it is necessary to restrict the independence of state-owned 
firms are: credit usage, control of budgetary support, wages policies, investment 
decisions and selling procedures of state firms. And, business decisions such as 
determination of production quantity, selling prices, technology, engagement of labour 
force et similar should remain in the hands of state firms' managers.
8 On the margins of his work, however, Kornai (1990, pp. 44 and 45) points that "it is impossible to refer to 
'capitalism' in general" and that whoever advocates for capitalism "should state more precisely what 
combination of liberalization and bureaucratic restrictions he has in mind" based on the grounds that "in 
some of the developed capitalist countries the intervention in the life of the individual and in the economic 
activity of private property is unnecessary frequent" and varies among countries. It should be noted, 
though, that the Kornai's argument, seen after 25 years, has lost much of its strength due to an increasing 
political and economic harmonisation between Western European capitalist countries and the 
accompanying clear prospects of the European Union membership for transition countries of Eastern 
Europe, streaming to adopt that particular- 'European' model - of capitalism.
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Even though Kornai (1990) proposes the above measures, he does not believe that 
the state sector will become more efficient or fully replaced by the private sector, but that 
the 'dual economy' of private and state sectors will prevail. However, the set of 
restrictions directed towards the state-owned firms should help achieve two goals: (i) the 
protection of private sector, and (ii) macroeconomic stabilisation. In this respect, the 
author stresses the fact that the supervision role of national parliaments and institutions 
like central banks during transition become indispensable, as they counterweight the state 
administration.
Regarding macroeconomic stabilisation9, however, Kornai (1990, p. 102) argues 
in favour of the simultaneous implementation of the following components of the 
programme: inflation stopping, restoration of budgetary equilibrium, management of 
macrodemand, formation of rational prices, and the introduction of a uniform exchange 
rate and convertibility. He also suggests that the authorities undertake these actions in a 
short, one-year period and that they explain them to the general public all along the way.
The gist of stopping inflation is rooted in the recognition that inflation is not a 
natural disaster and that the inflationary process, fuelled by inflation expectations and by 
government tendencies to finance large budget deficits, must be terminated. Kornai 
(1990) suggest that this exercise be done with the help of a radical reform of tax system 10 
in order to ensure the collection of budget revenues sufficient to finance necessary budget 
expenditures. Additionally, the author believes that the whole operation must rely on the 
management of macrodemand via strict supply of bank credits to loss-making state- 
owned firms, solid control of interfirm lending, and tight wage discipline in those firms.
Finally, he proposes that the stabilisation programme includes the formation of 
rational prices through total liberalisation of all private and state sector prices (with only 
a few exemptions), conditioned upon the level of price liberalisation prior to stabilisation, 
and the level of supply and reserves of essential goods. For this to happen, however, 
according to Kornai (1990, p. 155), it is also important that foreign trade be liberalised, 
uniform exchange rate applied and domestic currency convertibility established. 
Moreover, he suggests that all these measures be taken concurrently and radically.
9 Kornai (1990, p. 102) dubs macroeconomic stabilisation as 'surgery for stabilisation'.
10 In general, Kornai (1990, pp. 117-135) proposes that the new tax system become simple, neutral, non- 
progressive and non-counterincentive.
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Fischer and Gelb (1991) devote their work to the analysis of initial conditions for 
reform, the elements of reform such as macroeconomic stabilisation and control, price 
and market reform and enterprises reform, and the sequencing of reforms. They argue 
that after the collapse of central-planning, different socialist economies exhibit varied 
degrees of (de)centralisation and macroeconomic imbalances, as shown in Figure 2.1. As 
a result, the reform challenges these countries had faced at the beginning of transition 
were not the same.
Initial conditions for the socialist reform process
Hungary
* Czechoslovakia
*USSR
* Bulgaria
*SFR Yugoslavia
* Poland
Source: Fischer and Gelb (1991, p. 93).
What is striking about this figure is that SFR Yugoslavia was by far the most 
decentralised country, with severe macroeconomic imbalances at that time. This 
condition, in turn, made it difficult for the country to start structural reforms in line with a 
stabilisation programme. A similar situation was registered in Poland, while countries 
with less severe macroeconomic imbalances, such are Czechoslovakia and Hungary, had 
been advised to focus on structural reforms.
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Although decentralised economies tend to begin the transition with an advantage, 
according to Fischer and Gelb (1991, p. 93), these countries need to further foster 
enterprises' market behaviour either through the elimination of cross-subsidies or through 
privatisation. On the other hand, the more centralised economies face the problem of 
defining clearly the ownership rights and assigning them to enterprises' outsiders. In each 
case, however, a political and social consensus is deemed necessary.
Macroeconomic instability, which occurs because of non-existence of bankruptcy 
laws and hard budget constraint practices in transition countries, should be tackled before 
structural changes take place. In particular, macroeconomic adjustment should focus on 
the elimination of subsidies to loss-making enterprises, public sector wage controls and 
credit ceilings supervised by the central bank. In addition, stabilisation should include 
elimination of monetary overhang through the following measures: currency reform, 
inflation reduction, increases in interest rates and privatisation of state property.
The next phase of transition should, according to Fischer and Gelb (1991), include 
price and trade liberalisation. The authors see these two policy actions as means of 
creating the right incentives for profitable enterprises and exporters to conduct their 
business on market-based principles. Alongside price and trade liberalisation, domestic 
deregulation, demonopolisation, and labour and capital market liberalisation are also 
preconditions for successful systematic transformation. The core of the transition process, 
nevertheless, is privatisation, which should include not only enterprises, but also the 
banks. Moreover, the inauguration of a new role for the government, such as to support 
the process of transition by the establishment of a new legal environment, accounting and 
audit system, tax administration, social safety nets and other sustainable arrangements, 
should be installed together with all these changes.
Fischer and Gelb (1991, p. 101) conclude by saying that "a linear sequence of 
individual policy changes is not the right concept when considering comprehensive 
system reform". The authors provide a stylised model of possible reform phasing (see 
Figure 2.2), arguing that the speed of envisaged reforms hugely depends on political 
support, and stress the importance of Western governments' active role in transition 
countries through the provision of technical and financial assistance, debt reduction and 
opening of their markets to the goods, services and capital of transition countries.
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2.2. Phasing of reform
Intense Continuing
Demonopolise and private distribution
Remove quantitative restrictions Adjust tariffs to moderate levels
Deregulate hiring/firing Liberalise wage bargaining
LiberalisePreparation
Goods and Services: 
Price Reform
Trade Reform 
Labour Market 
Finance & Banking 
Small Scale Privatisation 
And Private Sector Dev.
Large scale Governance, 
Restructuring and Privatisation
Intensive (tax, property, commercial,
foreign investment, law)_______Continuing
Legal Reforms 
Institutional Reform 
Unemployment insurance
Governance, restructure and privatise
Tax administration, budgeting, legal, regulatory institutions
Emergency_________Institutionalisation____
Time (in years)
0 1 8
Source: Fischer and Gelb (1991, p. 102).
Fischer and Gelb (1991) were among the first scholars to offer a certain transition 
agenda, even though it is clear that they argued against a non-linear sequencing of 
reforms. Instead, they advocated a dynamic phased reform strategy that assumed the 
implementation of complementing policy reforms: macroeconomic stabilisation, price 
and market reform, restructuring and privatisation, and an accompanying process of 
redefining the state's role. The success of these policy interventions, however, according 
to the authors, depends on initial economic distortion conditions, population support and 
the overall political conditions in each transition country.
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Marer (199 la) chooses to open the discussion with the set of definitions including 
macroeconomic stabilisation/adjustment, structural-institutional reforms, economic 
liberalisation, enterprise restructuring, and transformation/transition. Later on in the 
work, however, the author focuses on particular problems of macroeconomic imbalances 
and the control of inflation, enterprises restructuring, fiscal policy and taxation, financial 
intermediation and currency convertibility in the transition economies. The author 
concludes by answering the question of whether Western experience is relevant for 
countries in transition.
"Macroeconomic stabilization (sometimes called 'adjustment') means bringing 
severe repressed or open inflation and unsustainable deficits in the budget and/or in the 
balance of payments under control" (Marer, 199la, p. 39). As repressed inflation induces 
many undesirable effects such as further price distortions, increased market segmentation, 
bargaining and other economic costs, it should be eliminated at the beginning of 
transition. Monetary overhang as an anticipatory form of repressed inflation can be 
eradicated in several ways, as described in the previous section.
The transition itself, however, according to the author, also causes inflation by 
hardening budget constraints, price liberalisation, new wage policies, exchange rate 
depreciation, inflationary expectations, and new external shocks. Furthermore, the 
problem of controlling inflation in a transition is additionally burdened because of the 
threat of wage-push inflation is substantial, the banking system is underdeveloped, 
enterprises do not operate on market-based principles, and there is a queuing problem 
induced by delays in supplies. Therefore, only a tight monetary policy coupled with the 
'draconian measures' of authorities can achieve results in bringing and keeping inflation 
down during a transition (Marer, 199la, p. 43).
"Enterprise restructuring refers to actions taken to bridge gaps between current 
performance and what is required to become internationally competitive" (Marer, 199la, 
p. 39). Since the tightening of monetary policy induces a week supply response of 
enterprises in the early period of a transition, enterprise restructuring is needed to spur the 
adjustment. Restructuring may take many forms, from a simple cleanup of balance sheets 
to layoffs and selling of firms to new owners. However, in each restructuring process, the 
state and new owners should have an active role.
According to Marer (199la, p. 48) the fiscal aspects of transition relate to two 
main policy objectives: first, a reduction in the level of spending and, second, a lowering 
of the fiscal burden for households and enterprises. These policy objectives are, 
nevertheless, in all transition countries, restrained by high political constraints and, thus, 
difficult to implement in full. Moreover, the task is encumbered with the declining 
revenues due to the closure of loss-making enterprises and an increased need for 
allocation of budget resources to social safety nets, which during transition should 
accommodate large layoffs of workers and other needs of vulnerable society' groups.
The economies in transition are also put before the problem of insufficient 
households' savings that are to be further channelled into more productive uses, 
generating growth. The origins of negligible voluntary savings in transition lie in the 
negative real interest rates and absence of attractive financial or real assets in which 
households could invest. Also, having in mind that previously centrally planned 
economies inherited a weak system of financial intermediation the authorities in 
transition must focus on strengthening the financial sector. Marer (199la, p. 51) argues 
that this problem can only be resolved institutionally by developing an attractive legal 
and regulatory framework that favours the flow of financial information, a revision of 
bank ownership, specialised financial institutions, competition, venture capital and equity 
markets.
In relation to the question of currency convertibility the author raises the 
following four policy questions: (1) what exchange rate regime, (2) what type of 
convertibility, (3) what timing, and (4) what exchange rate level are desirable during 
transition? However, the author does not offer any concrete answers, but rather briefly 
looks at various proposed alternative solutions and their advantages and disadvantages.
As for the applicability of other countries' experiences in transition countries, 
Marer (1991a) believes that at a high level of generalisation one can, indeed, talk about 
the particular relevance of Western experiences for transition economies. Emphasising 
that the EU's laws, institutions and policy orientations may be the best model-to-follow 
for transition economies of Europe, the author highlights the experience of Spain and 
Germany as two striking examples. And in a later paper, the author looks at different 
types of market economies in more detail.
Marer (1991b) analyses the three models of successful market economies: (i) the 
social market economies of Western Europe, (ii) the consumer-directed market 
economies like the one of the United States, and (iii) the administratively guided market 
economies such as that of Japan, in order to isolate their common qualities, which are to 
be attained by transition economies.
The model of social market economies like those of Western Europe, assumes the 
existence of private property and strong competition based on market principles. 
Nevertheless, this model of capitalism above all presumes a strong state commitment to 
sound monetary and fiscal policies, efficient health and education care, a solid 
infrastructure and housing system, accentuated environmental protection and a strong 
safety net for the unemployed and poor.
The main characteristics of a consumer-driven market economy correspond to the 
features of the US economic model. This model predominantly relies on strong market 
forces and large labour and capital mobility with only limited role of the state. Within this 
type of economic organisation, the focus is on every individual entrepreneur and his 
short-run economic incentives to acquire as much profit as possible, thereby producing 
growth. Legal framework discourages private savings and encourages spending, placing 
the consumer at the centre of attention. Much less attention is given to the growing needs 
of socially unprotected groups of society, although some job tenure programmes do exist.
An administratively guided market economy, in contrast to the US model, is 
rooted in large voluntary savings and investments, and a strong commitment to 
employment security. The model emphasises producers over consumers and workers 
through the close collaboration of government, business and trade unions. Together with 
the downward flexibility of wages and long-term protection of domestic market from 
foreign competition, these features contributed to Japan's spectacular economic success.
In his conclusion, Marer (1991b) emphasises these main qualities of successful 
market economies: rule of law, private ownership, competition and trade, sound currency, 
large savings, stimulating taxation, effective financial intermediation, sound 
infrastructure, protection of environment, and opportunities for individual fulfilment. 
According to the author, all of these characteristics are mutually interdependent and 
interact constantly.
Dornbusch (1991) investigates strategies and priorities for reform offering a 
particular agenda for policymakers in transition countries. That agenda includes seven 
sequences: 1) inauguration of new rules of the game (unrestricted private ownership and 
entrepreneur freedom), 2) institution building (legal system protecting private ownership, 
functional courts, new accounting, pension and tax systems, unemployment 
compensation scheme, effective bankruptcy mechanism, etc.), 3) establishment of 
macroeconomic balances, 4) privatisation, 5) foreign economic liberalisation, 6) 
integration with the world through trade not aid, and 7) financial reform. The sequencing 
should serve to avoid the consequences of the vacuum established in the transition from 
the old and new economic systems while ensuring government retreat from production 
and other economic decisions.
Additionally, the author argues that all reforms should be conducted in a rapid 
manner, and that there is no place for gradual changes in the process of Eastern European 
economic transformation. Having in mind that political tensions during transition may 
arise due to the limited citizens' patience and high reform costs, fast government action is 
highly recommended. Otherwise, those of which the government did not take care of and 
whom it 'left behind' will radicalise. Moreover, according to Dornbusch (1991, p. 171), 
"transition needs to be accomplished extremely fast because [...] the distance to go is far, 
and the task is overwhelming". Government, however, at the beginning of the transition, 
should concentrate on what is essential, not on what is urgent.
The disadvantage of a gradual approach to transition, the author claims, is that it 
may lead to further economic distortions, since the old system collapsed and there is no 
other system to replace it. As a consequence, it can be expected that all economic agents 
will act in their best interest, which can be realised on the black market. Moreover, the 
administrative capacity for gradual reforms does not exist, as argued by the author, as the 
existing bureaucracy does not have the capacity to carry out gradual approach. 
"Gradualism offers superficial appeal because it seems to take away the harshness of 
adjustment" Dornbusch (1991, p. 171) notes and concludes that gradualism is only 
appropriate if the costs of gradual adjustment appear to be lower in comparison to the 
costs incurred if a radical approach is followed.
2.2. 3. Concluding remarks
Clearly, the complexity of the transformation process of previously centrally 
planed economies of Eastern Europe was widely recognised in academic circles. Also, 
the fact that such major economic change must be backed by a strong political and social 
consensus was highly appreciated by many scholars. Nevertheless, even though the 
general picture was drawn, specific transition strategies remained ambiguous. On the one 
hand, the majority of economists promoted a rapid approach, arguing that a long-lasting 
adjustment can lead to "populism, protectionism, and a prolonged macroeconomic crisis" 
(Lipton and Sachs, 1990, p. i). On the other hand, only fewer academics underlined that a 
newly desired system cannot be built over night since it incurred high transition costs that 
could only be met gradually (see Kolodko, 1999).
These opposing views, however, relate to the reasoning of secondary adjustment, 
whereas the two groups of scholars agree that the transition's primary task - 
macroeconomic stabilisation - should be done promptly, as initially suggested by Kornai 
(1990). The same stands true for liberalisation measures. The logic behind this notion 
rests on long-established distorted practices and the (macro)economic imbalances of 
socialist economies at the beginning of transition, as was explained by Lipton and Sachs 
(1990), Fischer and Gelb (1991), Kornai (1990) and others. One should bear in mind, 
however, that not all transition countries shared the same starting positions. In other 
words, not all countries inherited the same (macro)economic imbalances.
It is reasonable to believe that those initial conditions differed due to diverging 
degrees of deviations from the classical socialist model of central-planning." This, in 
turn, influenced the design of particular transition strategies in those countries once the 
transformation process started. Most of our discussion in Chapter III actually hinges on 
this idea and shows that, indeed, the inherited characteristics of the market socialism, 
which existed in Serbia (i.e. Yugoslavia) prior to transition, in fact, determined the 
formulation and the design of its monetary stabilisation policy during the first years of 
transition, as well as the overall transition process that was implemented thereafter.
11 This argument is supported by the evidence from Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland, which exhibited low 
degrees of economic decentralisation, as explained by Fischer and Gelb (1991).
After experiencing political opening towards the West and after the political U-- 
turn took a place in the countries of Eastern Europe at the beginning of 1990s, major 
economic changes were triggered, too. Centrally planed system collapsed overnight; 
government' ministries and agencies stopped producing financial and other plans, thereby 
eroding the entire economic system. In such circumstances, it was first necessary to 
stabilise the economy.
Stabilisation, in its narrow sense, at the beginning of transition called not only for 
a change in the way money was perceived and deployed, i.e. monetary policy switch, but 
also for other economic ventures like price and trade liberalisation and the introduction of 
fiscal and income restraints. In a broad sense, stabilisation also included other policy 
actions such as privatisation, enterprise restructuring, strengthening the rule of law, etc. 
However, in this thesis, we refer to the stabilisation in its narrow, macroeconomic 
(monetary) sense, focusing on the four basic questions: why, when, how, and what was to 
be stabilised.
The first question considers the motives of stabilisation programmes in order to 
reveal why stabilisation was necessary. The answer lies in the fact that, at the beginning 
of a transition, the inherited economic variables were unstable. Namely, as we saw 
already, in a majority of transition countries, the initial macroeconomic conditions were 
such that the external balance of payments, inflation, excess demand, unemployment, 
exchange rate and budget deficits all needed some adjustment. Thus, these countries 
resorted to stabilising the macroeconomic variables first, necessary to establishing a basis 
for more profound structural reforms. 12
The second question relates to stabilisation objectives. In its essence, the 
stabilisation phase refers to an attempt to stabilise the inherited macroeconomic 
imbalances. Herein, stabilisation needed to deal with fiscal and external imbalances as 
these were the main sources of excess demand in socialist economies (Begg, 1996, p. 19).
12 As Lipton and Sachs (1990, p. 99) put it: "Structural reforms cannot work without a working price 
system; a working price system cannot be put in place without ending excess demand and creating a 
convertible currency; and a credit squeeze and tight macroeconomic policy cannot be sustained unless 
prices are realistic, [...]".
The third question looks at the timing of stabilisation programmes, recognising 
that transition countries began their stabilisation at different times, as shown in Table 2.1. 
According to Begg (1996), who based his conclusions on findings made by Bruno and 
Easterly (1995), the stabilisation phase ends once inflation is brought down to 40 per cent 
per annum. 13 Bruno (1993), on the other hand, believes that the reference point should be 
an annual inflation mark of 20 per cent, as it corresponds to the post-stabilisation results 
achieved in the Latin American countries (Bolivia, Chile and Mexico) and Israel in the 
aftermath of their hyperinflations.
Monetary policy framework in transition countries_______________
Countries
Group 1: Fast Response*
Albania
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
Slovenia
Slovak Republic
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Kyrgyz Republic
Moldova
Group 2: Slow Response
FYR Macedonia
Romania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakstan
Russia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Mongolia
Adoption of
Stabilisation Program
in/92
1/91
IV/93
1/91
1/90
1/90
1/92
1/91
11/92
11/92
11/92
11/93
111/93
1/94
IV/93
IV/94
1/95
IV/94
111/94
1/94
11/95
1/95
No targets as of IV/95
IV/94
IV/94
11/93
Principal Nominal Anchor in
Stabilisation Program
Money
Money
First money, later exchange rate
Exchange rate
Money
Exchange rate
Money
Exchange rate
Exchange rate (currency board)
First money, later exchange rate
First money, later exchange rate
(currency board)
Money
Money
Money
Money
Money
Money
Money
Money
Money
Money
Money
n/a
Money
Money
Money
Newly Introduced
Currency
No
No
Yes, II/94
No
No
No
Yes, 1/92
Yes, 1/93
Yes, 11/92
Yes, HI/93
Yes, 11/93
Yes, 11/93
Yes, 111/93
Yes, II/94
No
Yes, IV/93
Yes, 111/93
Yes, IV/94
Yes, HI/95
Yes, IV/93
Yes, HI/93
Yes, 11/95
Yes, IV/93
Yes, IV/92
Yes, 11/94
No
Notes: * Countries adopting a stabilization program within the first two years of transition.
Source: De Melo and Denizer (1997, p. 25).
The most important question of how the stabilisation is to be carried out is 
analysed in the several most influential papers presented in the following few pages.
13 Easterly (1996) extends this conclusion by defining the successful stabilisation to be over once inflation 
falls below 40 per cent annually, for two consecutive years. See also Cottarelli and Doyle (1999, p. 2).
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2.3.1. Monetary policy response to transition: stabilisation
Clavo and Frenkel (1991) believe that there is no a 'master blueprint' for 
economic transformation and focus on the implications of anticipated price reform in the 
period preceding the reform: the early phase of transition. They developed a simple 
model of a centrally planed economy consisting of two components (asset market and 
goods market) in order to investigate the effects of private agent expectations about the 
evolution of exchange rates, asset holdings and aggregate demand.
Under the assumption that nominal wages are fully indexed to the domestic 
prices, the authors find that price reform announcements induce an immediate 
depreciation of domestic currency, followed by a jump in the nominal and real exchange 
rate, as well as a consequent reduction in demand for tradable goods implying an 
accumulation of foreign exchange. When price reforms are implemented, the opposite 
happens because domestic prices and wages rise suddenly, resulting in a sharp fall in the 
real exchange rate, which as a consequence has a rise in demand for tradable goods and a 
decumulation of foreign exchange.
However, as many economic reform programmes anticipated unindexed wages, 
the authors also look at the macroeconomic and income distribution implications of price 
reforms under such scenario. The conclusion is that there exists a direct relationship 
between the degree of wage indexation, currency depreciation and inflation, i.e. the 
higher the wage indexation, the larger the currency depreciation and the inflationary 
pressures. 14 Having in mind particular relevance of such effects to transition economies, 
the authors extend the model of anticipated price reform with the assumption of a tight, 
contractionary credit policy. A conclusion emerges that the supply, demand and portfolio 
effects are the main factors determining the creation of a credit policy in transition. "A 
credit crunch resulting in a sharp rise in both deposit and loan rates of interest may be 
especially damaging under the institutional environment prevailing in PCPEs [previously 
centrally planned economies, auth. remark]" (Calvo and Frenkel, 1991, p. 287).
14 Moreover, since a rise of inflationary pressures may lead to a credit crunch and a resulting reduction of 
working capital and output supply, the microeconomic problem of price subsidisation trough wage 
indexation may, in fact, transmit into a macroeconomic problem of high inflation
The mentioned institutional environment relates to a weak banking system and 
impaired pricing mechanism, which do not facilitate the separation of 'good' and 'bad' 
firms, thereby threatening to undermine the efforts made to reduce macroeconomic 
distortions by giving a rise to further microeconomic distortions. One way to offset the 
dynamic evolution of the anticipatory price liberalisation is to resort to the complex fine- 
tuning of interest rates. However, this strategy cannot be sustainable, as it can be quite 
costly and damaging to the transitional banking system and to enterprises. As a result, the 
credibility of authorities announcing policy actions can be weakened and the whole 
operation put under question. Instead, a focus should be placed on a quick 
implementation of price reform and on the development and strengthening of domestic 
credit markets and corresponding regulatory and supervisory systems.
The authors also consider three different ways of reducing a liquidity overhang, 
which they define as "a situation in which price liberalization and the removal of 
subsidies bring about a rise in the measured average price level" (Calvo and Frenkel, 
1991, p. 290). The first way to reduce liquidity overhang is through an increase in the 
domestic currency deposits interest rate. However, due to the fact that in formerly 
centrally planned economies the banks, which are supposed to bear the costs of higher 
interest rates, are owned by the government, it is the government budget that needs to 
repay these increased costs applying new taxes. The second mechanism assumes a rise in 
the measured price level, which again is a tax on the real value of domestic liquid assets. 
The third possibility is to reduce liquidity either via direct confiscation (a monetary 
reform) or open market sales of assets. In any case, the full amount of monetary overhang 
is born by the private sector by means of increased taxation.
Even though Calvo and Frenkel (1991) conclude that the process of economic 
transformation is a long and complex one, they argue for a short pre-reform period and a 
quick implementation of a timely, although not necessarily a perfect, reform strategy. 
According to them, a comprehensive reform package should include the macroeconomic 
and structural reform measures adapted to each country according to its specific political 
and economic backgrounds. In designing and implementing of transition strategy, the 
credibility of the policymakers is fundamental, together with their limited discretionary 
policies, transparent and simple new rules transmitting signals to the marketplace.
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Edwards (1992, p. 129) recognises that transition countries in Europe face three 
main problems: macroeconomic stabilisation, structural reforms, and privatisation. At the 
outset of a transition process, however, the adjustment of macroeconomic variables 
appears to be the first challenge with the following open questions: (1) how to iron 
monetary and fiscal disequilibrium, including the elimination of monetary overhang, (2) 
what anti-inflationary programme and what nominal anchor(s) to chose, and (3) how to 
reform the labour market and to what extent to de-indexed it.
In his search for answers, Edwards (1992) analyses the experience of Latin 
American countries and their stabilisation programmes, looking for some similarities. 
Relying mainly on Chilean stabilisation exercises, the author draws some important 
lessons for European transitional countries, highlighting at the same time that there are 
profound differences between the two regions, although those happen to be mainly 
political. Thus, the author warns the policymakers in Eastern Europe that none of the 
programmes of Latin America should be automatically applied.
The characteristic of macroeconomic disequilibrium at the beginning of transition 
was that it exhibited the stock and flow component. According to Edwards (1992, p. 134) 
"the stock disequilibrium, which generated a monetary overhang, has been the result of 
years of rapid money creation under generalized price controls and declining 
productivity. [...] The flow disequilibrium, on the other hand, has been the result of large 
(and increasing) fiscal deficits that have been monetized". All countries with both stock 
and flow disequilibrium were advised to eliminate the monetary overhang first.
Defining the monetary overhang as an excess of actual real stock of money 
(M/Py) over the desired stock of money (M/Py)*, Edwards (1992, p. 135) argues that 
there are four possible ways of monetary overhang reduction. Theoretically, these can be: 
(i) a reduction in money balances M by monetary reform, (ii) a one-time increase in price 
level P, (iii) an increase in real output y, and (iv) a rise in the desired stock of money 
(M/Py)*. The author suggests that the third and fourth options are impractical, whereas 
the first and second solutions are both feasible, although not equally complex. In 
particular, a monetary reform requires an accurate estimation of monetary overhang 
quantum and may undermine the confidence in domestic currency, while a price-level 
adjustment can induce serious inflationary pressures, as it did in Poland and Yugoslavia.
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Fiscal discipline is another building block toward successful stabilisation. 
Stabilisation requires actions on both sides of the state budget, that is, revenue and 
expenditure side. On the part of the budget revenues, stabilisation, and transition in 
general, necessitates the introduction of a new tax system, possibly indexed to 
inflationary corrections. Similarly, the expenditure side demands a new approach to state 
finances via drastic cuts in budget subsidies to state enterprises. This strategy, however, 
opens the problem of enterprise debt restructuring, which can be solved either through 
privatisation or through the transformation of fiscal deficits into quasi-fiscal deficits.
Edwards (1992) argues strongly for an overall de-indexation of the economy since 
implicit or explicit indexation enables the persistence of a high inflation. The idea behind 
the de-indexation is to transform economic agents' behaviour by enhancing their 
economic forward-looking aspects instead of backward-looking methods related to 
inflation movements. Labour market reform and the de-indexation of wages in this 
context play an important role as they allow for more flexibility of labour markets. 
Labour market flexibility, in turn, brings a short-run fall in wages, which in combination 
with trade liberalisation may reduce unemployment growth rates. If the opposite happens 
and if wages remain indexed and unable to flexibly adjust to trade liberalisation effects, 
one may expect the unemployment rate to rise further.
In relation to the nominal anchors of stabilisation programmes, the author looks at 
the exchange rate based programmes. Edwards (1992, p. 142) argues that such plans, if 
they are to be successful, must be credible and accompanied with the "required 
corrections in the fundamental determinants of inflation, such as the fiscal deficit and 
money creation" in order to avoid large real exchange rate overvaluations. Credibility, 
according to the author, can be achieved through the coherence of the programme and by 
the imposition of certain institutional constraints, which will ensure the government's 
commitment to an exchange rate anchor and fiscal discipline.
Edwards (1992) concludes that only a credible stabilisation plan based on tight 
fiscal policy and coupled with de-indexed labour market can avoid serious overvaluation 
in the case of exchange rate anchoring strategy not relying on system inertia. This finding 
is of particular importance for our analysis of Serbian stabilisation programme discussed 
in Chapter III of this thesis.
Williamson (1991), in his relatively short paper, analyses the convertibility issue 
as a precondition for integration of transition economies with orld markets and increased 
competition. According to Williamson (1991, p. 252) "convertibility means the right to 
change domestic currency into a hard foreign currency [...] convertibility does imply the 
right to convert at the legal exchange rate, rather at an unofficial or parallel (normally 
depreciated) rate". There are, however, different concepts of convertibility.
Current-account convertibility assumes the right of an enterprise or a person to 
freely make payments and import whatever necessities, thereby enabling world prices to 
prevail in the domestic markets. Unrestricted convertibility implies that exchange 
restrictions on capital exports are abolished and that firms and individuals may export 
capital at the official exchange rate. Commodity convertibility gives an enterprise the 
right to solely handle its cash balances, but it must be coupled with the hard budget 
constraints. In fact, Williamson (1991, p. 253) argues that "hard budget constraints, 
commodity convertibility and market-determined prices are the three changes that jointly 
define the move from a planned to a market economy".
Even though convertibility induces certain macroeconomic costs in terms of 
preventing full employment, the author underlines that benefits stemming from 
convertibility are greater for transition countries, as convertibility fosters price 
adjustment and decomposes monopolistic practices by increasing competition. However, 
convertibility can promote these developments only if coupled with the right mix of trade 
and exchange rate policy.
In relation to trade arrangements, the author argues for a controlled and gradual 
opening of weak transition economies towards the world, but suggests a more liberal 
protection system among transition countries themselves. Vis-a-vis exchange rate policy, 
Williamson (1991, p. 261) believes that a short-term fixed exchange rate peg to the 
deutsche mark (DEM) makes a right policy option if followed by long-term exchange 
rate flexibility and substantial devaluation that should secure external competitiveness.
Governments should also ensure that certain macro conditions (control over 
domestic demand, satisfactory balance of payments position, adequate stock of reserves) 
are secured before convertibility is introduced, whereas convertibility can go in parallel 
with microeconomic adjustments such as efficient bankruptcy procedures, etc.
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In his highly influential and frequently cited book, Bruno (1993) treats the 
problem of crises, stabilisation and economic reform in general. However, in relation to 
stabilisation and reform in Eastern Europe, the author analyses the initial Yugoslav, 
Polish and other countries' reform efforts of the late 1980s and early 1990s and raises the 
questions of price shock, output decline, fiscal sustainability, and macroeconomic policy 
agenda during the transition.
In relation to the initial price shock, Bruno (1993) argues that the difference 
between expected, i.e. estimated, and actual price levels of transition countries derived 
from many sources (initial conditions, price response to exchange rate depreciation, 15 
large unabsorbed monetary overhang, enterprises monopolistic behaviour, etc.). The 
author also claims that the relationship between the initial price jump and a consequent 
inflation profile exhibit certain trade-offs in cases in which there truly existed large 
monetary overhang, implying once-and-for-all price rise. However, where this was not 
the case, price hikes had direct effects on the persistence of inflation inertia.
Over the issue of output decline, which occurred during the early years of 
transition, Bruno (1993) makes a case for a gradual and credible trade liberalisation. He 
builds his argument on the basis of an expectedly prolonged response from the real 
economy to changes in the economic system and the fact that regional trade networks 
were disintegrated once the transition period began. Consequently, the author believes 
that a government commitment to a pre-announced five-year trade liberalisation plan 
could have secured lesser output decline in the initial phase of transition.
The author further opens the issue of fiscal balance sustainability during the 
transition years. Bearing in mind McKinnon's (1991) comment on the increased safety 
nets expenditures and tax base erosion, the fiscal balance sustainability must be backed 
by a new VAT system. However, as the new tax system takes years to start giving full 
results, governments in transition resort to infrastructure investments cut-offs in order to 
maintained a balanced budget. Since the long-term economic costs of low infrastructure 
investments are high, Bruno (1993) suggests that the best solution is to plan these 
investments at least three years in advance and to define them precisely.
15 Bruno (1993, p. 222) explains that "in Israel this is called the 'dentist effect' because dentists allegedly 
raise their fees by the same rate at which the price of their material inputs rises even though these inputs 
comprise only a small portion of the cost of treatment".
42
Issues complementary to fiscal sustainability are current account sustainability 
and nominal anchor viability. Bruno (1993) believes that current account sustainability 
must be considered within a medium-term period. He underlines that the exchange rate 
anchor needs to be supported by a public sector wage ceiling as long as large public 
enterprises exist. However, these measures only represent general rules, whereas the 
specific choice of policy actions in fiscal, monetary, wage and other economic policies, 
depend on characteristics of each individual country.
Generally speaking, however, the author recognises that stabilisation/?er se could 
have not brought much benefit, thereby proposing what is nowadays known as 'Bruno 
blueprint'. This blueprint includes components of stylised stabilisation and structural 
reforms encompassing the following set of advised actions:
(a) Heal the real macroeconomic fundamentals first and find the right internal and 
external balance,
(b) Apply 'heterodox' stabilisation via introduction of multiple nominal anchors and 
achieve rapid synchronised disinflation of all nominal variables,
(c) Opt for currency reform, internal debt rescheduling and other administrative 
measures needed to support new macro-equilibrium,
(d) Undertake structural reforms in order to remove micro-distortions and to facilitate 
sustained growth, and
(e) Maintain political reforms and build up a strong democracy (Bruno, 1993, p. 269).
Nevertheless, according to Bruno (1993, p. 206), one must distinguished between 
the stabilisation of price and exchange rate levels, which can happen rather quickly, and 
relative prices, which establish slowly as reaction to the changes in investment, 
production and ownership patterns. This issue, however, reminds us that after the initial 
stabilisation phase, the transition calls for further structural adjustments. Within this 
complex process, new roles for governments are necessary. "A hands-off approach 
cannot be optimal", as Bruno (1993, p. 246) argues. Governments in transition must work 
extensively on institution building, establishment of new rules of economic behaviour, 
and must learn how to explain and share them with the general public.
As we have seen already, Sahay and Vegh (1995) developed a simple monetary 
model for non-market economies in order to reveal the sources of inflationary pressures 
and to assess the effectiveness of their stabilisation programmes in the period 1990-1993. 
If we expand on what was said about their model earlier, we can conclude that 
inflationary pressures in transition are the result of the fact that both the nominal anchors 
(wages and prices) that existed during socialism ceased to be employed during the 
transition period, but that they had not been replaced by appropriate monetary anchors.
Regardless of the countries' choice of primary nominal anchor (money vs. 
exchange rate), the authors find that all countries also included another nominal anchor, 
that is, wages. This, in turn, implies that all transition countries resorted to multiple 
nominal anchors during the stabilisation. It is important to understand, though, that the 
wage targets during a transition refer to public sector wages, which in transition 
economies appear to be sizable, whereas the wage policies in market economies relate to 
private wages (having in mind that public sector wages are already put in line with the 
monetary and fiscal policies in those countries).
Analysing further successes and failures of one nominal anchor over another, i.e. 
money versus exchange rate, the authors found that transition countries making use of 
exchange rate anchors managed to reduce inflation considerably even at the time of 
immense fiscal deficits and sluggish structural reforms. However, the adoption of the 
exchange rate nominal anchor did not seem appropriate for those transition countries that 
either a) lacked foreign exchange reserves needed to support the exchange rate, or b) 
were not sure about the 'equilibrium' exchange rate level from which to start out. 16 On 
the other hand, according to Sahay and Vegh (1995, p. 31) money-based programmes 
appeared to be difficult to implement because of: (a) the unpredictable velocity of money, 
(b) undeveloped indirect monetary policy instruments, (c) the rapid pace of dollarisation, 
and (d) interventions in foreign exchange markets.
16 Begg (1996) argues that besides the inadequate exchange rate reserves the lack of adequately applied 
tight fiscal policy appears as another reason for non-adoption of exchange rate as nominal anchor. Begg 
(1996, p. 14) also finds that the issue of the 'equilibrium' exchange rate is less problematic because 
nominal targets in stabilising transition economies easily adjusted ex post. Moreover, in relation to 
international reserves, Begg (1996, p. 22) points out that a difference must be made between lack of 
international reserves which results from initial inadequate stock that can be resolved quickly by assistance 
of international agencies such as the IMF, and inadequate international reserves caused by inherited market 
conditions and loose fiscal policy.
Finally, by investigating the effects of stabilisation programmes both in transition 
and in market economies, Sahay and Vegh (1995) concluded the following. Firstly, 
monetary and/or exchange rate accommodation is more important in sustaining long 
inflationary processes, even though fiscal deficits creates the inroads for inflation in the 
first place. 17 Secondly, wage policies play more a important role in transition countries 
than in developed market economies due to the fact that in the absence of another 
nominal anchor all other variables tend to adjust to the set levels of nominal wages, 
aggravating inflation pressures. Thirdly, exchange-rate based programmes prove to be 
more successful in reducing inflation in both transition and in market economies, 
compared to the money based programmes. Fourthly, if sound macroeconomic policies 
are pursued, market-based institutions do not represent a condition sine qua non in 
reducing inflation that emerges after a large-scale macroeconomic liberalisation.
As we have seen so far, the modelling of the stabilisation programmes in 
transitional economies goes in parallel with several important considerations. The 
political and social consensus about the direction of reforms appears to underline them all 
as it reinforces the credibility of the stabilisation programmes as such. Also, it is clear 
that a successful stabilisation, although necessary, cannot hold on its on merits. On the 
contrary, each stabilisation programme needs to be coupled with sustainable price and 
trade liberalisation, labour market de-indexation, fiscal sustainability, structural reforms 
and institution building.
On a more technical level, however, stabilisation also requires decisions about the 
selection of nominal anchors, exchange rate regime, monetary policy instruments and 
monetary strategy in general. We examine those issues more closely in the following 
section through a presentation of selected papers, thus, building a necessary theoretical 
basis for our further discussion contained in Chapter IV.
17 Numerous authors spell out the importance of fiscal policy as if fiscal policy is too relaxed, no monetary 
programme can hold for long. See, for example, Begg (1996) and Bruno (1993).
2.3.2. Transition monetary strategy and instruments
Bofmger (1990) was one of the first authors to place the problem of the tasks and 
strategies of monetary and exchange rate policies of transition countries within the 
context of their possible future EU membership. He did this while bearing in mind the 
specific conditions of economies in transformation such as the lack of credibility of 
stabilisation policies and instabilities of the real and financial sectors during the years of 
transition.
The starting point for his analysis is the impact of real sector reforms on the 
design of appropriate monetary strategy. For example, Bofmger (1990, p. 3) underlines 
that price liberalisation, including the removal of subsidies and monetary overhang, \sper 
se of a temporary nature, but that the conditions of economic restructuring "tend to be 
translated in a permanent increase of the inflation rate and an ensuing wage-price spiral".
The situation in a transition is additionally complicated by the occurrence of very 
high welfare costs of inflation such as the hoarding of goods, shortages, the reduction of 
real money balances, etc. Moreover, the most important of monetary policy problems in a 
transition is the low credibility of the central banks 18 , together with the limitations of 
domestic monetary policy targets. Those limitations, which derive from a high economic 
instability, undermine the central bank's ability to properly assess (in the case of 
monetary targeting with flexible exchange rates) three important determinants: the trend 
growth rate of potential output, the velocity of money, and the target inflation rate which 
can be tolerated. With regards to monetary policy targets, the author suggests that - 
having in mind the underdeveloped domestic financial markets of transition economies 
and the fact that those countries (except from Poland and the Soviet Union) do not 
represent an optimum currency area (see Section 2.4, p. 44) - credible nominal exchange 
rate pegs should have a primacy over the flexible rates as an anchor.
18 In relation to this Bofmger (1990, p. 5) writes: "An important reason for the low reputation of central 
banks in all East European countries is their insufficient control over the asset side of their balance sheet. 
This can be changed only if large parts of the enterprise sector are privatized - which is identical with a 
substitution of 'soft budget constraints' by stringent bankruptcy laws - and if the high degree of 
monopolization is reduced by more liberal foreign trade regulations. [...] Even after substantial privatization 
and trade liberalization it will be difficult for a East European central bank to establish by itself the 
reputation of being stability-minded. It cannot be excluded that a central bank has to produce some periods 
of surprise deflation in order to convince private agents of its anti-inflationary stance."
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In relation to the central bank credibility problem, Bofinger (1990) offers three 
solutions: (i) adoption of a unilateral peg to the ECU (i.e. the euro), 19 (ii) participation in 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in the form of bilateral peg, and (iii) membership 
in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). From an institutional point of view, 
the first solution is the least complicated, while the third makes the most complex.
A unilateral peg to the euro would require strong symmetry in the structures of the 
real sides of the economies owing to the two currencies (the domestic one and the euro) 
and high level of foreign exchange reserve to support the peg. Since these symmetries do 
not exist in the first years of transition - and since the required ratio of reserves to 
imports, which needs to be in the range between 36 and 69 per cent (see Bofinger, 1990, 
p. 10) - is not at a satisfactory level in many transition economies, it is likely that 
asymmetric shocks and speculative attacks will eventually appear, thus undermining the 
credibility of the whole stabilisation programme. Moreover, under such an arrangement, 
the European Central Bank (ECB) is not obliged to offer any credit facilities to countries 
which chose to peg unilaterally to the euro in the case of currency crises.
ERM participation differs from a unilateral peg to the euro as it assumes the credit 
facilities provided by the ECB at the time of speculative attacks, but at the same time 
requires a common decision making in relation to realignments. However, even though 
these two features increase the credibility of domestic monetary policy, the whole 
arrangement is seen as dangerous in terms of price stability for the 'old' ERM members.
Finally, according to Bofinger (1990, p. 16), "the EMU solution is superior to all 
other approaches as it solves the strategy and the credibility problem of monetary policy 
in Eastern Europe without provoking inflationary risks for the other European countries". 
This arrangement, however, has certain disadvantages to the participating countries over 
the other two strategies: prohibition of central bank lending to the government and loss of 
exchange rate as an instrument of adjustment. Nevertheless, the author believes that ERM 
participation should be excluded as an option, while full EMU membership is the most 
beneficial for both the transition countries and the existing EMU members.
19 ECU is an acronym for European Currency Unit, which existed from 1979 until it was replaced by the 
euuro in 1999. It was integral part of the European Monetary System (EMS), alongside with the ERM. 
ECU represented a currency basket made up of currencies of EMS member countries, which never existed 
in the form of coins and notes, but was used as a unit of account.
Rostowski (1993) analyses the problem of establishing a stable monetary system 
in transition through the lenses of a solid banking system and an appropriate monetary 
rule, under the assumption that the stable monetary system is conditioned by the 
existence of these two elements. Starting from the following preposition of banking 
reform sequencing: (i) dissolution of a monobank system into a number of state-owned 
banks, (ii) market opening for private domestic and foreign banks, and (iii) state-owned 
banks privatisation, the author also examines the implications of such sequencing on 
banking prudential regulation.
The main attributes of bank sequencing reform in transition economies are 
initially high ratios of bank deposits to central bank reserve requirements followed by a 
gradual reduction to a lower percentage. If decreased rapidly to a Western level of 10-15 
per cent from an initial 100 per cent, however, a percentage of deposits' reserve backing 
might induce monetary and macroeconomic instability, as explicated by Rostowski 
(1993). The underlying explanation is that during the initial phase of a transition, there 
exists a lack of banking skills in assessing clients' creditworthiness and project risk, 
which increases the feasibility of bank failure. This, in turn, reduces the readiness of 
citizens and businesses to rely on bank services, thereby reducing money supply and
*\f\ _
money multiplier. Therefore, the author suggests that in the initial phases of the banking 
reform in a transition, bank regulation ought to become tight and simplified. This 
regulation should include obligatory reserve above 25 per cent in order to ensure that 
money multiplier and money supply do not become extremely volatile. Additionally, the 
regulation should include a high capital adequacy ratio (capital to asset ratio) of 25-30 per 
cent "so that losses resulting from bad loans are born by the owners of the bank's capital 
and not by depositors or taxpayers (as happens if the bank is bailed out by the state)" as 
claimed by Rostowski (1993, p. 8).
Moreover, banks should be privatised, allowing private owners to strengthen 
control over bank management and efficiency. Another way of ensuring banks' prudent 
behaviour is to allow foreign banks to enter domestic markets, but then the question 
arises whether to permit those banks to operate under a relaxed regulatory regime.
20 Money multiplier, tn, is defined as follows: m=(\+d)/(d+r), where d is the ratio of the cash holdings of 
e non-bank public and bank deposits, while r is the ratio of banks' holdings of reserves and bank depositsthe
(Lewis and Mizen, 2000, p. 325).
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Rostowski (1993) further analyses the case for the establishment of an appropriate 
monetary rule. The author builds the argument for monetary rule on the grounds that: 1) 
central banks in transition are not knowledgeable about the conduct of monetary policy in 
an open economy model, 2) the fact that monetary policy conduct in transition becomes 
an inseparable part of an overall macroeconomic stability concept, and 3) the fact that 
formerly centrally planned economies have entered the transition with very high inflation.
The situation of high inflation, according to Rostowski (1993, p. 18), requires 
"fixing the exchange rate of the domestic currency, at least for a short period of time", 
thereby increasing the demand for domestic money. The process of accommodation of 
money supply to changes in money demand puts the authorities before the dilemma of a 
right speed of this adjustment. In principle, the volume and speed of money supply 
increase should ensure the credibility of a fixed exchange rate system and should not 
allow an uncontrolled rise in real interest rates. One way of securing this is to introduce 
monetary rule, which strictly bases money supply on international reserves. 21 The main 
question then, however, is how to accumulate international reserves in a way to back the 
currency fully.
f\f\
Another solution to the high inflation problem can be a currency board , but the 
author himself argues that 'broad money rule', which we described above is probably 
more suitable for transition countries than the classical currency board system. This is 
especially so because the currency board arrangement does not assume the lender-of-last- 
resort function, as that did a monobank in the centrally planned economies and, thus, may 
represent a too sudden and big change for a fragile transition banking system.
As a result of all these consideration, Rostowski (1993) suggests that during a 
transition, the monetary system should firstly be based on a 'broad money rule'. 
Subsequently, it should switch to a 'high-powered money rule', which postulates that 
central bank reserve money to banks is determined by international reserves and the 
balance of payment position of a country. And, finally, only once banking skills are 
improved should a currency board system be introduced.
21 Alternatively, Rostowski (1993, p. 20) proposes different monetary rules, such as 'fractional monetary 
rule' or a 'marginal monetary rule' as more relaxed in terms of reserve backing, but with the 
correspondingly lower insurance over the credibility of the system.
22 See Chapter IV.
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Hilbers (1993) examines a particular situation of ex-socialist countries and their 
usage of monetary policy instruments during the transition times, arguing that the choice 
of monetary instruments depends on the actual characteristics of financial system of an 
economy. Consequently, Hilbers (1993) distinguishes four stages of development of 
financial systems, which are characteristic of former centrally planned economies.
The first stage assumes that the traditional monobank system is formally replaced 
by a two-tier banking system, but with remaining centralised monetary practices. The 
second phase is characterised by a price liberalisation, segmented state-owned banking 
system, increased nominal interest rates, negative average real interest rates, excess 
reserves, weak interbank markets and underdeveloped markets for government securities 
and other financial assets. The third stage can be recognised by increased financial 
liberalisation, bank privatisation and competition, market-determined interest rates, 
increased liquidity of the system and hard budget constraints. The fourth stage 
corresponds to the financial system developments prevailing in a market economy.
Further into this essay, the author offers four general definitions of monetary 
policy instruments.23 Since these are important for our further analysis, we reproduce the 
most significant below:
"[...] Direct instruments act directly on credits granted by banks, while indirect instruments work 
indirectly by influencing the banks' liquidity and thereby their potential to provide credit [...] 
Direct instruments set or limit either prices (interest rates) or quantities (credit), while indirect 
instruments operate by influencing demand and supply conditions". Hilbers (1993, p. 2)
The author states that there exists a general misconception of direct instruments as 
rigid and administratively regulated and indirect instruments as fully market-oriented, 
underlining that this view is false and radical. In order to reveal this taboo, he thoroughly 
describes the different types of direct and indirect instruments. Brief summation brings a 
reader to the conclusion that the most common direct instruments of monetary policy 
include interest rates caps and credit ceilings. On the other hand, among the most 
important indirect instruments are reserve requirement, open market operations and 
central bank borrowing.
23 It should be noted that Lindgren (1991) was the first to propose a general classification of monetary 
policy instruments and their separation on direct and indirect instruments. For further details see Chapter 
IV of this work.
The author also elaborates on different conditions which need to be met in order 
for some instruments to be effectively applied, based on the level of development of the 
financial system in question. Hilbers (1993, p. 13) finds that the characteristics of 
financial systems during the initial stages of the transition toward a market economy 
"support the use of relatively directly controlled quantitative targets". He also concludes 
that the choice of instruments in such a set up was rather limited and it was not directed at 
establishing macroeconomic stabilisation, but rather at controlling micro-level financing. 
Consequently, the author's view is that a policy turn in usage of indirect instruments 
should happen gradually, in tandem with the reform of the financial sector of transition 
countries and the formation of reliable institutions of a new market-oriented financial 
sector. In the meantime, however, transition countries should continue relaying on direct 
monetary instruments.
Buch (1995) places the issue of transition monetary strategy and instruments into 
the broader context of banking system transformation offered by Hilbers (1993), starting 
from a view that these two problems are interrelated and mutually dependent.
The first question the author raises is the choice of intermediate targets between 
the four main types of intermediate targets: (i) volume of money supply, (ii) prices at 
which gold or foreign currency are convertible into domestic currency, (iii) interest rate 
variables such as the nominal market rate or the real interest rate, and (iv) other variables 
like GDP. However, since all these intermediate targets are difficult to measure during 
the transition, Buch (1995, p. 5) proposes that the choice of an intermediate target be 
based on the magnitude of financial and real shocks to which a country is exposed. 
Having in mind, though, that these shocks occur simultaneously during the 
transformation process in a magnitude which is hard to predict, the author suggests that 
the instability of money demand and the controllability of money supply are looked at in 
more details before a particular intermediate monetary target is actually implemented.
The instability of money demand seems to derive from the instability of the 
income velocity of money in a directly proportionate manner. Noting that "velocity is a 
function of income, nominal interest rates (i) - which determine the opportunity costs of 
holding money -, and the expected price level (Pe)", Buch (1995, p. 6) concludes that 
those variables which influence higher velocity also induce higher opportunity costs of
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holding money, thus lowering money demand, and, vice versa. Consequently, based on a 
specific structure of money demand24, different levels of money supply lead to various 
degrees of price increases implying that the optimality of specific monetary aggregates as 
intermediate targets cannot be assessed in advance (Buch, 1995, p. 6). This is even more 
so because there are two transition-specific factors, which additionally affect the 
measurement of velocity: (a) non-inclusion of private sector output in GDP statistics, and 
(b) overestimation of real velocity.
Regarding the controllability of money supply, Buch (1995) recognises two main 
problems relating to a specific monetary aggregate chosen by the central bank. The first 
problem steams from the fact that some of the factors affecting monetary aggregate are 
not easily observed by a central bank such as the actual money stock and money 
multiplier. Additionally, even the level of base money - due to unexpected changes in 
cash demand - is not always fully under the central bank control. 25 This control problem 
is particularly important during the years of transformation when the level of excess 
reserve holdings of banks change as result of the reform of payment system and due to 
liquidity problems. The second problem relates to a time lag that occurs in the process of 
central bank observance of the money stock including the liabilities of the banking 
system. Since these liabilities are not registered in accordance to international accounting 
standards during the first years of a transition, the central bank does not have data on 
which it can fully rely when exercising money supply adjustments.
Additionally, there exists one more control problem that is characteristic for 
transitional economies. Namely, the central banks in transition are usually obliged by 
political and institutional constraints to directly or indirectly define the money supply 
(Buch, 1995. p. 10). Directly, the central banks do this through supplying direct credits to 
loss-making enterprises, whereas they do this indirectly by ensuring refinancing facilities
24 Buch (1995) notes that the structure of money demand appears to be particularly complex in transition 
countries due to the abolition of administrative restrictions and transitional changes in the elasticity of 
money demand to income or interest rates. The author derives the point from Khan and Sundararajan
(1991).
25 The whole paragraph is based on the concept of money supply given by Buch (1995, p. 8) in the 
following equation: M = mm x H = [(cc + 1) / (cc + n + er)] xH;H = C + RR + ER, where M is the level of 
total money supply, H is the level of base money, MM is the money multiplier, cc is the ratio of currency c 
to total deposits in the banking system, and 7t(er) is the ratio of required (excess) reserves (RR and ER) to 
total deposits.
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to insolvent banks that provide credits to loss-making enterprises. The money supply 
becomes endogenously determined in both ways and is the "larger the greater the share of 
insolvent banks which is dependent on central bank refinancing" (Buch, 1995, p. 11).
Finally, starting from the four stages of financial system development in 
transition countries,26 Buch (1995) distinguished five groups of factors influencing the 
conduct of monetary policy: (i) inefficiencies in the payment system, (ii) soft budget 
constraints of banks and enterprises, (iii) substitution of bank credits by supplier credits, 
(iv) structure of the interbank money market and of the banking system, and (v) 
institutional deficiencies of financial markets.
The author concludes by analysing the monetary policy instruments that have 
been used in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and their impact on the operations 
of banks. It appears, indeed, that each of the three countries experienced the above stated 
problems and, therefore, switched from monetary targeting to other intermediate targets. 
Thus, one can extend the conclusion offered by Sahay and Vegh (1995) that it is 
premature to introduce monetary targeting in the stabilisation phase of transition 
economies to the post-stabilisation period.27 Clearly, time is needed for the payment 
system, accounting practices and institutional framework of financial system to be 
reformed and supportive to a market-oriented monetary strategy and instruments.
Sevic and Sevic (1998) discuss about open questions of monetary policy in a 
transitional economy. As first, the authors note that with regards to monetary policy 
objective(s), the central bank in transition should opt for a singe policy objective and that 
it could establish other objectives once the advancement of the financial system of a 
country in transition takes place. In any case, the primary objective of a central bank in
V V
transition should be "the preservation of monetary stability" (Sevic and Sevic, 1998, p. 
299). However, the authors notice that in operational terms central banks can better 
target more practical objectives than price stability, these being money supply, exchange 
rate,28 interest rates, or other variables.
26 SeeHilbers(1991).
27 See Sahay and V6gh (1995).
28 Apart form exchange rate, Sevic and Sevic (1998, p. 300) also see prices at which gold is convertible into 
domestic currency as a possible monetary policy intermediate target. See also Buch (1995, p. 5).
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Interestingly, the authors believe that the choice among these intermediate targets 
is generally a political one. Nevertheless, due to economic turbulences that exist in 
transition countries, the authors suggest that magnitude of these economic and financial 
shocks and their durability be taken into account when deciding upon monetary 
objectives. Moreover, Sevic and Sevic (1998) support the findings that propose 
synchronous application of several monetary targets and instruments.
In relation to monetary instruments, the authors rely on the definition of monetary 
instruments provided by Hilbers (1993). Extending those definitions, Sevic and Sevic 
(1998) conclude that a central bank has two channels through which it can regulate the 
monetary situation in a country: (1) a regulatory power, as provided by institutional 
central bank framework, and (2) by using the fact that a central bank is a major player in 
the financial markets.29 Analysing various monetary instruments, the authors find that 
during a transition, central banks mainly opted for direct monetary instruments, as these 
are less sophisticated and more easily applied.
In summing up, Sevic and Sevic (1998) note that, sooner or later, the central bank 
in transition will need to make a move towards more complex monetary instruments as 
this action sends a signal of existence of well functioning financial markets in the 
country. In doing so, nevertheless, a central bank will be expected to regulate, supervise 
and arbitrate the entire financial system for which purpose it will have to develop further 
its 'moral suasion' function, i.e. its overall credibility.
We have seen already that the design of monetary strategy and usage of monetary 
instruments highly depend on the level of development of financial, payment and 
accounting systems during the years of transition. Nevertheless, the choices made have 
greatly influenced and determined the overall results of transition countries. Those results 
are presented in the following pages, giving an overture for comparison with some of the 
Serbian macroeconomic achievements presented in our Chapter III.
29 One can, however, argue that the second channel draws from the first one, which is the "regulatory 
power (authority given by the law)" as explained by Sevic and Sevic (1998, p. 300). Namely, the fact that 
the central bank is the major player in the financial markets derives from its functions regulated by the law. 
Such consideration should, nevertheless, only be regarded as partially true due to a more operational 
perspective in conduct of monetary policy of central banks that place them in the centre of a country's 
financial scene.
2.3.3. Transition results
Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1996) analyse the stabilisation and growth results of the 
first five years of the transition (1989-1994) and look at the main short-run determinants 
of inflation and growth. Their conclusions are rooted in results of transition stabilisation 
programmes based on their relative stabilisation time, not on their nominal chronological 
time. Their findings are, nevertheless, detained with methodological problems since the 
output data used are biased for conceptual and measurement reasons.
It is interesting that out of 26 transition countries30 only four countries (the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Tajikistan) exhibited two-digit annual inflation, while 
the rest of 22 countries recorded triple-digit annual inflation one year prior to 
stabilisation, with the maximum inflation rate occurring at the start of transition process 
due to price and trade liberalisation. Moreover, up to 17 countries registered periods of 
hyperinflation31 , but apart from Armenia and Georgia (and, we add, Serbia) none of the 
hyperinflation episodes lasted longer than four months. Significantly, hyperinflation 
appeared in countries that faced a serious armed conflict.
As for the cumulative output decline in the stated period, differences among 
transition countries are huge; the range being bounded by the lowest 15.6 percent of 
output decline in Uzbekistan to the highest 74.6 per cent in Georgia. Even though these 
data is highly questionable, it is evident that countries affected by wars and trade 
sanctions like, for example Croatia, recorded largest output declines.
By running two regressions, the authors conclude that macroeconomic 
stabilisation is a necessary precondition for growth, although the speed by which a 
country grow directly depends on the level of undertaken structural reforms. 
Additionally, it appears that tight fiscal policy and a pegged exchange rate in combination 
explain the approximately 70 per cent of variation in inflation. Finally, the statistically 
negative and significant relationship between inflation and growth rates of R2=0.63 
confirms that stabilisation leads to growth; the evidence shows that only Bulgaria and 
Romania experienced growth before inflation was reduced below 50 per cent per annum.
30 The authors analysed 26 Eastern European countries, but the sample does not include Serbia.
31 According to Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1996, p. 9), Cagan (1956) defined hyperinflation as "inflation 
exceeding 50 per cent in a period of one month or less".
Cottarelli and Doyle (1999) investigate the overall process of reduction in 
inflation (disinflation) in transition in the period 1993-1997, its causes and consequences. 
The starting notion is that stabilisation (once it begun) led to the rapid lowering of 
inflation rate. As a result, by 1997 more than 20 countries in transition managed to bring 
inflation below the 60 per cent threshold level established by the authors; 16 of them 
even brought inflation below 15 per cent on annual level. However, after the initial 
stabilisation, only Croatia and the FYR of Macedonia kept inflation below 10 per cent for 
several years. In other cases, further disinflation occurred relatively slowly.
The disinflation in transition countries is accompanied by output decline and large 
current account deficit. Whether these two variables represent the costs of high inflation, 
as suggested by Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1996), or they result from the structural 
changes taking place during transition, is a difficult question. Based on Christoffersen 
and Doyle (1998), the authors conclude that low inflation is conducive to growth, even 
though the inflation threshold for transition economies of 13 percent only gets lower as 
structural reforms progress. At the same time, "no clear evidence of a high output cost of 
disinflation has been found", as noted by Cottarelli and Doyle (1999, p. 7).
On the other hand, there is evidence supporting the view that disinflation in 
transition contributes to a widening of external accounts; in the period between 1990 and 
1997 the external current account deficits relative to GDP increased from close to zero to 
above 5 per cent in most of the transition countries. But, the linkage between the two 
cannot be taken for granted as in some cases the recorded high current account deficits 
reflected the recovery of growth and investments, rather than a loss of competitiveness.
Moderate inflation32 of a range of 15-60 per cent per annum, which persisted in 
many transition countries even after stabilisation took place, reflected the authorities' 
policy options and their deliberate decision to somehow trade-off higher inflation with 
higher output growth.33 Knowing, though, that inflation reversals occurred in many 
countries and that there is no evidence that costs of disinflation in transition economies 
are significant, the authors suggest further disinflation up to industrial country levels.
32 Moderate inflation (defined as annual inflation rate of 15-60 per cent range) is "likely to be driven more 
by expectations than by fundamentals", as noted by Cottarelli and Doyle (1999, p. 33).
33 Policy-makers in transition countries believed that: (i) they should remain credible by further relaying on 
their successful nominal anchors, (ii) they should not risk further drops in output, and (iii) they made 
sufficient progress on inflation already.
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Cottarelli and Doyle (1999) point out that a number of financial policies also 
played a role in curbing high and moderate inflation, alongside policy credibility. 
According to the authors, the context of disinflation in transition is generally set up by 
indexation34 behaviour, financial fragility, political economy, and relative price 
adjustments. Evidence show that indexation and financial instability can pose a problem 
to disinflation attempts, but that disinflation itself may in turn aggravate financial 
fragility. Similarly, the non-existence of a political consensus over disinflation efforts 
increases the costs of high inflation, becoming unsustainable. Moreover, the need for 
relative price adjustments during transition confronts the disinflation process, especially 
in the early phase.
With regards to fiscal policy, the authors confirm that fiscal imbalances pose a 
threat to disinflation. Large initial fiscal deficits coming from increased expenditures and 
falling revenues during early transition additionally fuel inflation. The fact that 
government deficits in that phase are financed via central bank money printing endangers 
disinflation attempts. Therefore, as noted by Cottarelli and Doyle (1999, pp. 12), "the 
development of a broader range of financing options for government [i.e. government 
securities, auth. remark] alongside fiscal consolidation were key elements underlying the 
subsequent disinflations". Because after 1993 the transition countries experienced limited 
inflation inertia from earlier high-inflation periods, credible formal pegs become less 
important. This explains, at least partly, why many transition countries abandoned formal 
pegs after the initial stabilisation, making a space for exchange rate floats. 35 Another part 
of the explanation lies in the authorities' concerns over the entry and exit procedures for 
formal pegs. 36 Nevertheless, the credibility of disinflation programmes was maintained 
through improved legal central bank independence and IMF support. In contrast, the 
effects of income policies applied in some countries on disinflation remain rather vague.
34 "Backward indexation implies a lagged response of nominal wages to prices. This raises the output cost 
of disinflation, thereby reducing its credibility" (Cottarelli and Doyle, 1999, p. 9).
35 "A striking feature of the 1993-97 inflation stabilizations is the limited use of formal exchange rate or 
monetary targets. [...] The absence of publicly announced monetary targets, other than rules directly 
implied by the exchange rate regime as in the case of currency boards, reflects structural change and 
uncertainty" (Cottarelli and Doyle, 1999, p. 20).
36 "On the entry side, many countries in the post-1993 period began their disinflations with low 
international reserves, and so may not have been able to operate pegs credibly at sensible exchange rates. 
The mirror image of this problem, on the exit side, was the risk for a country of entering the exchange rate 
peg at a substantially undervalued exchange rate" (Cottarelli and Doyle, 1999, p. 23).
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Wyplosz (2000) discuses some open macroeconomic questions related to certain 
'microeconomic transformation indicators' and the EBRD's correlation matrix. Although 
for the author it seems to be impossible to answer the question of whether microeconomic 
or macroeconomic factors are more crucial for a successful transition for methodological 
reasons, an interesting conclusion emerges:
"Microeconomic transformation indicators are positively correlated among themselves, 
especially those concerning enterprise restructuring, financial institution development and market 
reforms. These three indicators are also correlated with the macroeconomic performance 
indicators and the growth performance, especially the budget surplus, with a further strong link 
between inflation over the whole period and market reforms. [...] inflation stabilization is a pre- 
condition for growth" (Wyplosz, 2000, p. 25).
Furthermore, by making a homage to the ten-year research efforts in the domain 
of transition economics studies, Wyplosz (2000) sets his analysis of macroeconomic 
indicators into a vast milieu of the transition debate 'Big Bang versus gradualism'. 
Summarising accumulated general knowledge and various transitional countries' 
experiences as well as statistical evidence, the author arrives at the following five 
conclusions.
Firstly, it has paid to start early and move fast; a conclusion that favours a radical 
approach on the basis of countries' track record and the fact that the countries that had 
started earlier and harder have progressed better.
Secondly, stabilise first and grow next; a conclusion that stresses the importance 
of macroeconomic stabilisation as a pre-requisite for growth, as well as advocating in 
favour of severing the link between budget deficits and money growth.
Thirdly, embark on structural reforms; a conclusion that points out that transition 
countries that have conducted structural reforms did better than those countries that 
imposed strict macroeconomic discipline, although they failed to pursue at the same time 
the more profound systemic reforms.
Fourthly, the exchange rate regime is irrelevant; this implies that in the early 
years of transition some form of monetary targeting is needed, although it is less 
important what that target is as far as it is adhered to.
Fifthly, there exist certain irreversibilities; a conclusion that refers to the causality 
between the structural policies and macroeconomic stability of the economy.
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2.3.4. Concluding remarks
The presented literature review allows a reader to single out the most important 
monetary policy issues during the transition years. Two main lines of reasoning emerge. 
The first deals with the specifics of the initial stabilisation phase, whereas the second 
refers to a more practical issue of selection of the adequate monetary policy strategy and 
instruments over the medium- and long-term perspective. A common factor to both cases 
is the credibility of implemented programmes, as noted by Calvo and Frenkel (1991) and 
Edwards (1992).
Credibility, namely, appears to be fundamental in reducing (eliminating) 
strong inflationary dynamics, which existed prior to transition. The establishment of 
monetary or exchange rate rules makes a precondition for the suppressing of inflationary 
expectations. However, as noted by Sahay and Vegh (1995), the exchange rate-based 
anchoring programmes appeared to be more successful in bringing down inflation than 
the money-based programs. Besides, wage policies, which are more critical in transition 
countries then elsewhere, need to be controlled via wage anchors.
It is clear, though, that the adoption of nominal anchors and monetary overhang 
reductions during the stabilisation phase alone could not bring satisfactory results. The 
whole set of 'backup' measures such as the de-indexation of labour markets (see Calvo 
and Frenkel, 1991), fiscal sustainability (see Edwards, 1992), current account 
convertibility (see Williamson, 1991), gradual trade liberalisation (see Bruno, 1993), 
structural reforms and institution building (see Bruno, 1993) need to be implemented too. 
However, in achieving these objectives a set of conditions must be fulfilled. Hilbers 
(1993), for example, points at the financial system's development as one condition that 
influences the monetary policy and the usage of monetary instruments. Similarly, Buch 
(1995) distinguishes five groups of factors influencing the conduct of monetary policy.
The conclusion, nevertheless, is that the central bank must eventually make a 
move towards the usage of more market-oriented, indirect monetary policy instruments 
(see Sevic and Sevic, 1998) and that in doing so it has to strengthen the viability of the 
banking system through the imposition of tight and simplified banking regulation, as 
suggested by Rostowski (1993).
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All these measures led to certain quantified outcomes. Indeed, the evidence shows 
that - apart from those countries facing the serious prospect of armed conflict - 
transitional countries managed to reduce inflation during stabilisation to one- or two-digit 
points. This, however, happened at the cost of output decline (see Fischer, Sahay and 
Vegh, 1996) and large current account deficit (see Cottarelli and Doyle, 1999). Further 
disinflation (below 13 per cent) proved to be difficult even though there is no clear-cut 
evidence about the associated high disinflation costs in terms of output and growth, 
which depended largely on the progress of structural reforms.
As disinflation during stabilisation brought about limited inflation inertia, the 
credibility of formal exchange rate pegs became less important and so a number of 
transition countries opted for a more flexible exchange rate regime once the stabilisation 
phase was over. The selection of exchange rate regime and the overall monetary strategy, 
nevertheless, called for a systematic approach to those problems, having in mind the 
European perspective of the SEE transition countries. Thus, a unilateral euroisation (see 
Bofinger, 1990) or currency boards appeared as relevant options. The following Section 
2.5. deals with those issues more closely, building a theoretical foundations for our 
analysis in Chapter IV.
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Transition, as a process or a period of changing from one state or condition to 
another, did not taking place during the 1990s only in Eastern Europe. The countries of 
Western Europe also went through a certain transition process. This other transition 
process, however, related to the formation of an economic and monetary union between 
the EU member states. 37 This 'Western transition' was initiated in order to set the stage
for the introduction of a single European currency, the euro. The commencement of the 
euro meant that countries which joined the EMU abolished one important instrument of 
their economic policies, namely, their national currencies.
On a general level, the act provoked economists to ask why would a country 
relinquished its national currency and what were the associated costs and benefits of such 
a decision. As noted by De Grauwe (1997, p. 5), the discussion over these issues is 
framed by the theory of optimum currency areas (OCAs), especially on its prevailing and 
more comprehensive alternative approach. 39
37 The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) formed in Europe has its roots in the European Monetary 
System (EMS) that came into force on 13 March 1979 with an aim of creating a zone of monetary stability 
in Europe. The EMS initially had three components: the ecu, the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) and 
credit mechanism, which we explain in more details in Chapter IV of this work.
38 Transition towards the euro included three successive stages. The first stage assumed the formulation of 
convergence criteria, i.e. Maastricht criteria, and ended on 31 December 1993. The second stage of EMU 
lasted from 1 January 1994 until 1 January 1999 and included: the establishment of European Monetary 
Institute (EMI), which was replaced by the European Central Bank (ECB) in 1998; efforts to achieve 
economic convergence among the EU member states participating in EMU including full liberalisation of 
capital accounts and abolition of privileged government financing, and defining the technical procedures 
for selection of EMU member countries including the setting of irreversible bilateral exchange rates among 
future EMU participants. The third stage started on 1 January 1999 with the euro becoming a currency on 
its own right, fulfilling its unit of account function. The euro coins and notes came into circulation on 1 
January 2002 and by 1 July 2002 all the national currencies of EMU participating countries were 
completely withdrawn and their legal status was abolished. The countries, which formed the so-called euro 
zone were all the EU-15 member states apart from the United Kingdom and Denmark, which unilaterally 
opted out from the EMU, and Greece, which did not satisfy the required Maastricht convergence criteria.
39 The term 'optimum currency area' relates to a currency area of optimum size from the point of view of 
its members and, thus, may extend beyond the national boundaries. The central question posed by the 
theory of OCAs is on what basis should units chose one another as partners in a currency area. According 
to Ishiyama (1975), the pioneering works on OCAs - the traditional approach - try to single out a crucial 
economic characteristic, which supposedly indicates whether an OCA should be formed: Mundell (1961) 
believes that a high degree of factor mobility and ability of adjustments to asymmetric shocks is the most 
important criteria, McKinnon (1963) proposes that a high degree of openness be used as a criterion, Kenen 
(1969) argues that a low degree of product diversification and low susceptibility to asymmetric shocks is 
what matters, etc. On the other hand, the cost-benefit approach - the alternative approach - explicitly 
measures the costs and benefits of a common currency and advocates for an OCA to be formed in those 
situation where marginal benefits exceed marginal costs once the last member joins.
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More specific questions, however, relate to issues of institutional implications 
deriving from the reality of EMU on actual and possible EU accession countries, that is, 
the European transition countries. This institutional implications fall under two 
categories. The first aspect relates to specific macroeconomic alignments as stipulated in 
Maastricht criteria, while the second set of institutional implications steam from the legal 
requirements of EMU, i.e. from the acquis communautaire.
2.4.1. Institutional implications of EMU membership
Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman (1999) produced probably the most cited work on 
institutional implications of EMU membership for the accession countries. Opening their 
discussion with a description of contractual and economic relations between the EU and 
CEE countries and selected Mediterranean countries, the authors further offer an 
institutional primer on E(M)U accession. Starting from the fact that the EU membership 
presumes legal approximation of the acquis in the area of EMU, the authors conclude that 
legal adjustment is an immediate challenge for all acceding countries.40
The EMU membership presupposes the adoption of the Single market acquis by 
the candidate countries, which in particular requires full liberalisation of capital flows 
vis-a-vis EU countries and third countries including foreign direct investments (FDIs) 
inflows and outflows, real estate-related transactions portfolio and credit flows. The 
experience of CEE and selected Mediterranean countries shows that, apart form FDI 
inflows, other categories of capital flows are likely to remain severely restricted up until 
actual EU membership due to the shaky macroeconomic situations typical for all 
transition countries.41
r
According to Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman (1999, p. 754), "unless the EU grants transitory periods, 
compliance with these obligations must be ensured by candidate countries by the time of accession". 
However, since the opt-out status had been disregarder for the new EU Member States during the accession 
negotiations, no transitional periods or special arrangements actually had been permitted, nor had they been 
requested by any of the countries in question (see European Commission, 2003). 
41 However, one should have in mind that, in general, all accession agreements, which the EU has signed 
with the transition countries contain provisions ensuring further gradual liberalisation of capital flows 
among the signatories.
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Additionally, the EMU acquis derives from the relevant provisions of the Treaty 
and the Statutes of the ESCB (Article 109 and Article 14 of Protocol 18):
"This implies, in particular: i) that their central bank governors should be elected for terms 
of no less then five years and should only be dismissed under circumstances of serious misconduct 
or inability to perform their duties (Art. 14 of Protocol 18); (ii) that their central banks should not 
take any instructions from the government (Art. 108 and Art. 7 of Protocol 18); and iii) that they 
should have as primary objective the maintenance of price stability (Art. 105 and Art. 2 of 
Protocol 18). In addition, iv) national legislation should prohibit any form of direct credit from the 
central bank to the government." (Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman, 1999, p. 757)
With regards to government financing of the central bank and other ways of 
advantaged financing of the government, the acquis is quite rigorous. As noted above, 
any direct central bank financing of government is strictly prohibited and excludes any 
form of overdraft facilities, advances, and direct purchases of government securities by 
the central bank, including purchases from public institutions and purchases in the 
primary market.42 Also prohibited is any privileged access by public authorities to 
financial institutions such as through the placement among banks of public debt at below- 
market rates. Only central bank purchases of government securities from a third party in 
the case of open market operations or in the case of refinancing of banks against 
government paper as collateral is an acceptable form of indirect credit to government.
Moreover, the EU membership has implication on its newcomers in that requires 
their participation in economic policy coordination and surveillance, ESCB membership, 
broad economic guidelines reporting, excessive deficit financial assistance procedures, 
application of the EU-wide payments system (TARGET), et similar. The prospect of EU 
membership alone also pressures acceding countries to strengthen their financial markets 
and support the market-oriented development of their financial sectors. However, 
according to the European Commission (2003, p. 39), the acquis relating to the above 
stated elements only have to be complied with from the date of accession. This contrasts 
the elements relating to prohibition of direct financing of the public sector, privileged 
access of the public sector to financial institutions, and central bank independence, which 
all must be implemented prior to the date of the EU accession.
42 Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman (1999, p. 761) note that existing legislation allows for overdrafts or 
short-term advances if these have a form of intraday credits needed for securing smooth operation of the 
payment system (as prescribed by the Council Regulation EC/3603/93 of 13 December 1993).
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Finally, the authors elaborate on the role of the Maastricht criteria. They qualify 
the Maastricht convergence criteria as useful guidelines in formulating macroeconomic 
policies of acceding countries prior to accession, but do not consider them as a 
precondition for a full EU membership. Namely, the full compliance with the Maastricht 
criteria does not assume an automatic participation in the euro zone (zone formed by the 
EU member countries embracing the euro), nor it assumes the EU membership in those 
cases in which a country fulfils the Maastricht criteria before joining the EU. On a 
contrary, Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman (1999, p. 751) explain that, even though a 
country meets all the EU accession criteria, it is difficult to imagine that a candidate 
country will join the EU and the euro zone simultaneously. Nevertheless, the Maastricht 
criteria remain a valid set of macroeconomic parameters imposed upon all those countries 
wishing to join the euro zone.43
The adoption of the euro also presupposes that a country (voluntarily) participated 
in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) for at least two years before joining the 
euro zone.44 The ERM II requires the oscillations of participating currency to take place 
within the bands of ±15 per cent defined with reference to the euro acting as the anchor 
currency. The mechanism, however, includes marginal interventions of the ECB through 
the existence of a very short-term financing facility (VSTFF) in case of large fluctuations.
All this will require that some countries with pre-announced crawling pegs or 
floating rates largely modify their exchange rate regimes prior to join the ERM II. On the 
other hand, certain accession countries with more or less fixed pegs and currency boards 
could continue with similar arrangements within the ERM II. In preparing for all these 
tasks, thus, the candidate should consider various policy options in relation to a speed of 
alignment to the Maastricht criteria, level of flexibility of their exchange rates and pace 
and sequencing of liberalisation of their capital accounts.
43 The authors' analysis of 1997-98 results recorded by the CEE and Mediterranean candidate countries 
shows that most countries are close to satisfying two fiscal criteria (public debt and government deficit), 
majority of them face problems with inflation and interest rate criteria, while almost all countries exhibit 
divergence in real terms and growth due to the lack of comprehensive structural reforms.
44 The experience of Italy and Finland, which join the euro zone even without two consecutive years of 
formal participation in ERM II confirms that the rule is not interpreted very strictly and that, theoretically, a 
country may join the euro zone on the grounds of its currency being stable against the euro within the 
standard bands for at least two years without having formally been inside ERM II. This, however, does not 
apply in the case of new EU Member States.
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To calm the overheated debate and speculations surrounding options alternate to 
the fulfilment of the convergence criteria laid down in the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, the ECB (2003) issued the official policy position of the ECB 
Governing Council on exchange rate issues relating to the acceding countries. In 
principle, the ECB's position underlined the following two points: (1) each new Member 
State will join ERM II at some point in time subsequent to the accession, and (2) when a 
Member State is found to fulfil the Maastricht criteria it will also adopt the euro. In this, 
according to ECB (2003) neither unilateral euroisation nor currency boards can be seen 
as a way to circumventing those stages.
2.4.2. Exchange rate alignments and capital account liberalisation
The issue of choosing an appropriate exchange rate regime and the accompanying 
question of the right tempo of capital account liberalisation of transition countries on 
their way to the third stage of EMU has occupied much academic attention. For example, 
Mundell (1999, p. 425), quite radically, proposes that all transition countries secure their 
fiscal balances first and that they adopt "currency-board-like arrangements", i.e. 
exchange rates fixed to the euro. The author builds his argument on the grounds that the 
nature of the EMU mechanism, which transition countries will be joining eventually, is 
rather similar to that of a currency board and that such exchange rate design can help 
those countries achieve an early convergence to the monetary union.
Similarly, Hochreiter (2000, p. 168) concludes that for "a small(er) country 
currency board may offer least cost adjustment to price stability" under the assumption of 
ensured government credibility. However, in the context of capital account liberalisation, 
internal policy consistency*5 matters more than the choice of exchange rate regime since 
several exchange rate regimes are seen as compatible with the full capital account 
liberalisation. This is so especially because of envisaged EU membership that enhances 
policy credibility and makes transitional exchange rate regimes less prone to attacks.
45 Internal policy consistency assumes "the internal consistency between exchange-rate and macroeconomic 
policies" as a key to the sustainability of an exchange rate regime (Hochreiter, 2000, p. 160).
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Kohler and Wes (1999)46 look at the institutional implications of the euro on the 
integration process of transition economies in Europe, including the impact of a single 
currency on trade and financial flows between the euro zone and accession countries.
With respect to the euro's implications on trade relations, the authors argue that 
there are anticipated positive growth effects within the EU arising from both 
microeconomic and macroeconomic efficiency gains. As a consequence, demand for 
imports from transition countries is expected to rise, too. A reduction in transaction costs 
along with eased market access due to euro-dominated invoicing may further increase 
trade between the EU and transition countries. Furthermore, the authors see the euro as a 
factor that will intensify the competitive pressures within the transition countries that will 
in combination with prospective market integration with the EU and expected increased 
growth, attract more investments and underpin structural reforms.
Kohler and Wes (1999) believe that in the medium and long run the euro will 
expand in financial markets. The consequent outcome will be the prevalence of lower real 
interest rates. This, in turn, may be advantageous for transitional countries since they will 
be in a position to finance their economic restructuring at lower prices. However, in the 
short run the effect may be an increase in speculative transactions of some of the 
currencies of transition countries. The authors also suppose that the variability of the 
euro's exchange rate vis-a-vis the dollar will affect the transition countries, for a great 
part of their external debt is dollar-denominated. Nevertheless, one can expect that at 
least the composition of the official reserves of transition countries will change over time 
in favour of the euro, due to an increase in trade relations with the EU member states.
Regarding the institutional implications of EMU membership, Kohler and Wes 
(1999, p. 14) advise that acceding countries should not "establish a hard peg with the 
euro too quickly" until their market-based systems are strengthened.47 For similar reasons 
the authors suggest the sequencing of capital account liberalisation, concluding that the 
real convergence (in terms of per capita income) of transition countries will probably take 
longer then nominal alignment with Maastricht criteria.
46 It is interesting to note that an identical article to that of Kohler and Wes (1999) appeared in Serbian 
language signed by Radovan Kovacevic (see Kova£evic, 1999).
47 On the other hand, Mundell (1999) believes that all transition countries should adopt a currency board - 
as the most rigid form of fixed exchange rate - before joining the EMU.
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Masson (1999) considers three main transition strategies for countries with strong 
aspirations towards E(M)U membership in relation to their exchange rate policy choices: 
(1) a currency board arrangement (CBA), (2) a band around an adjustable central parity 
(i.e. ERM II), or (3) a more flexible exchange rate regime, supported by some other form 
of monetary strategy. In choosing among these three options there are several points to be 
considered: the susceptibility to asymmetric shocks, the likelihood of a continuing real 
appreciation, and vulnerability to speculative attacks.
Even though Masson (1999) himself subscribes to the belief that the production 
structures between the EU and several reformers (Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovakia) are similar and thus not inevitably prone to real shocks, the 
probability of those shocks appearing under the CBA cannot be ruled out. Therefore, the 
CBA might not necessarily be the best transition strategy towards the EMU. On the other 
hand, due to the generally transparent nature of CBAs, they are usually not exposed to 
speculative attack and therefore are more attractive in comparison to adjustable pegs.
Adjustable pegs, on their side, are not easy defendable in the context of sudden 
capital flows, but are, at the same time, responsive to a trend real appreciation common to 
all transition economies. Despite the fact that real appreciation of the exchange rate "is 
not a bad thing itself (Masson, 1999, p. 15) if justified by a rapid productivity growth48 , 
it poses a threat to a CBA aiming at exchange rate stability. The inconsistency between 
exchange rate stability and low inflation may, in turn, pose serious problems to 
authorities wishing to fulfil all the Maastricht criteria simultaneously.
Thus, a third strategy of a more flexible exchange rate such as a crawling band or 
managed float in combination with inflation targeting may serve the purpose. Inflation 
targeting, however, requires several preconditions: central bank independence, political 
consent over low inflation, and a predictable relationship between monetary instruments 
and future inflation; none of which have yet been fully met by transitions economies.
48 "Productivity performance in the tradables sector is a well-known determinant of the long-run 
equilibrium exchange rate in a relatively low-income country. Gains in labor productivity in the tradables 
sector give rise to an increase in wages, including the nontradables, as well as an increase in the price level 
at home compared to the level abroad, reflected in an appreciation of the real (relative price-based) 
exchange rate. The real appreciation is manifested in an upward pressure on the nominal exchange rate or 
on the price level or both. This productivity effect or bias-known as the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect- 
has been observed during the rapid convergence of low-income economies to advanced economies." 
(Kopits, 1999, p. 13)
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Kopits (1999) builds the case for participation in EMU on the theory of optimum 
currency areas, assuming that the EMU is itself an OCA. The author finds that, over a 
medium-term perspective, the forerunner acceding countries (now EU members) - that is, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia - are likely to benefit from 
EMU participation. The conclusion is rooted in an argument of an endogenous and self- 
fulfilling nature of trade, productivity factors, income and output movements between the 
members of an OCA, and consequently between the members of EMU.
As a step toward the preparation for E(M)U membership (or independently of it) 
the five a for-mentioned countries have, according to Kopits (1999, p. 13), established 
exchange rate regimes that would support the credibility of their macroeconomic policies. 
At the same time, all countries subordinated their exchange rate policies to the objectives 
of price stability and increased external competitiveness. In doing this, these countries 
have paid particular attention to their productivity performance, wage formation, 
monetary and fiscal stance, soundness of financial institutions, and exogenous shocks as 
the main determinants of nominal exchange rate movements. The author considers the 
relative influence of these determinants on exchange rate movements as a solid indication 
of the countries' readiness for their future ERM II participation.
The analysis undertaken by the author shows that new ERM II participating 
countries can become especially vulnerable to economic shocks if they do not increase 
wage flexibility, fiscal and monetary discipline, and financial sector soundness alongside 
with operational skills in managing a stable exchange rate regime prior to the ERM II 
membership. Once these conditions are met, a country should then "approach fixed parity 
exclusively with the euro [...] and widen substantially the official margins" (Kopits, 1999, 
p. 34). Final preparation for ERM II should consist of shadowing the euro unilaterally.49
This whole convergence exercise, as suggested by the author, should stretch over 
a five-year horizon. Along this path it is likely that two policy dilemmas concerning the 
scope of revaluations and implementation of capital controls will appear, but accession 
countries and the EU members should decide upon them jointly.50
49 "[D]e facto staying within the exchange rate corridor-as closely as possible, but without adhering to it at 
all costs, especially since this will not be requirement even with formal participation" (Kopits, 1999, p. 35).
50 These dilemmas result from accession countries' experience with the possible upward exchange rate 
pressures due to long-term productivity growth and capital inflows following successful stabilisation.
68
Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser (2000) start from the point that independently 
floating exchange rates are not suitable for transition economies gravitating towards the 
EU. Thus, the authors elaborate on the aspect of monetary policy disinflation via 
exchange rate targeting aiming at amortising destabilising capital inflows. The main 
characteristic of such an approach is "the policy-maker's ability to exert monetary 
pressure by two different but interrelated channels: the interest rate channel and the 
exchange rate channel" (Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser, 2000, p. ii).
The authors put their analysis into a context of a three-stage process of accession 
to the EMU: (i) Stage I covers period until the full EU membership during which 
accession countries do not have any institutional exchange rate relationship with the EU 
(pre-accession stage), (ii) Stage II covers the term from EU accession to two-year period 
preceding the EMU membership during which acceding countries are expected to adopt 
the acquis communautaire while they can still apply a country-specific exchange rate 
regime, although they can also participate in ERM II, and (iii) Stage III covers two-year 
testing period before the EMU accession during which the EU newcomers must comply 
with the Maastricht criteria and thus cannot resort to any country specific exchange rate 
arrangements.
Assuming that all accession countries will pursue stable macroeconomic policies 
during the period of transition towards the EMU, the authors focus on uncovered interest 
parity (UIP)51 condition to examine a constraint it imposes on various forms of exchange 
rate targeting. A conclusion emerges that during Stages I and II a fixed nominal exchange 
rate target can be a solution only for countries with the inflation differential vis-a-vis the
£*y
anchor currency (the euro) of less then 3 per cent, whereas for all other countries a 
flexible exchange rate target (with or without an announced targets)53 should become a 
policy preference. Stage III requires no devaluations of domestic currency, thus implying 
that the countries should enter this phase with "a somewhat undervalued currency and 
adjust downwards if necessary" (Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser, 2000, p. 27).
51 "If domestic and foreign securities are substitutes, perfect capital mobility ensures the equalization of 
expected net yields including the expected rate of increase of the domestic currency price of foreign 
exchange ('uncovered interest rate parity')" (Lewis and Mizen, 2000, p. 184).
52 In this, CBAs as a form of fixed nominal exchange rate target is only advisable for very open economies 
with the ration of openness (1/2 [Exports + Imports] / nominal GDP) higher then 72.5 per cent.
53 However, "if the exchange rate target is not announced, the nominal anchor has to be provided by a 
publicly announced inflation target" (Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser, 2000, p. 22).
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Nuti (2000) sketches out the main costs and benefits of unilateral euroisation. The 
term euroisation defines the situation in which a country officially decides to adopt the 
euro as a legal tender without previously obtaining consent by the ECB as the euro issuer. 
The euroisation can take a form of a currency board or can imply "formal replacement of 
the national currency" (Nuti, 2000, p. 2) by euros.54 Even though it is possible to imagine 
that some other country - apart from those countries in Eastern Europe wishing to join 
the EU - resorts to euroisation, it is less likely that this will actually happen. Thus, 
euroisation is generally seen as an arrangement that can (but not necessarily must) 
precede the EMU membership or can be regarded as an alternative to it.
According to Nuti (2000), the benefits of such unilateral euroisation include: an 
increased ability to borrow on international markets in euros ('domestic' currency), 
reduced exchange rate volatility and vulnerability to speculative attacks, lowered 
transaction costs, grater economic and integration with the EU via increased trade and 
investments, declining currency risk premium, "automatic, self-regulating adjustments in 
money supply" (Nuti, 2000, p. 8), and eased choice of intermediate monetary targets 
implying lesser costs of exchange rate adjustments for producers and financial 
institutions.
On the other hand, the costs of unilateral euroisation account for the following: 
the need for excessive international reserves to back the currency in circulation, loss of 
seignorage, inexistence of a lender of last resort that could increase financial sector 
fragility, inability of full elimination of a parity change due to higher aggregate demand 
then in the euro-zone and lesser government credibility than that of the EU, 
transformation of current account deficit due to "regional under-development" (Nuti, 
2000, p. 12), inadequate level of foreign trade invoicing in euros, large part of external 
debt denominated in dollars, inability to exercise nominal revaluation, and unsuitability 
of monetary policy pursued by the ECB to the real fundamentals of a national economy. 
Additionally, indirect costs also include the non-existence of formal support by the ECB 
such as the provision of lender of last resort, very short-time financing facilities and 
financial sector supervision of a country which opted for unilateral euroisation.
54 "The Currency Board is Euro-isation in a broad sense, while the use of the actual Euro of other EMU- 
area means of payment are Euro-isation in a strict sense - though both falling short of the full-fledged 
Euro-isation obtained through full EMU membership" (Nuti, 2000, p. 5).
In conclusion, the author states that the cost and benefit net balance of unilateral 
euroisation for European transition countries depends on empirical estimates of all the 
above-stated monetary and other economic considerations.55 Nevertheless, the possible 
net advantages of such an arrangement should be considered carefully and in parallel to 
real convergence of these countries toward its Western partners. In any case, increased 
mutual trade and economic integration should stay first on the reformers' agendas.
2.4.3. Concluding remarks
The purpose of this section was to single out the main institutional requirements 
of EMU membership and its underlining policy considerations. By analysing Temprano- 
Arroyo and Feldman's (1999) paper, we have seen that in general these institutional 
issues can be resolved by adopting the EU acquis, but what specific challenges these 
legal adjustments may pose to an EU acceding country, and to Serbia in particular, is the 
main question of the Section 2.5 of this chapter and our entire Chapter V.
Nonetheless, a number of important macroeconomic policy issues deriving from 
the EMU institutional framework and from the Maastricht criteria need to be considered 
by those countries aspiring to EU membership well before this membership takes place. 
However, the nominal compliance to formal criteria should only steam from a real 
convergence and not the way around, as suggested by Kohler and Wes (1999). Gradual 
fiscal adjustment, steady opening of capital accounts, rapid disinflation and increased 
exchange rate flexibility are some of the general rules of this exercise. But, in practice, 
each country should decide on its own policy mix due to different country-specific 
factors like the flexibility of wages, soundness of financial sector and other (see Kopits, 
1999). We apply this approach in the case of Serbia in Chapter IV.
55 Similarly, Kopits (1999, p. 5) notes: "In general, the net benefits from joining an optimal currency area 
[assuming that the EMU is an OCA, auth. remark] will be larger (a) the smaller the size of the candidate 
country relative to the union, (b) the higher the degree of economic and political integration between the 
candidate and the union, (c) the stronger the similarity in economic structure between the candidate country 
and the union, and (d) the larger the public indebtedness of the candidate country. Characteristics (a), (b) 
and (c) reduce the likelihood of asymmetric shocks in the enlarged union that need to be offset through 
policy action at the country level. Further, a major up-front gain, in the form of a significant reduction in 
exchange rate risk premium, accrues under (d) [...]".
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2.5. 
In Section 2.2 of this chapter the central plan dominated the real side of 
previously centrally planned economies. Similarly, a central credit allocation governed 
the monetary and financial developments of countries with such an economic setting, 
having had the state bank at its centre. The state bank-the monobank-m socialism 
performed the functions of both the central bank and the commercial banks, holding a 
'monopoly' over banking and credit. 56 However, the monopoly was not effective as the 
bank could not autonomously decide on whom to grant credit, but was rather obliged to 
suffice the credit in accordance to the central plan.
As a consequence, monetary instruments did not have an active role in the 
distribution of financial sources. Monetary policy was exercised exclusively through the 
control of the overall volume of credit to state enterprises and budget entities. Interest 
rates and exchange rates also did not play a role in credit allocation. Therefore, once the 
transition started, it needed to encompass not only the process of transformation of a 
central bank in the cases in which it existed prior to transition or of building up a 
monetary authority where it did not exist, but also the reform of societal perception and 
the role which central banks have had in the management of socialist economies.
Perception and the role, but also, in a way, the policy outcomes of a central bank, 
derive from the institutional framework in which the central bank operates (Cukierman, 
1992, p. 5). Therefore, reforming the central bank legislative site makes an important step 
towards the overall central bank reform. 57 The construction of an appropriate legal 
framework requires a number of considerations to be taken into account, especially those 
relating to the redistribution of political power such as central bank independence, 
accountability, transparency and credibility, which are seen as necessary in securing 
monetary and financial sector stability and effectiveness.
56 The situation was not entirely the same in all socialist countries. As noted by Sundararajan (1991, p. 
250), "the pre-reform banking system in Yugoslavia consisted of a large number of banks owned 'socially', 
that is, associations of workers in nonfinancial enterprises joined together to form each bank. In effect, 
banks were 'owned' by enterprises. The state bank-the National Bank of Yugoslavia, and the national 
banks of the regions-was a major partner in extending credit to enterprises in selected sectors in the form of 
cofinancing (so-called refinancing) with individual commercial banks." See also Sevic (1999, p. 204). 
57 The central bank reform assumes introduction of a new: monetary and exchange rate management, 
monetary instruments, banking/insurance prudential regulations, payment system and research techniques.
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In the context of transitional economies, the appropriate central bank legal 
framework is broadly defined as the one which enforces economic decision-making that 
is based on market principles (Lybek, 1999, p. 76). At the core of market practices and
CQ
central bank legal arrangements stands a clearly defined central bank's objective(s) , 
against which the performance and behaviour of the central bank, i.e. the central bank 
governing bodies', can be measured. Theoretically, however, such institutional solutions 
derive from the theory of time inconsistency (dynamic inconsistency), analytically 
presented by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
According to Barro and Gordon (1983, p. 599), "the term 'time-inconsistency' 
refers to the policymaker's incentives to deviate from the rule when private agents expect 
it to be followed". Namely, due to the existence of inflationary bias, deriving from 
various policymakers' motives59 , the monetary authority (usually the central bank), which 
operates in a discretionary regime, is tempted to create surprise inflation above private 
agents' inflation expectations. The results appear to be excessive rates of monetary 
growth and inflation, and activist countercyclical central bank behaviour with no 
desirable effects in terms of unemployment. On the other hand, as pointed by the authors, 
under institutional arrangements in which monetary authority is expected to precommit 
its future policy choices to appropriate policy rules, the outcomes improve. In fact, under 
such a setup, the central bank policy becomes credible - that is, dynamically consistent.
The above model has become the basis for numerous other scholars to build new 
analytical or conceptual frameworks for the resolution of the inflationary bias problem of 
dynamic inconsistency in monetary policymaking. In particular, their attempts have 
focused on institutional design of central bank behaviour. With respect to that, Rogoff 
(1985) and Walsh (1995) provided the two main theoretical strands for central bank 
independence, thereby opening a debate over two other central bank institutional 
attributes: a central bank's accountability and transparency in its conduct of monetary 
policy. At the heart of these discussions, however, remains the central bank's credibility, 
as the ultimate objective of any public policy and, inter alia, of monetary policy.
58 Regarding the monetary policy objective(s) of central banks in transition, see Sevic and Sevic (1998).
59 Cukierman (1992, pp. 15-25) singles out (i) reduction of unemployment, (ii) increase of fiscal revenues, 
(iii) smoothing of interest rates, and (iv) avoidance of excessive balance of payments deficits under fixed 
exchange rates, as the main four policymakers' motives for monetary expansion under perfect information.
2.5.7. Central bank independence
Rogoff (1985) builds the theory of a conservative central banker on a 
presumption of the existence of dynamic inconsistency due to which a society constantly 
faces a higher then optimal inflation. He develops an institutional response to this 
problem through the appointment of a conservative central banker who is more inflation 
averse then the society. In this model, the central bank's independence is necessary 
because the central bank must ensure that its preferences, and not that of the society, 
determine the monetary policy. However, Rogoff (1985) also underlines that in such a 
setting the output variability increases as a cost of lower and more stable inflation rate 
than it would be under the less conservative and less independent central bank.
Walsh (1995) offers an alternative principle-agent approach for solving the 
inflationary-bias problem of discretionary policy.60 The model assumes a contract 
between the society (principal) and the central bank (agent) over the inflation output 
embodying penalties for a central bank when realised inflation deviates from its target 
level. The principle-agent approach differs from the conservative-central-banker 
approach in that it does not secure both the central bank goal and instrument 
independence, but just its independence in the selection of monetary instruments. On the 
other hand, in the Rogoff (1985) approach, the central banker - who is expected to 
maximise its own utility function - is actually given both goal and instrument 
independence. The principle-agent approach differs from the conservative banker 
approach also because it assumes less output variability due to the fact that it allows for 
an optimally active counter-cyclical central bank policy to be carried out.
McCallum (1995) highlights to two 'fallacies' relating to interpretations of the 
above-mentioned analytical results. The first points to the fact that central banks need not 
always to exploit the existing inflationary expectations, even they are tempted to do so. 
The second criticism recognises that the principal-agent contract does not overcome the 
motivation for dynamic inconsistency, but that it merely relocates it by increasing 
intricacy for the governments to pressurise central banks (McCallum, 1995, p. 210).
60 See also Persson and Tabellmi (1993)
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According to Cukierman (1992, p. 9), "central bank independence can be viewed 
as one way of committing monetary policy to focus mainly on the objective of price 
stability. Various degrees of independence lead to various levels of commitment." To test 
the central banks' legal and factual independence and political instability, the author opts 
for alternative measures61 from a broad sample of around 70 countries. Using this data in 
evaluating the effects of independence and of the political situation on policy outcomes, 
i.e. inflation, he concludes that in developed countries - in accordance to the common 
belief- a higher legal independence of a central bank, indeed, corresponds to higher price 
stability and is an important factor for inflation determination. However, the author also 
finds that in the less developed countries, price stability depends more on the rate of 
turnover of the central bank governors than on the central bank legal independence.
Additionally, by combining the various used measures of central bank 
independence, Cukierman (1992) produces a singe inflation-based ranking list of central 
banks for both groups of countries (developed and less developed), based on their overall 
independence. The rankings show varying degrees of central bank independence among 
countries as a result of underlying different country-specific structural and other factors.
Indicatively, the structural determinants show that in countries with a higher level 
of national consensus, more political instability induces higher central bank independence 
and that the opposite stands true for countries with a lower degree of internal coherence. 
Moreover, the author uncovers that persistent past inflation tends to erode the 
independence even though the legal independence remains the same. This implies that an 
independent central bank alone cannot restore disinflationary processes, but that it needs 
support by other institutions. "It seems therefore that CB [central bank, auth. remark] 
independence is more effective as a preventive then as a remedial device", Cukierman 
(1992, p. 449) concludes.
61 According to Cukierman (1992, p. 5), "these measures draw on three types of sources. One is based on 
the legal independence of the central bank, the second on the turnover rate of central bank governors, and 
the third on responses by central bankers to a questionnaire on central bank independence". Potentially, 
however, the following factors may also influence the degree of independence of a central bank: the quality 
and reputation of the central bank research department measured by the quality of its publications, the size 
and the level of development of the countries financial markets and of the overall financial sector, the 
governor's role as the economic adviser to the government and his reputation, appointment procedures of 
the central bank board members, ability of the central bank to maintain a sufficiently large volume of open 
market operations when needed and, in countries with fixed exchange rates, the width of the fluctuation 
band (see Cukierman, 1992, pp. 393-395).
Goodhart (1993)62 argues that the idea of central bank independence derives from 
two sources. The first builds on a widely acknowledged conception that in the long term 
the Phillips curve is vertical, that is, that there is no trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment in the medium- or long-run.63 The second argument hinges on the time- 
inconsistency theory, and implies that politicians are only interested in the short-run 
effects of economic policy due to their concentration on election cycles and on 
preoccupations associated with the demands of democratic accountability (re-election).
As a result, governments which are keen to subordinate the objective of price 
stability and lower inflation to the objective of increased employment during the pre- 
election periods, undermine the possibility of achieving price stability in the longer term. 
Accordingly, this entails that politicians delegate their authority over counter-inflationary 
policy to separate, autonomous institutions, i.e. to central banks that have the technical 
expertise and long-term horizon to achieve the set objective(s).
The assignation of independence to the central bank, nevertheless, has several 
economic and political implications. The economic consideration stands in favour of the 
argument that the granted central bank autonomy should not mean that all short-term 
shocks that occur in an economy should be disregarded along with all short-term 
economic developments. However, Goodhart (1993) argues that it is the level of the 
central bank credibility that would determine the accommodating capacity of the 
monetary policy to the short-term shocks at the end, in the sense that a more credible and 
independent central bank with the longer record of low inflation has a higher capacity to 
act as a shock absorber in the short period. On the other hand, the author believes that a 
central bank's credibility can only be obtained if there exists a wide political consensus 
supporting a long-term counter-inflationary monetary policy and the general public's 
understanding of monetary policy issues.
62 The same article appears in Goodhart (1995, pp. 60-71), under Chapter IV.
63 "Bill Phillips, a New Zealand economist working at LSE [London School of Economics, auth. remark], 
had earlier discovered in the 1950s that, using historical British data, when unemployment was high, the 
pressure of demand in an economy being low, then wage and price inflation had also been lower [...] 
Milton Friedman then explained that the problem was that the short run Phillips curve had depended on the 
existing state of inflationary expectations [...] In short, if the authorities tried to keep the level of 
unemployment below the natural rate, which is, broadly, the rate that causes workers to seek that rate of 
real wage increase that their own productivity increases make available, then inflation will not be constant, 
but will rise without limit; in economists' jargon, in the longer term the Phillips curve is vertical" 
(Goodhart, 1993, p. 2).
76
The first political qualification underlining central bank independence relates to 
the fact that the central bank is usually not independent in selecting its objective(s), but 
only the means of achieving it. The second consideration conveys the fact that the 
establishment of a central bank's legal independence lies in the hands of the legislator 
and that, therefore, this independence is subject to politicians' preferences at given times. 
This finding illustrates Goodhart's (1993, p. 9) point that by granting autonomy to the 
central banks, central banks will not be placed outside of the political context, but on the 
contrary, that they would need to resort to the "political and presentational skills" more 
often in order to became more accountable. In conclusion, however, the author stresses 
that the governments' and central bankers' priorities do not differ greatly and that, thus, 
the importance of central bank independence should not be exaggerated.64
Alesina and Summers (1993) come to an interesting and frequently cited 
conclusion that central bank legal independence is neither negatively nor positively 
correlated to the macroeconomic performance of developed countries. In particular, by 
plotting the measures of economic performance (economic growth, growth of GNP per 
capita, unemployment and real interest rate) of several selected countries for each 
variable separately against the indices of central bank independence, the authors find no 
relationship whatsoever between them. The only expected exemption represents "a near 
perfect" negative correlation between the central bank legal independence and the 
corresponding countries' inflation records.
With respect to transitional countries, Cukierman (1994) provides only tentative 
explanations of these countries' levels of actual central bank independence by asserting 
that these levels are not likely to increase over time due to the following reasons. Firstly, 
undeveloped capital markets continue to make pressure on central bank lending to 
transitional governments. Secondly, it is likely that the central banks will continue acting 
as commercial banks due to financial arrears and narrow capital markets until banking 
sectors are reformed. Thirdly, even if established quickly, the central bank legal 
independence should take time to be transposed into actual independence as the respect 
for the rule of law in these countries strengthens further.
64 Primarily, Goodhart (1993, p. 13) believes, the adoption of central bank independence should serve as 
means of "improved policy measures, in both the monetary and fiscal areas, aimed at longer time horizon, 
and to a better public understanding of policy issues".
2.5.2. Central bank accountability
De Haan, Amtenbrink and Eijffinger (1998) analyse the three features of central 
bank accountability: (i) ultimate objectives of monetary policy, (ii) transparency of 
monetary policy, and (iii) final responsibility for monetary policy. They propose that the 
decisions about monetary policy objectives rest in the hands of elected politicians 
(governments) and that the central banks are only granted with instrument independence. 
Regarding transparency, the authors believe that a central bank should be legally 
obligated to publish the meetings minutes together with more regular reports on its past 
performance and future plans, against which its accountability can be measured. They 
also argue that the final responsibility for monetary policy depends on the central bank 
relationship with the parliament, the existence of government/parliament's overriding 
mechanisms vis-a-vis the central bank, and the dismissal procedures for the governor.
Based on the current central bank laws and their proposed concept of central bank 
accountability, De Haan et al. (1998) construct an accountability indicator for 16 central 
banks, including the European Central Bank (ECB). The indicators show a varying 
degree of central bank accountability in observed countries, with the ECB indicator 
suggesting a rather low level of ECB's democratic accountability. Additionally, the 
authors test the relationship between the various aspects of accountability (objectives, 
transparency, responsibility) and the central bank independence. They find a positive 
relationship between the selection of a central bank objectives and independence, but 
negative relationships between the central bank independence and transparency and 
responsibility, respectively. The authors, however, conclude that the concepts of central 
bank accountability and independence are not adversarial and that a central bank can be 
both independent and accountable.
A theory of central bank accountability developed by Eijffinger, Hoeberichts and 
Schaling (1998) shows that accountability through transparency leads to lower inflation 
expectations and less stabilisation in the case of productivity shocks. On the other hand, 
the authors demonstrate that accountability through the shift of final responsibility from 
central banks to governments induces more inflation expectations and more stabilisation 
with regards to supply shocks.
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Castellan! (2002) develops a model of central bank accountability describing a 
mechanism by which the government holds an institution with a delegated authority over 
monetary policy, i.e. the central bank, accountable for its policies. The model underscores 
the ex post character of accountability, thereby allowing for a distinction to be made 
between the notions of accountability and transparency. Namely, in contrast to 
accountability, which is seen as an ex post political scrutiny of the undertaken central 
bank's deeds, the central bank transparency is presented as a set of ex ante decisions 
about the central bank's communication and presentation actions.65
Another result deriving from this model is that the central bank can be held both 
independent and accountable in achieving a socially optimal policy if there is no central 
bank preference uncertainty (zero 'democratic deficit')66 . However, it also appears from 
the model that if too much stringency in terms of the accountability mechanism is put in 
place by the government, the central bank may become overcautious in conducting the 
monetary policy even when unnecessary. Nevertheless, the author finds that the 'optimal' 
stringency of the accountability requirements depends on the government's preferences 
and, presumably, the state of the economy.
It is interesting to mention the work by Padoa-Schioppa (2000) who puts an 
emphasis on the following institutional attributes of the Eurosystem67 : independence, 
accountability, transparency, predictability and communication. In relation to 
accountability, the author underscores the fact that "accountability is counterweight of 
independence", where the latter places a limit to the functions performed by the 
institution(s) to which a central bank is accountable (Padoa-Schioppa, 2000, p. 29).
Thus, the author raises two fundamental questions: (1) for what should the central 
bank be held accountable, and (2) to whom should the central bank be accountable? 
Clearly, in the case of the Eurosystem, it is the European Parliament, as a highest 
democratically elected body of the European Union that should judge the fulfilment of 
the Eurosystem's legally entrusted mandate. Analogously, at the national level, the author 
suggests, the central banks should be accountable to their national parliaments.
65 The same argument was put forward by Padoa-Schioppa (2000, p. 29) a few years earlier, although in a 
rather non-analytical, indicative manner.
66 According to Briault et al. (1996, p. 12) an empowered, but unaccountable, central bank may also give 
rise to a democratic deficit.
67 Eurosystem comprises of the ECB and the national central banks of the countries that adopted the euro.
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2.5.3. Central bank transparency
Geraats (2002) offers a useful overview of the existing literature on central bank 
transparency up to 2002. Defining transparency as the absence of asymmetric information 
and building on Geraats (2000), the author distinguishes between political, economic, 
procedural, policy and operational transparency in accordance with the respective stages
SQ 
of the policy-making process. The author also builds a case for the economic argument 
of central bank transparency, as opposed to the public policy argument that treats central 
bank transparency in connection with the central bank accountability, as explained by De 
Haanatal. (1998).
In order to further develop the economic argument for transparency, Geraats 
(2002) chooses to single out two effects of asymmetric information: (1) the 'uncertainty 
effect', and (2) the 'incentive effect'. The first one derives from the fact that in a non- 
transparent environment with high uncertainty over the monetary policy, the central 
bankers who possess private information can, in fact, decide to exploit it. The second 
effect appears in those situations in which the (monetary) policymakers who do have 
private information try to use it in order to induce certain reactions from those economic 
agents who do not have that information, but eventually find themselves in a position of 
aligning their initial policy with the induced behaviour of other agents.
In relation to the empirical evidence on the effects of central bank transparency, 
Greaats (2002) reminds that there are, in general, four 'measurement' concepts. The first 
approach measures transparency (qualitatively and quantitatively) through analyses of the 
exposition and availability of monetary policy information. The second approach relates 
to measuring the effects of a central bank's concealed information on monetary policy, 
whereas the third set of transparency measures deals with the market's reactions to 
disclosed information. The fourth approach investigates the macroeconomic 
consequences of central bank transparency. Taking into account a number of existing 
indices of central bank transparency, the author concludes that "transparency tends to be 
beneficial" (Geraats, 2002, p. 27). Thus, there appear volumes such as the IMF's (1999) 
"Code of Good Practice on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies".
68 See Geraats (2002, pp. 8-22) for a detailed explanation of each transparency type.
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However, the evidence is not unequivocal and so scholars have still not reached a 
consensus on the economic desirability of transparency in monetary policy matters. It is 
thus not striking that a majority of scholars writing about the central bank behaviour are 
actually tempted to detect and evaluate the effects of central bank transparency (see, for 
example, Demertzis and Hallet, 2003a; 2003b), or optimal degrees of transparency in 
monetary policy making (see, for example, Svensson and Faust, 1999; Jensen, 2001), and 
to engage in investigations on how to achieve transparency (see, for example, IMF, 
1999). It is interesting to note that only rarely do the theoreticians and practitioners 
actually get involved into discussions about the generic notion of transparency and the 
related (mis)conceptions generated by relevant agents due to information ambiguity.
Among few authors engaging in that exercise is Winkler (2000) who points to 
different meanings of transparency in the conduct of monetary policy. Although not 
highly influential, his work is of particular importance as it draws attention to the issue of 
quality of unveiled central bank information. To be precise, the author provides an insight 
into various meanings of central bank transparency and proposes a new conceptual 
framework, which builds on the following four aspects of transparency: (i) openness, (ii) 
clarity, (iii) common understanding, and (iv) honesty.
Similarly, Posen (2002) presents six 'practical views' of central bank 
transparency discerning among specific sets of information releases, which can be: (1) 
reassuring, (2) detailed, (3) irrelevant,69 (4) contingent, (5) annoying, and (6) diverting. In 
particular, Posen (2002, p. 5) claims that "the public could be reassured in general if 
updates via regular releases about policy decisions reduce worry about what is going on 
in the short-term". However, we argue that in the case of the disclosure of 'irrelevant' 
information by the central bank, the opposite may occur. Namely, the public may become 
more worried about the central bank actions and, thus, about the short-term policy 
outcomes (real variables) if confronted with the 'irrelevant' information because what 
may seem 'irrelevant' information could induce alterations in the central bank policy 
preferences.
69 Posen (2002) sees irrelevance of information disclosed by the central banks through the lenses of that 
information ineffectiveness on changes in inflation expectations. In the words of Posen (2000, p. 5), "the 
public could find that, after all, what central banks say is irrelevant, so long as the central banks are no less 
responsive to shocks then before".
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Arguing that only the reassurance and details-oriented views have been supported 
empirically,70 Posen (2002) proposes that the focus be shifted from a discussion over the 
central banks' target achievements to a communication about the nature of shocks facing 
the economy. Furthermore, based on conclusions that increased transparency does not 
inhibit central bank independence nor that it provides for satisfactory democratic 
accountability, the author suggests that greater transparency and the appropriate formal 
accountability mechanisms be jointly arranged. Finally, Posen (2002) puts forward an 
initiative to deduct the goal independence from the central banks' jurisdiction, leaving 
them with the instrument independence only, underlying that instrument independence 
together with transparency brings benefits, at least to the inflation targeting countries.
2.5.4. Central bank credibility
By examining the central bank's decision-making, the policy effects on inflation, 
and the feedback of inflationary expectations to policy choices, Cukierman (1992) has 
contributed greatly to the theory of new political economy in the area of monetary policy. 
It should be noted, though, that most of his work draws and utilises from the literature on 
dynamic inconsistency pioneered by Barro and Gordon (1983).
In his voluminous and frequently quoted work on central bank strategy, credibility 
and independence, Cukierman (1992) in particular analyses factors behind the positive 
inflation and monetary expansion rates. As mentioned earlier, the author puts forward 
four different motives that cause central banks to inflate: higher employment, greater 
budgetary revenues, stability of the financial system, and attainment of balance of 
payments objective. Analysing these four motives, he demonstrates that the money 
supply and, therefore, inflation are not exogenous, but that they are instead influenced by 
interactions between monetary policymakers and the private sector, those being either 
institutions or private individuals. In relation to that Cukierman (1992, p. 1) writes:
70 Posen (2002) points that in the case of inflation targeting, central bank announcements of medium-term 
targets increases central bank flexibility with regards to shocks and decrease inflation perseverance.
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"Factors such as the ability to precommit policy, the rate of time preference of 
policymakers, the precision of their control over the price level, and the degree of political 
instability as reflected in frequent changes in emphasis on alternative objectives are identified as 
some of the fundamental determinants of the distributions of inflation and of monetary growth."
Those factors can operate either in the presence of perfect (symmetric) 
information or private (asymmetric) information. Cukierman (1992) analyses both cases. 
Under private information he assumes an information advantage on the side of 
policymakers deriving from their insight into the changing degrees of central bank 
independence or political pressures. The fact that those changing circumstances are 
usually not known by the general public in real time allows the central banks to create 
inflation surprises (by shifting its emphasis on alternative policy objectives), thereby 
generating temporary real effects on the economy.71 Although the author argues that the 
public learns about the changes in central bank preferences gradually, with every 
subsequent period of time some new factors become relevant which do not allow for the 
full elimination of public uncertainty about the course of monetary policy.
Therefore, the author underlines that the existence of asymmetric information 
becomes essential for a realistic analysis of changes in the credibility of monetary 
policymakers. Under the asymmetric information only dynamically consistent monetary 
strategies are credible. However, since private agents are not fully informed about the 
central bank objectives, there exists a discrepancy between the planned rate of monetary 
expansion and public perceptions about this rate. In such a situation the credibility 
becomes "a continuous measure that is inversely related to the absolute value of the 
divergence between the central bank's plans and public beliefs about those plans" 
(Cukierman, 1992, p. 207).
In the presence of perfect information, when the public is aware of central bank 
preferences and limitations, the central bank credibility in the conduct of monetary 
policy, that is, the policy announcement, is "fully credible if it is dynamically consistent 
and not credible at all if it is not dynamically consistent" Cukierman (1992, p. 205).72
71 Those effects come from the short-run Phillips curve and the existence of the underlining trade-off 
between inflation and employment or output in the short-run, as presented on page 60 of this work.
72 Fischer (1995, p. 33) rightly notes that the more general informal definition of central bank credibility 
should extend to those policy announcements and decisions, which were not anticipated at the time the 
public was making its decisions or acting upon them.
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Based on those main postulates, Cukierman (1992) further conducts detailed 
investigations over the fundamental determinants of credibility under (a)symmetric 
information and identifies factors influencing output and employment costs of 
disinflation. Furthermore, he reveals the complexity of central bank's operations 
depending on whether those are performed under a discretionary regime or under 
commitment.
The conclusion which emerges is that inflation is excessive under discretion and 
perfect information. However, Cukierman (1992) finds that in the presence of 
asymmetric information and discretionary setting, a central bank's temptation to inflate 
attenuates. This happens in the face of recognition that private agents form their 
inflationary expectations on the basis of current inflation and monetary growth rates. 
Consequently, Cukierman (1992) notes that a central bank's "reputational considerations 
moderate the inflationary bias of policy in discretionary regimes". Being aware of a 
constant, gradual learning process of the general public about its shifting objectives, 
monetary policymakers become sensitive to their reputation as an inflation fighter. 73
Blinder (1999) stresses that the evolution of the theory of (rational) inflationary 
expectations contributed greatly to the heightening interest in the credibility of monetary 
policy announcements of both, academics and central bankers. However, by making use 
of a questionnaire, the author discovered that the two groups prize credibility for different 
reasons. Namely, the central bankers find credibility important as it helps them to reduce 
the costs of disinflation, to keep inflation low, to defend the currency and generate public 
support for increased central bank independence. Yet although academics agree with the 
first two reasons, they markedly disagree with the two remaining ones.
On the other hand, when it comes to the methods of creating or enhancing 
credibility, Blinder (1999) finds that the two parties agree that the establishment of a low 
inflation record and central bank independence are the most important factors. 
Surprisingly, though, both the central bankers and academics rank the Barro and Gordon 
(1983) model of precommitment and incentive compatible contracts as least important.
73 Cukierman (1992, p. 205) underlines that the notion of reputation is inherently linked to the existence of 
asymmetric information.
Concluding remarks
The central bank in transition is a broad concept that encompasses the following 
two developments. The first relates to the fact that the central bank has a role in the 
overall administration of economic transformation, whereas the second recognises that 
the central bank itself is constantly in the process of transition. While the third section of 
this chapter dealt mainly with the central bank's various roles during transition times, the 
objective of the previous section was to underline the main institutional characteristics of 
a central bank, including those that operate in transitional countries: independence, 
accountability, transparency and credibility. Based on a number of studies dealing both 
with the theoretical and empirical aspects of those central bank attributes, we draw 
several conclusions.
A central bank should be assigned the adequate level of autonomy in 
implementing monetary policy and should, therefore, be independent from the 
government. Nonetheless, the concept of the delegation of authority over monetary policy 
to the central bank should not be confused with a central bank's accountability. The 
central bank must be accountable for its results, but only up to the point in which these 
results occur as the outcome of its performance and not because of factors that are 
beyond its decision-making power and jurisdiction. Hence, for the general public and 
politicians to be able to judge the actions and results of the central bank, the central 
bank's legislation must include transparency provisions. Once the central bank 
transparency and the related disclosure of monetary policy information are secured - 
together with the clear central bank objectives and legal independence - it can be 
expected that the central bank is perceived as credible in monetary policy conduct.
It can also be concluded that all these central bank attributes are highly 
interdependent and can change dynamically over time. They are also highly relevant for 
the formulation and implementation of an overall monetary strategy and its results. The 
issue of how this connection is established in practice, however, is discussed in more 
details in Chapter IV and Chapter V of this work. It is without any doubt that the Serbian 
central banking experience of the 1993-2003 period provides enough material for such 
research to be conducted.
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The main purpose of this chapter was to set up a theoretical framework for our 
further analysis by establishing a benchmark against which the Serbian transitional record 
of the 1989-2004 period could be measured. In practical terms this benchmark includes 
the general reform strategy components and monetary policy elements attributable to the 
CEE and SEE transitional countries. Those two building blocks are respectively 
elaborated in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 of this chapter on the basis of an extensive 
literature review. The results and conclusions obtained in those two sections shall be 
confronted to those of Chapter III dealing with the Serbian economic legacy up to 2004. 
In this way, by joining the theory (Chapter II) and evidence (Chapter III), we provide a 
new and unique insight into the Serbia's 15-year transitional experience.
However, apart from assessing its past performance, this chapter aimed at 
depicting the most important theoretical considerations about future European Union 
membership of the Eastern European transition countries and the accompanying 
monetary and central banking requirements. Therefore, Section 2.4 and Section 2.5 of 
this chapter investigate a number of papers dealing with the above-mentioned subjects, 
and thus build a basis for our subsequent discussion in Chapter IV and Chapter V. By 
matching the past and future aspects, we offer a dynamic overview of monetary and 
central bank developments that stretches over a long-term horizon. Chapter II contributes 
to this assignment by conveying several important messages.
Firstly, our analysis shows that a broad political and social consensus about the 
global reform strategy is essential if the transition is to be successful and less costly. 
Concretely, this means that a broad agreement about the transition action plan between 
the various factors in a society must be ensured for the reform plan to be implemented. 
Otherwise, the pressures of various political and social groups in the course of the 
transformation process can additionally encumber the reformers' tasks. Since those 
pressures are easily transmitted into wage, public expenditure and inflation increases, the 
costs of inflation inevitably rise, too. Ultimately, the speed of reforms decreases in 
parallel with the credibility of institutions executing the reform agenda such as, for 
example, the national central bank.
86
Secondly, the credibility of programmes and institutions is fundamental for a 
successful transition. Credibility can be achieved by (a) increased transparency in 
policymaking, (b) ensured consistency of the far-reaching real-sector reform 
programmes, and (c) secured democratic accountability. In other words, the political 
authorities should openly state their objectives and strategies for achieving them thus 
allowing the markets and the general public to make its own critical appraisals about their 
reputation. A prerequisite for such behaviour is, nevertheless, the establishment of a solid 
institutional framework.
Thirdly, an adequate legal framework remains the main mechanism for 
channelling discretionary policies. Practically, this is done by the introduction of certain 
institutional constraints, which should suppress the natural tendency of governing 
regimes to operate under discretion. This, however, should not happen at the cost of legal 
flexibility and the independence of the system's institutions. On the contrary, the main 
principle in the design of an adequate legal structure should be based on a balanced 
approach between the legal flexibility and legal restraints securing the accountability of 
democratic institutions. We believe that this is even more so in transitional times.
To what extent are those lessons applicable in the case of Serbia during its recent 
economic and monetary history (1989-2004) is the main question of our next chapter. 
But, in order to better understand how Serbia replied to the economic and institutional 
considerations of transition one must also know some basic facts about the Serbian post- 
World War II legacy. Chapter III will concern itself with outlining this legacy.
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The main objective of this chapter is to document the thesis asserting that the 
design and timing of implemented economic programmes in Serbia (i.e. countries that 
Serbia was a part of in the period after the World War II) were greatly influenced by 
prevailing negative socio-political factors. Because of this phenomenon, the programmes 
have never delivered the expected results, contrary to the experience of other transitional 
countries. More generally, the chapter will demonstrate that international recognition is 
crucial for successful macroeconomic and monetary stability and overall transition.
From 1947 until, de facto mid-1991, Serbia formed a part of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), a country which apart from Serbia also included five 
other constitutive republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro 
and Slovenia. 1 In economic terms, from 1947 until mid-1950s, the SFRY and, therefore, 
Serbia, linked its economic activity to the realisation of annual production plans 
determined by the central plan. During the 1950s, however, the rigid socialist blueprint 
was abandoned and replaced by the central planning of the workers' self-management 
model. Many authors saw this new economic system as the most advanced and superior 
to all other social economic models because some of its features incorporated
**
characteristics of market-oriented economic systems, Petrovic and Vujosevic (2000) 
even claim that, owing to the implementation of the extensive market-based reforms in 
the early 1960s, the SFRY at the time exhibited certain features of what later become 
known as a transitional economy.
1 SFRY dejure existed until May 1992 when the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was 
adopted ensuring legal continuation of the SFRY. But, de facto the SFRY ceased to exist when Slovenia 
and Croatia declared independence on 25 June 1991, which triggered military conflict between the 
formations of the Yugoslav National Army and local military formations of both Slovenia and Croatia. The 
conflict in Slovenia was over soon thereafter, but the civil war in Croatia, which spread to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina lasted until 1995, when the Dayton Peace Accord was signed.
2 Petrovid and VujoSevic (2000, pp. 496 and 498) note that, unlike in the other countries of the Eastern 
bloc, institutional frame of a market economy at that time already existed in the country.
Long before the start of the transition process in the countries of the former Soviet 
bloc in 1989, the SFRY had shown greater integration into the international market scene, 
and as early as 1970 had established trade arrangements with the European Community 
(EC). 3 However, due to political tensions and military conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the process of European integration was interrupted.4 The collapse of 
SFRY followed as Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991, Macedonia in September 1991, 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992 all unilaterally declared their independence. 
On 27 April 1992 Serbia and Montenegro formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY).
The period of FRY mostly coincides with the period of autocratic rule of 
Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, and the refusal of a part of the leading political structures 
in Montenegro to accept his political supremacy in the country from mid-1997 onwards 
(see Pavlowitch, 2002). 5 In practical terms, this meant that Montenegro began devising 
and arranging its own economic-political structure, selectively refusing to implement 
laws adopted at the common, federal level. At the same time, Serbia within the FRY was 
characterised by two sub-periods. The first sub-period, from April 1992 to September 
2000, is characterised by political upheavals and civil wars followed by the exodus of 
civilians, international isolation, economic and other sanctions, the NATO bombing 
campaign, a pervasive downfall of the economic system and the deferral of transition. 
The second sub-period began on 5 October 2000 with the peaceful overthrow of 
Slobodan Milosevic and his autocratic socialist regime (see Birch 2002). This was 
followed by the launching of the process of democratisation and economic stabilisation of 
Serbia.
3 The SFRY signed two non-preferential trade agreements with the EC in March 1970 and June 1973, 
respectively (see Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman, 1999, p. 784).
4 A Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA) between the SFRY and the EU was signed on 2 April 1980 
and was put in force on 1 April 1983. However, an Interim Agreement, implementing the trade provisions 
of the 1980 TCA, entered into force in April 1980. According to Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman (1999, p. 
784): "After the break-up of the SFRY, the EU denounced the TCA of 1980, but continued to apply 
unilaterally its commercial terms to the successor republics. This is done through the so-called autonomous 
preferential trade regimes, which are renewed annually. Those regimes stopped applying to Slovenia and 
FYR Macedonia upon the entry into force of their TCAs. Also, the EU decided on political grounds not to 
renew in 1998 and 1999 the autonomous trade preferences to FR Yugoslavia".
5 One should have in mind, however, that the period 1992-1997 was characterised by the close 
collaboration between the ruling Montenegrin government whose president was Milo Djukanovic and the 
Serbian ruling Socialist Party of Serbia whose president was Slobodan Milosevic (see Pavlowitch, 2002).
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The institutional vacuum in which Serbia and Montenegro had separate political 
and economic regimes lasted until 14 March 2002, when the general agreement on the 
"Prelude Principles for the Rearrangement of Relations Between Serbia and Montenegro" 
- the so-called Belgrade Agreement - was agreed upon and signed by the representatives 
of Serbia, Montenegro and the FRY.6 The Belgrade Agreement created the basis for the 
alteration of the FRY constitutional structure as it set forth the work on the Constitutional 
Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, and the Law on Implementation of 
the Constitutional Charter. 7 After almost a full year of preparations, the parliamentary 
assembly of the State Union Serbia and Montenegro (SCG)8 finally adopted the 
Constitutional Charter on 4 February 2003.
The adoption of the Constitutional Charter formally put an end to the existence of 
the FRY, thereby announcing a new era in the political development of the country. The 
new SCG administration become much smaller and performed fewer tasks compared to 
the FRY: its areas of competencies only include defence policy, foreign affairs, 
protection of human and minority rights, and some aspects of international and internal 
economic relations. The SCG appears to be particularly week in the economic domain, as 
the majority of responsibilities in the economic sphere lies in the jurisdiction of the two 
constituent republics. The point is best illustrated by the fact that the SCG does not 
collect its own revenues, depending rather on contributions by the republics (Box 3.1).
Thus, the new country - Serbia and Montenegro - has brought new concerns to 
political and economic analysis as it proved to be organised in a rather unique manner. To 
the political observes, the confusion arose from the fact that the Constitutional Charter 
contained a clause by which, after an initial 3-year period, a republic could chose to set 
up a referendum in which its citizens could vote independence. On the other hand, most 
economic analysts remain puzzled by the question of the functionality of a state with two 
parallel monetary, fiscal, customs and trade regimes.
6 The signatories of the document are: Vojislav KoStunica, President of the FRY, Miroljub Labus, Vice 
President of the Government of the FRY, Milo Dukanovic, President of the Republic of Montenegro, Zoran 
Dindic, Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia, and Filip Vujanovic, Prime Minister of the Republic of 
Montenegro. The agreement was signed in the presence of Javier Solana, High EU Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. See Official Gazette (2003, pp. 95-98).
7 Official Gazette of the State Union Serbia and Montenegro, No. 1/03.
8 The acronym SCG stands for drzavna zajednica Srbija i Crna Gora, which is the formal name of the State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro in Serbian language.
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3.2. 
The SFR Yugoslavia makes an interesting case study for all those whishing to 
explore various 'facial expressions' of socialist regimes. Gros and Steinherr (1995) argue 
that this is due to the fact that SFRY, unlike other countries of the former socialist bloc, 
was more independent of the Stalinist regime, resolute to implement its own brand of 
socialism and more determined to overcome its inherited huge regional socio-economic 
differences. This Yugoslav-type of socialism is often referred to as the 'socialism with a 
human face' or as 'market socialism'. 9
In pursuing these policies under the socialist federation, Serbia went through four 
different economic sub-periods. Based on Bosnjak (2002), the whole period form 1947 to 
1991 can be divided in the following manner:
(i) The period of central planning (1947-1952)
(ii) The period of self-management and economic raise (1953-1965)
(iii) The period of market-oriented economic reforms (1966-1980)
(iv) The period of economic crisis and the beginning of transition (1981 -1991).
Some authors, however, draw different distinctions. For example, Gros and 
Steinherr (1995, p. 324) distinguish two periods: (1) economic prosperity (from the 1950s 
until the end of the 1970s), and (2) economic stagnation and crises (lasting throughout the 
1980s). Also, according to these two authors, Mencinger (1986) distinguishes four 
periods: (1) Soviet-type economic system (1945-1952), (2) mixed administrative self- 
managed market economy (1953-1962), (3) labour-managed market economy (1963- 
1973), and (4) the 'contractual' economy (since 1974). Furthermore, Savic and Pitic 
(1999, p. 10) offer the following division: (i) central planning (1945-1956), (ii) self- 
management (1957-1970), (iii) contractual economy (1971-1982), (iv) stabilisation and 
reforms (1983-1990), and (v) dissolution of SFRY market (1991-).
9 For example, see Gros and Steinherr (1995, pp. 320 and 324) and Steinherr and Ottolenghi (1993, p. 211).
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3.2.1. Period of central planning (1947-1952)
Between 1947 and 1952, the economy operated under the classical social 
economic blueprint with the central plan at the core of the economic system. The concept 
included planners who set both the production targets and prices of produced goods in a 
manner described in the previous chapter. This Soviet-type economic system, however, 
started to be questioned soon after 1948 when President Tito 10 refused to remain under 
the umbrella of Stalinist political command. In economic terms, the consequences of such 
political decisions were, in the case of Yugoslavia, quite severe. By 1949, the SFR 
Yugoslavia was cut-off from all trade arrangements with the East European bloc, while at 
the same time it did not have established political or economic relations with the West.
Having in mind, though, that Yugoslavia preserved its independence from the 
political influence of the Stalinist regime, the political, economic and financial 
connections with the West were established relatively soon thereafter. In the meantime, 
however, the country had to develop its own economic habitat:
"The Yugoslav version of socialism was markedly different from that in other socialist countries 
in Europe. The resulting socialist system acted as a unique laboratory where trial and error 
replaced the theoretical blueprint, the objective being to better the Stalin experience or indeed its 
promises for the future [...] Starting in 1948, Yugoslavia gradually abandoned its rigid command 
system and by 1952 the basis for social ownership and self-management was in place." (Gros and 
Steinherr, 1995, p. 328)
In economic terms, the period following World War II was characterised by great 
state investments in public works, post-war reconstruction and especially in 
electrification, industrialisation, and urbanisation. As a result, some great infrastructural 
projects relating to transport, electric power industry, telecommunications and oil 
pipelines were carried out. Also, the agricultural capacities were renewed, and provided 
an average GDP growth of 2 per cent per annum. The growth of domestic product in this 
period, however, pointed to the forming of its different structure.
10 Josip Broz 'Tito' was appointed the president of the provisional government and the Marshall of 
Yugoslavia in November 1943. In 1945, Tito became prime minister of the government of national unity 
after his Peoples' Front candidate list received majority of the vote. As a result, King Peter II was deposed 
and a republic was proclaimed with Tito at its forefront where he remained for full 35 years, until he died in 
May 1980.
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The portion of industrial production in the domestic product increased from 17.8 
per cent in 1947 to 21.1 per cent in 1952, whereas the share of agricultural production in 
the overall domestic product in the same period dropped from 39.6 per cent to 30.4 per 
cent. At the same time, this period was one of noticeable growth in foreign trade in 
comparison to the pre-war period, marked by an average annual import growth rate of 
17.6 per cent, and, and export growth rate of 8.5 per cent. As a result of a constantly 
growing economy, the employment rate also increased by 8 per cent annually, bringing 
up a better standard of living to a larger number of citizens.
3.2.2. Period of self-management and economic raise (1953-1965)
The period after 1952 is important since the institutional framework for Yugoslav 
'market socialism' began to be implemented throughout the country. The concept related 
to the social ownership of capital and other means of production, which were allocated on 
market-based principles. Social ownership made a key difference between the Yugoslav 
concept of 'market socialism' and 'market socialism' more generally, as it was applied 
elsewhere in Europe through a combination of state and private ownership.
This particular feature of the Yugoslav political and economic system is known 
under the names of self-management, labour management and worker management, since 
management of socially owned firms was the responsibility of various workers' 
representative bodies. The main critique of such a model hinges on the fact that social 
ownership corresponded to the formulation of non-ownership, as workers owing 
enterprises were allowed to accumulate their assets, but could not in any way sell those 
assets in order to increase their incomes.
In macroeconomic terms, the economy recorded very high growth rates that on 
average stood at 8.1 per cent. 11 Even agricultural production, which went through a 
recession in the previous period, achieved a high 4.8 per cent growth rate per annum.
11 Gros and Steinherr (1995, p. 324) argue that the percentage of an average GDP growth during the period 
between 1956 and 1964 was as high as 9 per cent. Steinherr and Ottolenghi (1993, p. 211) note that "the 
period from 1953 and 1965 was the most successful and dynamic one, the period of the Yugoslav 
'economic miracle'...".
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Relative growth performance
Note: r Net Material Product (NMP) for Czechoslovakia 1970-90 and USSR 1980-90; Gross Social 
Product (GSP) for Yugoslavia 1980-90.
2 NMP represents the socialist equivalent of national income that excludes the value of most 
services (including government) that are unrelated to physical production. NMP measure is based on 
constant prices, which do not fully account for inflation, and excludes depreciation. GSP measures total 
output and roughly corresponds to GDP, but excludes certain items of which the most important is imputed 
income from ownership of housing (see Palairet, 2001, p. 904).
Source: Ottolanghi and Steinherr (1993, p. 219).
Such exceptional results even exceeded the OECD and EC countries' average 
growth rates (see Table 3.1). The recorded high average growth rates in the observed 
period mainly resulted from the high annual average employment rates of 5.9 per cent 
and increased investment efficacy. The period was also characterised for its relatively 
low inflation rate of 5.8 per cent and price stability, which induced savings and 
investments and supported a favourable balance of payment position. Still, the years 1961 
and 1962 were marked by a slower economic growth caused by inadequate institutional 
changes and by "weak experience of the state apparatus with a market economy" 
(Bosnjak, 2002, p. 24). Similarly, even though 1963 and 1964 were marked by economic 
growth, growth of work productivity, investment efficacy and living standard, economic 
growth during this and the following years slowed down again due to inadequate 
implementation of the 1960 and 1965 economic reforms. Besides, the lack of a broad 
political consensus further weakened the country's economic performance.
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3.2.3. Period of market-oriented reforms (1966-1980)
In institutional terms, the period after 1965 was marked by the abolishment of 
annual plans and introduction of medium- and long-term plans. The period until the 
adoption of the new constitution in 1974 was characterised by a gradual defiance of 
planning and the silent promotion of a market approach which, according to Gross and 
Steinherr (1995, p. 332), "reached its zenith around 1970". However, the Constitution of 
1974 instaured the so-called 'contractual bargaining' between political and economic 
actors over the allocation of labour and capital, thereby marking a withdrawal from 
market-based economic principles.
In the period after 1974, some elements of a market economy existed, but they 
were not applicable in an environment of a collectively commanded economy. 12 One 
example is the establishment of a two-tier banking system, which was backed by the 
reforms of 1965. Formally, during this period, the SFRY's banking system was
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composed of a 'united monetary system' (Sevic, 1999, p. 204), which included the 
National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBY) and the system of national banks of the republics 
and the autonomous provinces, and a number of 'commercial' banks.
Although the ownership over those 'commercial' banks remained either state or 
social, their direct role in financing enterprises increased remarkably. Banks mainly had a 
regional or local dimension since they were in the majority of cases founded by regional 
or local firms. They were obliged to financially support their clients - the same regional 
and local firms that owed them - regardless of their economic performance and 
profitability. As a result, financial allocation remained inefficient, albeit with a significant 
freeing of domestic prices and trade after 1965. This, in turn, led to the accumulation of 
bad debt arrears. Besides, according to Juselius and Mladenovic (2002, p. 3), "these 
credits were given in domestic currency at the current official rate and were mainly 
associated with external borrowing and domestic savings held in foreign currency" that 
were introduced already in the early 1960s, to make the banking system more attractive.
12 Constitutional changes introduced in 1974 made a basis for disintegration of Yugoslav enterprises into its 
component Basic Organisations of Associated Labour (BOALs). According to Steinherr and Ottolenghi 
(1993, p. 215), this meant that "the mediation of economic decisions through markets was, to a 
considerable extent, replaced by inter-BOAL negotiation and bargaining among enterprises, industry and 
regional consultative councils, which were conduits for political intervention".
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The period was characterised by rather unfavourable macroeconomic indicators as 
well. According to Bosnjak (2002, p. 25), in comparison with the previous period, the 
inflation rate more than doubled (in 1980 the inflation rate was 30 per cent), the GDP 
growth rate was reduced to 5.7 per cent (3.5 per cent in 1980), whereas the employment 
rate was 3.1 per cent. Even though the initial intention of the 1965 reform was to employ 
advanced technical equipment so as to improve work productivity and thus ensure an 
increase in the domestic product, this result was not achieved (see Bosnjak, 2002). Also, 
the economic structure did not change, while structural discord deepened further.
Emphasising the development of secondary industry, which caused the import of 
raw materials to grow faster than the export, terms of trade worsened, inducing the 
widening of balance of payments deficit. Parallel to this occurrence, savings rates were 
declining, putting additional pressure on the side of balance of payments financing needs. 
The consequent "Yugoslav foreign borrowing spree" (Palairet, 2001, p. 907), which 
ended in 1979, dramatically increased the total country's external indebtness. All this 
contributed to the overall worsening of the macroeconomic situation of the country in the 
period that followed.
3.2.4. Period of economic crisis and the beginning of transition (1981-1991)
The economic performance of SFRY in the 1980s differed enormously from 
previous experience. The beginning of the period was marked by the country's 
recognition that it could no longer finance its debt obligations. The problem reached its 
culmination at the end of 1982, and so the Federal Government in 1983 resorted to a 
specific set of reforms established under the "Long-Term Stabilisation Programme" 
(LTSP) policy framework (Gros and Steinherr, 1995, p. 326). New sets of traditional 
stabilisation policies combined with the resources allocation based on market principles, 
model was a central feature of the LTSP, which aimed to shift resources to net exports for 
a prolonged period of time in order to accumulate the financial means needed to service 
the foreign debt. Although the LTSP was not carried out consistently, during the period 
1983-1989, the country's balance of payments situation improved, recording a surplus.
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Even though the external position was stabilised, the economy recorded a low 
level of investment, which at first turned into stagnation and later into an overall decrease 
in economic activity and growth. The actual figures show that the rate of investment, 
which according to Gross and Steinherr (1995, p. 324) fluctuated around 30 per cent of 
GDP until the end of 1970s, fell drastically during the 1980s, amounting to 
approximately 20 percent of GDP (see Bosnjak, 2002, p. 26). During the period 1981- 
1990, the average annual GDP decrease rate was 0.4 per cent, which was followed by a 
reduction in the employment rate that turned negative as of 1987. 13 As a result, in 1990 
the rate of unemployment reached a very high 17.2 per cent.
The set of traditional stabilisation policies that made up part of the LTSP relied on 
a tight fiscal and monetary policy. Constitutionally, the balanced budget was secured 
since the federal government was obliged to finance its expenditures up to the level of its 
revenues and was not allowed to borrow in order to finance any increased expenditures. 
Nevertheless, the quasi-fiscal deficits that existed among various enterprises owned by 
regional or local administrations were monetised because of excessive wage demand and 
thus fuelled inflation. Petrovic and Vujosevic (2000, p. 511) confirm that, during the 
1980s, Yugoslavia's money supply accommodated wage instead of price inflation, 
suggesting that monetary accommodation in transition economies with dominant social 
sector and resulting soft budget constrains is 'institutionally specific'.
Under such circumstances, a tight monetary policy programme was needed in 
order to stop the acceleration of inflation, which in 1982 reached 32 per cent, whereas in 
1988 and 1989, it amounted to 199 and 1,256 per cent, respectively. But, controlling 
monetary aggregates was difficult. According to Gros and Steinherr (1995, p. 327), this 
was due to the fact that between 40 and 50 per cents of bank deposits were denominated 
in foreign currency 14 which, in combination with a continuous local currency 
depreciation, led to automatic increases in the money supply. The authors also point out 
that, although at the time the central bank used reserve requirements and credit ceilings 
on bank lending as its main monetary instruments, it was unable to ensure full financial 
discipline and banks' compliance with those requirements.
13 According to Savic and Pitic (1999, p. 11) the employment rate turn negative as of 1990.
14 Gros and Steinher (1995, p. 327) argue that "these deposits developed rapidly during the 1970s as a result 
of earnings from tourism and emigrants' remittances" since 1.2 million of workers migrated to the West.
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In fact, if the central bank had pursued the restrictive monetary policy it had 
advocated, it would have closed the banks with large exposures to the loss-making 
enterprises, which would have led to the closure of those enterprises, too. Since from a 
political perspective this measure was unpopular, the central bank had to ease its 
monetary policy and accommodate credit expansion in order to ensure the liquidity of the 
system by printing more money. In institutional terms, it was easy to implement such an 
expansionary monetary policy, as the National Bank of Yugoslavia retained a low level 
of legal independence. Cukierman (1992, p. 381) calculated that during the 1980s the 
index of the overall legal independence of the NBY equalled to 0.13, which corresponds 
to the second lowest rank among 68 observed central banks, Switzerland being the top 
ranking country with the index of 0.68.
In such circumstances, the exchange and credit risks were borne by the NBY, 
which that acted as the lender of last resort. These losses accounted for a large portion of 
quasi-fiscal deficit that in turn perpetuated and accelerated inflation. In relation to this, 
Petrovic and Vujosevic (2000) indicate that the dinar loans that commercial banks 
awarded to companies during the 1970s (while inflation rate was relatively low) were 
based on external borrowing and domestic savings held in foreign currency. However, 
when the inflation rate went up during the 1980s, "large nominal currency depreciation 
wiped out enterprises' dinar debts, ultimately leaving foreign currency liabilities in the 
hands of the central bank and the government" (Petrovic and Vujosevic, 2000, p. 499). 
Furthermore, Lahiri (1991) finds that inflation in SFRY induced a considerable increase 
in the velocity of money, resulting in 80 per cent rate of inflation. Besides, the NBY 
policy to support economic activity by ensuring liquidity in the system, combined with a 
large proportion of deposits denominated in foreign currency, simultaneously led to 
inflation perpetuation during the 1980s (see Petrovic, 1995).
The situation by the end of the 1980s worsened further, calling for a 
comprehensive systemic transformation of the enterprise ownership, a modification of the 
country's trade regime, the consolidation of federal/regional budgets and inflation 
stabilisation. As a result, in March 1989 the newly elected Federal Executive Council 
(FEC) presented its five-year "Economic Reform Programme" (see FEC, 1990), also 
known as 'Markovic programme' which marked the SFRY's beginning of transition.
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The significance of Markovic programme is twofold. 15 Firstly, as we argued in the 
introductory chapter, this programme was the very first transition programme applied in 
Eastern Europe. Secondly, this programme is significant as it recognised the necessity of 
establishing of a new economic system instead of revising the old one, with the complete 
acceptance of international economic and political standards and opening towards the 
world. The programme, nevertheless, had one major fundamental drawback. Namely, as 
we shall see later in our work, this programme was never fully implemented, because of a 
lack of political consensus.
It is interesting to note that Markovic already had clear and developed ideas about 
what steps needed to be taken in order to protect the country from a further economic 
downturn while before he become president of the FEC. Markovic presented those ideas 
at the session of the Presidency of the Federal Conference of the Socialist Alliance of 
Working People of Yugoslavia16 on 28 January 1989, when he stressed the following:
"After much wavering we have finally realized that the causes underlying our crisis are manifold 
and that we cannot find a way out of it through revisions of the system. We have to create a new 
economically efficient and democratic society, an entirely new kind of socialism [...] It is evident 
that the way out of the crisis lies in reforms, which will proceed from an integral market, 
autonomy and rights of work organizations and economic entities to economic an development 
decision-making an responsibilities for such decisions and which will be based on opening to the 
world, with communication of not only goods but also know-how, technology, capital and people 
who would represent our fight to become part of the world, and also part of Europe by establishing 
connections with the most advanced developments." (FEC, 1990, p. 21 and 67)
Despite the fact that, at that time, the Yugoslav economy's most immediate and 
acute problem was spiralling inflation, the FEC stood at the viewpoint that the creation of 
an entirely new economic environment was the precondition for a successful fight against 
(hyper)inflation. This realisation is exactly what decouples the SFRY's transition 
programme from the other transition plans applied elsewhere in Easter Europe. We recall 
from the previous chapter that conventional wisdom required that the stabilisation agenda 
be carried out before a comprehensive set of structural measures could be implemented.
15 Ante Markovic was the President of the FEC from 15 March 1989 until 20 December 1991.
16 The Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia [Socijalisticki savez radnog naroda Jugoslavije] 
steams from the People's Front of Yugoslavia [Narodni front Jugoslavije] headed by Tito. See footnote 10.
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According to FEC (1990, p. 69), the establishment of a new economic system 
implied the following: first, the building of new market institutions and mechanisms; 
second, identifying and resolving the issues surrounding the inherited large deficits of the 
state, banks and enterprises; third, adapting to the new market conditions of all economic 
agents (enterprises, banks, state institutions, individuals, trade unions); fourth, personnel 
changes and the strengthening of employee motivation through increased 
competitiveness;/////;, pursuing of a sound macroeconomic policy; sixth, formulating of a 
new concept and strategy of development.
The set of economic actions designed to address the above-mentioned problems 
can be grouped around the following ten points 17 :
(1) Battle against inflation;
(2) Financial system consolidation;
(3) Efficient state finance and fiscal system;
(4) Price and import liberalisation;
(5) Enhanced external economic relations;
(6) Setting up of a new business environment;
(7) Regulation of labour relations;
(8) Attention to social policy;
(9) Introduction of a new development strategy, and
(10) Enhanced economic growth via various neglected resources.
Nominally, these measures largely coincided with the measures suggested by 
Bruno (1993), Fischer and Gelb (1991) and the Washington consensus. By end-June 
1989, some of them were partially implemented, as a number of systemic laws supporting 
the overall economic reforms were adopted. Among the set of adopted laws, the law on 
enterprises introduced the most radical changes into the economic system of the country 
by enabling the transformation of undefined ownership of social property into social 
capital, with a designated holder bearing the consequences of its economic decision.
17 These ten points were put forward by Prime Minister Markovic in his speech delivered on 29 September 
1989 at the occasion of the review of economic policy of that year, its implementing instruments, and a 
presentation of further anti-inflationary measures (see FEC, 1990, pp. 67-89).
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Similarly, the Law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia of June 1989 18 aimed at 
the systematic improvement of the NBY's credibility, and at strengthening the financial 
discipline through a rigorous control of banks' debts and their restructuring. Likewise, the 
laws on accounting, foreign exchange operations, foreign economic relations and a 
number of other laws, from the point of view of the FEC, all incorporated anti-inflation 
components by ensuring increased security in economic transactions, deregulation and 
liberalisation of trade relations, and by building a market-oriented business environment.
However, while the federal government considered the transformation of the old 
arsenal of administrative measures as a precondition for fight against inflation, some 
economists considered it as a delayed implementation of much-needed stabilisation and 
anti-inflation measures. In relation to that, Savic (1989, p. 17) writes:
"Furthermore, the calendar of measures and moves is seriously reproached, for such a 
conceived programme directly pushed the economy into hyperinflation. We might say that FEC 
did not act upon the generators of inflation, which are today [November 1989, auth. remark] the 
most intense, while their actions or mere announcing of their actions, and sometimes even neglect 
of the need for certain actions, directly contributed to a swift shift from a high inflation to 
hyperinflation."
It seems that views among economists over the right anti-inflationary strategy 
varied according to their diverging views on the underlining sources of the country's 
(hyper)inflation. The FEC argued that the causes were cost-pushed and demand-pulled 
mechanisms embodied in the very fabric of the economic system and, thus, structural. 19
18 Official Gazette of the SFRY, No. 34/89, 88/89, 96/91 and 16/93.
19 The FEC (1990, pp. 80-82) indicated the following as the main causes of inflation: (1) Inclusion of 
anticipated inflation in the price, which meant that the goods and services were sold at future prices rather 
than at prices which reflected the real costs of production, thus inducing spiral effect and increased 
expectations of further price rise; (2) Elevation of taxes and public welfare was caused by the impossibility 
to collect on time, at lower rates, from state-owned debtors, and as this elevation of taxes and contributions 
ultimately burdened the economy, and further on the prices of final products, it hurried the progressive 
inflation growth; (3) Rise of the primary issue and its utilisation for covering the fiscal deficit, and the 
inability of NBY to handle a firm monetary policy and control the monetary aggregate movement, which, 
over the first four months of 1989, caused the money supply to grow faster than the growth of prices 
mainly through new monetisation flows like irregular use of promissory notes, quasi-regular flows between 
banks and enterprises and among enterprises, illegal use of cheques, etc.; (4) Existence of extensive public 
consumption and expenditure, which were not financed from real sources; (5) Unidentified deficit of the 
public sector due to non-existence of a unified state budget; (6) Deficits in banks and enterprises; (7) 
Indexing of personal income to anticipated inflation; (8) Restricted terms of trade and existence of trade 
barriers which, in turn, limited competition and supply and allowed for formation of monopoly prices, and 
(9) Rigid concept and role of commodity reserves, which stopped the government from intervening 
efficiently on the market and suppress the growth of prices of certain commodities.
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Although Savic (1989, p. 13) agrees that the inherited structural inefficiencies 
represented the core of the problem, he also emphasised that the "old concepts of 
defeating inflation and their classification into the inflation of demand, cost-push 
inflation, structural inflation, and other, are not longer sufficient and adequate". As a 
contrast, he argues that the causes of (hyper)inflation in the SFRY derived from private 
agents' inflation expectations and that, therefore, they should be analysed in the context 
of the theory of rational expectations. This theory, which was the leading economic 
theory in the late 1980s, is based on the assumption that all private agents use all 
available information in the formulation of their expectations over future rates of 
inflation, while at the same time not dominantly relying on the past experience.20
The author's view is also influenced by the solutions to fighting inflation applied 
during mid-1980s in Israel and in several Latin American countries like Argentina, 
Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. On the basis of those countries' experience, Savic 
(1989, p. 14) classifies the main generators of the SFRY's high inflation into the 
following three groups:
(i) Rational inflationary expectations of economic agents that are based on 
frequent changes in economic circumstances and on all available information,
(ii) Inadequate economic policy measures that accompany anti-inflationary 
measures (especially in fiscal domain and deficit financing), and
(iii) Problems of systemic nature that need structural adjustments in the fields of 
both economy and politics.
Additionally, the author points out that certain other actions by the FEC, and 
disengagement from its announced policy actions, also contributed to the inflation hike. 
In particular, he argues that the FEC's measure to limit personal incomes announced in 
October 1989, but not adopted provoked, in fact, a new inflation wave due to the rational 
expectations of the country's economic subjects and the adaptation of their business 
behaviour to the announced government measure.
20 The theory of rational expectations was pioneered by Muth (1961), whereas Lucas (1972, 1973), Sargent 
(1973), Sargent and Wallace (1976), and Barro (1976) developed this theory further (see Savic, 1989, p. 7).
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Additionally, Savic (1989) underlines that the interest rate of 28 per cent set by 
the FEC as a sort of nominal anchor, together with an inflation rate of about 50 per cent, 
created heavy disturbances in the monetary and exchange rate policy. Moreover, he 
argues that the government's income policy, based on the free formation of salaries, 
which aimed at establishing a balanced cost of labour as a production factor, actually led
to an uncontrolled rise of labour costs, induced further inflation growth. The final 
objection relates to the inexistence of adequate nominal anchor(s) in a situation in which 
the suppression of inflationary expectations is required.
One should have in mind, though, that Savic (1989) directs his comments to the 
actions and performance of the FEC in the period from March to mid-November 1989,
*}*)
and that the FEC presented its anti-inflation programme only on 18 December 1989. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the Markovic programme failed to introduce firm stabilisation 
measures at the beginning of the transition process, stands at the heart of this 
programme's critique, because the prolongation of stabilisation alters from the general 
theoretical recommendations substantiated in the previous chapter.
Once introduced, however, the included a wide set of 
measures in the area of fiscal, monetary, trade, credit and wage policies as well as
currency reform. A favourable balance of payments position, large foreign exchange 
reserves of USD 5.8 billion, and strong external financial support, formed the basis for 
the introduction of the anti-inflationary package. It should be noted that these propitious 
macroeconomic parameters were only registered after Markovic took over the FEC 
presidency and that the initial macroeconomic imbalances were more severe, as shown in 
the previous sections.
21 The authors of the OECD economic Survey for Yugoslavia (1990, p. 15) agree with this point, 
emphasising that the increase in real wages, which they estimated to be at around 20 per cent in the first 
eight months of 1989, represented an important cost-push factor: "A self-feeding process of runaway 
inflation developed in which producers selling on credit charged prices significantly above current costs in 
anticipation of expected losses arising from the erosion of real money value by the time of actual payment."
22 We have seen in the introductory chapter that some authors, like Gros and Steinherr (1995, p. 319), 
neglect the importance of this anti-inflationary programme on the grounds that it was not as comprehensive 
as the Polish programme of 1990. Edwards (1992, p. 130), on the other hand, notes that "the liberalization 
and stabilization programs in Poland and Yugoslavia exhibit a number of striking similarities".
23 This stabilisation programme differed from the previous partial stabilisations undertaken by various 
SFRY governments during the 1980s. According to Bruno (1993, p. 209) the stabilisation programme of 
1985 was based on wage-price controls, while 1988 stabilisation policies relied on imposition of wage and 
credit controls. Both programmes, however, were seen as partially stabilising as restrictive fiscal policies 
were not pursued and so both programmes failed in bringing long-term stabilising effects.
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Based on the country's favourable foreign exchange reserves position, the FEC 
was in a situation to design an exchange-rate based stabilisation programme which, 
together with Poland's stabilisation programme adopted two weeks later, on 1 January 
1990, was the first major stabilisation and reform programme applied among transition 
countries. Concrete stabilisation measures included the establishment of:
(i) Convertibility of the dinar in the current transactions with foreign countries by
introduction of a new currency unit 'convertible dinar' 24 ; 
(ii) Sound and restrictive monetary policy, and 
(iii) Restrictive policy of public sector wages and expenditure.
Even though it was the first and novel feature of the programme, 
was not seen as an aim in itself but as a means for achieving stable economic flows and 
sustainable development. The convertible dinar was pegged to the deutsche mark at an 
exchange rate of seven to one (12 convertible dinars to one US dollar). The idea behind 
the fixing of the dinar exchange rate to the deutsche mark lay in the extensive trade 
relations with Germany and the fact that, due to high inflation, most contract obligations 
were calculated in DEM. Moreover, as in the case of Poland, the nominal exchange rate 
was fixed for a period of six months, until 30 June 1990, after an initial maxi-devaluation 
"as a way of providing an anchor for the price system" (Edwards, 1992, p. 142).
The effects of the government decision to resort to the exchange rate as a nominal 
anchor were the following. Firstly, the measure sent a signal to enterprises that it would 
not be possible to accommodate prices through constant devaluation of domestic 
currency and that, therefore, enterprises would have to restrain cost and price increases if 
they were to remain competitive. Secondly, this decision aimed at restoring the citizens' 
confidence in domestic currency in order to support the credibility of the programme and 
suppress high inflation expectations, which was especially important in the short-run.
24 One new convertible dinar equalled 10,000 old dinars.
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The second feature of the programme was the pursuance of a 
exercised through a more effective control over the money supply during 1990. 
The target for the growth of net domestic assets (NDA) of the banking sector was fixed at 
7 per cent and for Ml at 24 per cent.25 Additionally, in order to contain the increase in 
liquidity registered at the beginning of 1990, the NBY instructed commercial banks to 
invest 700 million dinars in the NBY's bills, but at the same time it raised interest rate on 
mandatory reserves from 12 to 25 per cent, to prevent the squeeze in banks' profits.
Thirdly, until 30 June 1990 the stabilisation included Wages 
were frozen at their level of 15 December 1989, although there were two adjustments 
officially estimated to raise average wages by 15 per cent in January 1990 over those of 
December 1989. It is interesting to note that, apart from SFRY, no other transition 
country opted to freeze wages in order to stabilise the economy, although "wage policies 
were an integral part of all stabilisation policies" (Sahay and Vegh, 1995, p. 29).
Additionally, the programme assumed the imposition of a partial six-month 
that affected public utilities, (non-)ferrous metals and pharmaceuticals, comprising 
some 20 per cent of the consumer price index basket. 26 In addition, the price freeze was 
decreed for rents and other housing charges, mainly levied by local authorities, preceded 
by a considerable upward price adjustments in the course of December 1989, and was 
aimed at reducing distortions in the structure of prices (OECD, 1990, p. 61).
In parallel with measures taken in the monetary sphere, the government continued 
to apply its by integrating off-budget items and extra 
expenditures of the public sector in a consolidated federal budget. This action of 
incorporation was officially estimated to cost around 3 per cent of GDP, the greatest part 
of which was to be covered by increased taxation and through the Oliveira-Tanzi effect27 
(Bruno, 1993, p. 210). Accordingly, the government introduced a special turnover tax of 
3 per cent applying to all goods (except food) and of 5 per cent applying to a great 
number of services.
25 See OECD (1990, p. 62)
26 Consumer price index (CPI) is a measure of the average change in prices over time in a market basket of 
goods and services. See Bruno (1993, p. 210).
27 Oliveira-Tanzi effect is a synonym for delays in tax collections during the periods of high inflations 
leading to the widening of fiscal deficits to an extent equivalent to the rate of inflation increase (see Savic, 
1989). Or, as Rostowski (1998, p. 109) puts it, that is the fall in the real value of conventional tax revenues.
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The anti-inflation strategy itself, however, exhibited certain weak-points and to 
some observers seemed untenable (see OECD, 1990). This was so firstly because some 
remaining price pressures were still representing a threat to the sustainability of the 
programme. The second argument put forward by the OECD (1990, p. 64) is that 
"convertibility combined with a guaranteed exchange rate for a fixed period in the face of 
still high price rises by international comparison in the early months of the year could 
induce shift out of dinars into foreign currencies towards the end of the wage freeze and 
steep import growth". Namely, it was assumed that under those conditions, the balance of 
payments would exhibit a downward pressure on the exchange rate.
However, the authorities were aware of these drawbacks and were, therefore, 
paying extra attention to structural reforms. The aim was to restore domestic confidence 
and to enhance the positive results of the supply-side effects of reforms such as the 
increased financial discipline of enterprises and growing foreign competition. Moreover,
Q
the existing favourable level of official reserves of around USD 7.5 billion had to play 
an important role in case of a possible increase of conversion from dinars to foreign 
currency. Since, at that time, the deutsche mark had already gradually replaced the dinar 
as a unit of account for most domestic transactions, the margin for shifting out of dinars 
was limited and was estimated to USD 1.5 billion, leaving enough space for official 
reserves to meet rising imports.
However, the Markovic programme reached its maximum in September 1990 
when - only nine months after its inception - it fell into a crisis. After a slim price 
increase of 0.3 per cent registered in May 1990 and negative inflation rate of 0.3 per cent 
in June 1990, inflation recorded a 7.3 per cent raise in September 1990. The programme 
was greatly affected by the illegal issuance of money by the National Bank of Slovenia 
and the National Bank of Croatia, which took place in October 1990, and by the National 
Bank of Serbia and the National Bank of Vojvodina in December 1990 (see Dinkic, 
2000). The republican national banks were mainly granting liquidity loans to commercial 
banks above the collateral as prescribed by the National Bank of Yugoslavia.29
28 This figure corresponds to the end of February 1990 (OECD, 1990, p. 66).
29 Granting of credits on the basis of collateral was prescribed by the NBY based on Art. 14 and 19 of the 
Law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia and the Single Monetary Management of the National Banks of 
the Republics and the Autonomous Provinces, Official Gazette of the SFRY, No. 34/89.
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According to Dinkic (2000, 64), these "spectacular incursions into the monetary 
system" marked the end of the Markovic's programme. The magnitude of the illegal30 
money issuance in Serbia alone was such that it equalled to one half of the total official 
money supply envisaged for 1991. As a result, the level of international reserves in 
December 1990 decreased by USD 1.5 billion, which is the biggest monthly fall in 
SFRY's international reserves ever registered.
The mechanism, as explained by Dinkic (2000, pp. 59-69), worked in the 
following way. In the late 1990 and early 1991 political tensions between republics took 
primacy and so the republican administrations were unwilling to comply with the 
proposed structural reforms. Even more, as the republics anticipated the disintegration of 
the country, they aimed at collecting large balances of hard foreign currencies. They 
included in their plans the republican national banks and payment bureaus 
which allowed commercial banks to use their 
mandatory reserves and overdrafts to buy as much foreign currency as they could. Later 
on, the commercial banks had been provided with so-called liquidity loans to 'cover' 
their negative money balances. Those loans represented the 'grey emission of money' by 
the republican national banks that, in the period from October 1990 to February 1991, 
equalled to: DEM 3.1 billion in Serbia, DEM 289 million in Montenegro, DEM 243 
million in Croatia, DEM 143 million in Slovenia (see Dinkic, 2000, p. 68). The amounts 
in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were negligible.
As a result, the macroeconomic situation in the SFRY worsened again during 
1990. The country registered a large balance of payments deficit of USD 2.5 billion and a 
substantial foreign debt of USD 18 billion (Bosnjak, 2002, p. 26). Moreover, due to the 
disintegration of the Yugoslavia-wide market induced by political tensions, the GDP 
growth rate of 1990 exhibited a fall of 11.6 per cent in comparison to 1989, whereas the 
annual inflation in 1991 quickly reached a high 121.7 per cent (Dinkic, 2000, p. 33).
30 According to Dinkic (2000, p. 64), Serbia has legalised its action retroactively by adopting the Law on 
the Loan of the National Bank of Serbia to the Republic of Serbia and the Decree on Authorisation of the 
Loans for the Purpose of Securing Banks' Liquidity, both of which were published in the Official Gazette 
of the Republic of Serbia - Special Edition, No. 14/90, and labelled as 'top secret'. The confidentiality was 
based on the Article 14a of the Law on the Publishing of the Laws and Other Legal Acts (Official Gazette 
of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, No. 21/78 and 55/80) and the Decree on the Conditions and Conduct of 
Publishing and Handling of the "Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Serbia - Special Edition" 
(Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, No. 59/81 and 17/82).
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It should be underlined that Markovic's programme of 1989 was an exchange rate 
stabilisation programme, the elements of which resembled the basics of other transitional 
anti-inflation stabilisation programmes.31 The major critique of this programme, thus, 
hinges on the fact that its implementation was delayed and fractional. It remains unclear, 
though, whether the lack of full implementation was only due to political or also due to 
economic considerations. Our analysis has shown that the Markovic programme 
exhibited certain drawbacks on both fronts. With regards to political factors, we find that 
it was lucking strong political support, which undermined the credibility of the 
programme and the credibility of the institutions that were in charge of its 
implementation. Consequently, and in relation to the economic aspects, the programme 
failed as its stabilisation measures were prolonged and implemented only partially.
On a more technical side, the programme was considered to be comprehensive. Its 
first component aimed at the elimination of monetary disequilibrium (reduction of 
monetary overhang) through simultaneous (a) large nominal devaluation, (b) freeing of 
the vast majority of prices, and (c) declaration of the (partial) convertibility of national 
currency. Major price level adjustments happened almost automatically, but the fact that 
even after these price adjustments around 50 per cent of bank deposits were held in 
foreign exchange currencies points to the fact that the credibility of the programme was 
rather weak (Edwards, 1992, p. 138). Stabilisation in the SFRY also relied on an 
increased in interest rates, in order to control aggregate demand, and on tight fiscal 
discipline based on massive expenditure cuts and the reduction of subsidies to public 
firms. Additionally, the programme introduced a (partial) de-indexation of wages aiming 
at the reduction of inflation inertia through a decoupling of wage increases from the 
country's inflation experience. Moreover, after the large devaluation and the introduction 
of currency convertibility, the nominal exchange rate was fixed in order to provide an 
anchor to the price system. However, as the country experienced real exchange rate 
appreciation in 1990, which reduced the degree of its exports' competitiveness, the fixed 
exchange rate was abandoned by early 1991. Finally, the illegal incursions into the 
monetary system brought to an end the first transition stabilisation programme in SFR 
Yugoslavia and, incidentally or not, brought about the end of the country itself.
31 See Chapter I for the overview of main features of transition stabilisation programmes.
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One can argue that Serbia in the period between 1992 and 2000, being one of the 
two constituent republics of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, went through the most 
turbulent period in its modern history. After several decades of high economic 
achievements that lasted until the end of 1970s, and a subsequent decade of high inflation 
and external imbalances, Serbia during the 1990s stepped into an era of economic 
morass. Political developments, which took place during that decade, fully determined 
the economic (under)performance of the country, setting it tens of years back.
The 1990s were marked by a significant deterioration of economic activity, 
underpinned by international isolation and severe economic sanctions imposed on FRY 
by the UN Security Council, the US and EU administrations. 33 Apart from economic 
sanctions, civil wars, hundreds of thousands of refugees, and the loss of a broader 
Yugoslav market, have all contributed to the interruption of the transition process in 
general. In the period between 1992 and 2000, Serbia also experienced the blistering 
episode of NATO raids and an extraordinary, revolutionary event dubbed the 'bulldozer 
revolution'. 34 Most of those events, however, only related to the Republic of Serbia and 
thus we exclude the Republic of Montenegro from our further analysis.
32 Legally, the FRY lasted from 27 April 1992 until 4 February 2003.
33 The sanctions were imposed on all commercial and financial transactions between the FRY and the rest 
of the world. The embargo was extended to include sports and cultural activities. Also, a rather strict 
regime of working, business and travel visas was introduced for all FRY's citizens travelling to Europe and 
the United States. Undoubtedly, all this further encumbered the process of economic transformation of the 
Yugoslav society and economy, greatly hindering the renewal of FRY's linkages with the developed 
countries. The sanctions were in force in the period between 1991 and 2001. However, the exact 
chronology of legal measures introduced by the UN, EU and US is somewhat complex and it is, therefore, 
not presented here. For a detailed analysis of sanctions imposed on FRY see Bosnjak (2002, pp. 78-97).
34 The term represents a synonym for turbulent period surrounding the FRY presidential elections of 24 
September 2000. In relation to this, Birch (2002, p. 507) writes the following: "On 4 October the 
Constitutional Court released a statement claiming that the presidential elections were partially annulled 
and suggested that they would have to be re-held at a later date prior to the expiration of Milosevic's 
official term in July. This infuriated the opposition, which issued an ultimatum; if Milosevic did not step 
down by 3.00 pm on 5 October, Serbian citizens were to storm the federal parliament building. This is 
exactly what happened. A crowd estimated at between 500,000 and a million from all over Serbia gathered 
before the parliament. [...] The crowd stormed the parliament building, followed soon thereafter by the 
headquarters of Radio Television Serbia, where a front-loader was used to break the police cordon (whence 
the moniker 'bulldozer revolution')."
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Based on the above-mentioned facts, we divide the observed period into the three 
distinct sub-periods:
(i) Hyperinflation and economic destruction (1992-1998)
(ii) Economic aspects of the Kosovo conflict and the NATO raids of 1999
(iii) The 'bulldozer revolution' and the year 2000.
It is beyond any doubt that the Serbian episode of hyperinflation was the most 
intriguing from the monetary point of view and so the vast part of this section deals with 
that particular issue. Besides, hyperinflation as such represents a universal problem, 
whereas the other events mentioned here are more country-specific. Therefore, the 
section outlines the causes and consequences of Serbia's hyperinflation and critically 
appraises the stabilisation programme that followed. Also, based on an analysis of 
macroeconomic parameters registered during 1999 and 2000, the section concludes that 
the ten years have basically been lost and that the country only started catching up with 
the rest of transition countries in 2001.
110
The recession that Serbia faced in 1990 led its economy into a depression in 1991, 
which continued for a few years. Table 3.2 shows that the period between 1991 and 1993 
registered a sharp decline of growth rate, which in 1991 was -10.9 per cent, in 1992 
equalled to -31.9 per cent, and in 1993 amounted to -30.8 per cent. In addition, Bosnjak 
(2002, p. 28) calculates that the degree of production capacities usage in 1993 was only 
30 per cent, which was about 50 per cent lower then in 1990 when the degree of usage 
stood at 62 per cent. Such a low degree of economic activity was enough to secure only 
basic citizens' needs and to provide a minimum functioning of public services.
Moreover, as shown in Graph 3.1, statistically registered GDP in 1993 was about 
60 per cent lower than the GDP recorded in 1989. Graph 3.1 also illustrates the 
deterioration of productivity, which in 1993 was just slightly over 40 per cent of the 1990 
productivity rate. It is our view, however, that in an economy hamstrung by severe 
economic sanction, this occurrence appears inevitable. 35
Although faced with difficult social-economic circumstances, formal employment 
in Serbia was artificially maintained because of the fear of possible social outrage. 
However, due to a decrease in growth and productivity rates, the standard of living 
recorded a significant drop. Per capita income decreased by about 50 per cent in just one 
year, from USD 2,000 in 1991 to only USD 1,000 in 1993, as shown in Table 3.2.
Additionally, due to the economic sanctions and loss of business connections with 
Western European trading partners, the exchange of goods with the rest of the world was 
drastically reduced. According to Bosnjak (2002, p. 46), during the 1991-1993 period, the 
exports of goods fall by 20.5, and imports by 25.9 per cent. The export/import structure 
transformed as well. The share of low-scale manufactured products significantly 
increased, whereas the portion of final, high-scale manufactured products decreased in 
the total export numbers. Moreover, there was a significant reduction of equipment 
allotment in the import structure, which contributed to the drop in domestic products 
quality and resulted in a substantial decrease in their international competitiveness.
35 In contrast, Palairet (2001, p. 908) notes that "the extent to which trade sanctions brought about 
economic decline is debatable, because of the inefficiency, corruption and cynicism with which they were 
administered".
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3.2. 
c
a Inflation rates are calculated as differences of natural logarithms as in Cagan (1956)
b As in most Eastern European countries, the Yugoslav Statistical Office used and regularly reported 
the material balances definition of "social product," i.e., it excluded health, educational, financing, housing 
and other services. However, the Statistical Office made an estimate of GDP in 1994; starting from this 
estimate we find that a good approximation of GDP for the period 1991 to 1993 would be to increase the 
corresponding "social product" by a factor of 1.15. In this paper GDP is primarily used to obtain various 
shares, and these shares are not sensitive to increasing "social product" by a factor of 1.1 or 1.2 as 
compared to 1.15.
c An increase in the real exchange rate index signifies real exchange rate depreciation. When 
December is excluded from the estimate of real exchange rate, the number is much lower at 156. We are 
inclined to take this lower figure as a measure of the real depreciation in hyperinflationary 1993, as the 
official estimate of the inflation rate in December 1993 is somewhat unreliable.
d For 1993, the first column shows the estimate of the Federal Government, while the second column 
gives the estimate of the authors. The official estimate is distorted, in our opinion, by improper accounting 
of extreme hyperinflation in 1993. Therefore we offer our correction of official estimate, but nonetheless 
we report both estimates.
Petrovic (1999, p. 339).
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The crucial macroeconomic problem at the beginning of the 1990s was high and 
swelling inflation. Namely, the inflation annual average in 1991 stood at 117.8 per cent 
with a monthly average of 10 per cent (see Table 3.2). The same table reveals that the 
corresponding figures in 1992 were significantly higher - that is 8,954.3 percent and 55 
per cent, respectively. At that point, Serbia's high inflation turned into hyperinflation. 
Based on the official data, published by the Federal Bureaux of Statistics, Popovic and 
Stamenkovic (1994, p. 5) note that prices in December 1993 went up by more than 179 
thousand per cent. As a result, ending 1993 and entering 1994 the Serbian economy 
marked a monthly inflation rate of over 300 million per cent.
120
100
Employment - total ^| Productivity () Social product
BoSnjak (2002, p. 53).
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Inflation reached its peak in January 1994 when FRY recorded a rate of 313 
million per cent per month. Even though the data unquestionably reached high figures, 
some authors believe that the data was overestimated and that the appropriate figure was 
58 million per cent, which was the black market exchange rate depreciation.36 Regardless 
of whether the Yugoslav monthly rate of inflation reached 58 or 313 million per cent, the 
hyperinflation was placed into a historical contexts as the second highest (after the 
Hungarian hyperinflation of 1945-1947) and the second longest (after the Russian 
hyperinflation of 1922-1924)37 hyperinflation ever recorded in global monetary history. 
The comparative figures are given in Table 3.3.
_______________
Country
Austria
Germany
Greece
Hungary I
Hungary II
Poland
Russia
Yugoslavia
Beginning
Oct. 1921
Aug. 1922
Nov. 1943
Mar. 1923
Aug. 1945
Jan. 1923
Dec. 1921
Feb. 1992
End
Aug. 1922
Nov. 1923
Nov. 1944
Feb. 1924
Jul. 1946
Jan. 1924
Jan. 1924
Feb. 1994
PT/PO
70
1.0 xlO 10
4.7 xlO6
44
3.8 x 1027
699
1.2 x 10 5
1.6 xlO21
Average 
monthly 
inflation rate %
47
322
365
46
19,800
82
57
19,395
Average 
monthly money 
growth %
31
314
220
33
12,200
72
49
-
PT/Po: Price level in the last month of hyperinflation divided by the price level in the first month. 
Blanchard (2000, p. 447), Dinkic (2000, pp. 36, 43), Nielsen (2004, p. 6), Rostowski (1998, p. 88).
The period between 1991 and 1993 in Serbia was also characterised by an active 
role of quasi-state banks, which operated on the principles of pyramidal banking and 
which enjoyed full state support. The core of their business was the weekly building up of 
nominal interest rates at the expense of newly attracted deposits, which further spurred 
inflation. 38 The two most important examples include and 
Their failure to repay the deposits and related interests upon their collapse heavily 
burdened an already weakened domestic currency, banking system and state budget.
36 See Petrovic and Mladenovic (2000, p. 787) and Petrovic (1999, p. 338).
37 Our data is based on Petrovic (1999, p. 336). Rostowski (1998, p. 88), however, claims that 
Nicaragua (1987-91, 48 months) and China (1947-9, 26 months) experienced longer hyperinflations.
38 On the role of the quasi-state banks in creation of speculative financial flows of the country, the most 
extensively wrote Dinkic (2000, pp. 151-231).
39 According to Dinkic (2000, pp. 33 and 35), was operating from January 1991 until March 
1993 and from October 1991 until April 1993.
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It was clear at that time that the National Bank of Yugoslavia was not independent 
from political pressures and that it did not enjoy citizens' trust. In other words, it lacked 
credibility. Therefore, it is not surprising that some authors advanced the thesis that the 
central bank needed to be replaced by a currency board.40 Hanke and Schuler (199la) 
were the ones who actualised the idea of a currency board in Yugoslavia. We note, 
though, that during the first half of the 1990s, the same authors proposed similar solutions 
to a number of other formerly centrally planned economies.41
Their paper starts with an explanation of the basic principles of a currency board 
arrangement, whereas in the second part of their study the authors propose a model of a 
currency board law for Yugoslavia. Their main argument in favour of a currency board 
over a central bank is the existence of a fixed exchange rate of the domestic currency in 
relation to the specific foreign ('hard') currency and the existence of money supply, 
which is 100 per cent backed by foreign exchange reserves. In addition, Hanke and 
Schuler (199la, p. 17) argue that "in the currency board system, the amounts of loans that 
banks can create (and thus the total money supply) are limited by their ability to secure 
and hold sufficient reserves as the base for loans".
Having in mind the fact that in the currency board system the exchange rate is 
fixed, the authors attribute a number of advantages to this monetary arrangement. First, 
they underline that the elimination of exchange rate risk stimulates international trade, 
which further encourages economic efficacy and foreign investments. Second, under the 
currency board, access to the financial markets of a backup currency country is eased, 
thereby fostering the economic growth. Thirdly, within a currency board, a fixed 
exchange rate ceases to be the subject of political agreement and becomes a feature of the 
economic environment.
The question, however, remains as to whether the fixed exchange rate is the main 
advantage of a currency board arrangement and why it is necessary to abolish the central 
bank, which can also adopt a fixed exchange rate. In answering this question, Hanke and 
Schuler (199la) underline that this is due to the inability of a central bank to the 
fixed rate due to dynamic inconsistency.
40 See Hanke and Schuler (1991, pp. 11-12).
41 See, for example, Hanke and Schuler (1991b), Hanke and Schuler (1991c), and Hanke and Schuler 
(1994).
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Even though there are indices, based on the above-mentioned arguments, that 
such a currency board solution could have led to the calming of inflationary tensions in 
FRY at that time, the idea was deemed too radical and rejected by policymakers 
immediately after its launch.
Interestingly enough, Yugoslav academics opposed this idea, with a time lag of 
about eight years, in 1999. They argued in favour of a central bank over a currency 
board.42 Iglic (1999, p. 23), for example, claims that the "existence of serious limitations 
to the introduction of the currency board arrangement, and the shortcomings of the very 
arrangement, compared to its advantages, clearly speak in favour of sustaining the central 
bank institution [...]". Similarly, Lucic (1999, p. 21) claims that "a currency board is not 
an adequate solution for Yugoslavia", stressing that solid money is an important but 
insufficient requisite for growth and development of an economy, and that it is important 
for all economies to have an appropriate sum of money in circulation. Savin (1999) also 
believes that the replacement of the National Bank of Yugoslavia by a currency board is 
inappropriate, as the Yugoslav economy does not meet the necessary requirements.43 
Finally, Ognjanovic (1999, p. 21) argues that the currency board is in fact based on two 
projections:
"The first is based on the thesis of distrust in knowledge and competence of national, 
domestic institutions and national systems to adequately manage and carry out the monetary 
policy. The second is based on the illusion that the entire economy of a country could be put in 
order and economic prosperity, by mere monetary policy actions".
Broadly speaking, Ognjanovic's (1999) work contributes more to the general 
spreading of the idea of sustaining national monetary institutions than it contributes to the 
understanding of the essence of a currency board arrangement. Still, this paper is 
significant as it represents the most critical review of the idea of introducing currency 
board in Yugoslavia.44
42 Even though this occurrence seems utterly symptomatic, it is not clear why is this so.
43 According to Savin (1999, p. 7), foreign currency reserves are insufficient, the banking system burdened 
by large 'imperfections', export uncompetitive and burdened by a trade deficit. On the other hand, the main 
prerequisites for a successful functioning of a currency board are: large foreign currency reserves, healthy 
banking system and trade balance surplus, over which the growth of foreign currency reserves and, 
therefore, money supply increase would be ensured.
44 Vuk Ognjanovic was the NBY governor in the period from 17 July 1992 until 15 July 1993.
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Toward the end of 1993 it was evident that the Yugoslav economy had entered a 
state of hyperinflation, urging for stabilisation measures. During this period, the dinar 
nearly completely lost its medium of exchange function, on top of the fact that the 
national currency already registered a substantial loss in its store of value and unit of 
account functions. What is crucial for our study, however, is the fact that such a 
macroeconomic environment was in a way supported by institutional changes reflected in 
the position of a supreme monetary institution and the entire banking system that took 
place in mid-1993, when the new Law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia and the Law 
on Banks and Other Financial Organisations were adopted45 (see Chapter V).
Given these circumstances, the FRY introduced the "Programme of Monetary 
Reconstruction and Economic Revival of Yugoslavia" (PMR) (see Avramovic, 1994). 
The Federal Parliament adopted the programme on 12 January 1994, forming at the same 
time an expert team for the PMR implementation. Dragoslav Avramovic, who was the 
head of that expert team, was soon thereafter appointed the NBY governor.46 Officially, 
the programme's implementation started on 24 January 1994, even though at the time 
neither the Federal nor the Serbian Parliament was in session, nor did the NBY, which 
had the central role in this programme, have a governor. Nevertheless, the authorities 
began to implement the stabilisation programme, based on the following understanding of 
the main fundamentals of Yugoslavia's hyperinflation.
Rostowski (1998) cautiously argues that two factors drove the Serbian 
hyperinflation of 1992-1994. One is the sharp fall in real money balances, which brought 
the total real domestic money supply to amount to less then USD 4 per capita at the end 
of hyperinflation despite of which the seigniorage revenue47 has remained rather stable. 
The second force was the Oliveira-Tanzi effect, which the authorities unsuccessfully tried 
to overcome by shortening the periods of tax collection and increased tax rates.
45 See Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, No. 32/93.
46 Dragoslav Avramovic was the NBY governor from 2 March 1994 to 15 May 1996.
47 "Seignorage is equal to the product of money growth and real money balance" (Blanchard, 2000, p. 450).
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Analysing the causes, dynamics, and money supply processes in the case of 
Yugoslavia's hyperinflation in 1992-1994, Petrovic, Bogetic and Vujosevic (1999) try to 
answer three questions. Firstly, they investigate whether a monetary or a balance of 
payments view better explains Yugoslavia's hyperinflation by posing the following 
question: was excessive money supply growth or currency depreciation the driving force 
behind hyperinflation? The second question they put forward is whether the money 
supply process was an endogenous process or one that grew mainly in an unpredictable, 
exogenous fashion? The third question asks what was the role, if any, that exchange rate- 
based pricing played in the Yugoslav hyperinflation, bearing in mind the monetarist 
proposition that prices are set in the money market?48
During the period of hyperinflation, the fiscal deficit increased from 3 per cent of 
GDP in 1990 to 28 per cent of GDP in 1993, reaching 71 per cent of total expenditures. 
At the same time, the real level of tax revenues in 1993 fell to just one-sixth of its 1991 
level. Additionally, the seignorage on base money used to finance the fiscal deficits 
throughout the period was quite significant. It equalled to 10 per cent of GDP, which is 
similar to that of 1991, i.e. 13 per cent. However, the authors find that "the money supply 
did not target the amount of revenue needed to cover the given fiscal deficit, as suggested 
by Sargent and Wallace (1973), but instead reacted in a disorderly manner while 
monetizing the large number of local deficits" (Petrovic 1999, p. 341).
This leads to the conclusion that money supply was exogenous, i.e. unpredictable, 
by either inflation or currency depreciation, and that money supply growth exhibited a 
'random walk monetary standard'.49 Furthermore, the evidence confirmed that excessive 
money growth fuelled hyperinflation, implying that the monetary view explains the 
Yugoslav hyperinflation better than the balance of payments view. The process was 
happening, however, through exchange rate depreciation, which suggests that prices were 
not set in the money market, but that "they were indexed to the exchange rate" (Petrovic 
1999, p. 350). Such a view of the role of exchange rate-based pricing was also 
supported by the widespread everyday use of the DEM.
48 The authors base their work on exploration of the money supply process advanced by Sargent and 
Wallace (1973) who suggested "that, during hyperinflation, the government resorts to money creation to 
finance a given fiscal deficit in real terms" (Petrovic 1999, p. 336).
49 See (Petrovic 1999, p. 351)
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Petrovic and Mladenovic (2000) further explored the role of the exchange rate 
during hyperinflation. The authors tested a modified and advanced Monetary Model of 
Exchange Rate Determination (MMER) for Yugoslavia's hyperinflation of 1992-1994. 
Their main aim was to explore whether the exchange rate in Yugoslavia at the time was 
affected by prices as the MMER states, or whether it was determined directly by the 
money supply and demand, as studies of the MMER under the rational expectations 
would suggest.
The evidence from their paper supports the hypothesis that "the exchange rate 
under hyperinflation is determined directly in the money market, without any reference to 
prices" (Petrovic and Mladenovic, 2000, p. 803). The explanation for this lies in the fact 
that during hyperinflation the population bases its calculation on the exchange rate, rather 
than on price indices. This becomes obvious if one takes into account that an exchange 
rate is widely used and well understood by the general public during hyperinflation and, 
therefore, is set in market without error. Consequently, the domestic currency is replaced 
by the foreign currency and all prices and incomes are expressed in foreign currency, a 
phenomenon known as 'dollarisation' (see Chapter IV).
Much anecdotal evidence suggests that such a situation was indeed recorded in 
FRY in 1993, when the dinar was only used for tax payments, whereas private agents 
exchanged goods in the markets exclusively with foreign currencies (i.e. DEM). The 
severity of the crisis made the Yugoslav government opt for a structured orthodox 
stabilisation programme based on the removal of fundamental macroeconomic 
debalances through the implementation of monetary and fiscal policy actions and 
adequate policing of the exchange and interest rate.
However, an evaluation of the situation was such that that the programme needed 
sequencing. The PMR concept, thus, included the following three phases: (i) monetary 
reconstruction and anti-inflation measures phase, (ii) primary recovery phase, and (iii) 
transition and structural adjustment phase (see Avramovic, 1994). The first two stages 
needed to be implemented without delay under the closed-economy regime and under the 
effect of international community sanctions, while the third stage would only be able 
after the alleviation or cancellation of economic sanctions and the legitimising of the 
FRY in the international trade and financial markets.
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The most important measure taken by Avramovic's was the 
suspension of the 'old dinar' issue on 17 January 1994, seven days before the actual PMR 
application, and the issuance of the 'new dinar' that began on 24 January 1994. Further 
on, two days after the introduction of the new dinar, a fixed parity between the new and 
the old dinar was formed in the 1:12,000,000 ratio, at the same time determining the 
conversion parity of the new dinar toward the DEM in the 1:1 ratio. This way, the PMR 
actually established a dual currency system in Yugoslavia comprised of old and new 
dinars. However, as the currency parities remained unchanged and were accompanied by 
the equalled interested rates, it was practically one currency. One should, nevertheless, 
keep in mind that the exchange rate was formed freely, based on the supply and demand 
of foreign currency under the crawling peg system.50
Even though the PMR measures linked to the exchange rate were most in 
evidence, the more fundamental part of the programme related to those measures taken in 
the domain. The core of the programme was (increased 
real demand for domestic currency), for the purpose of which all of the primary money 
issue was fully backed by foreign currency reserves of the NBY amounting to 
approximately DEM 500 million. Additionally, remonetisation included the free purchase 
of convertible currency from citizens and companies in an estimated amount of about 
DEM 150 million for the first trimester of 1994.51
In the first six months of the programme's implementation, the fiscal deficit of the 
consolidated balance of all public expenditures was covered by the issue of new dinars in 
the amount of 147 million new dinars per month. However, administering the monetary 
policy required, beside the establishment of the above-mentioned parities, the 
introduction of a single real positive discount rate and the cancellation of selective 
investment. 52 The programme also included the establishment of an obligatory external 
audit system for all banks and the adoption of an operational schedule for banks and 
enterprises rehabilitating and restructuring their debts.
50 The programme predicted that "the foreign exchange rate set according to the crawling peg system would 
be a single exchange rate applicable to all transactions (including payment of customs duties and allocation 
from foreign exchange reserves towards importing certain products)" (Avramovic, 1994, p. 12).
51 See Avramovic (1994, p. 23)
52 The banks were given the possibility to finance programmes "in line with their own credit policies and to 
be refinanced by the National Bank of Yugoslavia" (Avramovic, 1994, p. 12).
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Within the mentioned PMR, the entire concept was built on the 
non-existence of foreign financial support.53 The PMR was based on projected fiscal 
expenditures not exceeding 40 per cent of GDP in the first three months of 
implementation, and a total fiscal deficit of not more than USD 330 million. For the other 
nine months of 1994, the PMR anticipated a reduction of total public expenditures to 5 
per cent of GDP with the budget deficit financing the state's borrowing on the capital 
market. In the meantime, fiscal policy reform was supposed to ensure an increase in 
public revenues, since the expenditure side of the budget could not be further reduced. 
The fact that stabilisation was achieved without a balanced budget "cast doubt on 
Sargent's (1986a) argument that balanced budgets are necessary to establish the 
credibility which is needed for stabilizations to succeed" (Rostowski, 1998, p. 87). 
Instead, fiscal reform relied on a reduction in tax rates on the basis of an expanded tax 
base and a conversion of illegal economic activities into the legal flows.54
Taking into account that Yugoslavis's hyperinflation was considered classical, 
and the method of knocking it down orthodox, the proposed PMR did not imply 
interventions in the and domain. In accordance with this, the 
programme had foreseen that wages would be formed freely, without control, and that in 
the monopolies and public enterprises they should be accorded with the movement of 
wages in the rest of the economy. Similarly, prices of all kinds of goods and services 
could be formed freely. The exemptions related to the selective price controls conducted 
in public enterprises that produced public goods, offered public services or were highly 
dependent on imports.
53 According to Avramovic (1994, p. 9), "with a view to obtaining foreign financial support, the Federal 
Government addressed the IMF, World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as 
well as the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee, towards the end of 1993, with a request for support 
in the implementation of this Programme, involving the unblocking of a part of the funds on Yugoslavia's 
accounts abroad, foreign financial support if possible and advice on and appraisal of the Programme itself 
from/by their experts. However, none of the proposed forms of cooperation were accepted because of the 
sanctions, and these institutions notified the Yugoslav Government accordingly."
54 In the first few months of the programme implementation, the income tax was first reduced to 35 per 
cent, then to 30 per cent, and later to 25 per cent; sales tax was reduced from 46 per cent to 27 per cent, and 
excise duty introduced for six groups of products; corporate profit tax was reduced from 40 per cent to 30 
per cent. Even the tax on financial transactions, which was retained for some time, was abolished on 19 
April 1994. However, together with the reduction of tax burden on some fiscal forms, there was an 
introduction of a fee on owning a company (the so-called "company fee"), which had not been foreseen by 
the PMR.
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In the first 85 days of its implementation, the programme produced goods results. 
Firstly, as shown in Graph 3.2, prices stabilised completely, with weekly changes of 0.1 
per cent recorded after the commencement of the programme. Nevertheless, what can 
also be seen in the graph is that within the observed average of price fluctuation, 
considerable structural differences in the price fluctuation of agriculture products, 
industrial products, service and merchandise were recorded. Still, such a tendency existed 
only until mid-February 1994, after which the difference in the price increase dynamics 
in separate sectors was significantly reduced and, as of mid-February, was almost 
invariable.
3.2. 
31.1 7.II 14.11 21.11 28.11 7.III 14.111 21.111 28.111 4.IV 11.IV 18.IV
Avramovic (1994, p. 28).
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Secondly, the programme contributed greatly to an increase in foreign currency 
reserves in the period from its inception until the end of March 1994. By setting up an 
environment which resulted in recovered citizens' confidence in the new dinar, the 
programme enabled an autonomous flow of money supply to take place. Remonetisation 
happened through the unlimited purchase of foreign currency from households and 
businesses by commercial banks. Having in mind that the actual purchase of DEM 286 
million exceeded by a factor of two the estimated amount of DEM 150 million, the action 
was seen as a success story.
Thirdly, according to Avramovic (1994, p. 26), the PMR contributed to the "the 
quick renewal of state finances". The fiscal policy reform led to an increase in Serbia's 
public revenues, which was since March 1994 used to cover a portion of the projected 
budgetary deficit of 147 million new dinars per month. On a federal level, however, total 
public expenditures exceeded public revenues by 334 million new dinars: the amount that 
was financed directly form the NBY sources and backed by the foreign exchange 
reserves. Herein, the budgetary deficit of 334 million dinars in comparison to projected 
229 million dinars was still considered attainable.
Following the increased scope of credit activity, primary issue and money supply, 
interest rates were reduced as well. The interest rates, according to Avramovic (1994, p. 
28), were positive in real terms for the first time in Yugoslavia after 50 years, and were 
reduced to 9-12 per cent. All these changes resulted in an output increase of 12.4 per cent 
in February 1994, i.e. over 22 per cent in May 1994.
Regrettably, the Avramovic programme just as the Markovic programme, only 
lasted about nine months. According to Dinkic (2000, p. 268), "breaking into the 
monetary system in October 1994 definitely collapsed Avramovic's stabilisation 
programme". The registered price rise in November 1994 was 7 per cent, whereas in 
January 1995 reached 12.4 per cent. Moreover, in late March 1995 there was another 
'horrific monetary attack', 55 after which governor Avramovic proposed the 
implementation of the so-called "Programme II" in summer 1995.
55 This 'monetary attack' differed from the previous attacks by the means used. It was not based on the grey 
emission of dinars, but was conducted with the legal emission of dinars and credits that the Serbian 
government transfer to selected commercial banks. This money ended in hands of street dealers, which 
used it to buy and sell foreign currency at speculative exchange rates (see Dinkic, 2000, p. 272-83).
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Programme II was supposed to handle (1) the closed and controlled market, which 
did not allow for healthy competition, and (2) the domination of inefficient socially- 
owned companies and their abuse. Import liberalisation and privatisation were, therefore, 
next on the agenda. According to Dinkic (2000, p. 285), the set also included appropriate 
stabilisation measures of monetary character, the most important of which were the 
establishment of the real dinar rate through devaluation, solving bank insolvency 
problems, and setting up a strict financial discipline regime.
These measures were basically the same as those originally incorporated in the 
PMR but which could not have been implemented during the first wave of stabilisation. 
In that sense, the new programme actually represented the continuation of a policy 
oriented towards a complete stabilisation of macroeconomic fundamentals, complex 
structural reforms and sustained economic growth. The programme was set forth in late 
November 1995. Generally speaking, the date also could have been a good political 
moment for the programme implementation, since the Dayton Peace Accord was signed 
and economic sanctions against the FRY were partly suspended56 .
However, only six months after its implementation was begun on 15 May 1996, 
Avramovic was formally dismissed from the position of NBY governor. Soon thereafter, 
the price increases were again registered. In the period from the inception of Programme 
II until August 1996, prices went up by 56 per cent (Dinkic, 2000, p. 291). During that 
time, the black market exchange rate was only 3 per cent higher than the official one. 
And, the fact that wages were paid in accordance with the changes of the black market 
exchange rate did not mean much as the registered price rise was greater than the foreign 
currency exchange rate. Thus, in this period, real wages were actually reduced, even 
though in nominal terms they were increasing. Due to the overestimated value of 
domestic currency, imports were surmounting exports, thus increasing the trade balance 
deficit, which in the first seven months of 1996 amounted to USD 1 billion.
56 "UN Security Council has, by Resolution No. 1074 of 1 October 1996, revoked the embargo imposed on 
the FRY, while leaving it to the states [UN member states, auth. remark] to adopt bilateral measures by 
which they will bring documents imposing embargo cancellation in bilateral relations" (Bosnjak, 2002, p. 
79).
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In the following sub-period of 1995-1998, the FRY economy was characterised 
by a reduction in the production scope, import and export levels, and levels of 
investments and employment. According to Bosnjak (2002, p. 29), "participation of gross 
investments in fixed assets was reduced to about 14 per cent of GDP, and participation of 
goods export to about 21 per cent of GDP". GDP levels registered in 1998 made for only 
one half of its 1989 level, both in aggregate terms. The unemployment rate 
reached 25 per cent and was accompanied by the registration of 900,000 redundant 
workers. Structure of the economy was also very unfavourable, with the dominant 
participation of social, state and mixed sector of about 60 per cent, and private sector 
participation of only about 40 per cent in GDP formation.
As a result, the transformation of the state and social ownership remained high on 
the governments' agenda during the 1990s. Several attempts to establish the operating 
transformation rules were made during the decade. Building on the federal law on the 
transformation of socially-owned capital that was introduced in 1989 as part of the 
overall Markovic economic programme, another federal law was passed in 1996.57 
However, these laws only gave limited results, as they become just a framework for 
actions taken on republican levels, which were conducted on the basis of separate
C Q
republican privatisation laws. In Serbia, the whole privatisation process was a 
voluntarily, one as enterprises could chose either to transform their ownership or to retain
CQ
the existing one.
57 Federal Law on Transfer and Disposition of Socially-Owned Capital 
was adopted on 22 December 1989 (Official Gazette of the SFRY", 
No. 84/89). This law was amended on 10 August 1990 (Official Gazette of the SFRY, No. 46/90) and, 
eventually, replaced by the Law on the Basis of the Transformation of Socially-Owned Capital 
on 26 June 1996 (Official Gazette of the SFRY, No.
29/96).
58 The Republic of Serbia adopted the Law on Conditions and the Procedure for Transformation of Social 
Ownership in Other Forms of Ownership 
(Official Gazette of the RS, No. 48/91) on 5 August 1991. This law was amended on 
1 August 1994 (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 51/94), and finally replaced on 22 July 1997 by the Law on 
Ownership Transformation (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 32/97). On 
the other hand, Republic Montenegro adopted the Law on Ownership and Management Transformation in 
1992 (Official Gazette of the RM, No. 2/92), which it 
replaced on 31 July 1996 by the Privatisation Law (Official Gazette of the
RM, No. 23/96).
59 The voluntary principle derives from the Serbian Constitution of 1990, which proclaims equality of all 
forms of property ownership. See Article 56 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (Official Gazette 
of the RS, No. 1/90) published on 28 September 1990.
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However, the state preserved its right to refuse to consent over certain enterprises' 
privatisation decisions if these were public or large social enterprises, making up 40 per 
cent and 30 per cent of the total capital, respectively. The remaining 30 per cent, i.e. 
small and medium firms, had the autonomy over transformation decisions, unless their 
debts exceed the capital or if they were under bankruptcy procedure. The model of 
voucher privatisation was applied, enabling each worker to purchase a small part of his 
enterprise. This way, the proclaimed government aim to ensure a fair privatisation was 
achieved, but whether this transformation brought the desired results in terms of firms' 
efficiency, and whether it contributed to the transition process, is another question.
3.3.2. Economic aspects of the Kosovo conflict and the NATO raids of 1999
If one considers that the period between 1992 and 1998 is marked by an extreme 
sluggishness of economic activities of the country, than, undoubtedly, the year 1999 
should be referred to as a year of a total collapse of the country's economic performance. 
The causes for such occurrence lie in the fact that in 1999 the country was exposed to the 
most severe external shock which took place in Europe after the World War II; the three- 
month military campaign by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), due to 
which the year 1999 will be well remembered in the Serbian history:
"Violating the provisions of Article 2 of the UN Charter, without the consent of the 
Security Council, 19 NATO member countries carried out the bombing of FRY. The air attacks 
lasted for 78 days without interruptions, from 24 March until 9 June 1999, and caused drastic 
negative and long-lasting effects to the economy and to the citizens" (BoSnjak, 2002, p. 98).
Notwithstanding the human cost of the war60, all segments of economic and 
industrial life were directly affected. According to Dinkic (1999, p. 7) NATO's targets 
were not only military objects, but also Serbia's most important infrastructure 
constructions: roads, airports, telecommunication objects, hydro-electric power plants, 
chemical, petrochemical, oil and gas refineries, etc. Besides, some health, education, 
cultural, religious and housing objects were severely damaged as well.
60 "Some 500 Yugoslav civilians are known to have died in these incidents" (HRW, 2000, p. 1).
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As a consequence, in 1999 the FRY registered an 18 per cent drop in GDP 
compared to the previous year, as well as a drastic decline in the exchange of goods with 
the world amounting to 36.5 per cent; exports were reduced by 46.9 per cent and imports 
by 30.4 per cent. Real net wages were reduced by approximately 15 per cent, and about 
300,000 employees were dismissed, causing a 27.7 per cent in unemployment 
rate. It is estimated that the destruction of basic infrastructure in Serbia had also 
influenced regional distractions, as the neighbouring countries registered declines in 
foreign direct investments (Bulgaria), tourism income (Croatia), and export levels 
(Romania). 61 The region also experienced a raise in transportation costs for all those 
being forced to find alternative solutions for transport of goods and passengers, as 
suggested by anecdotal evidence.
The consequences of the NATO foray are twofold: direct and indirect. Besides the 
calculated, direct effects of NATO operations on real GDP loss, a potential GDP loss in 
the subsequent years, indirectly resulting from NATO bombing, should also be taken into 
account. While the negative real GDP growth of 18 percent in 1999 was the lowest GDP 
growth ever recorded, a further reduction of potential losses has depended on real 
opportunities to reconstruct all the destroyed industrial and production capacities of the 
country. Bosnjak (2002, p. 65) indicates that losses in terms of unrealised gross domestic 
product amount to USD 30.3 billion for the period 1999-2010. To this indicative 
estimation of loss, one should also add the costs of the renewal of damaged cultural- 
historic monuments, natural resources due to ecological contamination62 , etc.
The final accounts of the estimated costs of the NATO incursion are not uniform. 
This is due to the fact that estimators have applied different methodological approaches 
in defining the scope of the parameters considered to have made an impact on losses 
incurred and that they have assigned diverging indices to the selected parameters. Thus, 
the World Bank indicates that material damages in Kosovo amounted to USD 1.2 billion, 
whereas Dinkic (1999, p. 9) has estimated the total economic damage at USD 29.6 
billion; the interim calculation of the Serbian Government made just after the bombing 
indicates that the damage amounts to USD 11.7 billion (Bosnjak, 2002, p. 66).
61 The mentioned countries reported to the UN Economic Commission for Europe in May 1999 the damage 
and costs resulting from the events that took place in the preceding months in the FRY. 
62 SeeKurykin(2001)
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3.3.3. The 'bulldozer revolution' and the year 2000
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia entered the year 2000 with unfavourable 
macroeconomic indicators, but this period will undoubtedly be remembered by political 
changes that took place: the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic from power on 5 October 
2000. In relation to this, Birch (2002, p. 499) writes the following:
"The date of 5 October 2000 has become a by-word in Yugoslavia for the collapse of the 
old regime and the inauguration of a new order. Slobodan Milosevic was removed from power 
when a popular mob stormed the Yugoslav parliament building and the main television station, 
and the Federal Election Commission was obliged to admit what independent election-watchers 
had been claiming for days-that Milosevic had lost the 24 September contest for the presidency. 
The result of Yugoslav parliamentary elections held the same day was more mixed, with parties 
that had supported Milosevic retaining a majority of seats. Yet in the highly-personalised politics 
of Yugoslavia, the fact of Milosevic's removal from office brought about the end of an era. 
Following the dramatic events of October, premature elections were announced for the parliament 
of Serbia, which was at this point still controlled by Milosevic's Socialist Party. These polls, 
eventually held on 23 December 2000, were won by the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, whose 
leader Zoran Djindjic then became Prime Minister of the Serbian republic".
On the economic front, the situation called for the reconstruction of an exhausted 
economy and the continuation of transition. The economic revival was, however, 
burdened by an unfavourable macroeconomic situation. According to the EBRD (2003, p. 
191), the year 2000 registered a percentage change in consumer prices (end-year) of 
113.5 per cent, whereas GDP percentage change in real terms stood at 5 per cent. FRY's 
foreign trade, which declined drastically during 1999, in 2000 also registered a low level 
of exports and imports of USD 1.9 billion and USD 3.7 billion, respectively. Foreign 
currency reserves of NBY amounted to USD 524.2 million, whereas the total external 
debt of the country was USD 11.7 billion. Net foreign direct investments (FDI) equalled 
to USD 25 million, which was even lower then in 1989. Official unemployment as a 
percentage of total labour force was 28.4 per cent. Nominally, though, some of the 
macroeconomic parameters recovered compared to 1999, but having in mind their low 
starting base, the improvements were not substantial. Consequently, the macroeconomic 
results of 2000 were still very weak and the economy faced new political and 
constitutional challenges.
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We recall from the previous sections that Serbia was a constituent republic of the 
FRY until 4 February 2003, when the Constitutional Charter of SCO was adopted. 
However, the changes that took place after 5 October 2000 were influenced far more by 
political factors than by the institutional framework of the country. Thus, this work - 
which investigates the economic rather than the legal aspects of the transition in Serbia - 
separates the analysis into two periods: (1) the period of Milosevic ruling and the 
economic downfall (1992-2000), and (2) the period of continued transition and opening 
towards the world (2001-2004). Having in mind, though, that the complexity of the 
constitutional arrangement of SCG greatly influenced some of the economic actions in 
Serbia during this period, Box 3.1. provides a short overview of the main constitutional 
elements of SCG.
Most important for out study is the fact that from 2000 thereafter the general 
course of the development of Serbian society changed so significantly it that enabled the 
continuation of the transition process. The newly elected government of Zoran Djindjic64 
chose to pursue the model of fast track economic reform established by the 'fast 
reformers' (Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary). The broad transition front that was 
established encompassed changes in foreign affairs, financial relations, monetary and 
fiscal sphere, institutional and regulatory domain and many other fields. The wide 
political consensus, that held the ruling coalition together at the beginning of 
democratisation of the country in 2001 allowed for such dynamic approach to be taken.65
63 Throughout the section Serbia is analysed separately from Montenegro, which started defining its own 
economic entity from 1997 thereafter. Therefore, the term 'country', which for the purpose of this section 
and for the ease of reading refers to Serbia solely, is used in an economic and not in a constitutional sense 
describing the territory that has exclusive competencies in monetary, fiscal and customs areas.
64 Dr Zoran Djindjic was the Prime Minister of the Government of the Republic of Serbia since 25 January 
2001 until 12 March 2003, when he was assassinated in front of the government building. Djindjic was also 
one of the founders of Democratic Party DS) and its president from January 1994. 
65 The Democratic Opposition of Serbia DOS), the ruling coalition led by 
DS included 17 other political partners. Apart from the Democratic Party of Serbia 
DSS), which was the second biggest coalition party, all other coalition parties were minor 
OS's partners. The political unity was hampered already during 2002 as DSS led by Vojislav Kostunica, 
who was at the time the President of the FRY, step out of the government in August 2002. KoStunica 
became the Serbian Prime Minister on 3 March 2004 after the second round of post-Milosevic democratic 
parliamentary elections held on 28 December 2003.
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Unlike other sections which focus on different sub-periods, this section is divided 
into several sub-sections applying a thematic, rather then a time-based analysis. This 
approach allows for a cross-section examination of the most important transitional 
actions, which were conducted during the four-year period (2001-2004). These actions 
relate to the measures applied and the results achieved during the stabilisation period in 
the following three areas, which we considered the most relevant for our study:
(i) International and European relations
(ii) Macroeconomic developments
(iii) Monetary, exchange rate and banking sector reforms.
______________
Article 12 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Constitutional Charter of the State Union Serbia and Montenegro 
(hereafter: the Constitutional Charter) stipulates that the State Union has a common market, which 
unhindered functioning falls under the responsibility of the member states, i.e. Serbia and Montenegro.
Article 14 paragraph 1 of the Constitutional Charter stipulates that SCG has the legal subjectivity and that it 
is a member of those international institutions, which require international subjectivity. However, the 
paragraph 2 of the same article envisages that the SCG member states can become the members of those 
international institutions, which do not require international subjectivity. This is, however, only possible if 
the prospective membership does not resume the responsibilities of the SCG and if it does not endanger the 
interests of another member state (Article 15 paragraph 2).
Article 34 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Constitutional Charter prescribe that the member states are represented 
in the international organisations: UN, OSCE, EU and CoE on a rotating parity-based principle, but that the 
Council of Ministers of the State Union, with the consent of the responsible bodies of the member states, 
determines the ways of representation and presentation of the member states in the international financial 
organisations. Additionally, Article 14 paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Law on the Implementation of the 
Constitutional Charter of the State Union Serbia and Montenegro stipulate that the Council of Ministers of 
SCG, upon agreement with the ministries of finance and the central banks of the member states, decides 
upon the fiscal agent in the international financial organisations, whereas the function of the payment agent 
shall, on behalf of the member states, be performed by the National Bank of Serbia and the Central Bank of 
Montenegro.
Article 18 of the Constitutional Charter prescribes that the member states will ensure financial means 
needed for the State Union functioning. In other words, the Constitutional Charter did not envisage the 
State Union budget, but contributions by the member states.
Art. 40 to 46 of the Constitutional Charter envisage the responsibilities of the following five ministers of 
the State Union: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence, Minister of International Economic 
Relations, Minister of Internal Economic Relations and Minister of Human and Minority Rights. All other 
affairs from the domain of economy, monetary, fiscal, financial and trade policy are exclusive competency 
of member states. ________________________ ________________________ 
Author, based on Fira and Bataveljic (2004).
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3.4.1. International and European relations: a ' window of opportunity'
The democratic changes that followed the decade-long international isolation 
imposed on the country during the Milosevic era, Belgrade was given a great degree of 
international political and financial assistance in the period 2001-2004. Soon after 5 
October 2000, SCO intensified its international relations and in a legal sense gained or re- 
activated its membership within many important international organisations.66 Opening 
up of the country in geo-political and economic terms also encompassed the 
strengthening of regional cooperation. SCO participated in various regional initiatives 
such as the Stability Pact of South East Europe (SP-SEE) and the Central European 
Initiative (CEI), as well as through preparations for eventual membership in the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) and NATO.
This political support was backed by significant multilateral and bilateral foreign 
aid, pledged by numerous countries and international organisations during the Donors 
Conference held in June 2001 and on many other occasions.67 This aid, either in the form 
of grants or loans, ensured that Serbia would step up the process of stabilisation and 
transformation and that it would pursue economic reforms. Equally encouraging for 
Serbia's economic development was reestablishment of relations with international 
financial institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank (WB), the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
Most importantly, however, is that the interrupted political and economic ties 
between Serbia and the European Union began strengthening after 2000 onwards, under 
the cap of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP).
66 For example, Serbia-Montenegro became the member of the United Nations (UN) and of the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in December 2000, and of the Council of 
Europe (CoE) in October 2002.
67 The Donors Conference of June 2001 was an occasion where the Serbian government presented its 
reform agenda, which outlined the direction of planned reforms and which served as a basis for donors' 
decisions to pledge financial resources for particular reform projects. The reform agenda was presented in 
the document "Reform Agenda of Serbia" (Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2001). The subsequent 
Donors Meeting that was held in Brussels in November 2003, on the other hand, represented a coordination 
meeting where the Serbian government provided the donors' community with an update about the achieved 
reform results and its further reform plans. The core document presented during the second Donors 
Meeting in November 2003 was "Serbia on the Move: Three Years Later" (Government of the Republic of 
Serbia, 2003).
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The stabilisation and association process, which normally precedes the conclusion 
of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, includes several 
important elements. Firstly, SAP assumes that a continuous political and technical 
dialogue is established between the representatives of the SAP country and the European
Commission. Such intense dialogue paves the way to work on the Feasibility Report 
prepared by the European Commission. Its main objective is to assess a SAP country's 
political and economic developments in relation to the Copenhagen political and 
economic accession criteria, and the administrative capacity of a country to negotiate, 
conclude and implement the SAA.
Aside from the political and technical support, in 2000 the EU unilaterally 
introduced trade preferences for goods imported from the Western Balkan countries, 
including Serbia and Montenegro.69 These "autonomous trade measures" (ATMs) 
enabled the Western Balkan countries a duty free access to the EU market for almost all 
goods,70 under the condition that the countries respect the rules of origin and the so-called 
'standstill clause'. Compliance with the first condition assumes the ability of the 
authorities to adequately apply the system of certification and control of the preferential 
origin of goods exported to the EU, and to verify the originating status of those products. 
The standstill clause implies that a country benefiting from the ATMs should not 
introduce new or increasing existing duties, charges and quantitative restrictions or 
measures having the equivalent effect for imports originating in the EU.
Additionally, the overall process of European integration has been backed by 
substantial EU financial assistance, disbursed under the Community Assistance for 
Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme managed by the 
European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR). Apart from CARDS, the EU's financial 
support also included emergency assistance, channelled through the European 
Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and Macro Financial Assistance (MFA), 
which provided support to the balance of payments adjustments (see Table 3.4).
68 The dialogue between the EU and SCO was held under the framework of the Consultative Task Force 
(CTF) and Enhanced Permanent Dialogue (EPD) meetings, held regularly every 3-4 months. SCO hosted 
five CTF meetings during 200land 2002 and eight EPD meetings in the period 2003-2005.
69 Council Regulation (2007/2000/EC), Official Journal of the European Communities, L 240, pp. 1-9.
70 The only exceptions are exports of vine, baby beef, some fishery products, and textile (until 1 July 2005 
when the Textile Agreement between the EU and Serbia entered into force).
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'EUR millions
SERBIA
CARDS
ECHO
MFA2
2000
182
100%
100%
20.15
13.25
-
-
-
2001
194
100%
99%
47.89
35.63
345
310.50
234
2002
171
93%
84%
31.85
35.82
130
116.50
103.50
2003
220
82%
48%
5.30
20.49
70
70
47.20
2004
202
40%
10%
-
-
70
70
117
Total
979
82%
76%
105.19
105.18
615
569
501.70
Data without Kosovo and Metohija.
2 Data includes Montenegro, which share equalled to 10 per cent (Serbia received 90 per cent).
Official website of the European Agency for Reconstruction, www.ear.eu.int [Accessed: 
14.03.2005] and the Ministry for International Economic Relations of the Republic of Serbia.
The above-mentioned examples of international assistance to Serbia in the period 
following the downfall of the Milosevic regime point to the fact the Serbian government 
mounted a large political capital within and outside the country. This political capital was 
transposed into a level of credibility that (for a short and limited period of time) eased the 
reform process, as suggested by the argument of 'extraordinary polities' deriving from "a 
great change in a country's history" (Balcerowicz, 1993, p. 31)71 .
The Serbian experience of 2000 thus confirms that some other events beside the 
fall of communism can represent the perfect momentum for the implementation of an 
immense reform agenda.72 Namely, owing to the enormous accumulation of common will 
to overthrow Milosevic, Serbia's political opposition brought about huge changes in the 
political and economic system of the country of a magnitude comparable to the sudden 
fall of communism elsewhere. The introduction of those changes was possible because 
the elites of the former regime were at that time discouraged and disorganised, new 
interest groups were not yet formed, and the population was willing to accept changes.
71 Wyplosz (2000, p. 9) interprets this 'political window of opportunity' more narrowly, assigning it to the 
exceptional political circumstances that followed the collapse of communism.
72 One should bear in mind that the communism in Serbia collapsed well before 2000, in the late 1980s (see 
Birch, 2002).
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It should be noted, however, that due to internal political instability and external 
political pressures resulting from a non-cooperation with the International Crime Tribunal 
for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Hague, and the fact that on 12 March 2003 the Prime Minister 
Djindjic was assassinated, the political window of opportunity as seen by Balcerowicz 
(1993) was closed for Serbia. 73 The succeeding government of Prime Minister Zoran
y 
Zivkovic, which lasted until 3 March 2004, tried to reafirm the dynamics of reform and 
the course of the transition as established by the preceeding Djindjic's government. But, 
it lost this 'battle'. Besides the fact that its was heavily attacked by the 
opposition throughout its short mandate, this government was also strongly pressured by 
the internation community with regards to furthering co-operation with the ICTY.
Nonetheless, the international community has tried several times during 2003 and 
2004 to ensure that the country remained on a reform track. The EU itself had shown, on 
many occasions, its strategic interest in the prosperity and integration of the Western 
Balkans including Serbia and Montenegro. In political terms, in June 2003, the ministers 
of foreign affairs of the EU Member States concluded, during the first political EU- 
Western Balkans Summit held in Thessaloniki, that "the future of the Balkans is within 
the European Union".75 Consequently, on 14 June 2004 the Council of the EU decided to 
adopt the "European Partnership"76 as a new SAP instrument. The 
was formulated in a way to guide the country's process of European integration. In 
particular, it included a set of short-term (to be implemented in 1-2 years) and medium- 
term (to be implemented in 3-4 years) political and economic priorities, which Serbia and 
Montenegro needed to realise on its way to the European Union. 77 These priorities, 
however, were not 'imposed' on the SCO by the EU, as they represented a sublimation of 
conclusions and EU recommendations issued during the CTF/EPD meetings.
73 This assessment relates to the period 2003 and 2004 when, according to the ICTY representatives, 
Serbia-Montenegro was not collaborating with the ICTY sufficiently. On the other hand, during the same 
period the Serbian officials were trying to explain that the cooperation with the Hague does not only imply 
the extradition of indictees, as something on which the ICTY has persistently insisted, but that it also 
includes other legal actions with which the country was fully complying.
74 Prime Minister Zivkovic kept more or less the same cabinet as Zoran Djindjic.
75 Conclusions of the EU-Western Balkans Summit.
76 Council Decision (2004/520/EC), Official Journal of the European Union, L 227, pp. 21-34.
77 These priorities relate to the activities in the following areas: democracy and rule of law, human rights 
and protection of minorities, regional and international co-operation/obligations, co-operation injustice and 
home affairs, establishment of market economy, structural reforms, management of public finances, 
internal market and trade, and sectoral policies (agriculture, transport, energy, environment, etc).
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However, owing to the complex constitutional frame of the State Union and the 
lack of political will on the part of the Montenegrin government to build a strong and 
functional common administration, the fulfilment of certain priorities was completely 
stalled. The most obvious example was the inability of SCG to establish a common 
market which would allow for the free movement of goods, services, people and capital. 
Recognising the existence of separate, republic-exclusive competencies and the treaty- 
making powers of the two SCG constituent republics in most of economic and trade- 
related matters, the EU Member States foreign affairs ministers introduced the so-called 
The twin-track approach was informally adopted in Maastricht on 
3-4 September 2004 during the Gymnich meeting78 . Formally, this approach was 
endorsed on 11 October 2004 by the Council that gave its support:
"[...] for the twin-track approach, which would imply a single Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement with distinct negotiations with the Republics on trade, economic and 
possibly on other relevant sectoral policies. The Council reaffirmed its commitment to a 
strengthened State Union of Serbia and Montenegro based on the Constitutional Charter."
Following the introduction of the twin-track approach, the process of European 
integration for Serbia (and Montenegro) once more gained momentum. The work on the 
Feasibility Report for the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro by the European 
Commission, which resumed in October 2004, added a whole new dimension to the 
reform process in the country. The positive assessment of the readiness of the SCG to 
negotiate the SAA with the EU79 , which came out as a result of this process, reopened the 
window of opportunity for the country, helping it to re-establish its credibility, much 
needed for further economic reforms. More formally, a positive Feasibility Report 
enabled the European Commission to prepare its mandate for the SAA negotiations with 
the SCG and to actually begin those negotiations upon approval by the Council, in 
October 2005.
78 Gymnich stands for regular semi-annual informal meetings of the EU Member States Foreign Affairs 
Ministers named after the German city where such first meeting took place in 1974.
79 See the European Commission document COM(2005)476 final and SEC (2005)248 final dated 12 April 
2005.
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3.4.2. Macroeconomic developments: the (Balkan tiger'
The fact that Serbia after October 2000 managed to articulate its political activities 
around the democratic principles for which it attracted strong international support also 
influenced its economic performance. The purpose of this sub-section is to provide an 
overview of the main macroeconomic achievements Serbia realised during its 3-year 
stabilisation period (2001-2003). Based on our findings from the previous chapter, we 
argue that initial inflation stabilisation ceased in 2003 when the inflation rate fell below 
20 per cent - and in any case below 40 per cent per annum, as suggested by Bruno (1993) 
and Begg (1996), respectively. 81 The year 2004 only brought some minor structural 
reforms due to intensified political commotion, which in a way, agitated the already 
achieved macroeconomic stability, as will later be demonstrated in our thesis.
The stabilisation begun in 2001 was based on a well-structured government 
economic programme. 82 The applied stabilisation programme was an exchange rate-based 
programme, which included the unification of the exchange rate and an initial 
devaluation of the national currency. Also, the programme envisaged price and trade 
liberalisation and the resolution of the accumulated debt through its reduction and 
rescheduling. The crucial component of the programme, however, was the separation of 
fiscal and monetary policy and a clear discontinuity with the past policy of financing 
government deficits through money creation, and imposition of hard budget constraints.
80 'Balkan tiger' is a phrase used by Mr Bozidar Djelic, Minister of Finance and Economy of the Republic 
of Serbia in the period January 2001-March 2004, during his speech delivered at the Donors Meeting for 
SCO held in Brussels in November 2003. The phrase represents an allegory to the fast-developing Asian 
countries dubed 'Asian tigers', which describes one country's good macroeconomic results and a great 
underlining potential for further economic growth and development.
81 See Chapter II of this work, page 20.
82 The evolution of the government reform plan applied in 2001 is rather interesting. Namely, in 1997 the 
group of 17 independent experts named 'Group 17' or 'G17' wrote "The Programme of Radical Economic 
Reforms in the FR Yugoslavia" Later on, 
during 2000 the group of 20 authors led by Dragoslav Avramovic and Pavle Petrovic prepared the project 
"Recovery and Transition of the Yugoslav Economy" This 
voluminous study encompassed the three synthetic studies: (i) "The FRY Economy: the New Tendencies 
and the Main Imbalances" (ii) "Macroeconomic 
Stabilisation and Recovery of the Yugoslav Economy" 
and (iii) "Structural Economic Reforms" The 
second study that was written by Petrovic, Arsic, Dragutinovic and Stamenkovic, together with the 
mentioned G17's work (Group 17, 1997), made a basis for the government's stabilisation program in 2001.
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It is peculiar that the Serbian stabilisation programme was not drafted by the IMF, 
as it has in many other East European transition countries. The Fund, as well as other 
major international partners (e.g. World Bank), however, had an important advisory role 
in fine-tuning of the existing government programme in cooperation with the authorities. 
Also, the IMF officially backed that programme on 11 June 2001 by approving (to the 
FRY) an amount of SDR 200 million under the Stand-by Arrangement, and SDR 650
million on 14 May 2002 under the Extended Fund Facility. According to Begg (1996), 
such IMF role in transition is bilateral rather then systemic, as it focuses on technical 
advising in construction of a programme's details and in its overall preservation.
It is also interesting to note that Serbia's 2001 stabilisation did differ 
much from the reform programmes previously applied in FRY and in SFRY that we 
presented in the previous sections. What was different, however, was the political support 
to stabilisation and reforms. Group 17 (1997, p. 31) notices that an already implicit and 
weak political support to earlier stabilisation programmes in Serbia tended to fed out only 
after 4-6 months of implementation, confirming the thesis that the problem was in the 
political oligarchy and not in the economic reform design. 84
Therefore, one could argue that the Balcerowicz's (1993) 'extraordinary polities' 
argument has played in Serbia from 2000 onwards an even more important role than in 
some other transition countries. The conclusion is that success on the economic front was 
only possible after a new government was put in place and obtained the largest possible 
political support, as that was the case with the democratic government of Dr Zoran 
Djindjic in 2001. Moreover, Serbia's case confirms that the beginning of stabilisation 
goes in hand with international support, and that it coincides with IMF financing, as 
suggested by Fisher, Sahay and Vegh (1996, p. 5). The results of such approach are 
presented in the following pages.
83 At 20 December 2000 the IMF determined that the FRY has fulfilled the necessary conditions to succeed 
to the membership of SFRY with the overall quota amounting to SDR 467.7 million (about USD 604 
million). On the same day, the IMF Executive Board also approved a loan to FRY in equivalent of SDR 
116.9 million (about USD 151 million) under the Of this amount, 
about USD 130 million was used to bridge the loans that were received to eliminate arrears with the IMF. 
84 One should, however, note that the observed period (2001-2004) was also politically turbulent in a sense 
that the three different governments and three central bank governors were in charge of implementation of 
that programme at different sub-periods. Nevertheless, the same course of actions was more or less 
preserved over the period; the only exception being the year 2004 with regards to privatisation.
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in Serbia was carried out in October 2000 when price controls
on most goods were abandoned or relaxed, and disparities eliminated. According to 
Bosnjak (2002, p. 124), even though this initial price liberalisation induced a one-off 
price increase of 26 per cent in October and of 19 per cent in November 2000, it 
eliminated the existing shortages, especially of some foodstuff. Still, price controls for 
some medicines, electricity, public services, food, oil and oil derivatives remained. Their 
share in the retail price inflation basket in 2004 accounted for 40 per cent (IMF, 2005, p. 
69) although initially the reform plan envisaged their gradual adjustment over a period of 
three years so as to smoothen their negative impact on a low standard of living.
In order to allow international competition to affect domestic prices and to 
reinforce price liberalisation, was initiated in December 2000 based 
on the amended Foreign Trade Law86 . The foreign trade regime in general was also 
largely liberalised in May 2001, when most non-tariff import restrictions (import licences
ft*7
and quotas) were abolished and a new Customs Tariff Law was introduced on a federal 
level. Those measures resulted in the reduction of the average weighted tariff protection 
rate in Serbia from 14.43 per cent to 9.37 per cent. The total reduction of the overall 
protection level is difficult to determine due to existence of discretionary system of 
import quota/licence allocation of the previous foreign trade regime.
Although there exists a solid theoretical background to support the parallel 
elimination of import licences and quotas, there is also an argument suggesting that the 
tariff level should not be reduced to a very low level, or to zero, at once (Bruno, 1993) 
Namely, time is needed for the economy in transition to restructure and to resume 
growth, which implies that a gradual approach to trade liberalisation should be taken. It is 
nevertheless difficult to determine the right speed and the level of trade liberalisation. In 
our view, though, the initial reduction of the overall tariff level by about one third that 
was applied in Serbia in 2001 was, in fact, outsized.
85 This initial price liberalisation was carried out by the leaving government aiming at producing political 
instability, but this turned out to be an important reform step. See Bosnjak (2002) and Arsic (2001).
86 Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 73/00.
87 Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 23/01 and 40/01. This law applied to Serbia only.
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The argument becomes even more compelling once the other trade liberalisation 
measures are considered. Besides the fact that Serbia phased out most of its non-tariff 
barriers on exports and liberalised crude oil imports in May 2003, it also further 
decreased its tariff protection in an attempt to harmonise its trade regime with that of
Montenegro. The so-called Internal Market Action Plan attempted to create a 
between Serbia and Montenegro, as envisaged by the Article 12 of the 
Constitutional Charter (see Box 3.1). The result was the harmonisation of 93 per cent of 
all tariff rates between the two republics, which further reduced the average weighted 
tariff protection rate in Serbia from 9.37 to 6.3 per cent (the nominal average rate stood at 
7.37 per cent) as of 15 August 2003. Thus, within just two years, the tariff protection rate 
in Serbia was more then halved, as it was reduced by 56.34 per cent from 2001 to 2003.
It should also be mentioned that, within the SP-SEE framework, SCO signed and 
ratified a number of free trade arrangements with the regional countries during 2003 and 
2004, further liberalising regional trade. The Memorandum of Understanding on Trade 
Liberalisation and Facilitation signed by Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
FRY Macedonia, Moldova, SCO and Romania called for the liberalisation of at least 90 
per cent of all tariff lines, and 90 per cent of the value of bilateral imports.
However, Serbia kept some export controls on agricultural products as well as 
some import licences for steel products. Having in mind, though, that on 15 February 
2005 Serbia (and Montenegro) separately applied for World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
membership89 , one can expect that further trade concessions will be made by Serbia over 
the medium-term. Such rapid trade liberalisation is not negative in itself, but it can pose a 
threat if not accompanied by more sophisticated methods of protection of domestic 
industry such as, for example, countervailing, safeguard and anti-dumping measures, or 
higher technical standards.
88 The Law on the Action Plan of Harmonisation of the Economic Systems between Serbia and Montenegro 
to Prevent and Remove Barriers to Free Movement of People, Goods, Services and Capital (Official 
Gazette of the RS, No. 67/03). Even though 93 per cent of the tariff lines between Serbia and Montenegro 
have been harmonised, the formation of a single external commercial policy was never achieved. The 
reason why is this so, besides the lack of political will, is that Serbia and Montenegro have had opposing 
economic interests; Serbia wished to protect the domestic industry and agricultural producers, while 
Montenegro, being a small and open economy, aimed at protecting their consumers and importers.
89 The Article XII(l) of the Agreement Establishing the WTO foresees the membership of "any state or 
separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations".
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Hurried trade liberalisation and an inadequately balanced protection of domestic 
production, which in some cases resulted in a negatively effective protection rate90 , 
caused an ever-growing In fact, the trade deficit rose from EUR 1.74 billion 
in 2000 to EUR 5.9 billion in 2004 (33.7 per cent of GDP in 2004). Such a large trade 
deficit is, together with the current account deficit, considered as the most problematic 
macroeconomic imbalance of the Serbian economy in the observed period.91 The trade 
deficit came as a result of large imports that increased from EUR 3.3 billion in 2000 to 
EUR 8.94 billion in 2004, accounting for 43 per cent of GDP in 2004. On the other hand, 
the exports grew at a slower pace, from EUR 1.56 billion in 2000 to EUR 2.98 billion in 
2004, which share in GDP in 2004 was 18 per cent.
Most of the imports in this period were driven by the Serbian companies' need to 
renew its machinery, public need for oil, and the citizens' need for quality (imported) 
goods for final consumption. The larger part of exports was on the side of raw or low- 
processed materials and agricultural products. Consequently, the structure of trade flows 
convectively point to a rising domestic demand and to a low level of competitiveness of 
domestic goods and services. Both of these indicators, in turn, point to the underlining 
structural problems of the Serbian economy, which can only be resolved by economic 
restructuring and underpinned by investments.
The macroeconometric modelling of the Serbian economy conducted by a group 
of Serbia's leading economists92 point to the fact that the movements of the real exchange 
rate, real wages and industrial production predominantly determine the size of imports. 
According to Arsic (2005, p. 214), real exchange rate appreciation leads to an 
import rise, as does the growth of real net wages that represents an indicator of domestic 
demand increase. Additionally, the authors show that an increase in industrial production 
is directly correlated with growing imports, mostly reflecting the import-oriented nature 
of Serbian production.
90 Negative effective protection rate appears when the protection of final products is lower then the 
protection of inputs used in their production.
91 See Arsic (2005, p. 209).
92 
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Regarding the current account as a whole, it should be noted that a partial 
was already introduced in January 2001, whereas full 
convertibility for current transactions was adopted on 14 May 2002 in line with Article 
VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the IMF Statute. The Law on Foreign Exchange 
Transactions93 that introduced the convertibility in current transactions, however, 
preserved controls on capital flows both for residents and non-residents throughout the 
observed period, and was, thus, deemed over-restrictive.
The large trade deficit was offset mainly by private remittances, accounting for 
16.9 per cent of GDP in 2004, by the large inflow of official financing from IFIs, the EU 
and other donors,94 by private capital inflows in the form of foreign direct investments 
(FDI), and to some extent by green-field investments. The stock of FDI inflows to Serbia 
in the period from 2001 and 2004 amounted to EUR 2.7 billion, placing Serbia behind 
only Croatia (EUR 4.7 billion) in terms of the highest FDI inflows among the Western 
Balkan countries. The inflow of FDIs was especially high in 2003 as a result of several 
successful privatisation deals and equalled to EUR 1.2 billion, or 4 per cent of GDP. Still, 
however, the estimated level of FDI inflows needs to ensure sustainable growth in Serbia 
in the forthcoming period.
The balance of payment statistics also reveals a large increase in the 
of Serbia. Total foreign exchange reserves increased from 
USD 890 million in 2000 to USD 5.1 billion in 2004. A substantial part of this increase 
was channelled through the remonetisation95 of the economy, i.e. through a raise of 
foreign exchange bank deposits previously held outside of the banking system. Even 
though a certain percentage of this remonetisation happened automatically in the period 
preceding the replacement of the deutsche mark by the euro (first half of 2002), the 
process itself also reflected an increased confidence of the population in the 
macroeconomic stability and the domestic banking system of the country.
93 Official Gazette of the RS, No. 23/02 and 34/02.
94 "Disbursements of donor support jumped from about US$ 210 million (2.3 percent of GDP) in 2000 to 
and average of US$ 756 million (5 percent of GDP) over 2001-2003" (World Bank, 2004, p. 7).
95 Based on Arsic (2005, p. 145), we define monetisation as an effect of currency substitution in a 
situation when the foreign currency tends to replace domestic currency due to, for example, high inflation. 
Accordingly, remonetisation occurs when there is a growing demand for domestic currency (in real terms).
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Regarding it should be noted that Serbia started 
repaying its debts again in 2001 after an almost eight-year of moratorium. The most 
important agreement was reached with Paris Club creditors in November 2001. This 
included the following two components: (1) a phased debt relief of 66 per cent of the net 
present value of commercial obligations equalling to some EUR 5.1 billion by end-2001, 
and (2) the rescheduling of the remaining stock over a twenty-two years, with a 6-year 
grace period. 6 Additionally, an arrangement was made with the London Club of 
commercial creditors in July 2004 that stated: (1) the write-off of almost 62 per cent of 
the net present value of EUR 2.2 billion (USD 2.7 billion) of outstanding debt, and (2) 
the rescheduling of the rest of the debt over twenty years, with a 3.75 per cent interest 
rate in the first 5 years, and a 6.75 per cent for the remaining fifteen years.
Moreover, Serbia has cleared all of its outstanding arrears with IFIs, and has 
concluded debt-rescheduling agreements with many other bilateral creditors. As a result 
of those efforts, Serbia was - for the first time in its history - granted a credit rating (in 
October 2004).97 Despite these encouraging results, however, a high level of total 
external debt, which share in GDP stood at 63.6 per cent in 2004, placed Serbia among 
medium indebted countries according to World Bank criteria. Moreover, Serbia's 
medium- and long-term debt sustainability remains questionable, because of envisaged 
rising debt service obligations and it financing needs for restructuring and investments.
The effects of fiscal policy are somewhat less easily assessed due to the fact that 
fiscal measures take more time to transmit in the real economy. Nevertheless, one 
preliminary assessment made by the IMF (2004, p. 16) is that all throughout the observed 
period, the Serbian authorities managed to keep fiscal policy appropriately tightened, 
"albeit overly reliant on revenue measures".98
96 See World Bank (2004, p. 7).
97 Serbian credit rating was established by Standard&Poor's and it stood at B+ (stable).
98 The exception was the year 2003, when the fiscal policy turned out to be expansionary in the run-up to 
the general parliamentary elections held on 28 December 2003.
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Besides fiscal tightening, one of the most immediate tasks in 2001 was to secure 
fiscal consolidation. Even though off-budget items and commitments were included into 
a consolidated budget, the budget deficit amounted to only 1.4 percent of GDP in 2001. A 
medium-term management on public revenues and expenditures was introduced through 
a three-year memorandum on economic and budgetary planning, as suggested by Bruno 
(1993, p. 233). Simultaneously, starting in March and April 2001, Serbia enacted a set of 
new tax laws incorporating significant tax reforms. A unified sales tax rate was 
introduced in 2001, replacing a number of different tax forms. The new system was based 
on the principle of efficiency, fairness and transparency. As a result, the new tax system 
become simplified, easier to administer, and rules-driven.
Furthermore, a comprehensive reform agenda for strengthening the tax and 
customs administrations responsible for revenue collection was designed. The new law 
on the budget system, tax procedures and tax administration, and the new customs law 
were enacted, and a new treasury system was introduced. The former payment bureau 
was replaced by a new payment system. The fight 
against tax evasion started with the mandatory introduction of fiscal registries and so the 
share of the grey economy in the GDP started diminishing. The most evident result was 
an improvement in tax collection: this was reflected in a sharp rise in real government 
revenues from 39.1 per cent of GDP in 2001 to 45.8 per cent of GDP in 2004. Following 
the replacement of the sales tax with the value added tax on 1 January 2005, tax evasion 
was reduced and tax collection further improved.
However, having in mind that the move from a direct to an indirect taxation 
system has only been gradual and limited, there is still room for additional improvements. 
Also, the expenditure side of the budget has not been reformed enough and thus the 
expenditures rose to 45.8 per cent of GDP in 2004, comparing to 40.1 per cent of GDP in 
2001. Even though there was a shift form current to investment spending, a large 
percentage of public spending requires further reform. Only in 2004, the budgetary 
adjustment reflected substantial cuts in overall spending, primarily through a reduction of 
transfers to the State Union and to state subsidies. These efforts, however, did not include 
major adjustments in current spending (wages and pensions). During 2001-2004, budget 
deficits were mainly covered by foreign financing and privatisation receipts.
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Similarly to other former-Yugoslav, and other transitional countries, Serbia 
experienced a strong real wage growth, once the transition continued in 2001. The actual 
results reveal average net monthly wage growth from about EUR 60 in early 2001 to 
approximately EUR 180 in early 2004, reflecting the real wage growth and real 
appreciation of the dinar (World Bank, 2004, p. 100). Such a considerable wage growth 
exceeded real GDP and productivity growth, as illustrated by Figure 3.1, thereby raising 
concerns over the Serbian competitiveness, ability to attract new FDIs and, therefore, 
over the entire sustainability of macroeconomic stability.
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On the other hand, the unemployment rate increased more moderately, from 12.1 
percent in 2000 to 18.5 per cent in 2004 (see Table 3.6), which is relatively low in 
comparison to other transition economies. Throughout the period, the labour market 
exhibited duality in many aspects, the most remarkable being a split between the formal 
and informal sectors. Herein, the formal labour market appears to be quite rigid, whereas 
the informal labour market, comprising around one-third of total employment, shows 
greater flexibility. Similar duality is observed between the private and state sectors, the 
former being more flexible, and the later relatively rigid. On average, according to the 
World Bank (2004, p. 102), labour mobility in Serbia befalls high, as 9 per cent of 
workers happen to change jobs within a given year.
144
As shown in Table 3.6, real GDP grew on average by some 4.3 per cent annually 
from 2000 to 2003 - after a large drop of 18 per cent registered in 1999. During that 
period, industrial production was weak, and GDP growth was mainly driven by services 
(construction) and trade. Agricultural production was negatively affected by droughts in 
2000 and 2003, resulting in an 12.4 and 7 per cent decline, respectively. Consequently, 
the share of agricultural production in GDP shrunk that year as well. Real GDP grew by 
2.4 per cent in 2003, and thus mainly reflected buoyant services. During 2004, the 
situation was somewhat different, as real GDP growth reached 8.6 per cent as a result of a 
rebound in agricultural production and a recovery in industrial output, which followed 
major privatisation and the large inflow of FDI in the previous year (2003). During 2004, 
industrial output increased by 7.1 per cent compared to the same period in 2003. As a 
result of all these programmes and financial support, Serbia recorded the following 
macroeconomic results (see Table 3.6).
INDICATOR
Inflation
Real GDP 
growth
Productivity
Industrial 
production
Agricultural 
production
Unemployment 
(LSF data)
Net FDI
Exports
Imports
Trade deficit
CA deficit
External debt
%
%
Chain indices
Chain indices
Chain indices
% of labour 
force
EUR million
EUR million
EUR million
% of GDP
EUR million
% of GDP
EUR million
% of GDP
EUR million
2000
113.5
5.2
116.9
114.4
87.2
12.1
54.7
1,680.0
3,606.4
20.5
1,926.4
3.8
353.1
124.0
11,659
2001
40
5.1
104.1
100.1
118.6
12.2
184.1
1,896.0
4,757.9
24.2
2,861.9
3.3
394.9
106.4
12,609
2002
14.8
4.5
112.7
101.8
96.6
13.3
504.8
2,192.0
5,918.6
24.6
3,726.6
10.0
1,524.0
70.9
10,768.1
2003
7.8
2.4
110.9
97.0
92.8
14.6
1,203.4
2,442.4
6,589.3
24.5
4,146.9
9.2
1,554.7
64.2
10,857.4
2004
13.7
8.6
112.5
107.1
119.5
18.5
777.1
2,831.6
8,623.3
32.6
5,791.7
13.2
2,350.7
58.3
10,354.7
I-VI 2005
8.0
...
104.9
97.9
...
...
563.7
1,667.7
3,614
1,946.3
410.5
59.0
LSF - Labour Force Survey, CA - Current account. 
Serbian Statistical Bureaux and the National Bank of Serbia.
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3.4.3. Monetary, exchange rate and banking sector reforms
In the implementation of the stabilisation programme, which began in October 
2000, one can distinguish between two sub-periods. According to Arsic (2005, p. 
127), the first sub-period that lasted from October 2000 to end-2002, and was 
characterised by fast disinflation, strong remonetisation, substantial appreciation of the 
real exchange rate, and a considerable rise in real wages. The same authors note that the 
second sub-period, which lasted from end-2002 to end-2004 registered sluggish 
disinflation, stagnation of remonetisation, moderate real exchange rate depreciation, and 
the slower growth of real wages. The purpose of this section is to reveal what factors 
influenced such processes and what results derived from them.
Due to the quite long and turbulent historical episodes of high (hyper)inflation, as 
described in the previous sections, an immediate task put before the authorities in 2000 
was to establish the basis for the long-term stability of exchange rate and prices. The 
applied stabilisation programme was an exchange rate-based programme, in which the 
exchange rate was used as a nominal anchor.
The primary programme phase related to the unification of Serbia's multiple 
exchange rate system: official, commercial and grey market exchange rates all existed up 
until the last quarter of 2000. In the first instance, the programme envisaged a 
depreciation of the national currency's commercial exchange rate of to the level 
prevailing on the black market, i.e. from around YUD 20 to YUD 30 per DEM on 13 
October 2000. In the second phase of the programme, on 5 December 2000, the official 
exchange rate of YUD 6 per DEM was abolished. On 1 January 2001, Serbia officially 
adopted a managed float exchange rate regime that, generally speaking, contributed to the 
increase of exchange rate stability. This move was largely in line with the policy 
recommendations, presented in Chapter II.
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Nevertheless, the 'managed float' regime in Serbia was implemented in a rather 
restrictive manner, with the central bank intervening on the foreign exchange market in 
order to keep fluctuations of the exchange rate within certain narrow limits. Even though 
Bofmger and Wollmershaeuser (2000) note that this was a usual practice in many Eastern 
European transitional countries, which officially applied either a 'managed float' or 
'independent float' exchange rate regime, such a policy was not without risks. Namely, 
having in mind that a large share of the loans in Serbia were extended under the foreign 
exchange clause, the impression created by the central bank that it was targeting the 
exchange rate may have cause some market participants to miscalculate their credit costs.
In nominal terms, the exchange rate of the dinar to the euro remained almost 
unchanged during 2001 and 2002. On the other hand, the real effective exchange rate 
increased by 16.8 per cent in 2002 only, which implied a real appreciation of the dinar by 
around 95 per cent in the period from October 2000 to end-2002." According to Arsic 
(2005, p. 124), such a substantial appreciation of the real exchange rate is 
characteristic for all transitional economies because of price liberalisation and the 
elimination of price disparities. However, the same authors point to the fact that in 
Serbia, two other country-specific factors were in motion. First, Serbia began stabilisation 
with an overly undervalued dinar exchange rate. Second, Serbia's exchange rate policy in 
the period until beginning of 2003 implied a fixed nominal dinar exchange rate 
due to the 'fear of floating' (see Calvo and Reinhart, p. 2002).
Since the beginning of 2003, the authorities adopted a more flexible exchange rate 
policy even though officially they retained a 'managed float' regime. As a result, the 
dinar nominally depreciated by 11.1 per cent the euro in 2003 and by 15.8 per 
cent in 2004. In real effective terms, the exchange rate remained broadly stable in 2003 
and 2004, in line with announced policy objectives. This was due to the fact that the 
nominal effective rate depreciated faster then the difference between domestic and euro 
inflation. Furthermore, the period from 2003 to 2004 was characterised by slower 
remonetisation, that is, by slower growth of demand for domestic money, to which a 
slower increase in real wages also contributed.
99 See Arsic (2005, p. 127).
Despite the successive adjustments of administered prices such as those for food 
and electricity, in Serbia decreased considerably from 113.5 per cent in 2000 to 
40 per cent in 2001. The rate of inflation in 2002 was then further reduced to 14.8 per 
cent annually as a result of cuts in government spending and improvements in foreign 
exchange inflows. In 2003, inflation was additionally lowered to 8 per cent, but had 
increased again to 13.7 per cent in 2004 in view of higher world oil prices, relatively 
strong wage growth, and dinar depreciation.
Still, compared to the dynamics of disinflation exhibited in other transitional 
countries, as presented by Cottarelli and Doyle (1999), the conclusion emerges that 
Serbia was very successful in achieving inflation stabilisation within a short period. 100 
The question, however, remains as to whether Serbia should have disinflated at a slower 
pace, thus, reducing the risk of inflation reversals and the costs of real dinar appreciation.
We recall from previous sections that there is evidence to support the view that 
disinflation in transition contributes to a widening of external accounts. 101 Matching that 
with the disappointing results of a wide and ever-growing current account deficit in 
Serbia in the stabilisation period, we conclude that the country could have lowered the 
costs of rapid inflation reduction if it had disinflated at a slower pace, leaving the 
economy some additional time to restructure and gain on its external competitiveness. 
The econometric study of Arsic (2005) also shows that a more substantial real 
depreciation of the dinar exchange rate during 2001-2002 would have led to the
narrowing of external imbalances.
Moreover, the likelihood of inflation reversals experienced by many transitional 
countries would have been significantly lowered. 103 Instead, Serbia faced an inflation 
turnaround already in 2004, when the actual inflation rate of 13.7 per cent exceeded the 
projected level by about 50 per cent.
100 The same conclusion appear if one confronts the Serbia's inflation performance against the more rigid 
criteria established by Easterly (1996) or Bruno (1993), as indicated on page 20 of this work.
101 See page 40 of this work.
102 As this did not happened, the current account deficit in Serbia reached a record high level of 13 percent 
of GDP in 2004 (USD 7.5 billion), comparing to a far modest 0-5 per cent range in which the external 
account deficits of other transition countries orbited during the years of stabilisation. 
103 See Cottarelli and Doyle (1999, p. 4).
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By disinflating from a high above-one-hundred inflation rate to a one-digit one so 
quickly, the central monetary authority in Serbia imposed on itself an additional 
constraint; that is, an obligation to keep the rate of inflation at a 'historically' low level in 
the post-stabilisation years. That way, the NBS also eliminated the possibility of 
employing a surprise inflation in order to get a somewhat higher output growth, as some 
other transitional countries had done.
The conclusion that Serbia brought inflation down to a single digit rate too 
rapidly, within just 3-4 years of stabilisation, is also overwhelmingly supported by the 
findings of the interviews that were conducted during our research. The main argument is 
that such rapid disinflation, combined with the real appreciation of the dinar exchange 
rate, is not sustainable in the long-run. A second conclusion states that the central bank 
cannot successfully target both inflation and exchange rate. The proposition emerges to 
introduce an inflation targeting monetary regime, and to leave the exchange rate to be 
determined on foreign exchange market. In that, the targeted rate of inflation can be 
achieved by controlling other factors that encourage retail price growth, such as salaries 
and public spending.
Throughout the stabilisation period, the National Bank of Serbia pursued a 
(moderately) restrictive monetary policy. The basic monetary indicators are given in 
Table 3.7. The NBS money supply, i.e. increased from CSD 19,845 
million in December 2000 to CSD 76,970 million in December 2004, that is, by 74 per 
cent in nominal terms. In real terms, the growth was negative, given the corresponding 
inflation rate. Higher net foreign assets (NFA) were the main primary issue maker in this 
period. On the other hand, net domestic assets (NDA) caused a reduction in the primary 
issue. The NDA decreased as a result of a drop in the state's net position at the NBS and 
of the other net assets. The rate of growth in the NFA and NDA of the NBS were, in fact, 
set as monetary policy quantitative targets together with the level of government 
borrowing from the banking sector.
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The as measured by M1 monetary aggregate 
(currency in circulation and sight deposits), increased significantly from CSD 27,051 
million in 2000 to CSD 111,179 million in 2004, that is, by approximately four times. It 
should be noted, though, that the highest growth was registered from 2000 to 2002, while 
during the years 2003 and 2004, Ml grew only moderately. According to the NBS (2003, 
p. 31), the high growth of Ml had no unfavourable effects on inflation in the 2000-2002 
period, "since most money creation came from foreign currency transactions". At certain 
times, the Ml monetary aggregate did not grow as much as the primary issue because the 
monetary multiplier was lower because of the high mandatory reserve rate.
3.7. __________________
in CSD million, end-of-period balance
National Bank of Serbia, various issues.
Throughout the observed period, however, the structure of the Ml monetary 
aggregate remained unchanged, with the share of cash of about 40 per cent and the share 
of deposit money (dinar sight deposits) of around 60 per cent.
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As a consequence of growth in the money supply Ml, the money supply M2 
(including total dinar deposits) as well as the money supply M3 (total dinar and foreign 
currency deposits) increased by about the same percentage as the Ml monetary 
aggregate. It is, however, evident from the data presented in Table 3.7, that the pace of 
growth of Ml, M2 and M3 monetary aggregates was proportionally higher in the first 
two years of stabilisation (2000-2002) then during 2002-2004. Unlike the structure of 
money supply M1, the structure of the monetary aggregates M2 and M3 has changed 
over the observed period. In particular, the dinar term deposits were the main generator of 
the M2 supply growth, whereas the aggregate M3 changed due to increase in both the 
volume of dinar time deposits and foreign currency deposits. The foreign currency 
deposits mostly came from the 'new' citizens' foreign currency savings.
The 'new' citizens' foreign currency deposits are savings deposited at banks after 
1 July 2001, which became subject to a 50 per cent liquidity requirement. The so-called 
'old' or 'frozen' foreign currency households' deposits, which the state apparatus ceased 
repaying in early 1990, were not calculated against the reserve requirements. The FRY 
government only started gradually settling off its public debt based on the 'old savings' in 
2001 in line with the provisions of the Law on the Settlement of Obligations Arising 
From the Foreign Currency Savings of Households 104 and the accompanying by-laws. In 
mid-2002 this law was replaced by the Law on the Settlement of Public Debt of the FRY 
Arising From the Foreign Currency Savings of Households 105 , which fully transferred the 
public debt to the Serbian and Montenegrin republican budgets (see NBS, 2003). In order 
to meet its obligations arising from frozen deposits, the Republic of Serbia started the 
process of conversion of frozen deposits into euro-denominated bonds (securitisation), 
"with coupons at below market interest rates" (IMF, 2005, p. 68) on 31 August 2002.
Reserve money, which includes dinar reserve money (currency in circulation and 
commercial bank reserves) and bank foreign currency deposits over the stabilisation 
period (2001 -2004) rose considerably because of an increase in both its components. A 
more significant increase, however, was registered in bank forex deposits with the NBS.
104 Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 59/98, 44/99, 30/00 and 53/01.
105 Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 36/02.
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At the beginning of stabilisation, changes in the structure of NFA inflows implied 
a portfolio shift from foreign currencies into dinars due to an increased in confidence of 
domestic currency. However, this trend reversed in 2003 and 2004, which points to the 
fact that this confidence might have fallen again as a result of inflation reversal and still 
large interest rates, thereby suggesting a monetary policy shift.
  Monetary policy instruments
During the first years of the implementation of the stabilisation programme, the 
NBS had a very limited range of monetary policy instruments at its disposal (IMF, 2002, 
p. 15). Still, this period witnessed the gradual evolution from direct to indirect monetary 
policy instruments, as well as the building up of the capacities and knowledge of the 
NBS's employees in the application of indirect monetary instruments. The main focus of 
the NBS was to absorb the excess liquidity of banks, whose ratio to total dinar deposits 
amounted to a high 18.9 per cent in 2000 and 19.4 per cent in 2001, respectively. 106
The of dinar and foreign currency deposits, which were the 
main monetary policy instrument during the 1990s, were also the primary monetary 
instrument used by the NBS throughout the stabilisation period. The mandatory reserve 
mechanism in the period pre-October 2000 to April 2002 required the daily maintenance 
of reserves, the amount of which was assessed every ten days - whereas the reserve base 
was comprised of dinar deposits only. As of 11 April 2002, the NBS transformed reserve 
requirements by widening the reserve base to include foreign currency deposits as well, 
and by extending the ten-day reserve maintenance period to a monthly level.
Throughout this period, the rate of reserve requirements ranged between 17 and 
24.5 per cent for dinar and between 21 and 26 per cent for the hard currency deposits. We 
compare these rates with those suggested by Rostowski (1993) who proposes that in the
106 According to the IMF (2002, p. 15), "structural conditions have encouraged liquid banks to hold excess 
liquidity, primarily due to the high costs of financial transactions (notably a 0.6 percent tax and fee on the 
value of all payment transactions), the scarcity of profitable lending opportunities, and institutional 
impediments to the banks' efforts to manage their liquidity. The latter include the absence of (a) an 
averaging provision for the reserve requirement, (b) adequate information to project daily liquidity needs 
because all payments are conducted by the payment bureau (ZOP), (c) deposit and reasonably priced 
lending facilities at the NBY, and (d) an operational interbank market".
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countries in transition a rate of banks' reserve requirements be maintained above 25 per 
cent in order to ensure that money multiplier and money supply do not become extremely 
volatile. The conclusion emerges that the experience of Serbia largely matches those 
recommendations, thereby confirming the universality of the authors' findings.
To supplement the reform of the banking sector and to encourage the 
development of an interbank market, the NBY also introduced new 
during 2002. These facilities included the use of intraday credit, overnight 
credit, Lombard credit of varying duration, emergency credit and overnight deposits. On 
its deposit facilities the NBY had paid the related interest rates, whereas the credit 
facilities have been conditioned by the corresponding pledge of either foreign exchange 
deposits, foreign currency cash or NBY bills. For the purpose of maintaining the financial 
discipline of the banks, the NBY also introduced minimum credit rating requirements and 
based its deposit/credit facilities to banks upon their compliance with those requirements.
In its attempt to absorb the excess liquidity of banks and in order to switch from 
direct to indirect monetary policy instruments, the NBS (at the time the NBY) renewed 
the issuance of its short-term securities, that is, the NBY bills, in late 2000. According to 
the IMF's (2002, p. 18) assessment, "both the volume and the interest rates of the 
have been relatively low". Up until 10 October 2003, the NBY's bills auctions were 
carried out the Belgrade Stock Exchange and afterwards through the NBS's own 
electronic platform for auctions. The move towards open market operations was 
accompanied by the end of the issuance of the NBS's bills that took place on 31 January 
2005. Simultaneously, however, the NBS organised its first of 
government securities on 31 January 2005. After the adoption of an adequate law 108 , the 
Republic of Serbia issued long-term bonds that became both the property of the central 
bank and a suitable instrument for repo operations. During this first repo auction, the 
NBS temporarily sold government bonds worth a total of CSD 89.9 million, with an 
obligation to repurchase them in 14 days. The average repo rate stood at 17.6 per cent and 
their total repurchase price is CSD 90.5 million.
107 See page 32 of this thesis.
108 Law on the Settlement of Obligations of the RS to the NBS (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 135/04).
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After a somewhat more rapid reduction of the from 26.34 per 
cent at the beginning of 2000 to 9.5 per cent at the mid-April 2002, the subsequent 
movements in the discount rate until April 2005 reflected only a moderately declining 
trend from 9.5 to 8.5 per cent. exhibited downward trend throughout the 
period, but the cost of credit and the spread between lending and deposit rates remained 
high though negative in real terms. According to the IMF (2005, p. 67), the lending rates 
have been "primarily determined by the Euroibor, the country risk premium and changes 
in the dinar/euro exchange rate" due to a high level of euroisation (see Chapter IV).
Banking sector reform started already in 2001 and has generally progressed quite 
fast. Up until mid-2003, the reform process was focused on transforming the commercial 
banking sector, leaving the institutional reform of the central bank to one side. 109 The 
reform of the banking sector aimed to consolidate the weakened banking sector in Serbia, 
a sector that suffered from bad loans, illiquidity, and a low level of financial 
intermediation. Moreover, two of the objectives was to introduce effective banking 
supervision, and to align the banking procedural operations with the standards of the 
Basel principles of prudential banking. 110
The most demanding among the tasks relating to banking sector restructuring 
certainly was the closure of the four large state-owned banks 
and accounting for two thirds of total assets at the 
beginning of 2002. The remaining insolvent banks were either liquidated or put under 
bankruptcy procedures in 2002. As a result, the number of banks in Serbia was reduced 
from more then 80 in 2000 to 43 as registered by end-2004. The fact that only the 6 
largest banks have a cumulative share of about 53 per cent in the total balance sum (NBS, 
2005a, p. 4) illustrates the need for further consolidation.
109 There was an attempt to adopt the new Law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia already in 2001, but it 
failed. Nevertheless, the administrative and organisational reforms of the National Bank of Yugoslavia 
(later the NBS) begun even before the institutional changes took place in mid-2003.
110 Core Principles of Effective Banking Supervision of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, (so- 
called Basel I and Basel II principles).
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The privatisation process in the banking sector in Serbia appears to be gradual, 
especially the privatisation of state-owned banks (see Table 3.8). Namely, in mid-2002, 
the Serbian government acquired stakes in 16 banks, accounting for around 50 per cent of 
assets of the solvent banks through debt-equity-swaps of Paris and London Club debt. 
The privatisation of those banks, however, only started in 2004.
____________
BANK SEAT
Novi Sad
Pancevo
Novi Sad
Beograd
Novi Sad
Kragujevac
Novi Sad
Nis
Beograd
Cacak
Beograd
Beograd
Beograd
Pirot
REPUBLIC OF SERBIA'S SHARE
98.65 %
92.42 %
94.64 %
76.49 %
82.91 %
60.58 %
67.27 %
88.56 %
46.10%
33.06%
29.08 %
16.36%
14.90%
97.27 %
Official website of the Bank Rehabilitation Agency, www.bra.gov.yu [Accessed: 21.07.2005]
In the meantime, the privatisation of other non-state-owned banks continued 
through mergers and acquisitions carried out mainly by foreign banks. The start of 
operations by foreign banks or banks with predominantly foreign capital encouraged 
competition and increased the quality of services provided, but it also ensured a 37.7 per 
cent share of foreign ownership in the Serbian banking sector (see Table 3.9).
Domestic banks
- State banks
- Private banks
Foreign banks
Total
BALANCE SUM
318,041
184,306
133,735
192,051
510,092
SHARE (%)
62.3
36.1
26.2
37.7
100.0
CAPITAL
79,845
39,773
40,072
19,605
99,450
SHARE (%)
80.3
40.0
40.3
19.7
100.0
National Bank of Serbia (2005b, p. 98)
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Still, even after four years of transformation, the banking sector in Serbia remains 
underdeveloped, i.e. over-banked and under-serviced. This point is illustrated by the fact 
that, at the end of 2004, the sector's total assets amounted to a mere EUR 6.5 billion in 
absolute terms. Expressed in relative terms, the level of financial intermediation 
(measured by the banking sector's aggregate total assets as a percentage of GDP) stood at 
38.8 per cent, comparing to a high EU-15 average of 200 per cent.
Nevertheless, the general assessment is rather positive. Banks in Serbia took 
responsibility over payment operations with the closure of national payment bureau on 1 
January 2002. That confidence in the banking sector, which was completely lost during 
1990s, was regained again is supported by the fact that total bank deposits have increased 
from 17.7 per cent of GDP in 2001 to 24.2 per cent of GDP in 2003. It is worrying, 
however, that the total lending of the banking sector in Serbia has dramatically declined 
from 38.1 per cent of GDP in 2001 to 18.0 per cent of GDP in 2003. On the one side, this 
occurrence came as a result of an increase in banks' credit and risk assessment skills. On 
the other hand, this points to the fact that banks still rarely meet the needs of enterprises 
in terms of maturities and price (interest rates), suggesting that further improvements are 
necessary.
This chapter aimed at revealing some specific features of Serbia's 15 year-long 
monetary and transitional experience (1989-2004), by presenting it in a clear 
chronological manner. Such an approach allows for the direct comparison of findings 
presented here with the theoretical literature and practical experience of other transitional 
countries discussed in the previous chapter. Also, this method enables the reached 
outcomes to be easily challenged by some proposed policy actions envisaged for future 
times, which will be presented in the following chapter. Moreover, the review offered 
here opens the door to deeper analysis of the underlining institutional structures of the 
Serbian monetary authority, that will be conducted in Chapter V.
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Based on the first canvass, we conclude that the transition in Serbia differs from 
transition elsewhere for the following several reasons. Section 3.2 disclosed that the 
SFRY, which Serbia was a part of from 1945 until 1991, was the first to begin the 
transition process. However, the section also demonstrated that SFRY did not need to 
transition from a classical socialist economic set up, as it had developed its own specific 
type of market socialism: a kind of system which already resembled some of the features 
of a market economy, such as a two-tier banking system. The failure of Markovic's 
programme, however, shows that even such an advanced initial position appears to be 
insufficient if there is no clear political will to support the economic programme or if the 
programme lacks the prompt application of stabilisation measures.
Additionally, Section 3.3 shows that Serbia paused its transition for a full decade 
(1991-2001), thereby applying a radical stop-and-go model of transition not implemented 
in other transitional countries. During those years, a very high inflation, combined with 
periods of hyperinflation, determined the negative tendency of (macro)economic 
performance in Serbia, further decomposing its previous economic achievements. This 
came as a result of both an isolationistic and ignorant attitude of the ruling political elite 
(see Palairet, 2001) 111 and the inconsistent sanctionist behaviour of the international 
community (see Pavlowitch, 2001, p. ix). The collapse of Avramovic's programme of 
monetary reconstruction also confirms that no credibility of an economic programme can 
be secured if the programme lacks either adequate domestic political backing or 
necessary international recognition.
Section 3.4, which describes the period between 2001 and 2004 when transition in 
Serbia was re-commenced, demonstrates the suitability of conventional propositions 
established back in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the form of the Washington 
consensus. On top of this, the Serbian experience demonstrates that the time is needed for 
an economy in transition to restructure, resume growth, and gain on its external 
competitiveness, implying that a somewhat gradual approach to trade liberalisation and 
disinflation should be taken.
111 The economic consequences of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic are most clearly and comprehensively 
presented by Palairet (2001) who underlines that the erosion of human capital, corruption, and regime's 
ignorance towards the other economic trends represent its most unforgivable legacy.
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More specifically, it shows that by disinflating very quickly, the central bank 
imposes on itself an additional constraint; that is, an obligation to keep the inflation at a 
'historically' low level in the post-stabilisation years. It cannot, according to Bofinger 
(1990, p. 5), be excluded that a central bank has to produce some periods of surprise 
deflation in order to convince private agents of its anti-inflationary stance. But, as the 
Serbian case shows, this exercise must be counterbalanced with the costs of disinflation 
and exchange rate rigidity, which come in the form of widening external imbalances. The 
lesson emerges that rapid disinflation combined with the real appreciation of domestic 
currency appears to be unsustainable in the long run, as central bank cannot successfully 
target both inflation and exchange rate. The conclusion also seems to be in line with the 
results obtained by Sevic and Sevic (1998) and Hilbers (1993). 112
Nevertheless, it is clear from our analysis that the period from October 2000 
thereafter represents the longest period of continuous efforts to stabilise the economy 
contemporary Serbian economic history. 113 The lessons drawn are that (i) real instead of 
nominal democracy is needed for substantial reforms to be implemented, (ii) a 
complicated constitutional structure does not represent an impediment to reforms if there 
exists a genuine domestic political and international support to reforms, (iii) international 
support represents a necessary but insufficient condition for reforms to succeed, and (iv) 
a time of extraordinary politics, outside the scope of collapse of communism, may serve 
as catalyst for difficult reform tasks, but these periods remain relatively short.
Based on those findings, we raise the question of whether this relatively stabilised 
economic position will be maintained until the end of transition and beyond. The answer 
appears to depend largely on future policy decisions in both spheres, political and 
economic. In this work, however, we chose to explore the potential for further 
developments of monetary and exchange rate regimes (Chapter IV) and the central bank's 
institutional framework (Chapter V). It is our aim to contribute to the overall 
understanding of the need for an increase in institutional credibility and democratic 
accountability that has been lacking in Serbia for decades.
112 See the analysis in Chapter II of this thesis.
113 In contrast, Arsic (2005, p. 127) argue that period from October 2000 thereafter represents "the 
longest period of economic stability in the newest economic history of Serbia".
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This chapter analyses the monetary policy issues during the transition. The theory 
of economic transition has offered a view by which the countries longing for EU 
membership should transit toward a particular - European model - of market economy 
(see Kornai, 1990). In approaching the EU, several options are available and it is the task 
of this chapter to disclose them. Thus, our main question in this part of the thesis revolves 
around the issue of monetary and exchange rate policy options for Serbia in approaching 
the EU. A complementary question is that of timing in the design of an adequate strategy 
and means for its implementation. As a result, we shall also analyse the conceptual issues 
surrounding the monetary policy strategy and its composite parts: monetary policy 
objectives, targets and instruments.
The process, however, is not free from the outside influences, as it depends on the 
transmission mechanism and prevailing economic conditions. This is so because the 
monetary policy itself does not represent an isolated case, but it forms part of a much 
broader macroeconomic milieu, as recognised by the monetarists 1 in the late 1960s. 
Additionally, as explained previously, the macroeconomic variables of transition 
economies exhibit certain specific features; the output, inflation, internal and external 
imbalances and other variables seem to deviate from its usual levels so much that 
Blanchard (2000) even classifies them under the 'pathologies' (e.g. hyperinflation). 
Moreover, the central banks in transition generally lack the expertise in monetary 
policymaking within the layout of emerging market economy and are devoid of 
knowledge about how this rising economic setting operates.
1 Term 'monetarists' stands for the followers of the so-called 'Monetary Theory', which was developed by 
Milton Friedman during the 1960s. The theory opposed the then prevailing belief, set up by John Maynard 
Keynes in the 1930s, that fiscal policy is the key to fight against recessions and that changes in the interest 
rate have little effect on demand and output, leading to the conclusion that monetary policy is not working 
well. Quite opposite to the Keynesian view, the monetarists argue that movements in money can indeed 
explain fluctuations in output (see Blanchard, 2000).
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In face of uncertainty about the true structure of an economy and the shocks to 
which the economy is exposed, policymakers and economic agents may disagree about 
the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy and thus about the appropriate policy 
actions ('what monetary policy can and cannot do'). Similarly, they may have diverging 
views about the adequate monetary policy targets and different understanding about the 
monetary transmission mechanism, that is, the channels through which the monetary 
policy decisions are passed on into the real activity (see Lewis and Mizen, 2000). The 
debate is abundant. Thus, the last part of the chapter provides the overview of Serbia's 
monetary characteristics and experience with monetary and exchange rate regimes.
Serbia's monetary history of the last 15 years, as described in the previous 
chapter, is pivotal to the comprehension and assessment of the country's future monetary 
policy actions. One viewpoint is that, throughout the period, the position and role of the 
Serbian central monetary institution have been challenged by a distorted public 
perception of what monetary policy had done for the Serbian society. The 
causality, however, may have worked in a reverse direction and so another premise is 
that the actual position and the functions performed by the central bank in Serbia over the 
years have lead the public to believe that the National Bank of Serbia had done 
more (or less, ironically) then suggested by the monetary economics theory.
During the 1990s, misconceptions came about as a result of an abusive behaviour 
of elected politicians in terms of central bank and monetary management, as 
meticulously explained by Dinkic (2000). Since 2000 thereafter, the politicians have 
become more disciplined despite the fact that the legislative frame was not immediately 
altered (see Chapter V). But, some residuals of public misconceptions remained till 
today. We argue that, at least partially, they are rooted in basic misunderstandings about 
the monetary policy limitations. Therefore, we chose to go back to explaining the 
underlining the playing field within which the central bank of 
Serbia must operate in future in order to regain its dwindled credibility.
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In order to define the borders of a mentioned central bank playing field, one must 
answer the question of what monetary policy carried out by a central bank, including the 
National Bank of Serbia, and do (see Mishkin, 1996). The issue is, thus, a 
general one. In other words, to maximise the utility function of a central bank one must 
look at the ultimate economic welfare a central bank can bring to a society. An extended 
deliberation in the case of Serbia requires that a question of what the National Bank of 
Serbia do, is also posed.
In institutional terms, the lawmakers draw the boundaries of what monetary 
policy can and cannot do inclusion of monetary policy objectives - price 
financial stability - into the central banks' institutional frameworks (i.e. central bank 
laws). In practical terms, those boundaries are defined by some generally accepted 
findings of economic theory and track record of monetary policy conduct of various 
countries over the years. The theories that predominantly shaped the economists' 
considerations over the monetary policy during the 1960s had two main strands.
The first relied on the assumption that the macroeconomic models, which existed 
at the time, are sufficiently advanced and that they could be employed to accurately 
predict the effects of changes in monetary and fiscal policy on the aggregate economy. 
The second assumption was that there exists a long-run trade off between unemployment 
and inflation that could be exploited, as advanced by Samuelson and Solow (I960)2 . 
Both components sponsored the so-called requiring an 
expansionary monetary policy approach to be used whenever unemployment increases 
above its 'natural rate' 3 .
In the late 1960s and during the 1970s, the 
strengthened due to advancement of monetarists' theories. The first set of arguments was 
based on a couple of presumptions. Firstly, according to Mishkin (1996, p. 15), "Milton 
Friedman staked out his famous position that activist policy would be counterproductive 
because policy, and particularly monetary policy, affects the economy only with 
undermining the results of then prevailing macroeconomic models.
2 See Mishkin (1996).
3 According to Lewis and Mizen (2000, p. 216), the natural rate of unemployment "represents the long-run 
level of unemployment consistent with any level of nominal wage inflation, given that there is no money 
illusion and that price expectations correct for nominal changes in wages".
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Moreover, the 'Lucas critique' came into play in the mid-1970s based on the 
rational expectations theory. The critique emphasised the misleading nature of existing 
macroeconomic models' results on the grounds that they had treated expectations as 
structural parameters (that is, unchanged), whereas the in line with 
variations in policy preferences.
The second collection of arguments against monetary policy activism came from 
the understanding that there is no trade off between inflation and unemployment in the 
medium- or long-run, i.e. that the (see Chapter II). In relation 
to that, Lewis and Mizen (2000, p. 216) assess the following:
"Friedman (1968a) and Phelps (1970) put forward the hypothesis that this was because the 
process by which wages were negotiated, which determined the rate of inflation, involved 
expectations of future conditions. Their contention was that the Phillips curve was failing to 
account for the impact of expectations on the wage inflation process and as a result of the 
misspecification was failing to explain the true nature of the relationship between inflation and 
unemployment".
The third pool of opinions against monetary policy activism gathered around the 
The first paper to bring the issue of inconsistency of optimal 
pubic policy, as explained in Chapter II of this thesis, is the paper by Kydland and 
Prescott (1997). The work of Barro and Gordon (1983) followed. The authors build the 
theory around the notion that a government's optimal policy option at a given time may 
not be optimal in the subsequent period. In other words, they found inconsistency in 
selection of government policy between one period and another due to a simple fact that 
the public may, by trusting the government, act upon its initial policy announcements and 
thus induce the government to re-optimise its policy in face of altered circumstances.
In terms of monetary policy, all these theories worked in a way that they formed 
the precincts to what monetary policy can and cannot do in achieving a desirable 
economic output for society, which was our starting question. Namely, the fact that there 
are long variable lags in the conduct of monetary policy limits the central bank in 
subordinating its expansionary policy to short-run decrease in unemployment or 
increased output, as usually instructed by politicians concerned with the re-election of 
their mandates.
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Equally, the theory of time inconsistency points to a need to reduce the temptation 
of monetary authorities to create surprise inflation - motivated by reduction of 
unemployment, increase of fiscal revenues, smoothing of interest rates, or lessening of 
excessive balance of payments deficits (see Cukierman, 1992) - above private's agents 
inflation expectations.
In practice, the applicability of those theories is evident in lawmakers' attempts to 
institutionally constrain the central banks' behaviour and to utilise its public function by 
coercing it to concentrate on policy outcomes. The Serbian monetary 
history of 1990s, however, confirms the political economy's argument that what is 
considered to be the best policy option in terms of country's welfare does not necessarily 
coincide with what is considered to be the best policy option by the mischievous 
politicians (see Chapter III).
Then again, in normal circumstances, these two should coincide. In such case, the 
structural characteristics of an economy and the nature of shocks to which a country is 
exposed as well as the authorities' prioritisation over economic objectives determine the 
choice of monetary policy strategy that is to introduce stability and predictability into the 
system. Besides, considerations over the monetary policy objectives, targets, instruments, 
and operational procedures also play a role.
4.2.1. Elements of a monetary policy strategy
Nothing in life, and thus neither a monetary approach to a given problem at a 
given time, is constant. However, although the content and expressions may change, the 
notions in principle remain the same such as, for example, (political stability, 
economic stability, financial stability, monetary stability, price stability, etc.). For 
decades now the monetary economists have been occupied with the of securing 
the price and financial stability. The duality derives from the evidence pointing to the 
benefits that accompany both, price and financial stability.
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The gains for a society associated with the stem from the fact that 
price stability promotes an economic system to function more efficiently (Mishkin, 1996, 
p. 19). On the other hand, it was found that the economic costs increase in line with the 
raise in inflation due to several occurrences.4
The benefits associated with derive from the reduction 
(elimination) of fluctuations in price level, which otherwise produce disruptions in 
financial markets due to existence of debts denominated in foreign currencies. This, in 
turn, may trigger financial crises and further destabilise the economy. Consequently, a 
prudential central bank approach to banking supervision and regulation as well as its 
ability to act as a lender-of-last-resort make crucial elements of financial stability. 
Although strongly backed by numerous arguments, the considerations about the monetary 
policy objectives put a constraint on central bank independence. This is because 
nowadays in most countries the central banks do not have the liberty to select their 
ultimate policy goals independently.
Namely, we have seen in Chapter II that the central banks only have 'instrument 
independence' and that the objective of securing the long-term price stability is assign to 
them by politicians (by enforcing a central bank law). Goodhart (1993) argues that this is 
not negative in itself as it indirectly pushes the central bank into the political arena, where 
it can learn how to practice the accountability and gain credibility politicians 
and general public. On the other hand, Cukierman (1993, p. 5) asserts that "some 
ambiguity about the emphasis it [central bank, auth. remark] puts on alternative 
objectives" is desirable, as it allows the monetary authority to produce surprises, 
therefore actively reacting to changes in real economy in the short- and medium-term.
4 Firstly, the so-called 'shoe leather' effect brings about the costs of economising on the use of non-interest- 
bearing money, estimated to account to more then 1 per cent of GDP for economies where inflation raises 
above 100 per cent (see Bailey, 1956). Secondly, higher inflation induces more financial transactions as 
speculators find it more profitable to act as mediators then to invest in production, which may cost the 
economy up to several percentage points of GDP (see English, 1996). Thirdly, high inflation affects 
decisions about future expenditures by creating shifts in investment decision patterns from long- to short- 
term, and by generating alterations in investors' preferences from nominal to real assets. Fourthly, high 
inflation produces distortions in the tax system with resulting misallocations of capital. Fifthly, due to the 
fact that inflation erodes the level of productivity and the base from which the economy grows, it was 
calculated that, on average, 1 per cent rise in inflation could cost an economy from 0.1 to 0.5 per cent of its 
rate of growth (see Fischer, 1993). Finally, the process of disinflation itself registers loss in terms of 
widened external accounts and possibly output (see Cottarelli and Doyle, 1999, in Chapter II).
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We find it important to investigate in what way has Serbia approached all these 
considerations in practice and how has the thinking of politicians changed over the last 15 
years with respect to the tasks they have been assigning to the Serbian central bank. 
Serbia of today, like many other modern countries in the world, has ensured that its 
central bank has price stability as its ultimate monetary policy objective. However, it took 
15 years until the time has come for some new and progressive generations to get into 
position to enforce this institutionally (see Chapter V).
In operational terms, however, the objective of price stability appears to be 
imprecisely defined. Literally speaking, price stability would mean that no changes in 
aggregate prices in an economy take place. This, however, does not make much sense in 
the present ever-changing global economic environment. Therefore, the economically 
meaningful definition of price stability should include the stability of prices of goods that 
are produced or consumed in an economy Furthermore, if a weighted 
average of the prices of goods is taken to denote the price level in that economy, then the 
price stability should also mean the stability of the price In this, it is important to 
know that "the price level and the value of money always move in precisely opposite 
directions" (Bofinger, 2001, p. 153), thus strengthening the rationale for the price 
stability objective.
Having cleared the meaning of the price stability5 , one should move to a more 
practical question of means for achieving it. For this to be possible, however, it is 
essential that a measure, i.e. an indicator, of changes in price level is known. For this 
purpose, the economists have constructed a which rate of increase is 
recognised as the It is interesting that the EU has constructed a unique 
which measures inflation in all EU 
Member States in the same way. There is also the concept of which 
derives from the cost-of-living indices, but excludes certain parameters. 7
5 There exists a difference between quantitative determination and conceptual meaning of price stability.
6 Bofinger (200, pp. 154-157) sketches the main issues (e.g. selection of products in index and attached 
weights) surrounding the selection of an adequate price index and explains some main prices indices 
concepts, such as the 'basket of goods' (Laspeyres index) or the cost-of-living index.
7 "For the communication with the public, core inflation rates have the disadvantage that they are not 
necessarily regarded as a relevant information, since they are not always related to changes in the cost of 
living. Thus, for the HICP the ECB has decided not to adopt the concept of a core inflation rate" (Bofinger, 
2001, p. 157).
165
Aforementioned indices provide useful information to central banks and to 
general public about movements in the inflation rate. But, in order to be in a position to 
influence changes in inflation rate, the central banks must develop some operating tools, 
that is, The case for rules strengthened during the 1970s after 
recognition that in the long-run there is no trade off between inflation and unemployment 
and that discretion of monetary authorities may just add to uncertainty already inherited 
into the economic systems.
The targets appeared to be results of monetary policy makers' search for 'simple 
rules' to which they can adhere in pursuing its more general objective of price stability. 
Thus, an explicit monetary policy target should guide inflation expectations and reduce 
uncertainty by setting a pre-announced monetary policy path. Targeting, however, does 
not imply that judgemental decisions of policymakers are disregarded or that exclusively 
a strict rule-based approach must be applied. Rather, a monetary policy targeting should 
mean that the two approaches are combined so as to co-enforce the overall process of 
monetary policy making introduction of increased consistency and forward-looking 
into a stipulated monetary policy programme, and by making space for imperfect 
mathematical computations of targeted aggregates.
The selection of monetary policy targets depends upon the structural 
characteristics of an economy as well as on the characteristics of the targets themselves. 
In relation to this, Houben (2000, p. 74) sketches the necessary/minimal attributes a 
variable should have in order to qualify for a monetary policy target: "[T]he monetary 
policy target should be: (i) sufficiently controllable; (ii) predictably related to outcomes 
under the end objectives of monetary policy; (iii) a leading indicator of developments in 
these end objectives; (iv) readily communicable to the public at large; and (v) 
monitorable on a timely, frequent and reliable basis".
Herein, the difference may be made between the explicit (i.e. ultimate, operating) 
and intermediate targets. The concept of intermediate targets was introduced once it was 
recognised that the monetary policy, because of time lags that exist between the changes 
in operational targets and effects on the ultimate goal, can react only after disturbances 
occur. Following a seminal article by Poole (1970), the choice among intermediate 
targets scaled down to a price (interest or exchange rate) versus quantity (money).
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Ultimately, however, the selection depends on the transmission mechanism and 
links, which exist between monetary policy objectives, targets and instruments. An 
intermediate target is set to perform two very important functions. The first is to serve as 
a transparent communication device between the economic agents and central banks. The 
second is to establish a tangible benchmark against which the central bank accountability 
can be measured. Indirectly, thus, the targeting is meant to increase the discipline and 
credibility of monetary policymakers. Unfortunately, none of this is achieved in Serbia, 
yet.
The operational and intermediate targets are impacted by adjustments in the 
monetary policy which can be either direct (direct credit, credit ceilings, 
interest rates controls) or indirect (reserve requirements, refinance/discount facilities such
as rediscount and Lombard facilities, government and central bank papers). The choice 
of monetary policy instruments depends on the actual characteristics of an economy, its 
underlying transmission mechanism, and financial system development (see Hilbers, 
1993). The example of industrialised countries, which underwent a dynamic liberalisation 
and deregulation of its financial markets during 1970s and 1980s, illustrates this point. In 
this, the scholars9 argue, a widespread use of indirect monetary instruments both, aimed 
at, and was, an unavoidable result of financial innovations, which occurred at the time.
De Melo and Denizer (1997) examine monetary policy in 26 transition countries 
of Europe and Central Asia in the period 1989-1995 and conclude that the use of credit 
ceilings is particularly helpful in stabilisation years, although the effective stabilisation 
(and financial depth) is accompanied by elimination of credit controls. The authors also 
find that financial depth benefits from evolution of markets for government paper and 
that inflation in transition appears to be associated with the abolition of direct credit and 
introduction of a market-oriented refinancing window. Alexander, Balino and Enoch 
(1995) argue that introduction of indirect instruments goes in hand with increased 
effectiveness of monetary control and amplified efficiency of financial intermediation 
market based allocation of financial resources).
8 "In general, direct instruments take the form of regulations while indirect instruments work through 
markets" (De Melo and Denizer, 1997, p. 7).
9 See Hilbers (1993, p. 1) and Alexander (1995, p. 27) for additional references; both papers point to 
Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh (1989) and Kasman (1992).
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Monetary authorities wishing to introduce indirect instruments are, nevertheless, 
susceptible to certain costs. These costs are bigger the less progress is made in 
concomitant reforms, which require following actions to be taken: (i) insulation of 
monetary policy from deficit financing, (ii) strengthening and integration of money 
markets, (iii) restructuring of banking system and competition fostering, (iv) adaptation 
of supervisory and regulatory framework to market conditions, and (v) bolstering of the 
technical capacity of the central bank. To this, Alexander (1995. p. 27) add the 
stable (macro)economic conditions, which although auspicious to adoption of indirect 
monetary instruments, are "neither necessary nor sufficient" for successful transition to 
indirect monetary policy instruments.
All these factors are likely to affect the pace of transition from direct to indirect 
instruments, which happens to last 3.7 years on average (Alexander 1995, p. 31). 
Transition to indirect monetary instruments clearly does not happen over night; it requires 
sequencing. The sequencing path, however, can only be tentative as transition itself 
depends on a mix of many factors and is, thus, country specific. Accumulated evidence 
from a number of countries (industrialised and non-industrialised) suggests that one can 
distinguish among three transitional stages. assumes that: (i) liquidity 
overhang or liquidity is absorbed, which is best done by reserve requirements, (ii) 
temporary accommodation mechanism (lender-of-last-resort) is established, usually 
overdraft or Lombard facilities, (iii) funds are provided to the market through a credit 
facility (credit auctions), and (iv) elimination of interest rates controls are initiated in line 
with legal and technical preparations for development of money and government 
securities markets. corresponds to issuance of government or central bank 
securities, which should foster developments of secondary markets and introduction of 
repurchase operations (repos). Such open market operations should be accompanied by 
reduction in reserve requirements and short-term credit auctions, Lombard window or bill 
rediscounting (Alexander 1995). involves accelerated development of 
money and secondary market for securities that necessitates further refinements in the 
design of monetary instruments. Comparing this with the findings of Chapter III, we may 
conclude that Serbia is currently in the second stage of transition and that a vigorous 
reform potential will have to be applied if this process is to be acomplished.
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Monetary policy instruments together with the central bank operational 
procedures make the so-called monetary policy Operational 
framework can be more or less complex and may include a range of economic and 
(macro)econometric analyses. For example, the monetary policy strategy of the European 
Central Bank is based on two pillars, which represent a tool for analytical evaluation and 
cross-checking of all information relevant for assessing the risks to price stability (see 
ECB, 2004). The two-pillar analytical framework encompasses the conduct of separate 
economic analysis and monetary analysis, the results of which are then compared and 
cross-checked.
According to the ECB (2004, p. 55), the focuses on the 
developments in economic and financial variables (developments in overall output, 
aggregate demand and its components, fiscal policy, capital and labour market 
conditions, a broad range of price and cost indicators, developments in the exchange rate, 
the global economy and the balance of payments, financial markets, and the balance sheet 
positions of euro area sectors) and the short- and medium-term risks they pose to price 
stability. Due attention is also paid to the nature of shocks to which the economy is 
exposed. A complementary relates to a comprehensive assessment of 
liquidity and credit conditions based on the counterparts (in particular, loans to the 
private sector) and the structure (in particular, Ml) of a broad monetary aggregate M3, 
for which the ECB announces a reference value, upholding the M3 growth compatible 
with its primary goal of price stability over the medium term. Based on our interviews 
with the NBS Vice Governors, we conclude that the NBS's research capacity is still 
further away from the best practices and that it will need to be substantially strengthened. 
While the main function of monetary policy objectives and targets is to set 
is to be achieved ('doing the right thing'), the monetary policy operational framework 
provides answer to the question of that is to be achieved ('doing the thing right'). In 
combination, all these elements (objectives, rules and targets, instruments, operational 
procedures) make the In Houben's words (2000, p. 2), 
"monetary policy strategy is considered to consist of the specification of the intended 
monetary reaction function to economic developments as well as the communication of 
this reaction function and of actual policy decisions to the outside earth".
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Expectations/Credibility
Institutional structure of central bank
Intermediate 
Targets
Ultimative 
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Controllability
Relation with ultimate objectives
° Open market 
operations
o Official 
interest rates
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° Money market 
interest rate
o Monetary base
o Broad money 
0 Exchange rate 
o Domestic credit 
o Capital market 
interest rate
o Inflation
o Output
o Normal income
o Employment
o Balance of payments
Houben (2000, p. 3).
The above definition and its graphical presentation attest that the elements of the 
monetary policy strategy are inseparable from the structural characteristics of an 
economy and nature of shocks to which the economy is exposed. This is so because the 
controllability over monetary variables induced by shocks (see Buch, 1995) and the 
stability of the relation between the monetary and real parameters depend on the 
underlining transmission mechanism, a comprehensive assessment of which ensures that 
monetary authorities' decisions are made in a forward-looking manner, and that they are 
transparent and credible.
170
Factors influencing the choice of a monetary policy strategy
Each and every economy in the world is constantly exposed to certain types of 
economic shocks. Frequently, these shocks occur simultaneously and are thus more 
difficult to trace and to react to. Also, quite often, they are only evident i.e. once 
they happen. Leaving an economy everywhere and at all times exposed to the shocks is 
not the best policy option and is potentially very costly. Therefore, the governments and 
central banks are in most cases called upon to react. However, in order to assign to the 
monetary policy a realistic task of responding only to those shocks and to the extent to 
which the central bank policy actions may suppress the negative effects of shocks without 
introducing additional instability into the system, one must first assess the nature of 
shocks to which the economy is exposed.
The shocks may stem from the monetary (e.g. disturbances to money demand) or 
real (e.g. changes in demand (expenditure), or supply side of the economy such as abrupt 
productivity changes or changes in energy prices) disturbances. They may be of domestic 
(endogenous) or foreign (exogenous) origin, temporary (i.e. self-reversing) or permanent, 
and symmetric (i.e. not country specific) or asymmetric. Extracting information about the 
shocks hitting the economy is, clearly, not an easy task. Depending on the type of shocks, 
the monetary policy will more or less successfully respond to the price and output growth 
fluctuations resulting from those shocks. In this, the selection of monetary policy targets 
appears crucial, but it is additionally burdened by the fact that only the knowledge about 
the nature shocks exists, whereas what matters is the character of possible 
disturbances. Some tentative guidelines are, nevertheless, given in Table 4.1.
At a high level of generalisation, the following relationships between the optimal 
policy targets and different types of shocks can be drawn. If shocks are primarily of 
monetary nature, then an interest or exchange rate target will shelter the economy better. 
To the extent that the economy is exposed to real disturbances, a money target will 
insulate price and output fluctuations more effectively. In cases when shocks come from 
the supply side, the preferred monetary rule is more ambiguous. Similarly, according to 
Houben (2000, p. 14) "nothing conclusive can be said about the superior regime under 
foreign shocks". One recommendation, although constrained by specific circumstances,
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for monetary authorities is to accommodate the shock if it is temporary and to adjust 
interest/exchange rates if the shock is permanent.
_______
Type of chock
Domestic 
monetary shock
Domestic real 
demand shock
Domestic real 
supply shock
External 
nominal shock
External 
symmetric 
shock
Other external 
shock
Temporary 
shock
Monetary policy target and objective
Price target
(Interest rate or Exchange rate)
Stability of 
output
+
-
? + /-
-
Stability of 
prices
+
-
? + /-
-
Quantity target
(Money supply)
Stability of 
output
-
+
Stability of 
prices
-
+
? + /-
+
(outcome according to same domestic shock type, 
but with stable exchange rate)
9
+
9
+
9
-
9
-
With given type of shock, pursuing stated monetary policy target enhances (+) respectively 
undermines (-) fulfilment of stated policy objective; a question mark (?) indicates that the superior 
monetary policy target is unclear.
Houben (2000, p. 16)
Due to the complexity and uncertainty about the stated disturbances, it is 
important that central banks regard the choice of monetary strategy as an 
Such approach will equip them with the greater flexibility in situations when 
some unanticipated disturbances occur requiring a swift monetary strategy switch. The 
choice of monetary policy strategy, however, depends not only on the nature of shocks 
but also on the structural characteristics of an economy as these determine the ability of 
that economy to absorb the disturbances. In this, the following structural aspects play a 
role: (1) wage flexibility, (2) labour mobility, (3) prevalence of budgetary stabilisers, (4) 
openness, (5) capital mobility, (6) diversity of the production base, (7) financial structure, 
and (8) endogeneity in the monetary strategy choice (see Houben, 2000).
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The level of considerably influences the choice of monetary 
strategy, especially the exchange rate regime. If wages are highly or fully 
indexed, then any attempt to nominally adjust exchange rate would be offset by the 
nominal adjustment in wages, leaving real wages unchanged. On the other hand, if real 
wages are fully flexible, both flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes work in terms of 
stabilising output in case of disturbances. However, if wage flexibility is constrained by 
(downward) nominal wage rigidity, the flexible exchange rate better responds to shocks; 
the relationship vanishes with the increased level of nominal wages indexation. In this, as 
argued by Houben (2000, p. 17), the degree of nominal wage rigidity does not 
represent the main problem, but rather the institutional characteristics of labour markets 
and especially intermediate systems of wage barging, as an option in between the 
centralised and decentralised systems of wage barging.
Regarding two views are considered relevant. The first opinion 
derives from Mundell's (1961) argument that a low labour mobility requires greater 
exchange rate flexibility and that the fixed exchange rate regime appears impotent in the 
face of respective economic disturbances. Herein, the higher the asserted uncertainty 
about the prospective employment and income opportunities elsewhere, the lower is the 
labour mobility 10 . Therefore, the relative stability of prospective income and exchange 
rate itself are factors, which influence the choice of monetary strategy (exchange rate 
monetary target) more than the level of labour mobility (Houben, 2000, p. 19). On 
the other hand, as viewed from a single country perspective, if other mechanisms (e.g. 
budgetary policy) - apart from mobility of labour - are engaged in accommodating 
shocks, the fixed exchange rate regime may be compatible with labour immobility.
Theoretically, due to the prevalence of (e.g. wage freeze), 
even under the fixed exchange rate regimes, the negative effects of asymmetric shocks 
can be offset. In practice, however, because of a strong pro-cyclical tendency and sharp 
increases in government debt, the exchange/interest rates remain the preferred solution. 
Besides, the effectiveness of fiscal measures is directly correlated with the size and 
mobility of the tax base and limits it poses on increase in taxes, as it is the case in Serbia.
10 For Houben (2000, p. 19), "labour mobility is a function of the degree of economic uncertainty facing an 
individual".
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There are a few arguments in relation to the influence of a country's to 
the selection of a monetary policy strategy. The first is the efficiency argument implying 
that a more stable exchange rate better insulates the economic disturbances the greater the 
degree of openness (i.e. the larger the share of tradables sector in the economy). Namely, 
the more open the economy, the greater role of exchange rate in determining relative 
prices; thus, the exchange rate stability makes a prerequisite for domestic price stability. 
Besides, in such circumstances, the accommodation of monetary shocks happens 
balance of payments. An opposing argument states that greater openness increases 
vulnerability to external disturbances, thereby entailing larger exchange rate flexibility. 
Additionally, in cases where wages and prices are closely linked to exchange rate 
movements, unlike in Serbia, a more flexible exchange rate effectively stabilises output 
in face of disturbances in domestic demand or external shocks. Altogether, more 
openness seems to favour exchange rate stability, but the ultimate choice of monetary 
strategy remains somewhat ambiguous.
The openness of an economy in terms of the financial sector, i.e. the extent of its 
capital liberalisation and financial integration, considerably influences the choice of 
monetary strategy. In this, according to Houben (2000, p. 24) there exist the 
'incompatible triangle' among unrestricted monetary policy autonomy 
and exchange rate stability as, at any point in time, out of these three objectives, only two 
can be fully met. The causality works in the following way; the larger is the capital 
mobility, the greater is the country's exposure to foreign shocks, especially to changes in 
international interest rates, and, thus, less effective is the exchange rate targeting in 
achieving domestic monetary policy objectives. Notwithstanding the above relationship, 
it should also be noted that the greater capital mobility facilitates the conveying of 
monetary shocks abroad. Highly relevant for transitional countries wishing to join the EU 
and thus aiming at eliminating the prevailing capital controls such still exist in Serbia (see 
Chapter III) is the effects of capital liberalisation to monetary policy instruments as some 
of them tend to lose its strength in view of increased capital mobility. Taken together, all 
those considerations suggest that removal of capital controls should be accompanied by 
direct inflation or nominal income targeting, and not by intermediate solutions such as 
money or exchange rate targeting (see Houben, 2000).
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The experience of Western European countries forming the EU, illustrates the 
point that greater reduces the reliance of monetary 
policy on fixed exchange rate as more diversification by itself reduces the likelihood for 
adverse shocks (see Houben, 2000). Also, in the case of a higher degree of 
diversification, the shocks that occur appear to be more symmetric. The argument, 
however, diminishes in case of transitional economies that exhibit different production 
and trade patterns. 11 Implication for monetary policy is that in those economies greater 
exchange rate flexibility may be required, which is a point of special interest for Serbia.
Limited knowledge about the monetary policy transmission channels precludes 
any conclusive policy recommendation to be made in terms of optimal degree of 
monetary activism under the given country-specific characteristics of its 
The differences among countries in financial structures derive from dissimilar 
private sector financial arrangements reflected in various degrees of indebtedness and 
debt maturities, interest rates variability preferences, and preferences towards alternative 
forms of financing (banking or other). Additionally, within each category, the different 
institutional implications appear to be an important factor for monetary considerations. 
Generally speaking, though, the more those factors determine the structure of balance 
sheets towards a greater sensitivity to changes in short-term interest rates, the weaker is 
the argument for application of exchange rate oriented monetary policy strategy.
Finally, it is important to look at the of adopted (or intended) 
monetary policy strategy, i.e. its effects on the structural characteristics of economy and 
behaviour of economic agents ('Lucas critique'). In the case of monetary targeting, this 
implies analysis of changes in statistical relationship between a monetary aggregate and 
nominal income induced by strategy implementation, as suggested by 'Goodhart's Law' 
(see Houben, 2000). In the case of exchange rate targeting, this requires careful 
considerations about the effects the exchange rate fixity has on the structural 
characteristics of an economy (e.g. labour market reforms aimed at reducing rigidities), 
which initially may work against the option of exchange rate targeting.
11 As explained in Chapters II and III of this thesis, the share of production of primary commodities 
(agriculture, energy and mining) in transition economies is much larger then in industrialised economies, 
whereas the share of manufactures and services is considerably smaller. Moreover, the composition of 
exports and imports is largely unfavourable and thus prone to terms-of-trade shocks.
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4.2.3. Money, exchange rate and inflation targeting
As explained earlier, monetary policy targeting tends to increase the central bank 
transparency, accountability and credibility. As a result, targeting appears to be beneficial 
especially to those central banks lacking the above-mentioned attributes. We argue that 
the National Bank of Serbia is among the central banks which are in deficit of democratic 
accountability, comprehensible communication strategy and genuine credibility. Apart 
from the implementation of institutional mechanisms for achieving those qualities, which 
will be elaborated in the subsequent chapter, the operational framework of a central bank 
with the monetary target at its centre, may serve the purpose. In this, a whole set of 
practical single monetary targets is available to central banks (money, domestic credit, 
interest rate, exchange rate, nominal income, direct inflation) alongside with the 
implementation of a combined targeting approach. A synthetic overview of main 
advantages and disadvantages of respective targets is given in the following Table 4.2.
________
Monetary 
policy 
target
Neutral (0), positively correlated (+), negatively correlated (-). 
' Short-term nominal interest rate.
2 Assumes broadly similar economic structures, shocks and preferences, as well as stability 
oriented policies in the anchor country.
3 Assumes that forecast inflation, rather then actual inflation, is the policy target; this enhances the 
leading indicator properties of the target, but complicates its statistical measurability.
4 Outcome depends on target combination. Here, a dual strategy with money and inflation target is 
assumed, as well as pragmatic monetary implementation.
Houben (2000, p. 120)
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It has been confirmed empirically that the choice of a superior monetary policy 
target is a country-specific process that evolves over time, but that nonetheless some 
normative recommendations do apply, regardless of specificities of any particular 
economy. These mainly point to the fact that interest rates and domestic credit are loose 
targeting options because they do not provide a monetary authority with a nominal 
anchor. 12 Similarly, nominal income target is difficult to forecast and is, thus, not very 
reliable or transparent, while a mixed approach carries the risk of inconsistency of 
multiple targets, which decreases communicability and raises discretion. Consequently, 
the selection narrows down to the following three targeting options: money, exchange 
rate and inflation.
The selection of intermediate target leans essentially on the transmission process 
through which the central bank spreads monetary impulses. There, however, is no one 
single transmission channel. Bofmger (2001, p. 72) provides a summary of key theories 
that explain the channels for transmission:
1. "the channel of the which relies on a direct impact of the 
money supply on macroeconomic demand;
2. the (or aggregate demand channel), which relies on changes 
in the structure of interest rates and their impact on investment and other 
components of aggregate demand (the IS/LM model, Tobin's yield structure);
3. the which relies above all on the impact of inflation 
expectations in wage negotiations; this mechanism is usually presented in the 
form of a Philips curve, which operates via the supply side of the economy [...]
4. For smaller open economies these three transmission channels have to be 
supplemented with an that is based on the purchasing 
power parity theory."
12 Credit targeting is advisable as a temporary solution in situations of balance of payments crisis.
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The developed during the period of the metallic standard 
(gold and silver era), postulates a very simple relationship by which an increase in money 
supply automatically induces an increase in macroeconomic demand. The relationship is 
nowadays evident in situations when central banks finance governments' expenditures by 
raising their monetary base and thus money supply which, in turn, increase inflation. 
Because of its neoclassical background, however, the quantity theory is unable to deal 
with macroeconomic demand and supply disturbances. It, nevertheless, offers a basis for 
a monetary targeting and medium-term oriented stabilisation programmes in high- 
inflation countries based on a calculation of maximum size of the deficit "that is 
compatible with a return to price stability" (Bofinger, 2001, p. 79).
is a medium-term approach based on a simple cue assuming 
raise/reduction in short-term interest rates in face of raise/reduction in monetary growth. 
In this, money appears to be a straightforward nominal anchor. The approach relies on the 
basic assumption that the stock of money determines the aggregate level of nominal 
spending and that money demand is thus The supply of money is then 
steered based on projections of money multiplier, velocity of money, real output growth 
and inflation rate. The targeted monetary aggregates are usually set annually. 13 
Successful monetary targeting, nevertheless, is preconditioned by a of short- 
terms relationship between money demand and price levels that is usually unlikely to be 
observed in countries facing financial deregulation and capital liberalisation such as 
transitional countries.
as a prominent targeting option was established in many 
European countries in the aftermath of the Bretton Woods system during the 1970s. The 
approach is associated with a number of preconditions, which need to be met if the 
benefits of applying this approach are to materialise. These preconditions, according to 
Houben (2000, p. 91), hinge upon the general optimum currency area considerations, i.e. 
upon the existence of similarities in economic structures, economic shocks and policy 
preferences between the anchor and anchoring country.
13 Interestingly, even though the ECB did not adopt the monetary targeting, the ECB produces annual 
calculations of its reference value for the broad monetary aggregate M3 that is compatible with the price 
stability over the medium-term (ECB, 2004, p. 56).
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In a modern world, aims at stability by inaugurating inflation 
for an effective nominal anchor placed at the end of the monetary transmission 
process. The most obvious advantage of inflation targeting is that it establishes a clear 
hierarchy of objectives and that it does so in a rather transparent manner. The result is 
increased visibility and predictability of monetary policy, which in turn raise the 
accountability of the central bank pursuing such targeting option. Most importantly, 
however, is that monetary authority aiming at inflation stabilisation in the context of 
inflation targeting thoroughly assesses all available information and indicators of future 
price developments. At the same time, nevertheless, such methodical approach requires 
vast resources and poses the question of who is producing inflation forecasts (central 
banks professional institution) and whether those forecasts are open to manipulations. 
Moreover, the information, although easily communicable, are also very complex and 
thus require an additional effort from the central bank to engage in pedagogical activities.
As it will be explained in more detail in the following section, Serbia has targeted 
exchange rate traditionally and officially. The literature and the information which we 
collected while interviewing members of the NBS's highest decision making body, 
however, point to the fact that this may currently not be the case. Namely, the NBS has 
for some months now targeted both inflation and exchange rate. The current monetary 
framework may, therefore, be treated as the implicit inflation targeting. We believe, 
though, that such situation is not sustainable as it produces a lot of confusion to the 
market participants. If we add to this inadequate exploration of modern central bank's 
concepts like transparency in daily NBS's operations (see Chapter V), we may conclude 
that the entire NBS' monetary strategy should be revised.
In fact, all transitional countries of Southeast Europe are advised to rethink their 
current monetary strategies and understand necessary changes, which they may need to 
undertake in the course of alignment with the best European practices. But, in order to 
assess whether the proposed targeting and exchange rate options are compatible with the 
formal convergence criteria (the Maastricht criteria) one must firstly scrutinise the 
E(M)U institutional requirements contained in the primary and secondary sources of the 
EU legislation. Transposition of the EU legislation into the domestic legal system is a 
condition for all those countries wishing to become the EU members.
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As 
The countries of the Western Balkans, including Serbia, have declared the EU 
membership to be their strategic goal. Consequently, the EU has become an external 
policy anchor for those countries. 14 The EU itself also has demonstrated its strategic 
interest in the Western Balkans, as its immediate neighbouring area. Herein, the peace 
and stability of the region appear to be the main political motives shared by both sides. 
On the other hand, the economic motives differ and for the Western Balkans include the 
economic reconstruction, development and real convergence in terms of income per 
capita the current EU members. For the EU, the economic incentives are rooted 
in the prospective increased market space and expansion of mutual trade. 15
However, EU membership is a distant reality. This is so not only because the EU 
itself has to learn how to cope with the ten new members, which is an argument put 
forward quite often lately. Namely, the process proved to be the lengthy one for the ten 
new members during their accession as well. Essentially, this is so because the European 
accession is a rather complex undertaking, requiring years of systemic alignment with 
'European values'. Additionally, for all the former centrally planned economies, the 
integration with the EU coincides with the process of transition towards the market-based 
economic setting which, as we have seen earlier, has its own postulates.
The successful transition and the EU membership, thus, represent a confirmation 
of a cleverly applied combination of autonomous prioritisation of national political and 
economic objectives and the EU accession requirements. In other words, we argue that 
the principles and rules of the European integration process should be seen as means, not 
ultimate goals, but that, nevertheless, they have to be acknowledged by the Western 
Balkan countries sooner, rather then later.
14 In the foreword of Lopandic's work (2001, p. 13), Jelica Minic notes that "[t]he region of South Eastern 
Europe is not a on a European or a world level, but rather a The ruling of 
Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia during the 1990s clearly demonstrates that this is not necessarily so. 
Therefore, besides an argument implying that the policy of the great political and economic world powers 
is imposed (transposed) on smaller countries, there is also a clear need for those countries to embrace those 
policies internally if the 'policy taker' argument is to hold firmly.
15 One should understand that the regionalisation in this respect plays a great role. Analysed separately, the 
countries of the Western Balkans are relatively small in size and their economic potentials are, thus, 
limited. Joint together, however, as a region, they gain on attractiveness by representing a market of around 
50 million consumers.
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Serbia affirmed its European determination by the adoption of the Resolution on 
European Integration 16 and the National Strategy for European Integration. The Strategy, 
nevertheless, discloses that this determination is abstract as it is based on a limited 
knowledge about the essence of both the accession process and the social consequences, 
which it produces (Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2005, p. 6). We find that this is 
so at least because of the following two reasons. Firstly, the politicians in Serbia debate 
about the issue of the EU accession almost exclusively within the context of electoral 
campaigns, both ongoing and perceived. Secondly, the political and economic 
circumstances (e.g. unclear prospects of the State Union SCG, hardship of the economic 
transition) do not themselves facilitate the mobilisation of all social actors in this process. 
Consequently, the issue of Serbia's integration into the EU is often overlooked or over- 
simplified. The purpose of our analysis here is to contribute to a better understanding of 
the requirements of accession process in the area 
4.3.1. EMU acquis communautaire
As explained in the introductory chapter, the full EU membership is condition by 
the fulfilment of Copenhagen criteria, which - among other things - assume the ability of 
a future EU Member State to undertake the obligations of membership. In practice, this 
means that any prospective EU Member State will have to comply with the Community's 
legislation (i.e. The process of the adoption of acquis is gradual 
and it takes place, almost exclusively, prior to membership through the so-called 
negotiating process. Membership negotiations are split into 31 chapters, each of which 
relate to a specific area of community law. 17
16 The Resolution on European Integration was adopted by the Serbian parliament in December 2004.
17 The Chapters include the following areas: (1) Free movement of goods, (2) Freedom of movement of 
persons, (3) Freedom to provide services, (4) Free movement of capital, (5) Company law, (6) Competition 
policy, (7) Agriculture, (8) Fisheries, (9) Transport policy, (10) Taxation, (11) Economic and monetary 
union, (12) Statistics, (13) Employment and social policy, (14) Energy, (15) Industrial policy, (16) Small 
and medium-sized enterprises, (17) Science and research, (18) Education and training, (19) Telecom and 
information technology, (20) Culture and audiovisual policy, (21) Regional policy and co-ordination of 
structural instruments, (22) Environment, (23) Consumer protection, (24) Justice and home affairs, (25) 
Customs union, (26) External relations, (27) Common foreign and security policy, (28) Financial control, 
(29) Finance and budgetary provisions, (30) Institutions, and (31) Other (see European Commission, 2003).
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There does not exist a clear demarcation line between the chapters as the 
regulations covered by various chapters are mutually reinforcing and in most cases 
cannot be applied independently. This proves to be the case with the acquis covered by 
Chapter 11, which relates to economic and monetary union, and Chapter 4, which 
regulates the free movement of capital. Moreover, according to the European 
Commission (2003), the participation in EMU presupposes the adoption of the Single 
market acquis and in particular the acquis on free movement of capital. This is so because 
"monetary integration has two essential components: an exchange rate union and capital 
market integration" (El-Agraa, 2001, p. 124).
With regard to capital mobility (Chapter 4), the evidence from prior accessions 
points to the fact that several candidate countries (now the EU Member States) have 
requested and were granted transitional periods (5-12 years) on foreigners' rights to 
invest freely in real estate in those countries. Nevertheless, they had to comply with the 
rest of the Chapter 4 acquis upon the date of accession. As already explained in Chapter 
II of this thesis, the situation in the case of acquis covering economic and monetary union 
(Chapter 11) is somewhat different. Namely, according to the Treaty Establishing the
European Community (thereafter: the Treaty) , an EU Member State is either a Member 
State that has adopted the euro or a Member State with a All new Member 
States entered the EU with the derogation, meaning that none of them embraced the euro 
upon the date of accession to the EU. As in the case of Chapter 4, the new Member States 
had to comply with the rest of Chapter 11 acquis upon the accession date.
The requirements of Chapter 4 swings around Art. 56 to 60 of the Treaty (see Box 
4.1) prohibiting all restrictions on capital movements amongst the EU Member States, 
and between the Member States and the third countries (i.e. liberalisation). 
Besides the relevant Treaty provisions the Council Directive 89/36I/EEC 19 and the 
relevant rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) also regulate capital movements 
(short-, medium-, and long-term capital movements). This directive represents a decisive 
reaction of the EU authorities to liberalise capital movements from 1988 onwards, after 
the initial liberalisation of early 1960s failed to achieve this goal.
18 Official Journal of the EC, C 325, pp. 33-184.
19 Official Journal of the EC, L 178.
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CHAPTER 4 
1. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this chapter, all restrictions on the movement of 
capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.
2. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this chapter, all restrictions on payments between 
Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.
57
1. The provisions of Article 56 shall be without prejudice to the application to third countries of any 
restrictions which exist on 31 December 1993 under national or Community law adopted in respect of 
the movement of capital to or from third countries involving direct investment  including in real estate 
  establishment, the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to capital markets.
2. Whilst endeavouring to achieve the objective of free movement of capital between Member States and 
third countries to the greatest extent possible and without prejudice to the other chapters of this Treaty, 
the Council may, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, adopt measures on 
the movement of capital to or from third countries involving direct investment  including investment 
in real estate  establishment, the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to capital 
markets. Unanimity shall be required for measures under this paragraph which constitute a step back in 
Community law as regards the liberalisation of the movement of capital to or from third countries.
1. The provisions of Article 56 shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States:
(a) to apply the relevant provisions of their tax law which distinguish between taxpayers who are not in 
the same situation with regard to their place of residence or with regard to the place where their capital is 
invested;
(b) to take all requisite measures to prevent infringements of national law and regulations, in particular in 
the field of taxation and the prudential supervision of financial institutions, or to lay down procedures for 
the declaration of capital movements for purposes of administrative or statistical information, or to take 
measures which are justified on grounds of public policy or public security.
2. The provisions of this chapter shall be without prejudice to the applicability of restrictions on the right 
of establishment which are compatible with this Treaty.
3. The measures and procedures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free movement of capital and payments as defined in 
Article 56.
Where, in exceptional circumstances, movements of capital to or from third countries cause, or threaten 
to cause, serious difficulties for the operation of economic and monetary union, the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the ECB, may take safeguard 
measures with regard to third countries for a period not exceeding six months if such measures are 
strictly necessary.
1. If, in the cases envisaged in Article 301, action by the Community is deemed necessary, the Council 
may, in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 301, take the necessary urgent measures 
on the movement of capital and on payments as regards the third countries concerned.
2. Without prejudice to Article 297 and as long as the Council has not taken measures pursuant to 
paragraph 1, a Member State may, for serious political reasons and on grounds of urgency, take unilateral 
measures against a third country with regard to capital movements and payments. The Commission and 
the other Member States shall be informed of such measures by the date of their entry into force at the 
latest. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, decide that 
the Member State concerned shall amend or abolish such measures. The President of the Council shall 
inform the European Parliament of any such decision taken by the Council._________
Official Journal of the EC, C 325, pp. 56-57.
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An instructive overview of relevant Treaty provisions mentioned above is 
provided by Craig and De Burca (2003). Importantly, the authors note that those 
provisions, in fact, do not supply the definition of capital movements, implying that the 
ECJ is called for to decide - based on the Directive 89/36I/EEC - whether a particular 
measure restricts the movement of capital. Hitherto, it appears that the ECJ had been 
interpreting those articles rather restrictively; the strictness being evident both in 
application of articles setting up the basic principles relating to the capital movements 
and in employment of articles carrying exceptions.
Notwithstanding the significance of acquis regulating the area of free movement 
of capital directly and unswervingly - due to its connectivity to the regulation of financial 
sector (banking, insurance, financial markets, etc.) and related activities such as the 
payment system operations, accounting and auditing, prudential supervision, and money 
laundering - those elements must be considered concurrently. Starting from this position, 
we note that Serbia's achievements in relation to the capital account liberalisation are 
unsatisfactory mainly due to the fact that a complete financial infrastructure does not 
exist yet. The Serbian National Strategy for European Integration recognises this fact. It 
is, thus, not surprising that the Strategy itself steps out of the limits of a general strategic 
document by setting a quite detailed action plan of necessary activities.20
This feature also reveals an obvious attempt of the Serbian government to 
overcome the problem of non-existence of adequate national development strategy 
through the adoption of the National Strategy for European Integration. The implications 
of this approach are such that the existing Strategy fails to offer answers to the questions 
relating to the pace and sequencing of capital account liberalisation (gradual big 
bang) in relation to the EU accession, which should be its primary task. That Serbia is 
still at the very early phase of financial transition is confirmed by the exact fact that the 
Strategy is actually setting the preconditions of a functioning financial market, without 
any substantial reference to the liberalisation of that market. In such circumstances, the 
only sensible straightforward policy recommendation would be for Serbia to complete the 
financial regulatory framework without any additional delay.
20 The Strategy suggests that the following laws are adopted: Law on Investment Funds, Law on Electronic 
Payments, Law on Supplementary Protection of Payment Transactions, Law on Protection of Small 
Investors, and Law on Protection of Bank Deposits (Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2005, p. 153).
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The acquis relating to the Economic and Monetary Union (Chapter 11) includes 
the basic principles underlining the Treaty. In particular, Article 2 of the Treaty defines 
the general of the Community, whereas the Article 4 envisages the 
adoption of an economic policy of close coordination among Member States based on 
irrevocably fixing of the exchange rates and promotion of principles of stable prices, 
sound public finances and monetary conditions, and a sustainable balance of payments. 
The Treaty further prescribes that the economic policies should be regarded as a matter of 
common concern (Article 99); it prohibits direct financing of the public sector by central 
banks and of privileged access of the public sector to financial institutions (Art 101 and 
102), and imposes the obligation upon the Member States to avoid excessive budget 
deficits (Article 104).
With relation to the Treaty prescribes the maintenance of the 
price stability as the primary objective of ESCB and defines its other rights and duties 
(Article 105). Article 107(1) specifies ESCB membership, while Art. 109 and 116(5) 
envisage the independence of all national central banks. Moreover, the Treaty instructs 
each Member State to treat exchange rate policy as a matter of common interest (Article 
124). Article 121 and Protocol 21 of the Treaty define the criteria, which must be met by 
a Member State before it can adopt the single currency, the euro. Member States that do 
not fulfil the criteria are referred to as 'Member States with a derogation' (Article 
122(1)).
In practice, the derogation implies that the rights and obligations defined by 
Article 43 of the Statute of the ESCB as given in the Protocol 18 of the Treaty and Treaty 
Article 104(9,11) about the procedure for giving a Member State formal notice to reduce 
its budget deficit and the possibility for the Council to impose financial and other 
penalties on Member States which persistently fail to comply, are temporarily suspended. 
On the other hand, only those Member States with the derogation may benefit from a 
facility providing medium-term financial assistance for Member State's balance of 
payments in line with the Council Regulation 2002/332/EC21 and the European Central 
Bank Decision ECB/2003/1422 .
21 Official Journal of the EU, L 53, and L 349 (corrigendum).
22 Official Journal of the EU, L 297.
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Institutional implications of the Treaty provisions relating to the length of the 
terms of central bank governors, prohibition for a central bank to take any instructions 
from government, objective to maintain the price stability and prohibition of lending by 
the national central banks to governments are of special importance for our study. We 
believe that those considerations are likely to induce further alterations to the institutional 
framework of the National Bank of Serbia in a foreseeable future and Chapter V of this 
thesis, therefore, investigates those issues in more detail. In this context, we shall also 
engage in elaboration of necessary actions, which Serbia's institutions need to conduct to 
prepare themselves for economic policy coordination and surveillance, compliance with 
the broad economic guidelines reporting, and possible usage of excessive deficit financial 
assistance procedures that become effective as of the date of the EU accession.
As an EU member, each country is instructed to treat its exchange rate policy as a 
matter of common interest in line with the Article 124 of the Treaty. Moreover, each 
Member State that wants to adopt the euro must, among other things, operate its 
exchange rate policy under the framework of the so-called Exchange Rate Mechanism II 
(ERM II) for at least two consecutive years, although the decision about the participation 
in ERM II itself is a voluntary. The bilateral central rate against the euro is determined 
jointly by the Finance Ministers of the euro area countries, the ECB and the Finance 
Minister and Governor of the non-euro area country participating in ERM II. ERM II 
mechanism aims to contain the oscillations of the participating currency within the agreed 
bands (maximum ±15 per cent) the central rate without the possibility of 
devaluation for at least two years before the assessment about the fulfilment of the 
Maastricht criteria takes place.
The ERM II is seen as "a training room prior to irrevocably fixing of exchange 
rates" (Banque de France, 2004, p. 5) with a strong multilateral and cooperative 
dimension that exists between the central banks involved. Also, ERM II is viewed as a 
phase in which the credibility and sustainability of pursued policies are tested. Since 
those are not the attributes that can be obtained over-night, the candidate and association 
countries have started their search for a right monetary and exchange rate policy mix well 
before the actual E(M)U membership. The conducted literature review reveals that the 
currency board arrangements and euroisation are, in fact, the two most debated options.
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4.3.2. Currency board arrangements (CBAs)
Why are the currency board arrangements seen as one of the main modules in 
fulfilling ERM requirements? It is our firm belief that the answer to this question is 
identical to that responding to the query of what has initiated the revival of the CBAs
during the 1990s. The simple reply is the search for the and in 
monetary policy matters. The primary goal of the currency board arrangements, back in 
the 19th century when they were first established, however, was far more lucrative 
(although, this is not to say that the credibility and stability of monetary policy are 
secluded from any money-spinning activities at its far end). Namely, the conventional 
mantra stipulates that the CBAs came into existence during the colonial period and that 
the first CBAs were placed in the British colonies24 with the view to economise on 
transport costs and to allow local governments benefit from seigniorage. The context of 
those currency boards, therefore, significantly differs from the CBAs of modern times.25
Nowadays, a currency board arrangement in its pure sense "can be defined as a 
monetary regime based on an explicit legislative commitment to exchange domestic 
currency for a specified foreign currency at a fixed exchange rate, combined with 
restrictions on the issuing authority-the currency board-to ensure the fulfilment of its 
legal obligation" (Balifio and Enoch, 1997, p. 1). In other words, the currency board is 
meant to be a rather strict rule-based monetary arrangement. Over time and due to 
country specific circumstances under which the CBAs were introduced, the rigorousness 
was somewhat lost. In some cases, this did not happen at expense of CBAs' credibility, 
but rather introduced more flexibility into the operations of CBAs and has relaxed the 
procedures in the so-called 'exit strategy' scenarios. Still, in many aspects, the CBAs do 
resemble the characteristics of standard fixed peg arrangements. What is different is a 
clear legal commitment - existing under the currency board arrangements - not to alter 
the exchange rate.
23 Here, we have in mind the CBAs established in Argentina (1991), Estonia (June 1992), Lithuania (1994), 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (June 1997) and Bulgaria (July 1997).
24 The very first currency board was introduced in Mauritius in 1849 (Balifio and Enoch, 1997, p. 1).
25 According to Balifio and Enoch (1997, p. 1), "[t]he degree of capital mobility during the colonial period 
was limited, and most colonial governments lacked fiscal independence. Moreover, the banking systems of 
these colonies consisted of foreign banks that relied on their headquarters for liquidity support and 
interbank settlements."
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The adoption of a currency board requires that a law is passed stipulating the 
fixity of the exchange rate and the foreign exchange reserves necessary to cover the 
domestic liabilities. Although there is a possibility for the authorities wishing to 
implement a CBA before the law is passed to do so by operating a this should 
only be regarded as a transitory solution while the law is actually adopted. The law 
enactment, however, takes time and so it is important that thorough preparations take 
place well in advance. This is so because, apart from the time-consuming procedural and 
political nitty-gritty that surround the endorsement of any law by a parliament, there is a 
more fundamental issue of reaching the national consensus and informing the general 
public and media of the intention to adopt such a specific rule-based regime (see Enoch 
and Guide, 1997).
In extreme situations, the provisions defining the scope of a currency board 
arrangement may even be included in a country's constitution, which places additional 
time and political pressure on the authorities. Even though this will tend to increase the 
public confidence in the authorities' decisiveness to maintain the CBA, it will further 
constrain the practical CBA management reduced flexibility. The same stands true for 
any overly detailed law establishing a CBA such as the prohibition to finance 
government. Depending on the country specific characteristics and aims, which the 
authorities want to achieve, this law may also specify the terms under which the 
exchange rate peg be changed. This, however, may seriously undermine the 
credibility of the currency board even before it is introduced. Just a possibility that the 
authorities may wish to step back from its initial commitment may lead the public to 
believe that they are not ready to firmly defend the chosen monetary regime and, thus, 
that the regime is not credible.
Conceptually, thus, we may say that there is an obvious trade off between the 
increased transparency in operating a CBA and the accompanying increased credibility, 
on the one hand, and the loss in flexibility of a CBA, which in itself may weaken the 
above mentioned credibility, on the other hand. Therefore, the authorities may trade those 
legal provisions for more credibility by simply leaving them out of the law. This is of 
particular importance having in mind that the crux of CBAs lies in their ability to reduce 
discretion of monetary authorities by imposing on them rather strict 'backing rules'.
188
'Backing rules' specify restrictions on currency issuance the level of 
defined foreign exchange reserves, which have to be implemented continually. Herein, 
both the composition of foreign exchange reserves as well as the definition of domestic 
monetary liabilities that are to be backed must be specified. The foreign exchange 
reserves may be set either on a net or on a gross basis and may or may not include the 
IMF and other long-term borrowings. In its narrowest form, the CBAs are designed in a 
way that the entire monetary base (MO) is covered by the central banks' net foreign assets 
(NFA). However, as evidence confirm, this rigid rule is often disobeyed (see Balino and 
Enoch, 1997). Although, in principle, the backing rule is determined on a case-by-case 
basis, the adoption of a CBA presupposes existence of a high level of forex reserves.
The issue is also connected to the question of selection of a peg currency. Enoch 
and Guide (1997) advise that a peg currency be a stable currency of a country with the 
sound financial system and long record of low inflation. The authors also point to the fact 
that the actual and potential trade flows are also taken into account when deciding about 
to which currency to peg. Besides, they propose that the level of 'dollarisation', that is, 
the usage of another currency in the country opting for CBA, is also considered before 
announcing the decision. Ultimately, the question of designated reserve structure during 
the CBA operation is influenced by the composition of international reserves prior to the 
CBA inauguration. Here, it is recommended that a country opting for a specific peg 
currency also ensures that a major part of its international reserves (around 80 per cent26) 
is held in the peg currency by the time of the start of the CBA.
On the other hand, according to Enoch and Guide (1997, p. 6), "the specified 
domestic monetary liabilities can comprise reserve money, or domestic liabilities of the 
central bank". At minimum, however, the designated monetary liabilities should include 
currency in circulation and banks' deposits at the central bank, but may also include other 
central bank's short-term liabilities. It would be important, though, both from the 
psychological and economic point of view, for a central bank to ensure that the supply of 
adequate quantities of banknotes is available and that appropriate storage and transport 
facilities are put in place in time for the start of the CBA, bearing in mind potential large 
costs of these operations.
26 The figure is put forward by Enoch and Guide (1997, p. 19).
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Backing and exchange rate rules are obviously a country specific question, but the 
authorities Grafting a CBA should abide by the universal principles of simplicity and 
transparency. These two principles aim at securing the overall credibility of the CBAs, as 
earlier explained. The credibility of the CBAs will also be underpinned if the banking 
system went through a broad-based restructuring prior to the start of CBA operations. 
This is especially important having in mind one of the main features of the CBA, that is, 
the restriction in terms of lending to banks (lender-of-last-resort function). As a matter of 
fact, the lending to banks under the CBAs is permitted if excess reserves are 
accumulated. This, in turn, requires that the inter-bank markets, which take on a crucial 
role under the CBAs, are institutionally and operationally strengthened before the CBA 
regime is established. The same applies to the banking supervision.
Similarly, if the CBAs are to make sense and offer full benefits, a sufficient 
degree of countries' openness in terms of trade and capital flows must be provided. 
Namely, as pointed out in Chapter II, Bofmger and Wollmershaeuser (2000) stress that 
the CBAs are only advisable for very open economies with the ration of openness higher 
then 72.5 per cent. The idea behind such statement is that only open CBA economy with 
no or with fewer restrictions on capital movements may benefit from interest equalisation 
taking place in international setting, i.e. between the CBA country and the country of the 
peg currency, which is a strong motive for a CBA introduction in itself.
A major drawback of the CBAs, besides the one relating to the loss of classical 
central bank functions (e.g. monetary management or lender-of-last-resort function), 
derives from the rigidity that is inherited into the system of CBAs. This question is also 
linked up with the issue of CBA duration and resulting 'exit strategy' problem. Balino 
and Enoch (1997) stress the need for the authorities to decide on whether a CBA is a 
transitory or long-term/permanent solution. If the former is the case, then the exit strategy 
may assume gradual relaxation of rigid rules or it can happen 'under stress' due to a large 
external shocks once they occur. In this, a country may be put under the pressure to 
appreciate or depreciate, or may decide to switch to another peg currency or to altogether 
switch to a floating regime. If, however, a CBA is deemed to be a longer-term policy 
options, then the accompanying structural reforms (e.g. fiscal policy and labour markets) 
must take place in order to allow more flexibility to enter the system.
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Interestingly, however, none of the modern currency boards had predefined their 
exit strategies as of 2000 (Guide, Kahkonen and Keller, 2000, p. 16). Nevertheless, the 
new EU member countries (Estonia, Lithuania), as well as acceding country (Bulgaria) 
operating CBAs and wishing to adopt the euro, started scrutinising their monetary and 
exchange rate regimes as early as several years prior to their accession to the EU. The 
two main questions they posed are: (1) can a CBA be seen as a regime compatible with 
the Maastricht requirements, which need to be fulfilled in the period preceding the euro 
adoption, and (2) are the CBAs as such compatible with the participation in ERM II.
The analysis performed by Guide (2000) reveals that, in principle, the CBAs 
are compatible with the formal requirements alongside with a variety of other exchange 
rate regimes. Officially, the European Central Bank confirmed its consent with such 
stance in late 2003, as mentioned in Chapter II. The position is built on the evidence 
pointing to the fact that the macroeconomic stability, as requested by the Maastricht 
criteria, has been achieved in the countries operating the CBAs. Most remarkable is the 
low inflation record, which did not happen at the costs of output decline. Also successful 
were the countries operating a CBA in achieving the fiscal discipline and containing 
current account deficits. The authors, however, note that all this could have happened as a 
result of a 'rebound effect' (as many CBAs were establish after crisis took place) or 'self 
selection' (CBAs were in general established by pro-reformist governments) and not due 
to the CBAs, and thus recommend a dose of caution in interpreting the results.
More particularly, in relation to ERM II participation, the authors find that the 
main objectives (facilitation of nominal convergence towards the Maastricht criteria, 
allowing a market test for exchange rate stability, helping to ensure that countries enter 
the euro zone at an appropriate exchange rate, preparing central banks for operating 
within the euro zone) can be achieved under the CBAs (Guide 2000, p. 17). This, 
in turn, means that countries operating CBAs would not necessarily have to switch to 
intermediate regimes prior to the euro adoption, but that they could continue applying the 
CBAs. Nevertheless, under such scenarios, the countries are likely to face several 
challenges such are large capital inflows and asymmetric shocks. To be able to respond 
adequately, therefore, they would need to maintain the policy discipline in a number of 
areas (fiscal policy, financial system, external debt, flexible labour markets, etc.)
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4.3.3. Euroisation
A precise definition of 'euroisation', which in some parts of the world is dubbed 
'dollarisation',27 pretty much depends upon the extent of the domestic currency 
substitution and upon the degree of formality surrounding that process. The simplest 
definition is that euroisation occurs when a foreign currency replaces a domestic currency 
as a store of value, a medium of exchange, and/or a unit of account. In other words, 
euroisation assumes that people are using the chosen foreign currency in order to hedge 
against the exchange rate risks (i.e. domestic currency devaluation) and high inflation by 
diversifying their portfolio holdings.28
Depending on the degree of domestic currency substitution, the distinction can be 
made between the: (1) financial euroisation, (2) payments (currency) substitution, and (3) 
real euroisation. occurs when the foreign currency takes over the 
domestic currency's function of a store of value (i.e. when residents hold their financial 
assets in foreign-currency denominated assets) and when the deposits are held in foreign 
currency (liabilities euroisation). implies that the foreign currency 
assumed the role of a medium of exchange and is used by residents in wholesale and 
retail transactions instead of the domestic currency. takes place when 
domestic prices and wages are indexed to the exchange rate (IMF, 2005, p. 66).
Moreover, the distinction may be made between the (i) unofficial euroisation, 
when foreign currency is not declared as legal tender (also called euroisation' or 
bicurrency system), and (ii) official euroisation, when a foreign currency formally obtain 
the status of a legal tender in which case the domestic currency cease to exist.29 Finally, 
in the context of European integration, the difference is made between the 
and reflecting the agreed adoption of the euro.
27 The notions euroisation and dollarisation are, in conceptual terms, synonymous. The difference arises 
from the specific currency underlining the process. Thus, euroisation assumes involvement of the euro, 
whereas dollarisation implies the usage of the dollar. Similarly, some authors refer to 'markisation' thereby 
stressing the supremacy of the deutsche mark over the domestic currency (see, for example, Gligorov, year 
not known).
28 "[Euroisation] can be explained as a risk hedging instrument to limit the volatility of total returns in a 
multiple currency portfolio (Ize and Levy-Yeyati, 2005)" (IMF, 2005, p. 66).
29 To this division, some authors (see Fabris a/., 2004) also add the: (iii) official semi-euroisation, 
whereby both currencies, foreign and domestic, are used as legal tenders, and (iv) monetary union, which 
refers to a situation when several countries use a common currency such as the case with the EMU.
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Due to the fact that euroisation and currency boards resemble similar 
characteristics, a number of scholars often debate about the two regimes in the same 
context (see, for example, Nuti, 2000, in Chapter II). Although we principally agree with 
such position, it is our view that one critical difference clearly separates the two regimes. 
Namely, the currency boards (including the quasi-CBAs) are always born out of a 
conscious decision of monetary authorities to impose a firm discipline and gain on 
monetary stability by providing a full foreign exchange backing for money circulating in 
the economy. On the other hand, unless it is formally embraced, euroisation reflects the 
rational reasoning of economic agents and the public at large about the necessity of 
attaining monetary stability (for) themselves. Even the official euroisation does not 
happen 'out of blue', but instead often results from euroisation.
The motives for both adoption of CBAs and euroisation are thus arguably very 
similar in comprising of increased monetary stability and policy credibility. However, the 
clearly comes from different sources; from the authorities in the case of 
CBAs and from the general public in the case of euroisation. This separation appears 
helpful in identifying the causes and consequences of any high euroisation, and especially 
its macroeconomic, prudential and policy implications. Herein, it is indubitable that 
initial euroisation "is a response to economic instability and high inflation" (Balino, 
Bennett and Borensztein, 1999, p. 5). What is intriguing is that even the stability is 
achieved and inflation drastically reduced, euroisation resides as the initial impulse of the 
general public to euroise does not fade. The view is strongly supported by evidence from 
many euroised countries (see Balino 1999), including Serbia. Why is this so?
One explanation, offered by Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992) and embraced by 
others30 , is 'hysteresis', which assumes that some form of irreversibility is built-in the 
process of euroisation. This component of consistency in usage of foreign currency most 
plausibly results from the convenience experienced by the economic agents and the fact 
that a switch to a domestic currency could only occur if: (i) accompanied by substantial 
benefits, and/or (ii) if faced with increasing costs of foreign currency holdings. An 
alternative or additional explanation is that the asset substitution increases due to the 
reversal of capital flight and remonetisation, as explained below.
30 See, for example, Balino (1999) and IMF (2005).
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In order to reveal the mechanics behind the process of dollarisation (euroisation) 
and because of its obvious connection with monetary developments, Balino (1999) 
distinguish between the three types of foreign-currency-denominated assets: (1) foreign 
currency deposits (FCD) in the domestic banking sector, (2) foreign currency in 
circulation (FCC) within the domestic economy, and (3) cross-boarder deposits (CBD) 
held at banks abroad. They found that FCD constitute a significant share of broad money 
in several transition economies, reaching 30-60 per cent in early years of reforms. 
According to the authors, high inflation, negative real interest rates on assets held in 
domestic currency, and sharp devaluations (increasing the value of foreign-currency- 
denominated assets in domestic currency) all contributed to the increase in FCD ratio. 
The FCD ratio, however, sharply declined in several countries (e.g. Estonia, Poland) just 
after the effective price stabilisation.
Interestingly enough, the same did not happen to the dollarised Latin American 
countries. On a contrary, the FCD ratio further increased following the stabilisation. 
Apart form the hysteresis effect, the explanation seems to lie in the surge of capital 
inflows to developing countries. Namely, Balino (1999, p. 8) found that the increase 
in FCD ratio was taking place in parallel with the decrease in CBD, reflecting the raise in 
confidence of the domestic economy "(^though not necessarily in the domestic 
currency)". The occurrence is assumed to be a part of a larger process of remonetisation 
of the domestic economy, as in the case of Serbia (see IMF, 2005).
Implications for monetary and exchange rate regimes in euroised economies 
appear to be rather substantial. In relation to exchange rate policy, the existing literature 
suggests that tends to increase the volatility of a floating exchange 
rate because the demand for domestic money becomes more sensitive to changes in its 
expected opportunity costs (increased interest elasticity of domestic money demand). 
Depending on the shocks to which the country is exposed, however, the higher elasticity 
may also bring the opposite effects. Therefore, the case for fixing the exchange rate is not 
a clear-cut. "A clear case for fixing the exchange rate in a highly dollarized [euroised] 
economy is when stabilising from very high inflation or hyperinflation" (Balino 
1999. p. 14) due to which the prices are indexed to the exchange rate. Fixing the 
exchange rate, thus, serve to stabilise the inflation expectations.
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Although the authors stress that the does not directly affect a 
narrow definition of money demand, since the domestic currency deposits and foreign 
currency deposits became close substitutes, the link between the interest rates of foreign 
currency abroad and in euroised economy with interest rates on domestic currency 
strengthens as well. This, in turn, limits the central bank control over the domestic 
currency interest rates implying that a more flexible exchange rate may be more effective 
instrument in hands of monetary authorities. The difficulty with such conclusion is that it 
contradicts the general recommendations in the case of currency substitution. It is thus 
advantageous to know the exact extent of asset currency substitution.31
Regarding the implications of euroisation on monetary policy, it is found that in a 
floating exchange rate regime, or a fixed exchange rate regime with limited capital 
mobility, euroisation indeed influences the choice of intermediate targets of monetary 
policy. What would be a right monetary aggregate to target in such circumstances is an 
empirical question depending on the asset composition of money demand in each 
particular euroised country. One broad observation, however, is that frequent revisions of 
intermediate target values would deem necessary whatever the chosen target. Analysis 
thus leads to the fundamental question of the usefulness of the monetary targeting 
strategy in case of euroised economies. It is true, though, that monetary policy can 
operate using various domestic or foreign currency instruments, but this assumes that a 
whole set of institutional and arrangements are put in place (payment system adjustments, 
central bank expertise, prudential bank supervision, etc.) before this becomes possible.
This is not to say that euroisation as such does not bear any On the 
contrary, euroisation is coupled with several positive occurrences such as higher financial 
intermediation, financial deepening, and increased credibility. Financial intermediation 
tends to increase with the reestablishment of macroeconomic stability and low inflation in 
an environment in which FCD are available and can be held at domestic banks. Allowing 
FCD also increases the credibility of the authorities to maintain financial stability by 
raising the stakes, but this still does not by itself rules out the possibility of crisis.
31 However, the measurement problems, especially in the case of currency substitution, happen to be rather 
complex. Balifio (1999, p. 15), nevertheless, provide one general hint: "In this light, a potentially 
more fruitful approach to identifying currency substitution would start not with money demand but with the 
determinants of inflation".
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And the risk of financial crisis is the main cause of concern and the major 
associated with euroisation. The risks come mainly from two sources. Firstly, 
as it is the case in Serbia, the great euroisation of bank assets increases credit risks 
because of a simple fact that, while lending is indexed to the euro, the borrowers' wages 
and salaries are not. Furthermore, since the loans are extended on the basis of collateral 
an increased volatility of the exchange rate or a large devaluation of domestic currency 
would lead to credit crunch, forcing banks to improve the quality of their loan portfolios 
and increase provisioning.32 In relation to this Balino (1999, p. 13) note the 
following: "In fact, the central bank may attempt to avoid significant devaluations 
because of the quality of the bank's loan portfolios, even if there were otherwise valid 
macroeconomic reasons to devalue", which will prove to be of particular importance for 
Serbia (see next section). In other words, euroisation may increase the 'fear of floating' 
(see Chapter III) and thus limit the exchange rate policy preferences.
Secondly, the high liability euroisation exposes banks to systemic liquidity risks, 
as foreign currency deposits are not fully covered by liquid foreign currency assets. Thus, 
unless the banks have available liquid CBD, they may run out of foreign currency 
reserves in face of unexpected disturbances. Furthermore, this increases the pressure on 
the central bank to build large foreign currency reserves in order to be able to bail out the 
banks in case of sudden shifts in capital outflows. The question of constrained central 
bank's function of the lender-of-last-resort in the case of partial euroisation and the 
complete loss of that function in the case of full euroisation is, however, possibly 
somewhat exaggerated. 33
Finally, at the top of this list of costs of euroisation, there comes the loss of 
seigniorage, as euroisation reduces the demand for domestic currency.
32 The deterioration of banks' financial position is less likely if a large share of foreign-currency- 
denominated loans is extended to those debtors whose net financial position benefits from devaluation, 
such are exporters (Baliffo 1999, p. 13).
33 Interestingly, the participants to the panel about euroisation (the National Bank of Serbia Governor 
Radovan Jelasic, the National Bank of Slovakia Governor Ivan Sramko, and the National Bank of Croatia 
Deputy Governor Boris Vujcic), which was held in Belgrade in May 2005 during the Annual EBRD 
Conference, expressed the view that the concept of the 'Lender-of-Last-Resort' is in a way outdated. The 
main argument behind such statement is that, in real life, a central bank may attempt (and shall hopefully 
succeed) to bail out one bank if in crisis, but that it is very unlikely that the central bank will be able to do 
the same for all the banks in view of a systemic banking crisis. The problem also arises from the fact that 
no clear line can be drawn between s single-case and a systemic banking crisis taking place.
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Altogether, the case for euroisation shrivels together with its costs. Therefore, the 
next question to be posed is how to reduce those costs. The answer, in principle, depends 
on whether the authorities want to totally reduce or to contain euroisation. Generally 
speaking, there are measures that would assume the use of: alternative financial 
instruments, policies that create an interest rate wedge, direct restrictions on foreign 
currency deposits, or measures to encourage the use of domestic-currency-denominated 
cash. It is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis to explain each of them in detail.
One alternative approach, which appears especially appealing to countries 
involved in the process of European integration, is to euroise officially, though 
unilaterally, prior to obtaining a full EMU membership. In this context, Coricelli (2002), 
who investigates the issue on the sample of several CEE countries, finds that the 
significance of real or structural factors is exaggerated and that financial factors play a 
much more important role. Namely, it is evident that transition countries typically register 
faster growth rates then the EU Member States, large current account deficits implying 
accumulation of foreign debt, and large stocks of foreign currency deposits. These 
underlining macroeconomic fundamentals happen to expose countries to the adverse 
effects of exchange rate swings. Herein, a sufficient exchange rate flexibility has two 
main justifications: (1) Balassa-Samuelson effect implying real appreciation of the 
exchange rate, and (2) opportunity to test the equilibrium exchange rate over time.
Coricelli (2002), however, finds both arguments to be rather weak on the grounds 
that the exchange rate flexibility in transition countries also tends to be associated with 
high interest rate spreads, high real interest rates, and vulnerability of the domestic 
economy and the financial sectors to external shocks. On the other hand, the case for the 
early adoption of the euro strengthens as EU membership approaches because the 
transition countries become more open, strengthen their trade relations with the EU and 
increase the flexibility of their labour markets during the accession process. The analysis 
suggests that with the adoption of the euro further convergence will take place, permitting 
an immediate elimination of the interest rate premium and the reduction of real interest 
rates. Besides, with the capital liberalisation (part of EU acquis) "the adoption of the euro 
would eliminate the vulnerability of those countries to sudden shifts in capital flows, and 
their disruptive effects on the domestic financial sector" (Coricelli, 2002, p. 412).
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How do all these considerations relate to Serbia? Is it premature for Serbia to start 
thinking of a relatively distant EMU membership? When is a good time to start? What 
approaches are available? Those are some of the questions that are, for the time being, 
only sporadically raised within the narrow circle of Serbian economists. A wide public 
debate has not been initiated so far. In this respect, an inhibiting attitude of the authorities 
those issues, is not encouraging either. But, what are the reasons behind such 
behaviour?
The most likely explanation is that the real fundamentals in Serbia have still not 
been fully stabilised. This is understandable. The transition in Serbia is yet far from being 
complete. It is, thus, comprehensible that immediate concerns over the regular and 
anticipated revisions of conditioned arrangements concluded with the IMF are the main 
preoccupation of the Serbian politicians.34 Comparing to this, a non-contractual 
relationship with the EU does not stand a chance and, consequently, does not bear a 
priority status. Besides, the Serbian National Strategy for European Integration was only 
adopted in July 2005. 35
The purpose of this section is to encourage the debate about the EU-related issues. 
For that purpose, the section depicts the structural and monetary characteristics as well as 
the rudiments of Serbia's monetary and exchange rate regimes in the period of the last 
fifteen years (1989-2004), leaning on the main findings of Chapter II and Chapter III. The 
overview of historical monetary and exchange rate modes should allow us to sketch out 
the alternative policy choices Serbia is likely to face in the run-up to E(M)U.
34 A political debate surrounding the privatisation of the Serbian state-owned oil and gas company 
(NIS) may serve as an illustration. The initiation of NIS privatisation was one of the 
conditions for conclusion of the Sixth Review under the Extended Arrangement with the IMF. A delayed 
compliance with this condition noted in the IMF letter to the Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica in 
mid-August 2005 caused a real turmoil at the Serbian political scene. Being put under the pressure, the 
Serbian government launched the process of selection of NIS privatisation adviser on 18 August 2005. 
However, the Law on NIS (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 37/91), which needed to be revoked by the 
Serbian parliament in order to allow the company restructuring prior to privatisation, caused the members 
of the Social-Democratic Party to leave the ruling government coalition. 
The parliament eventually revoked the Law on 22 August 2005.
35 The Government of the Republic of Serbia adopted the" National Strategy of Serbia for Serbia and 
Montenegro's Accession to the European Union" on 17 June 2005. The Strategy was also formally 
endorsed by the Serbian Parliamentary Committee for European Integration on 12 July 2005.
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4.4.1. Serbia's monetary and structural characteristics
Here, several studies of varying time-spans appear relevant. The main question in 
SFR Yugoslavia during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was whether the money supply was 
indeed endogenous, i.e. was it simply accommodating enterprises' needs in periods of 
price pressure resulting from supply side forces, or was the National Bank of Yugoslavia 
actually affecting real output. Chowdhury, Grubaugh and Stollar (1990, p. 643)36 found 
for the period covering the last quarter of 1964 to last quarter of 1986 that money in SFR 
Yugoslavia did not "cause industrial production" and that "the money supply was 
endogenously determined".37
The issue during the 1980s, when inflation in the SFR Yugoslavia started 
spurring, was to establish the functions of money demand and supply. For that purpose, 
Petrovic (1995) developed a money demand model where real money holdings depend on 
the expected price level and the expected real exchange rate. For the period 
the study reveals that the broad base money - which included 
both the dinar component of base money (currency in circulation and bank reserves) and 
foreign currency liabilities to commercial banks - did generate Yugoslavia's high 
inflation in the 1980s, whereas the dinar component only accommodated it.
Herein, Petrovic (1995, p. 47) establishes that broad money was co-integrated 
with prices as "prices caused money and money caused prices" and that the narrow 
money was cointegrated with prices and exchange rate in a way that "they caused narrow 
money, while narrow money did not cause them". Moreover, a conclusion emerged that 
the exchange rate losses in the form of quasi-fiscal deficits borne by the NBY were the 
main driving force behind the broad money expansion that fuelled inflation. Therefore, 
the exchange rate losses appeared to drive the Yugoslav inflation in 1980s, as suggested 
by Lahiri (1991) that we introduced in Chapter III.
36 In their study, interestingly, Chowdhury (1990, p. 640) chose Greece and Spain "for comparison 
since they are economies at a comparable stage of development [...] and of a similar size" to Yugoslavia.
37 According to the authors, the two reasons may have laid behind this: (1) the NBY was not pursuing an 
active monetary policy, and (2) the NBY was unwilling to let any enterprise fail by declining them credits. 
Those findings led authors to conclude that the combination of a market economy and socialism such 
existed in SFRY (see Chapter III) may not be compatible with an effective monetary policy.
38 This is a period preceding the introduction of the 'Markovic's programme', which was initialled in 
December 1989, as explained in Chapter III.
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Petrovic and Vujosevic (2000) further looked at peculiarities of monetary 
accommodation in SFR Yugoslavia and found that other then the quasi- 
fiscal deficits resulting from exchange rates losses, the monetisation of quasi-fiscal 
deficits induced by the excessive wage demands had an equal share in perpetuating the 
Yugoslav high inflation. In other words, the authors documented that the money was co- 
integrated with wages, not with prices, and that the aggregate supply shocks (i.e. those to 
wages and prices) and exchange rate shocks were driving inflation, whereas the impact of 
money supply shocks was transient. The accompanying conclusion was that the Yugoslav 
inflation was not driven by excessive government deficit.
Sharpening the focus on the dynamics behind the inflation in Yugoslavia during 
the 1980s, Juselius and Mladenovic (2002) confirmed empirically that the inflationary 
expectations over nominal wage claims as well as the expectations about the depreciation 
of black market exchange rate also played a role in spiralling inflation. In summing up, 
Juselius and Mladenovic (2002, p. 26) noted: "The underlying cause of the ever 
increasing inflation rate seems to be in the financing of excessive wage claims with cheap 
bank credit based on currency deposits, with consequent currency depreciation, and 
increasing prices".
Petrovic, Bogetic and Vujosevic (1999) analysed the causes, dynamics and money 
supply process in the FR Yugoslavia during the hyperinflation As it was 
explained in Chapter III, the authors found that hyperinflation was driven by excessive 
money supply through monetisation of various deficits. The money growth was found to 
be weakly exogenous, affecting inflation currency depreciation and suggesting high 
indexation of prices to exchange rate movements. Petrovic (1999, p. 335) concluded 
that this resulted in the NBY's loss of control over the money supply.
Additionally, Petrovic and Mladenovic (2000) discovered, in relation to Yugoslav 
hyperinflation of 1992-1994, that the exchange rate was not referenced to prices, but that 
it was directly determined in the money market. In other words, the exchange rate was 
directly determined by the rational expectations over future growth of money supply, 
implying that real money holdings were denominated in foreign currency. A conclusion 
emerged that 'dollarisation' played an important role in the Yugoslav hyperinflation. The 
result was also supported by Nielsen (2004).
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Arsic, Mladenovic and Petrovic (2001) provided an overview of the main 
macroeconomic imbalances in the period following hyperinflation They 
notice that during those years, the real money demand almost halved comparing to the 
1980s' figure (6 and 15 per cent, respectively), hence illustrating a low credibility of 
economic policy in the second half of 1990s. The authors also find that, during the 
observed period, money supply was exogenous, driving wages, exchange rate and price 
levels. In this, the result that the exchange rate is determined by money supply is seen as 
a legacy of the Yugoslav hyperinflation 1992-1994, confirming that even after 
hyperinflation the macroeconomic instability was fuelled by monetisation of fiscal and 
quasi-fiscal deficits. Money supply, however, happens to influence prices only through 
wages and exchange rate. Herein, prices are found to be sticky with respect to exchange 
rate, which appears to be the result of a relatively closed Yugoslav economy throughout 
the 1990s (Arsic 2001, p. 10). Moreover, the study reveals a long-term trade off 
between real wage rate and real exchange rate, meaning that real devaluation leads to fall 
in real wages.
In relation to initial stabilisation period the same authors discover 
that the credible stabilisation offered a 'free lunch' through: (i) a strong increase in real 
money demand used to mounting up of foreign currency reserves, (ii) non-inflationary 
growth in money supply accommodating increase in real money demand, (iii) large real 
depreciation of dinar that restrained inflation by using nominal exchange rate as an 
anchor, and (iv) sustained budget deficit relaying on increased tax revenues coming from 
a broadened tax base. The first year of stabilisation was also characterised by a huge 
growth of real money holdings of 173 per cent (Arsic 2001, p. 15), which largely 
resulted from real dinar appreciation.
The authors also argue that real exchange rate, after a year of stabilisation, 
reached the average 1994-1998-level, thus draining out the scope for initial real 
appreciation. Similarly, the wage growth in DEM terms of 120 per cent was considered to 
be sustainable and in line with its historical levels. Arsic (2001), thus, warn that 
further real exchange appreciation and wage growth should only take place if 
accompanied with structural reforms and increased productivity, thereby nominating this 
approach as an alternative policy mix for Serbia's (post-)stabilisation period.
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Arsic, Mladenovic, Nojkovic and Petrovic (2005) conducted the econometric 
modelling of Serbian economy in the (pre-)stabilisation period and 
discussed implications of their findings on monetary and economic policy. As pointed in 
Chapter III, the current account deficit resulting from ever growing trade deficit, has 
appeared to be the main macroeconomic imbalance of the Serbian economy since 
stabilisation inception to date.
Appreciation of real dinar exchange rate and excessive domestic demand growth 
are found to be the main deriving force behind the widening of foreign trade deficit. The 
influence of the exchange rate on imports is statistically so strong that encompasses very 
heterogeneous periods; 1999-2000 when the economy was 'closed' and 2001-2004 when 
the economy opened rapidly (Arsic 2005, p. 213). During 2001 and 2002 the dinar 
was used as nominal anchor and was largely undervalued, which offered a chance for a 
sustainable growth strategy. However, subsequent huge dinar appreciation wiped out 
such policy option and focused on complete exchange rate stability and rapid disinflation. 
The authors argue that this reflects the ailing prioritisation of economic objectives from 
long-term to short-term results. Even though a policy turn took place at the beginning of 
2003 allowing for real exchange rate depreciation, the continuous increase in foreign 
trade deficit points to still existing dinar overvaluation.
According to Arsic (2005), the expansion of domestic demand (especially 
consumption) influenced raising imports above the level determined by the real exchange 
rate and wages through overspending of privatisation receipts in period November 2003 
to June 2004. The effect of reduction in tariff rates that took place in August 2003 in view 
of harmonisation with Montenegro (see Chapter III) was found to have had symbolic 
influence on import rise. Also, the authors claim that the entire tariff reduction could have 
been neutralised had the appropriate dinar exchange rate policy been put in place. 
Moreover, the growth of domestic demand is found to have had a much greater effect on 
increasing imports than on amplifying domestic output growth. Furthermore, Arsic 
(2005) calculate that only between one-quarter and one-third of nominal exchange rate 
depreciation is transposed into inflation (NBS (2004c, p. 32) estimated the exchange rate 
pass-through to prices of 0.32), thus suggesting an alternative policy option including real 
dinar depreciation combined with reduced wages and domestic spending.
An interesting part of this study, however, relates to the assessment of the 
exchange rate and monetary regime - managed float - as officially announced policy 
approach during the observed period. however, the National Bank of Serbia 
implemented a fixed exchange rate in 2001 and 2002, while it turned to a policy of 
moderate dinar depreciation in 2003-2004 by dominating the foreign exchange market 
through its daily interventions. In relation to this, the authors suggest that the NBS 
withdraw from daily interventions, leaving the market to determine the exchange rate:
"The NBS tends to release simultaneously forecasts on the exchange rate level and the target 
inflation rate, which is methodologically and conceptually inconsistent. By announcing the 
exchange rate forecasts, the NBS creates an impression in the public that it is targeting the 
exchange rate, whereby undertaking a form of obligation towards the public. This NBS 
commitment becomes important in the case when, like in Serbia, a large portion of loans is 
extended under an FX [foreign exchange, auth. remark] clause. The public may perceive that 
exchange rate is fixed or that will depreciate just a bit, thus miscalculating the credit costs. [...] 
Instead of simultaneous targeting of inflation and the exchange rate, the NBS should clearly 
define and announce the monetary regime. This might be, having in mind the relevant 
comparative experiences, inflation targeting." (Arsic 2005, presentation, p. 3).
Maravic and Palic (2005, p. 21) find, for the period 
that money demand in Serbia is instable39 and thus "could not be used for the purpose of 
targeting monetary aggregates". In particular, Maravic and Palic (2005, p. 15) claim that 
money demand in Serbia is mainly affected by inflation expectations (1 per cent of 
inflation induces 1.08 per cent growth in money demand), and nominal dinar depreciation 
(1 per cent in dinar depreciation leads to 0.19 per cent reduction in money demand with a 
one-month time lag), whereas interest rates are found to have only limited effects on 
money demand (1 per cent rise in interest rates leads to 0.06 per cent fall in money 
demand with a four-month time lag).
39 Among the reasons for the money demand instability one can find the underlying structural 
characteristics of Serbian economy and nature of shocks to which the country is exposed. We recall from 
Chapter III that, for the last 15 years or so, the country was exposed to various types of external and 
structural disturbances such as: dissolution of the SFR Yugoslavia (1991), military conflicts among the 
former-Yugoslav republics (1991-1995), UN sanctions (May 1992-November 1995), privatisation of the 
national telecommunication company (August 1997), the Kosovo crisis and NATO raids (1999), 'bulldozer 
revolution' (October 2000), general price liberalisation (December 2000), trade liberalisation (December 
2000 and August 2003), liquidation of four large state-owned banks (January 2002), replacement of the 
deutsche mark by euro (first half of 2002), transfer of payment operations from ZOP to commercial banks 
(January 2003), VAT introduction (January 2005). The list is, however, not exhaustive as it should also 
include changes in ownership structure resulting from privatisation and other accompanying reforms 
typical for a transition economy.
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Finally, the IMF (2005) analysis of inflation determinants in Serbia reveals that 
the exchange rate is a primary factor of inflation in the short run, along side income and 
output gap, while broad money growth (M2) is found to be statistically insignificant. In 
this, the pass-through effect from exchange rate to inflation from 0.4 in the medium term 
to 0.7 in recent years may be seen as a result of a managed exchange rate policy. IMF 
(2005, p. 47) also argues that the growing share of imports in GDP sets "0.4-0.5 as the 
'natural' lowest threshold for reasonable pass-through estimates for 2004-05". Low 
impact of money growth on inflation is likely to derive from high euroisation of Serbian 
economy estimated to have increased from 45.7 per cent in 2001 to 54.7 per cent in 2004 
(Maravic and Palic, 2005, p. 16). Moreover, the euroisation itself is found to have 
contributed to the strong pass-through effect on inflation.
The deliberation about the factors influencing the choice of monetary policy 
strategy, subsequent elaboration of monetary flows in Serbia in period since late 1980s, 
and previous analysis of (macro)economic fundamentals of the Serbian economy 
(Chapter III) reveal the following:
Money supply in Serbia happens to influence prices through wages and 
exchange rate (i.e. prices are highly indexed to exchange rate movements); 
High level of euroisation results in low impact of money growth on inflation; 
Money demand in Serbia is instable and mainly affected by inflation 
expectations and nominal dinar depreciation;
- There is a long-term trade-off between real wage rate and real exchange rate, 
as real devaluation leads to fall in real wages.
Due to the obvious historical reasons and dreadful experience with two 
devastating hyperinflations, there exist a strong anti-inflationary bias that drives 
monetary fundamentals in Serbia through inflation expectations and a high 
euroisation. This further reduces the level playing field for the National Bank of Serbia, 
which credibility has been seriously undermined on several occasions in the last 15 years 
(see Chapter V). We feel that this credibility can only be restored by the resolute 
adherence to a credible anchor. In this respect, Serbia's experience so far is telling.
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4.4.2. Serbia's experience with monetary and exchange rate regimes
Under the socialist economic setting the exchange rate was mainly fixed. Dinar 
was only convertible on the streets and abroad. During the 1970s, inflation was slightly 
higher then in Germany and, thus, the real exchange rate was appreciating. The pursued 
monetary policy was based on negative real interest rates, as the foreign currency 
deposits held at domestic banks earned higher nominal interest rates then the dinar 
deposits (see Gligorov, year unknown). In the 1980s, the exchange rate was not fixed any 
more, but the authorities continued applying the same monetary policy. Consequently, the 
dinar was constantly devalued and high inflation prevailed.
During 1989, both the interest rate and inflation served as nominal anchors, 
creating heavy disturbances in the monetary and exchange rate policy. According to 
Savic (1989), this points to the fact that there were no adequate nominal anchors in that 
period; inflation was rising. In such circumstances, several options were considered, 
including the adoption of the currency board, but were equally rejected.40 At this time, 
the official markisation was not considered at all. In late 1989, the exchange-rate-based 
programme was installed (the Markovic's programme), assuming the dinar convertibility 
in current transactions. Large dinar devaluation preceded. As of 18 December 1989, the 
dinar was pegged to DEM. Nominal exchange rate was fixed. Even after the programme 
implementation, however, around 50 per cent of deposits were still held in foreign 
currencies, pointing to high markisation and low programme credibility. During 
December 1990, the dinar devalued nominally by 30 per cent indicating the start of new 
inflation wave (Petrovic 1999, p. 342). Throughout the 1990s the real exchange 
rate appreciated, further deteriorating an external competitiveness of Yugoslav exports.
Fixed exchange rate was abandoned in early 1991. The dinar lost its functions as a 
store of value and a unit of account and was under threat to completely lose its function 
of a medium of exchange. The existence of a very high markisation, which put in 
motion an informal exchange-rate-based pricing, was supported by ample anecdotal 
evidence (e.g. formation of green market prices).
40 "The alternative option on offer was not altogether articulated, but did include a flexible exchange rate 
and some kind of a more federal system of central banking (this is the unclear part). This was not supported 
by the IMF and was not politically feasible anyway" (Gligorov, year unknown, p. 3).
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By February 1992, Yugoslavia entered the state of hyperinflation in which large 
currency depreciation played a great role. The entire period of hyperinflation, which 
lasted until February 1994, witnessed the National Bank of Yugoslavia's loss over money 
creation. The stabilisation programme that was put in place (Avramovic's programme) on 
24 January 1994 formally opted for a crawling peg system under which the exchange rate 
was supposed to be formed freely. The monetary policy relied on nominal exchange rate 
anchor. Up to June 1994, however, the programme represented a quasi-CBA, as the entire 
primary money issue was fully backed by the central banks' foreign currency reserves.
The period following the collapse of Avramovic's programme (mid-1994 to 1999) 
is generally insufficiently covered by both Serbian and foreign literature. What is known, 
nevertheless, is that during that period the dinar was officially pegged to DEM and was 
used as nominal anchor (Barisitz, 2004, p. 97). In reality, however, the multiple exchange 
rates were in effect. The average growth rate of nominal variables (base money, Ml, 
inflation, exchange rate) of around 40-50 per cent, as found by Petrovic (2004, p. 2), 
indicates the existence of very low confidence of the general public in the economic 
policy of the second half of the 1990s.
Following the Kosovo crisis and NATO foray (24 March-9 June 1999), the 
National Bank of Yugoslavia lost competency over the monetary and exchange rate 
regimes in Kosovo and Metohija. The province was semi-euroised from September 1999 
onwards, when the UN administration (EU-led Pillar IV)41 permitted the free use of 
foreign currency, alongside with the dinar. Inner Serbia continued using the dinar that, 
after the outbreak of the Kosovo conflict, strongly depreciated in real terms and was 
accompanied by fast demonetisation (i.e. a flight from the domestic currency into the 
foreign currency). Foreign exchange reserves of the central bank dried out, amounting for 
a mere USD 297.4 million in December 1999 (Arsic 2001, p. 13). Following the 
democratic changes, which commenced in October 2000, the regime of a tight managed 
float was introduced in December 2000 with the nominal exchange rate anchor. The 
exchange rate of the dinar was practically fixed.
41 "The United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (INMIK), created in June 1999 by Security 
Council Resolution 1244, consists of four pillars, namely Pillar I: Police and Justice, under the direct 
leadership of the UN; Pillar II: Civil Administration, under the direct leadership of the UN; Pillar III: 
Democratization and Institution Building, led by OSCE; Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic 
Development, led by the EU" (Barisitz, 2004, p. 105).
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The period of initial stabilisation (2001-2002) was characterised by the fixed 
nominal exchange rate and the real exchange rate appreciation of 95 per cent (Arsic 
2005, p. 209). During those two years, euroisation remained very high primarily due to 
raising real wages and increasing remittances (see Chapter III). Also, the conversion of 
the deutsche mark banknotes ('mattress money') into the euro-denominated deposits in 
the course of 2002, that was taking place mainly through the banks, contributed to strong 
euroisation estimated to amount to around EUR 2 to 3 billion (IMF, 2005, p. 72). As a 
result, in the third quarter of 2002, the share of foreign-currency-denominated deposits in 
total deposits equalled to 54 per cent (IMF, 2005, p. 67). This was understood as a lack of 
credibility of stabilisation policies. However, as already explained, euroisation tends to 
remain high even after successful stabilisations as a result of hysteresis and 'network 
externalities' 42 . Nonetheless, euroisation in Serbia supported remonetisation, financial 
intermediation and portfolio diversification.
Since January 2003, the National Bank of Serbia has somewhat loosened the 
dinar's float, which nominally depreciated by about 11 per cent against the euro and 
appreciated by around 7 per cent against the dollar (Barisitz, 2004, p. 111). The real 
effective exchange rate of the dinar, however, remained largely unchanged during 2003. 
In 2004, real exchange rate depreciated only moderately, as nominal exchange rate 
continued depreciating faster then the difference between the domestic and the euro 
inflation (Arsic 2005, p. 209). Starting from 2003, the NBS officially used the real 
exchange rate as an anchor. While remonetisation stagnated, euroisation continued to 
increase and already by end-2004 about 65-67 per cent of all deposits were held in the 
foreign currency. Several factors contributed to high euroisation such as prevalence of 
negative real interest rates on dinar deposits and foreign banks facilitation of euro- 
denominated deposits and euro-indexed lending. At the mid-August 2005, the total forex 
reserves amounted to USD 5.8 billion, thereby reaching its 1989-level, after full 16 years. 
The fact that those reserves cover by 200 per cent the monetary aggregate M1 proves that 
the quasi-CBA is currently in place in Serbia.43
42 According to the IMF (2005, p. 72), "[t]he utility of using a specific currency as a store of value, medium 
of transaction, medium of account etc. increases with the number of economic agents choosing the same 
currency for these purposes [...]".
43 This fact was revealed by the NBS Governor JelaSic in May 2005 during the EBRD Annual Conference.
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Table 4.3. provides an overview of Serbia's experience with monetary and 
exchange rate regimes (1989-2004). What is striking is that throughout the period, with 
the exception of (pre-)hyperinflation years and the year 1999 (Kosovo conflict), Serbia 
was actually operating the quasi currency board regime with the exchange rate as 
nominal anchor. Also, the conducted analysis points to the fact that Serbia is highly 
euroised economy comparing to the international standards (see IMF, 2005).
Regime
Exchange 
rate 
regime
Monetary 
regime
1989- 
1990
Fixed 
exchange 
rate 
(Since 18 
December 
1989)
Quasi-CBA
Nominal 
exchange 
rate anchor 
(DEM)
1991 1
Fixed 
exchange 
rate
1992- 
1993
Fixed 
exchange 
rate
State of 
hyper- 
inflation
Nominal 
exchange 
rate anchor 
(DEM)
1994- 
1998
Crawling 
peg (DEM) 
(Since 24 
January 
1994)
Quasi-CBA 
(until June 
1994); 
Multiple 
exchange 
rates
Nominal 
exchange 
rate anchor 
(DEM)
1999- 
2000*
Peg to DEM 
(EUR)
Fixed 
exchange 
rate 
(since 
October 
2000)
Nominal 
exchange 
rate anchor 
(DEM)
2001- 
2002*
Tightly 
managed 
float 
(Since 1 
January 
2001)
Fixed 
exchange 
regime; 
Quasi-CBA
Nominal 
exchange 
rate anchor 
(EUR)
2003- 
2004*
Managed 
float
Quasi-CBA
Real 
exchange 
rate anchor 
(EUR)
Not related to Kosovo and Metohija.
1 The year of dissolution of SFR Yugoslavia.
Author.
As a result, two conclusions emerge. The first and more general conclusion is that 
the public in Serbia is extremely inflation averse due to the demoralising experience with 
the hyperinflations and monetary mismanagement of late 1980s and 1990s. To put it 
differently, the economic agents in Serbia highly value both currency and inflation 
stability notwithstanding the fact that they have learned, over time, how to effectively 
hedge against the currency and inflation risks. Implications of this reality to monetary and 
exchange rate policy choices are quite stringent. Whoever is to take a seat at the 
governing boards of the National Bank of Serbia is sentenced to conservatism, as 
monetary experiments are not welcomed (see also Section 5.3.2). Although this is not 
negative in itself, it constrains adequate prioritisation of different macroeconomic 
objectives at given times.
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Secondly, and more technically, the existence of a quasi-CBA requires continuous 
maintenance of foreign exchange reserves at a very high level, which could otherwise be 
used for more lucrative purposes. Besides, under the quasi-CBA and high euroisation, the 
scope for monetary and exchange rate interventions drastically narrows. Notably, for 
years, the NBS has basically been: (i) unable to control the expansion of broad money 
and credit, (ii) it has been experiencing the 'fear of floating' due to the potential balance 
sheet risks, (iii) it was decoupled from a part of seigniorage revenues (estimated at 0.6-2 
per cent of GDP)44 , and (iv) the exercising of its lender-of-last-resort function has been 
subdued by the potential loss of credibility of its exchange rate policy.
Operating under such a setting, the National Bank of Serbia was during 2001 and 
2002 applying an overly restrictive monetary and exchange rate policy, obstinately 
refusing to devalue dinar despite the growing trade deficit.45 This opened a vividly 
debate, which swung around a single question: 'To devalue or not to devalue the dinar?'. 
Gligorov (year unknown, p. 9), however, rightly notes that the real issue was more 
whether the devaluation could have been effective in the context of high currency 
substitution. According to this author, the history argues against it (as population euroise 
to hedge against the devaluation at the first place), but since wages were not contracted 
nor indexed to the euro, devaluation might have brought some positive effects.
This initial debate was in a way closed in early 2003, when the NBS started 
gradually moving towards less rigid exchange rate regime, depreciating the dinar 
moderately (1.1 per cent in 2004). The next issue that was put on the agenda - apart from 
an intense debate surrounding the drafting, adoption and implementation of the new 
National Bank of Serbia Law (see Chapter V) - was whether the exchange rate could and 
should be used for attaining the sustainable balance of payments situation and whether 
the applied exchange rate and monetary regimes qualify for such task.
44 IMF (2005, p. 74) estimated that the minimum of foregone seigniorage would amount to 0.6 per cent of 
GDP under the assumption that about EUR 3 billion in cash circulate in Serbia, replacing an equivalent 
amount of dinar-denominated cash. Arsic (2001, p. 6) calculated that, despite high money growth 
(1994-2000), the collected seigniorage could finance only relatively small fiscal deficit of about 2 per cent 
of GDP.
45 Throughout that period, the Serbian exporters have been persistently requesting devaluation of the dinar, 
pointing to the huge loss of competence of domestic exports other countries' tradables. See, for 
example the Serbian weekly magazine [The Economist] No. 82 dated 17 December 2001, the 
interview with Mr. Slobodan Kora6, the President of the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce, and No. 100 
dated 22 April 2002, the interview with the National Bank of Yugoslavia Governor Mladan Dinkic.
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The answer, in principle, depends on two factors. The first presupposes the 
existence of a common understanding between the politicians and experts about the 
underlining real fundamentals and monetary transmission mechanism, which drive the 
economy (see Kornai, 1990). Such consensus in Serbia in 2005 was clearly not present.46 
The second factor is prioritisation of policy objectives, which is ultimately determined by 
the ruling government's political preferences. We conclude, based on the fact that the 
NBS was up to 2004 very reluctant to depreciate the dinar substantially, that the priority 
was on the side of containing the possibility of banking crisis (see also IMF, 2005). As 
from mid-2004, the authorities assigned more weight to the external objective (see 
Barisitz, 2004), silently switching its policy preference.
The problems of the Serbian economy are, however, quite acute thus requiring a 
broad consensus of all interested parties (politicians, experts, general public, industry) 
about a comprehensive economic (including monetary and exchange rate) policy 
approach. The prevailing disagreements point to the fact that this may as well be a critical 
moment for Serbia to revise its monetary policy strategy. The policy of 'being neglect' in 
which the NBS mutely continues its current policy does not seem to be the optimal 
solution. Alternatively, Serbia may opt for: (1) official euroisation, (2) formal CBA 
introduction, (3) flexible exchange rate target, or (4) freely floating exchange rate.
Besides the fact that the first two options have in Serbia traditionally been 
rejected whenever considered47 , they would also require substantial efforts in 
approximation of legislation and institutional changes. Moreover, the functioning of any 
of those two regimes would require practical adaptation of everyday operations of the 
National Bank of Serbia, which are both costly and time-consuming. Therefore, the first 
intuitive answer would be that those two options would most probably not materialise, at 
least not in a foreseeable future. Nevertheless, in order for a credible decision to be made, 
additional analysis focusing on the potential costs and risks, which may occur in the case 
of unilateral euroisation or a currency board arrangement, should be conducted.
46 See, for example, the magazine No. 249 dated 28 February 2005, which brings the interview 
with the Serbian leading macroeconomist Professor Pavle Petrovic about the findings of the CESMECON 
study on macroeconometric modelling of the Serbian economy, and a replay published in the 
No. 253 dated 28 March 2005 in an interview with Mr Miroljub Labus, the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister.
47 See, for example, Iglic (1999), Lucic (1999), Savin (1999) and Ognjanovic (1999) for the discussion 
about the possible introduction of a currency board arrangement in Serbia.
210
Moreover, as explained previously, the CBA as a form of fixed nominal exchange 
rate target, is only advisable for very open economies with the ratio of openness higher 
then 72.5. Serbia (and Montenegro), however, has a relatively low degree of openness of 
60.7 (Zaman, 2004, p. 20).48 Also, the fixed nominal exchange rate target appears to be a 
superior solution only for those countries with the inflation differential the 
anchor currency (the euro) of less then 3 per cent, which have completed their 
disinflation and price liberalisation processes (see Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser, 2000). 
In Serbia, this is clearly not the case. Moreover, since both options (CBA and unilateral 
euroisation) lack the lender-of-last resort function, their adoption in Serbia could 
substantially increase the financial sector fragility.
With regards to the option of a freely floating exchange rate regime (option 4), the 
situation is pretty straightforward. Such regime is treated as a corner solution, just as the 
rigidly fixed regimes (CBA and euroisation), although placed at an opposite end. The 
floating exchange rates are perceived to have a detrimental impact on cross-border 
investment and to be incompatible with the ERM II (ECB, 2003, p. 3). The fact that the 
literature on transition from a centrally planned economy towards a market-based 
economy makes no reference to a freely floating exchange rate regime is another 
confirmation of inappropriateness of such regime for Serbia in given circumstances.
The choice is, consequently, narrowed down to the so-called 'intermediate 
solution' (options 3 in our case). We believe that the flexible exchange rate target should 
be a preferred policy option for the NBS in the forthcoming period in which a sequential 
capital account liberalisation should also take place. In this, an active crawling band 
appears to be an appealing option for Serbia. This is especially so as "a crawling band is 
capable of achieving a reasonable trade-off between the conflicting objectives of 
reducing inflation and maintaining export growth" (Williamson, 1996, p. 101)49 . Besides, 
the various implementing options under such regime would allow the NBS to further 
sharpen its focus (e.g. to publicly announce inflation target exchange rate target) and 
set a relatively wide band of fluctuations, as a safety margin against large capital inflows.
48 According to Zaman (2004, p. 20), Croatia has a degree of openness of 113.3, while Romania and 
Bulgaria exhibit the same degree of openness of 80. Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser (2000, p. 22) state that 
the ratios of openness for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia are 60.3, 39.6, 27.8 and 57.7, 
respectively.
49 Cited by Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser (2000, p. 22).
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That exchange rate targeting is still a superior option for Serbia in comparison to 
other targeting approaches is documented by the fact that macroeconomic fundamentals 
have not yet settled (see Chapter III). The adoption of direct inflation targeting, as 
suggest by some authors50 , would thus be premature given the non-existence of a stable 
quantitative relationship linking monetary policy instruments to future inflation. Besides, 
there is lack of political consensus over the low inflation and central bank independence 
(see Chapter V), both of which are considered to be prerequisites of direct inflation 
targeting. However, inflation targeting in combination with the greater exchange rate 
flexibility, as proposed by Masson (1999), in our view may be an adequate 
to be implemented in Serbia in the period preceding the EU membership.
4.4.3. The Maastricht criteria in the shadow of the Copenhagen criteria
As already explained, the countries that joined the EU on 1 May 2004 are the 
Member States with a derogation, meaning that they had not adopted the euro at the outset 
of their membership. It is likely that Serbia will share their same faith, once it joins the 
EU (see Dvorsky, 2004). In any case, Article 124 of the Treaty requires all Member States 
treat their exchange-rate policies as a 'matter of common interest'. Herein, "the choice of 
the monetary and exchange rate strategy after EU accession is, in the first instance, a 
responsibility and prerogative of the Member State concerned" (ECB, 2003, p. 1).
The Treaty, nevertheless, does prescribe a set of macroeconomic criteria (the 
Maastricht criteria) that must be fulfilled before the euro is adopted without stipulating 
how these criteria are to be met. It is certain that there is no one single path towards the 
adoption of the euro. Presumably, though, each Member State with a derogation will be 
committed and will strive towards a swift adoption of the single currency, in which case 
the Maastricht criteria become very important. Having in mind, however, that these 
involve the alignment of inflation, government debt, budget deficit, nominal long-term 
interest rate and exchange rate, we believe that cautious policy considerations must take 
place well before the actual EU membership.
50 See, for example, Arsic (2005) and IMF (2005).
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In the case of Serbia, this means that a broad, long-term macroeconomic 
framework should be designed by the relevant authorities, the National Bank of Serbia 
and the Ministry of Finance in the first place. Currently, there are no clear indications that 
such exercise is taking place or that it has been envisaged. The closest the Serbian 
authorities get to such document is by preparing the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper51 , 
a three-year memorandum on the budget and economic and fiscal policy for a given year 
with the projections for the subsequent two years52 , and by the National Strategy for 
European Integration.53 The Strategy, in particular, recognises that the Maastricht criteria 
should start being looked at as guidelines for the maintenance of a sustainable 
macroeconomic stability (see Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2005).
the the Strategy notes that monetary policy should 
follow the policy of neutral money by: (i) maintaining the monetary equilibrium as a 
precondition for the stability of prices and equilibrium exchange rate, (ii) greater reliance 
on open market operations, (iii) building of the elements of sterilisation of the primary 
money created on the basis of capital inflows from abroad, (iv) strengthening the 
supervisory role of the NBS and protection of financial system from the influence of state 
bodies or interest groups, and (v) establishing the limits for commercial banks' 
acquisition of public debt instruments.
In relation to the the Strategy stresses that fiscal sustainability 
represents the major challenge, recommending that the structure of the public 
expenditures be changed in favour of investments and education. Also, the document 
proposes that either: (1) the tax burden be reduced in view of increased fiscal revenues, or 
(2) a budget surplus be formed that would reduce the pressure of domestic demand on 
imports and consequently on the exchange rate.
51 Government of the Republic of Serbia (2003c).
52 The document is produced by the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Serbia once a year in line with 
the relevant provisions of the Budgetary System Law (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 9/02).
53 It should be noted that under the IMF arrangements, Serbia has been obliged to implement a set of agreed 
macroeconomic and structural conditions, which may be regarded as a comprehensive medium-term policy 
framework. However, this approach does not have a 'European component' as was demonstrated on several 
occasions. One example is a linear 10 per cent cut-off in the number of public servants, which took place in 
2005 as a result of an agreement with the IMF. This measure, aimed at reducing the overall public 
expenditure turned out to be contrary to the general recommendation of the European Commission for 
Serbia to further build its administrative capacity, necessary for the process of accession of the country to 
the EU. It would be a logical step to establish some form of co-ordination between the actors (Serbian 
government, the EU and the IMF), as to ensure the sustainability of the undertaken reform tasks.
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Under the heading the Strategy puts forward several 
points, which are of interest to our work. Firstly, it rightly notes that the Serbian foreign 
policy in the years to come will be defined within the context of multilateral and bilateral 
negotiations for membership in the World Trade Organisation and the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement, respectively. Secondly, the document argues that the foreign 
exchange transactions, regulated by the Law on the Foreign Exchange Transactions54 and 
the Law on the Foreign Credit Relations55 , are problematic due to the existence of 
inconvertibility of current transactions and restrictions imposed on capital transactions. 
Moreover, the existence of monopolies is recognised as a threat to further capital 
liberalisation. Thirdly, the Strategy proposes that the evolvement of the issue of Serbian 
current account deficit should be looked against the background of its volume 
(determined by the domestic demand financed new loans that, in turn, affect the 
sustainability of foreign debt) and its structure (imports of equipment necessary for 
production imports of consumers goods driven by increased domestic 
consumption). Finally, the document concludes that the answer to the unsustainable 
Serbian current account deficit should be sought in the management of the deficit's 
structure and volume and not in the regulation of the degree of foreign trade liberalisation 
(by imposition of trade restrictions) or by the exchange rate policy, which are both seen 
only as corrective factors.
Regarding the the Strategy asserts that the exchange rate 
regime should be regarded as the most important instrument of economic policy, but 
instead should be considered in connection with fiscal, monetary and financial 
developments. Moreover, the document argues that "it is not necessary to make a choice 
between the fully fixed or fully floating exchange rate systems, but rather between the 
different degrees of flexibility" (Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2005, p. 58). 
Additionally, the entire projection of economic growth in Serbia up to 2010, brought by 
the Strategy, is built on the assumption of the existence of a stable exchange rate based 
on moderate real depreciation of the dinar the euro up until 2007, after which 
period the exchange rate policy is supposed to be 'neutral'.
54 Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 23/02 and 34/02 (applicable to Serbia only).
55 Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 42/92.
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In this model, is projected at 10.1, 7.2 and 5.9 per cent for the years 
2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively, whereas for the period 2008-2010 it is projected to be 
at a constant 5 per cent. In addition, it is recognised that a precondition for the 
maintenance of inflation rate at such low level (in comparison to historical figures) would 
be to impose rigorous financial discipline and to bring down the entire public spending 
within 'realistic' limits. Besides, the Strategy finds that the competition must be 
strengthened and that monopolies must be prohibited for the purpose of eliminating the 
sources of destabilisation of domestic supply and demand and therewith of the overall 
price level.
The overview of the proposed policy measure given by the Serbian Strategy for 
European Integration reveals one striking feature; that the Serbian authorities are 
overwhelmed by the transition tasks. An instantaneous consequence of such finding is 
that the formal Maastricht criteria can only be contemplated against the background of a 
prolonged macroeconomic instability and delayed structural reforms. In other words, it 
seems a way too premature to discuss the Maastricht criteria when the Copenhagen 
criteria requiring the existence of a functioning market economy is not even near to 
realisation.56 Our conclusion is a result of analysis performed in other parts of this thesis, 
which have then been confronted with the established methodology of the European 
Commission released in 1997 for the purpose of preparing the so-called Regular Reports:
"equilibrium between demand and supply is established by the free interplay of 
market forces; prices, as well as trade, are liberalised;
significant barriers to market entry (establishment of new firms) and exit 
(bankruptcies) are absent;
the legal system, including the regulation of property rights, is in place; laws and 
contracts can be enforced;
macroeconomic stability has been achieved including adequate price stability and 
sustainable public finances and external accounts;
broad consensus exists about the essentials of economic policy." (EC, 2004, p. 6).
56 The economic Copenhagen criteria also include the capacity to withstand competitive pressure and 
market forces the Union, but this criterion can only be assessed once a country joins the EU.
215
In particular, we assert that in the Republic of Serbia due to the existence of 
public monopolies57 , which substantially hamper the competition, the prices and 
(internal) trade have not been sufficiently liberalised. As a result, the prices of a number 
of services, including the financial services (e.g. interest rates in the case of banking 
sector) are still unnecessary high. In other words, the prices in those sectors are not 
entirely determined on the basis of supply and demand, but are formed in line with the 
planned or envisaged privatisation strategies. By refusing to break the monopolies and by 
keeping the capital account almost firmly closed58 , the authorities presumably hope to 
obtain better prices for banks, insurance companies and companies that are in the process 
of privatisation. This, further, points to the short-term policy orientation, which evidently 
comes with the costs of slow structural adjustments and inability to secure a sustainable 
macroeconomic position (including monetary and exchange rate policies). 59 
Consequently, the overall transition process has practically been trapped by these 
developments.
The prolonged macroeconomic instability has also been fuelled through another 
channel. Namely, the fact is that the capital account is almost completely closed and that 
the exchange rate is fixed. At the same time, imports grew at a rate of 31.7 per 
cent in period 2001-200460, whereas the foreign exchange reserves have constantly been 
increasing partly due to steady FDI inflows, but also as a result of high donations and 
substantial borrowing. From a macroeconomic point, this situation is unattainable; it 
points to the possibility of debt crisis, urgently calling for a set of comprehensive, 
precautionary and consistent measures. In this, the monetary and exchange rate policy 
may only have a supporting role, although an important one.
57 Monopolistic positions of companies providing public services is ensured by an obsolete Law on Public 
Companies (Official Journal of the FRY, No. 6/91) and a number of other laws, such as the case with the 
Law on Telecommunications (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 44/03) securing the monopolistic position of 
in the area of fixed telecommunications until 9 June 2005 (Article 109). Herein, it 
should be noted, that the term 'public companies' does not correspond to the Anglo-Saxon meaning, as 
these companies in Serbia are not publicly traded but are, in fact, companies that provide service to the 
public (telecommunications, broadcasting, air transport, railways, etc.).
58 Even the new Law on Foreign Exchange Transactions, adopted by the Government of the Republic of 
Serbia on 15 July 2005, which has a positivistic approach to the regulation of the area of foreign exchange 
transaction (as opposite to the current Foreign Exchange Law, which is overly rigid), introduced only minor 
changes relating to the liberalisation of capital account.
59 This point has been publicly raised by the NBS Governor Jelasic on several occasions. See, for example, 
magazine No. 271 dated 1 August 2005, p. 10.
60 Prica (2005, p. 7).
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4.4.4. Proposal for a new policy approach
All points to the fact that this is a critical moment for Serbia to sharpen its grit in 
relation to the remaining transition tasks. These, however, have to be looked at within the 
context of existing political commitments, which relate to the agreements the country has 
signed with IMF (focus on macroeconomic policies - fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate 
- aimed at facilitating sustainable growth)61 and World Bank (support to structural 
reforms).62 Besides, Serbia's declared policy goal to join the WTO and to conclude an 
SAA with the EU within 3-4 and 1-2 years, respectively, should also be considered. 
Taken together, these existing commitments set the basic policy framework out of which 
a concrete action plan can be drawn. Based on our analysis hitherto, however, we note 
that such framework is missing a strong EU-bias.
Acknowledging Serbia's strategic orientation towards the EU, we propose that the 
focus on the European integration be narrowed. The Serbian National Strategy for 
European Integration makes a vital step in that direction, but we suggest that the new 
approach also incorporates a complementary methodology, which should serve as a 
constant point of reference. This methodology can as well be the same as the one 
implemented by the European Commission in assessing the existence of a functioning 
market economy of candidate (accession) countries. In other words, we recommend that 
Serbian authorities use the E(M)U membership as a long-term policy anchor.
In short- and medium-term, Serbia can rely on the principles underlining the 
WTO membership and Stabilisation and Association Agreement, which include further 
trade, financial and capital liberalisation.63 In order to be able to offer concessions in 
these areas, Serbia will undoubtedly have to decompose all existing monopolies and to 
complete the regulatory reform, especially in the domain of (financial) services. The 
approach would, thus, require a high-level policy co-ordination between the monetary, 
fiscal, foreign trade and other authorities.
61 See IMF (2005), Country Report, No, 05/13.
62 "[...] the Bank leads the policy dialogue in (i) public expenditure management; (ii) macroeconomically 
important sectoral reforms (e.g. in the energy sector); (iii) pension, health and social assistance reform; (iv) 
the restructuring and privatization of enterprises; and (v) legal reforms with a bearing on the business 
environment, including labor markets" (IMF, 2005, p. 43).
63 The example of other neighbouring countries (e.g. Croatia and FYR of Macedonia), which already signed 
the SAA and secured the WTO membership, may be instructive for Serbia.
217
Serbia has already liberalised its foreign trade substantially, which initiated a 
vivid debate about its consequences and dynamics; this debate being a lot more intense 
then the one, which has capital liberalisation at its centre. We, however, believe that 
greater attention should be given to the liberalisation and sequencing of the capital 
account, which will inevitably happen in the relatively near future (over the medium- 
term). In this, the lessons that have already been learnt in relation to trade liberalisation 
must be taken into account; most importantly, that the time is needed for the economy in 
transition to restructure and to resume growth (see Chapter III).
The increased competitiveness of domestic industry should be a starting point, as 
by improved competitiveness the current discomfort (deriving from a mounting current 
account deficit) and the likelihood of debt crisis will be contained and, possibly, even 
reduced. The major challenge in this would be to adequately coordinate the domestic and 
external sectors and to decide about the pace of liberalisation (radical gradual). 
The arguments in favour of the sequencing of capital account liberalisation, however, 
seem more compelling. First, prolonged macroeconomic stabilisation, which should 
precede the capital account liberalisation, has not yet materialised in Serbia. Second, 
Serbia has not yet completed the regulatory and financial sector reforms. Third, once 
institutionally encircled, the financial sector in Serbia should be further strengthened and 
prudential supervision controlling for manipulative and deceptive practices should be 
imposed before free movement of capital can be allowed64 . It therefore appears that time 
is needed for Serbia to restructure fundamentally, calling for sequenced liberalisation.
The decision about the alternative sequencing strategies should be evaluated 
their contribution to the broader objectives of financial sector reforms and durable 
macroeconomic stability (see Johnston, 1999). For that purpose, the benefits (increased 
competition, financial intermediation and risk diversification) and risks (effects on the 
exchange rate and interest rate developments) associated with the capital account 
liberalisation must be assessed.
64 According to Johnston (1999), prudential supervision should oversee both the domestic and foreign 
activities of financial institutions in view of transfer risk, sovereign risk and country risk. Besides, 
prudential regulation should be design in a way to control the management of foreign exchange risk 
exposure and foreign exchange liquidity. Moreover, prudential regulation should address issues of weak 
banks, tax evasion, money laundering, and statistical reporting by market participants.
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Implications of capital account liberalisation on monetary and exchange rate 
policies may be quite stringent, imposing the 'incompatible triangle', as explained earlier. 
Namely, under unrestricted capital mobility, either exchange rate stability or monetary 
policy autonomy (in setting the domestic interest rates) can be achieved at one time. We 
have seen that the authorities in Serbia have kept the exchange rate fixed 
together with the controls on capital account for full four years (2001-2005) in order to 
stabilise the economy. However, if such exchange rate policy is maintained in future in 
line with the anticipated capital account liberalisation, there is a risk that the demand for 
domestic monetary aggregates will become more sensitive to international interest rate 
differentials (Johnston, 1999, p. 118), reducing the effectiveness of a fixed exchange rate 
regime in achieving domestic monetary objectives.
This further points to the fact that Serbia should consider adopting a more flexible 
exchange rate regime over the medium-term period, because flexible exchange rate 
regimes are found to better insulate the economy in the face of disturbances in domestic 
demand. Also, by adopting a more flexible exchange rate, Serbia will not be forced to 
subordinate its external objective and endanger the competitiveness of domestic industry, 
which should be its top policy priority. The analysis in Chapter II revealed that the 
foreign debt and current account sustainability are the most challenging tasks for the 
Serbian authorities in the forthcoming period. These objectives should thus be clearly 
stated and publicly announced not only by the government, but also by NBS.
Within the scope of this new policy approach, the most sensitive decision relates 
to the determination of the appropriate degree of exchange rate flexibility. Bearing in 
mind the high level of euroisation in Serbia, the scope of manoeuvre is limited, but it 
nevertheless has to be exploited, as long as the wages are not contracted nor indexed to 
the euro. Although the greater exchange rate flexibility could itself reduce the level of 
euroisation in Serbia, we believe that in any case a conscious decision about deploying a 
set of measures aimed at containing euroisation is made as a part of this new policy 
approach.65 Moreover, the effectiveness of existing monetary instruments in the context 
of increased capital account liberalisation will also have to be reviewed and evolution 
towards the indirect monetary policy instruments stepped up (see Table 4.4).
65 IMF (2005) also makes a case for containing euroisation and minimising associated risks.
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The new policy approach outlined here started from the fact that in turbulent 
times, such are those Serbia has been passing through in the last 15 years and those that 
lie ahead, the knowledge about the economic fundamentals is incomplete. As a result, the 
NBS' potential to specify its future policy actions highly depends on its assessment about 
the future economic developments and the likelihood of possible alternative outcomes. 
Apart from assessing the probability of distribution of various scenarios, the central bank 
is also invited to assess the risks/costs associated with each of them. In the words of Alan 
Greenspan, the Chairmen of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System66 :
"Despite extensive efforts to capture and quantify what we perceive as the key macroeconomic 
relationships, our knowledge about many critical linkages is far from complete and, in all 
likelihood, will remain so. [...] In effect, we strive to construct a spectrum of forecasts from 
which, at least conceptually, specific policy actions is determined through the tradeoffs implied by 
a loss-function."
In the case of Serbia, the major risk accompanying further real appreciation and 
real wage growth above the productivity level derives from the fact that these may 
continue contributing to the widening of current account deficit, thereby endangering the 
country's capacity to service its external debt liabilities producing currency and banking 
crises. Similar scenario is probable under the hypothesis of uncontrolled capital inflows. 
However, taking into account anticipated capital account liberalisation in view of WTO 
and SAA commitments, we propose that the monetary authorities in Serbia make a 
cautious stance assuming real dinar depreciation and greater exchange rate flexibility.
Once a high degree of capital account liberalisation is achieved, however, the 
National Bank of Serbia may wish to switch to direct inflation targeting. It is a policy 
approach, which was followed by some other countries in a run-up to EMU (e.g. Poland). 
Inflation targeting may contribute to increased NBS credibility, by establishing a clear 
and transparent mode of operation. It seems, however, to be premature for Serbia to adopt 
this monetary regime at this moment when the structural reforms are incomplete and 
predictable relationship between monetary instruments and future inflation inexistent. 
Moreover, the complexity of such approach requires that the NBS first be strengthened in 
institutional and administrative terms before turning to a direct inflation targeting.
66 Extracted from a speech 'Reflections on Central Banking' delivered on 26 August 2005 at a symposium, 
in Wyoming, US. Mr Greenspan is also the Chairmen of the Federal Open Market Committee.
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This chapter described the complexity of the monetary strategy selection process 
within the context of transitional environment and in view of perceived Serbia's E(M)U 
membership. In performing the assigned task, we have chosen quite deliberately to attach 
additional weight to the explanation of theoretical issues surrounding the process of 
selection of adequate monetary strategy (see Section 4.2). Such reasoning came as a 
reaction to the realisation about the inconsistent use of certain monetary economies' 
concepts by the Serbian economist, policymakers and the general public. The basic idea 
was to put the Serbian monetary developments on the 'standard' route, out of which it is 
often displaced due to the belief that Serbia is a 'special' case. Notwithstanding the 
country's specific characteristics and unique historic circumstances in which the 
monetary policy strategies were conceived, our analysis proves that universal rules apply 
in Serbia too and that thus they need to be acknowledged.
The analysis also reveals that the understanding about the E(M)U requirements is 
abstract and that the process of European integration is often overlooked and 
oversimplified. Thus, the entire Section 4.3. was devoted to the explanation of the E(M)U 
membership requirements relating to monetary integration, as given by the relevant 
provisions of the EU primary and secondary legislation. Against this background, we also 
looked at different exchange rate options, notably the currency board arrangements and 
euroisation. We conclude that, although Serbia at periods operated the CBAs and 
was highly euroised (including the present situation), the likelihood of a formal CBA or 
official euroisation being adopted in Serbia in the foreseeable future is minute.
Our conclusion is also based on the finding that transition in Serbia is still in 
progress, driving the process of European integration, as explained in Section 4.4. 
Consequently, the contemplation about the macroeconomic Maastricht criteria is 
constrained by a more immediate need to contain domestic spending and real wage 
growth below the productivity levels. In this, the National Bank of Serbia is expected to 
take an active role by depreciating the real dinar exchange rate (see Arsic 2005). In 
a highly euroised economy, however, this places an additional burden on the central bank 
aiming to secure the financial system stability and external debt sustainability.
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Nevertheless, the prevailing disagreements among politicians, economists and 
industry about the efficiency of the current monetary and exchange rate policies of the 
NBS in the period following the initial stabilisation of 2003 indicate that this may well be 
the critical moment for Serbia to rethink its monetary policy strategy. This task, we 
believe, can be approached in two ways: (1) some fine-tuning is employed so as to 
establish a steady and tenacious monetary policy framework, complementary with the 
structural measures that would make it possible in the first place, or (2) entire policy is 
reconsidered in view of alternative monetary policy targeting options and benefits they 
may bring to Serbia in terms of increased economic welfare.
This process, however, is not free from the outside influences as it depends on a 
number of considerations including the fact that: (i) Serbia is highly euroised economy, 
(ii) money demand is found to be instable, (iii) the transition from direct to indirect 
monetary instruments is not yet completed, (iv) degree of openness is still relatively low 
in comparison to some neighbouring countries, (v) there exist restrictions on capital 
movements, (vi) nominal wages exhibit downward rigidity although the internal labour 
mobility is relatively high, etc. Besides, the decision about the new monetary policy 
strategy would also need to reflect the anticipated future developments envisaged by the 
Serbia's WTO membership, conclusion of a SAA with the EU, and by the commitments 
incorporated in the agreements concluded with the IMF and the World Bank.
Our analysis, thus, points to the fact that the National Bank of Serbia will most 
probably continue targeting the exchange rate, as it had done traditionally. On a 
conceptual level, this indeed seems to be the preferred policy option at least in the period 
until a prolonged macroeconomic stabilisation is achieved. In this, however, the decision 
about the adequate degree of exchange rate flexibility must allow for the change of 
priorities away from a rapid disinflation to the resolution of the existing external 
imbalances and increased competitiveness. The purpose of this exercise would be to 
simmer down the debate about the effectiveness of the current NBS's policy, which has 
been greatly politicised, thereby blurring the process of selection of a monetary policy 
objectives, targets and instruments. More importantly, however, the deliberation about 
the Serbia's new monetary policy strategy should contribute to restoration of NBS's 
credibility that the Serbian politicians challenged on various occasions (see Chapter V).
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Up to this point, it has been demonstrated that the transition from a socialist to a 
market-based economic system is an all-encompassing process, which requires the 
involvement of various institutions, including the central bank. The analysis also 
disclosed that transition begins with macroeconomic stabilisation, in which the central 
bank plays an indispensable role. Thus, one cannot analyse the transition as such without 
assessing the role of the central bank, which in practice is at the centre of a complex 
process. The role of the central bank in transition, nevertheless, has to be looked at from 
the perspective of an institution that itself must be transformed, a point already made in 
Chapter II. Namely, the central banks under socialism mainly accommodated enterprises' 
needs for credits in line with the established production and financial plans. The role of 
money under socialism was therefore passive, as was the role of the central bank (cf. 
But, with the start of transition, the central bank's position and tasks changed with 
society's needs and preferred policy outcomes, requiring active central bank 
participation. Formally, adjustments to these new socio-political and economic 
circumstances materialised through institutional changes, that is, through alterations in 
central bank legislation (i.e. adoption of new objectives, instruments, etc). In reality, 
active central bank participation is sought behavioural changes in the approach to 
central banking. Whereas the main goal of formal modifications to central bank laws is to 
secure the central bank's independence (functional, institutional, personal, and 
financial), central bank independence only becomes evident when the central bank 
law is implemented and monetary operations conducted. Together, the legal and 
behavioural changes aim at securing the desired central bank attributes: accountability, 
transparency and credibility, as explained in Chapter II.
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The purpose of this chapter is to disclose the economic and political 
circumstances in which the central bank law was modified in Serbia (i.e. Yugoslavia) 
over the last 15 years (1989-2003) in order to substantiate our initial thesis that during 
this period the central bank of Serbia shared the country's gloomy faith. Also, we will 
calculate the 'Cukierman index' of legal central bank independence on the basis of the 
current NBS law, as one of the most commonly used indices of central bank legal 
independence. 1 Additionally, based on Dvorsky (2004), we will assess the existing 
drawbacks in current Serbian central bank legislation the relevant EMU 
requirements already elaborated in Chapter IV. We hope to be able to answer the 
question of how these institutional characteristics relate to the past monetary and 
exchange rate experience and what mechanisms (including could be used in the 
future to upgrade the NBS's credibility, found to be chronically lacking for years.
5.2. 
According to Cukierman (1992, p. 5) "institutions such as the legal framework 
within which policy operates are important determinants of policy outcomes." We shall 
substantiate this hypothesis by dissecting Serbia's central bank institutional legacy into 
four parts, depending on the timing of the introduction of a new central bank law: (i) Law 
on the NBY of 19892 , (ii) Law on the NBY of 19933 , (iii) Proposal of the Law on the 
NBY of 20024, and (iv) Law on the NBS of 20035 (to be analysed in the next section). 
The analysis should unveil the relationship between the adopted legal framework and the 
central bank's credibility, which ultimately determines the capacity of monetary policy to 
respond to short-term disturbances and to maintain low inflation (see Goodhart, 1993).
1 The second most widely used index for the measurement of central bank independence is the Grilli- 
Masciandaro-Tabellini (GMT) index (see Dvorsky, 2000).
2 The full title of this law is the Law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia and on the Uniform Monetary 
Operations of the National Banks of the Republics and the National Banks of the Autonomous Provinces, 
Official Gazette of the SFRY, No. 34/89. We will refer to the law as the Law on the NBY of 1989.
3 Law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia, Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 32/93.
4 Law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia was drafted by the NBY and sent to the parliament in April 
2002 (Ref. Ac. 272/1), but was never enacted for the reasons explained later in the text. 
Law on the National Bank of Serbia, Official Gazette of the RS, No. 72/03.
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Our analysis will discern the following aspects of central bank independence: (1) 
functional independence, (2) institutional independence, (3) personal independence, and 
(4) financial independence. The separation, as well as the entire content, of each of the 
economic expressions of central bank independence is based on Dvorsky (2004), who 
uses the Treaty requirements as a yardstick. Additionally, we will look at some features 
of central bank accountability, as a means of counterweighting to the notion of 
independence (see Padoa-Schioppa, 2000).
The independence relates to the necessity for a central bank to have a 
single objective, namely the achievement of price stability. This, however, does not mean 
that the central bank should ignore other economic policies. Thus, legislation on the 
central bank should also include a secondary objective of supporting the implementation 
of those policies, under the condition that it does not jeopardise the fulfilment of the 
primary objective. independence depends on a number of considerations 
such as: the formulation and implementation of monetary policy, freedom from 
instructions, legality and statutory independence, and the selection of exchange rate 
regime. Similarly, independence relies upon the ways in which the role, status 
and composition of the highest decision making bodies are regulated. In other words, 
personal independence is measured the appointment and dismissal procedures 
and their respective criteria, the length of the governor's mandate, the possibility of its 
renewal, professional competence requirements, and an incompatibility clause. 
independence has two aspects. The first is a budgetary aspect that depends on rules 
guiding the management of the central bank budget (financial plan), ownership issues, 
allocation of profits, and coverage of the bank's losses. The second aspects relates to the 
prohibition of the monetary financing of public entities either through the form of direct 
credits or through the acquisition of their securities on primary markets.
Accountability is defined as "the legal and political obligation of an independent 
central bank to justify and explain its decisions to the citizens and their elected 
representatives (see ECB, 2002b, p. 45)" (Dvorsky, 2004, p. 64). Here, the elements of 
the central bank accountability include: mutual participation at meetings between 
government and central bank officials, appearance before the parliament, reporting 
requirements and the publication of meeting minutes.
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Law on the NBYofl989
Unlike many other transitional economies, the SFR Yugoslavia, of which the 
Republic of Serbia was a constitutive part, did operate a two-tier banking system well 
before the transition towards a market economic started. According to Sevic (1996, p. 
25), it was in the period from 1961 to 1971 that the National Bank of Yugoslavia was 
assigned a role in: (1) issuance of the dinar, (2) extension of credit, and (3) foreign 
exchange operations, which other banks in the system could not perform. In line with 
this, Chowdhury (1990, p. 637) claim that the National Bank of Yugoslavia was the 
formulator of monetary policy since the reforms of 1965 and that "it is a central bank 
with functions and arrangements similar to central banks in market economies (see 
OECD, 1987; Hauvonen, 1970)". It should be emphasised, though, that a two-tier 
banking system in SFR Yugoslavia was in comparison to the 
two-tier banking systems common in market economies (see Hilbers, 1993). In other 
words, the banking system of SFRY comprised of a number of large banks - each of 
which dominated a specific segment of a market (e.g. agriculture, foreign trade)6 , 
especially after the late 1970s. No competition among these 'specialised' commercial 
banks really existed in the lending market, nor were they conducting their business on 
profit-maximising principles (see also Section 3.2.3).
Chapters III and IV revealed that under such a setting the money supply was 
determined endogenously, i.e. that the National Bank of Yugoslavia did not have control 
over the money supply. Chowdhury (1990) write that this occurrence was, in fact, 
the result of the existing contradictions built into the institutional framework: "In 
particular, the state has conflicting goals-to promote macroeconomic stability and growth 
and to "mediate [enterprise] competition for investment resources" (Gedeon, 1985/6, p. 
219)" (Chowdhury 1990, p. 637). The accompanying observation is that the NBY 
was not pursuing an active monetary policy, which in itself was an important legacy of 
the monetary institutional order of SFRY, and of Serbia.
6 Sevic (1996, p. 24) notes that in the period 1955-1961 a number of 'specialised' banks were established in 
SFR Yugoslavia including: Yugoslav Foreign Trade Bank 
(established on 24 June 1955), Yugoslav Investment Bank (established 
on 12 July 1956), and Yugoslav Agricultural Bank (established on 
27 June 1958).
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The specificities of the SFR Yugoslavia were reflected in the institutional 
arrangements of its central monetary authority: the country in fact had an atypical, 
decentralised of republics and autonomous provinces. 7 The Law 
on the NBY of 1989 is, therefore, particularly interesting because it was the first central 
bank law introduced as a part of a greater 'transitional package', but was at the same time 
the last central bank law in Yugoslavia that recognised this complex system of central 
banks. One would expect that such a law - as a part of a reform plan - would delegate 
more power to a central bank, which was envisaged to have a major role in the process of 
transition. But, obviously, this could not happen in the political circumstances in which a
v
"decadent, decentralised (defederalised) bureaucracy" prevailed (Sevic, 1996, p. 28).
As a result, the new law brought only some minor changes, thus preserving the 
inefficient uniform monetary system. That the law was still retrograde in terms of 
delegation of powers and in securing the central bank's independence can be illustrated 
by the following few points. Firstly, in relation to the central bank objectives and 
monetary policy formulation, the law empowered the SFRY Assembly to "set the 
objectives and tasks of the common monetary and foreign exchange rate policy and of the 
common foundations of credit policy" upon the proposal of the NBY (Article 2(1)). In 
addition, Article 2(3) of the law prescribed that - within the given framework of 
objectives and tasks of the common monetary and credit policy - basic instructions about 
the channelling of reserve money, the discount rate of the NBY and the interest rates, 
would be determined by the SFRY Assembly.
Secondly, it would appear the NBY was seemingly given the possibility to 
independently introduce the implementation measures of the above-mentioned objectives 
and tasks, as foreseen by Article 2(4). A simple reading suggests that the NBY did have 
the instrument independence. However, Article 10(3) prescribed in detail the 'measures' 
to which the NBY could resort in implementing a common monetary and credit policy. 
The only exemption was foreseen by Article 10(4) saying that, owing to its responsibility 
for currency stability, the NBY could use additional measures if the monetary effects of 
foreign currency transactions departed from the set monetary targets.
7 According to Sevic (1996, p. 27), such system existed since 1972 until 1991, formally until 1993. 
Moreover, Sevic (1996, p. 27) argues that with the adoption of the new SFRY's constitution in 1974, the 
NBY was no longer the single issuer of the domestic currency.
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Moreover, the law of 1989 did not clearly stipulate the objective; it only 
prescribed that these (many) objectives should be assigned to the central bank by the 
Federal Assembly. What makes this approach unique is that currency stability was 
established as a policy objective by this law in a rather manner (Article 10(2,4)). 
A conclusion thus can be drawn, that in the period 1989-1993 when the new law on NBY 
was in force (see discussion below), the National Bank of Yugoslavia did not enjoy the 
goal (functional) independence nor the instrument (institutional) independence.
Regarding personal independence, the 1989 Law inaugurated the Board of 
Governors and Governor as the National Bank of Yugoslavia's governing bodies (Article
___77). According to Article 78 of the law, the Board of Governors consisted of the NBY 
governor and of the governors of the national banks of the republics and autonomous 
provinces. Interestingly, the law envisaged both the collective responsibility of the Board 
of Governors and the individual responsibility of "each one of its members" the 
SFRY Assembly in line with Article 78(2). 9
For his work, the governor was accountable to the SFRY Assembly (Article 88), 
which appointed him (Article 89). Also, the appointment of a Deputy Governor and one 
or more Vice Governors was too in the hands of the Federal Assembly (Article 90(3)), 
although the law did not explicitly make them accountable to it or any other body. 
Interestingly, the law was also silent about the term of office of the members of the Board 
of Governors, their professional qualifications and appointment procedure. 10 On the other 
hand, Article 78(3) empowered the SFRY Assembly to propose the initiation of dismissal 
procedure to the republican parliaments, if in the process of 'political control' found the 
members of the Governing Board 'responsible' (criteria unknown). All thus points to the 
existence of strong political influence by the republics, and a low corresponding personal 
independence, of the NBY's officials.
8 The law stipulates that the Board of Governors shall decide by a simple majority except in certain cases 
(drafting laws or by-laws, adoption of NBY's financial plan and balance sheet, decisions concerning 
mandatory reserves, interest rates and the volume and rate of increase in credits granted to banks) when it 
should decide by a two-thirds vote of the total number of its members (Article 81(1,2)).
9 In the case of ECB, the ECB Governing Council is only held accountable collectively (see Dvorsky, 2004, 
p. 67). The issue is related to the question of whether just the outcome or the detailed minutes of the 
meetings of the highest decision-making body are published. According to Article 10(4) of the E(S)CB 
Statute, the proceedings of the ECB Governing Council meetings are confidential, although the Governing 
Council may decide to make them publicly available.
10 Those issues are regulated by the laws on the national banks of the republics and autonomous provinces.
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In financial terms, the NBY Board of Governors was obliged by Article 103(1) of 
the law to prepare the NBY financial plan and annual financial statement, and to submit 
these to the SFRY Assembly for ratification. The NBY was required to use realised 
revenues to ensure resources for the: (1) fixed assets fund, (2) special reserve fund, and 
(3) working community (i.e. employees) of the NBY (Article 100(2)). Similarly, the 
remainder of gains accumulated after covering for accumulated exchange rate losses were 
to be transferred to special reserve fund (Article 101(1)). The rest of net revenues were to 
be allocated to the federal budget (Article 104(1)). At the same time, the law prescribed 
that only the expenditures of the NBY, which arose from the operations performed for the 
account of the Federation, would be covered from the federal budget (Article 102).
This control over the NBY budget, representing an infringement of the 
central bank's independence, was accompanied by another aspect of central bank 
financial dependence - lending to government. According to Article 52(1), the NBY 
could have granted credits to the Federation under the conditions prescribed by a separate 
federal law. "Notwithstanding the provisions of the first paragraph of this Article, the 
NBY may also grant short-term credits to the Federation for the purpose of bridging over 
time delays between the inflow of revenues and the financing of expenditures of the 
federal budget" (Article 52(2)). In fact, no limits were placed on direct central bank 
lending to government and, thus, the financial independence of the NBY was inexistent.
The fact that the NBY was also obliged to provide credit and to perform other 
banking operations "for the needs of the Yugoslav People's Army, and for other 
requirements of national defence" in conformity with the Article 53(1) by itself generated 
further market distortions. In particular, the law stipulated that a special People's Army 
Service be formed the National Bank of Yugoslavia (Article 53(2))''. The law 
proscribed for the possibility of using short-term central bank credits for the financing of 
enterprises producing armaments and military equipment (Article 55(2)). Ironically, the 
NBY was given the right to determine the terms and conditions for the use of credits for 
military purposes, as per Article 55(3).
11 The specialised organisation operated under the name of 
[National Bank of Yugoslavia - Military Service], and it had been given the status of a legal entity by 
Article 53(2) of the NBY law.
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Although not independent, the NBY was certainly held to account by the Federal 
Assembly to which it had to submit, at least twice a year, a report on the implementation 
of the common monetary and foreign exchange policy, on the policy of foreign credit 
relations, the common foundations of credit policy (Article 7), and on the control of 
banks and enterprises (Article 65). In line with the same article, the NBY was obliged to 
submit its annual balance sheet jointly with its annual report. Whether this also meant 
that the Governor was invited to appear before the parliament and use the opportunity to 
express his views and concerns is unclear. Still, while the relationship with the Federal 
Assembly was transparent, the form of cooperation between the NBY Governor and the 
Federal Executive Council was blurred. Namely, Article 86(2) stipulated only that the 
Governor "shall cooperate" with the FEC, without clarifying what form of cooperation 
the legislator had in mind.
To all this, one should add the complexity of relations between the National Bank 
of Yugoslavia, six republic national banks, and two autonomous provinces national 
banks. The 'federal system' of central banks, either national or supranational, though, is 
not necessarily inferior to a single central bank model as such. The US Federal Reserve 
System and the European System of Central Banks exemplify this point. What was 
different in the SFRY's system of central banks is that: (i) there was no clear supremacy 
of the NBY over the issuance of money and monetary policy, and (ii) the NBY and the 
national banks of republics and autonomous provinces were not exempted from the 
exertion of political influences.
We believe that the design of the NBY legislation itself greatly contributed to 
such a situation. In relation to this, one cannot ignore the fact that it was under this law 
that that the republican national banks intruded into the monetary system in 1990 and 
1991 (see Section 3.2.4.1) - the primary motive being of a political nature, despite the 
fact that this was taking place in the face of war. The episodes of 'spectacular intrusions 
into the monetary system' confirm that the NBY's independence was practically 
non-existent. Moreover, the above analysis unveils a very low level of NBY 
independence as assigned to it by the Law on the NBY of 1989. 12
12 As a benchmark, we used the standard definition of variables as suggested by Cukierman (1992, p. 373- 
376), although we have applied them in a more intuitive and not in a strictly structured manner.
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Before the new law on the NBY was adopted, the existing law was amended on 
several occasions. 13 From an economics point of view, the most interesting are the 
'special' provisions made effective on 8 April 1993 - applied during the sanctions period. 
By those special provisions, the NBY was given the authority to set forth the maximum 
interest rates of banks and other financial organisations in line with the movements of the 
NBY discount rate (Article 108a(l)). Paragraph 2 of the same article stipulated that the 
NBY would determine the special conditions under which it would provide short-term 
credits to the banks. Next, the law allowed the NBY to oblige banks and other financial 
organisations to allocate a part of their financial resources into the projects envisaged by 
the economic policy of the country for a given year (Article 108a(3)). Finally, the last 
point of this article entitled the NBY to prescribe in which cases and under which 
circumstances legal entities that are registered for the "conduct of banking 
operations" could allocate the excess of their financial resources.
We recall from Chapter III that 1993-1994 was a period of dynamic activity for 
the so-called pyramid banks. In view of their disastrous involvement and role which they 
had in "the great robbery of the people" (see Dinkic, 2000), it is suspicious that the 
National Bank of Yugoslavia needed the law to be changed and to introduce one or two 
'special provisions' in order to be able to fight such serious misconduct. This suggests 
that: (1) the likelihood that the NBY was itself involved in the building of prices in line 
with the instructions of elected politicians, as suggested by Dinkic (2000), is high, and (2) 
the institutional framework of the NBY established in 1989 was indeed very weak in 
terms of NBY's independence and assigned competencies.
The failure to delegate more power to the NBY and to secure its independence 
greatly facilitated its malfunctioning at the beginning of transition. Had the NBY been 
more independent, we argue, the stabilisation results might have been better, preventing 
the deterioration of the federal state's credibility. The unwillingness of the republican 
authorities to give up a part of their (monetary) sovereignty turned out to be calamitous. 
Consequently, this supports our earlier conclusion that the political consensus on reforms 
- which must include central bank reform and the distribution of power - is a necessary 
precondition to any successful stabilisation and transition.
13 Official Gazette of the SFRY, No. 88/89, 96/91 and 16/93.
5.2.2. Law on the NBYofl993
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 14 of 27 April 1992 
prescribed, in Article 114(1), that the National Bank of Yugoslavia is a single (legally) 
autonomous issuing institution of the FRY's monetary system, responsible for monetary 
policy, currency stability, financial discipline and other tasks as defined by federal law. 
The Implementing Law 15 stipulated that the Law on the NBY of 1989 was to be aligned 
with the Constitution by 31 December 1992. The deadline was missed and the new Law 
on the NBY was adopted with a six-month delay, on 25 June 1993. The new law was 
passed in difficult circumstances during which hyperinflation reigned and in which - in 
the words of the then Prime Minister of the FRY Government - "the macroeconomic 
policy was created and implemented on at least three levels [of government, auth. 
remark], which impeded its uniformity and efficacy". 16
Delays in encircling of the FRY competencies, including the delay in the adoption 
of the new NBY law covering the monetary sphere, were among the institutional reasons 
behind the perilous state of the economy. 17 On the other hand, as evident from the 
statement by the Prime Minister, the 'endogenous factors' (i.e. the economic sanctions 
imposed on FRY) represented another major destabilising factor (FRYP, 1993b, pp. 5-7). 
Under the circumstances of an external blockade and severe internal shortages (especially 
of oil, medicine and some agricultural goods), the Federal Government took the view that 
the market could not optimally allocate those resources, and that thus state intervention 
was required (FRYP, 1993b, p. 7). Concurrently, however, the FRY Government did not 
want to give up ownership of the transition process, claiming that the transition towards a 
market-based economic model was its ultimate goal (FRYP, 1993b, p. 6). We believe that 
these evident inconsistencies and contradictions in the government's approach largely 
contributed to the severity of the economic crisis (see Chapter III), representing the 
background for the adoption of the new NBY law.
14 Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 1/92.
16 Extract from the statement of Mr. Radoje Kontic, Prime Minister of the FRY Government, delivered at
the First Meeting of the First Extraordinary Session of the House of Republics (Upper House) 
on 16 June 1993 (FRYP, 1993b, p. 8).
17 SeeFRYP(1993b,p.9).
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The first striking feature about the NBY Law of 1993 is that this law was 
completely silent on the central bank's objectives. Whereas the previous NBY law had 
left the formulation of NBY objectives in the hands of the SFRY Assembly, this law 
omitted to mention it completely. Instead, the new law only spoke of NBY 
(Article 1(2)). In describing those functions, the law (Article 1(1)) literally replicated the 
wording of Article 114(1) of the Constitution. The only addition was introduced by 
Article 1(2) stipulating that the NBY should contribute to the establishment of internal 
and external stability of the economy and its international integration.
Implicitly, it may be assumed that currency and financial stability were the main 
NBY objectives at the time. Having in mind, though, that the fulfilment of those 
functions (objectives) was to be pursued parallel with overall economic stability and 
international integration goals, one can detect potentially conflicting objectives, pointing 
to possible frequent policy preferences changes. One reasonable explanation, apart from 
the obvious constitutional constraints, is that the legislator wanted to leave the legal 
central bank framework sufficiently flexible in view of additional, unexpected 
disturbances. Even if true, we argue that such approach could only be counterproductive, 
as demonstrated by the disastrous record in monetary sphere in the period of the 
application of this law. The second and more likely reason behind such unusual language 
in the central bank legislation is that the NBY was subordinated to political influences.
The non-existence of the goal of (functional) independence did not automatically 
assume the absence of institutional independence. On the contrary, the law allowed the 
NBY to design and implement the monetary policy (Article 8). Even though we find that 
the provisions proscribing the competencies of the NBY in the monetary sphere (Art. 24 
to 52) are overly detailed, the assurance remains that the NBY was indeed given 
functional independence by the law of 1993. This is seen as a substantial improvement in 
comparison to the previous NBY law of 1989 by which the NBY was refrained from the 
possibility to independently formulate the country's monetary policy. The solution, by 
which the NBY was obliged to cooperate with the Federal Government in determining 
exchange rate policy (Article 39), is also a step in that direction. The proposition by 
which the Federal Government was given the right to determine the actual exchange rate 
of the dinar upon the NBY proposition (Article 40) is, however, more ambiguous.
This law is also highly intriguing because it created the NBY Council as an 
additional governing body alongside the NBY Governor (Article 11), in spite of the fact 
that the FRY Constitution clearly stipulates that the NBY is governed by the Governor 
who is solely responsible for NBY operations (Article 114(2)). Even more dubious is the 
behaviour of legislators when the official opinion of the Secretariat for Legislation is 
taken into account. Namely, the Opinion on the Proposal of the Law on the National 
Bank of Yugoslavia, issued on 8 June 1993, clearly notes:
"We point out that one cannot create by a law a new body - the NBY Council - which would be 
superior to the NBY Governor, because such an approach would run counter to the provision of 
paragraph 2 Article 114 of the Constitution. Namely, it is not arguable that by this law one can, 
besides the Governor, introduce another NBY body, but only if that body does not perform tasks 
that are by the Constitution conferred to governor, i.e. if it does not perform the tasks that are 
considered managerial, but only those assisting tasks such as counselling" (FRYP, 1993a, p. 5).
Nonetheless, the legislature adopted the law by which the NBY Council and 
Governor were established as governing bodies. Their competencies differed in that the 
Council was responsible for analysis and the adoption of decisions relating to the 
formulation of monetary policy and the overall functioning of the NBY (Article 14(1)), 
whereas the Governor was given executive authority over those decisions (Article 17(1)). 
Needless to say, even though the governor was a member of the Council by his position 
(one vote), the organisational model of the NBY ran against the Constitution. Formally, 
however, the FRY Constitutional Court recognised the unconstitutionality of the law only 
on 30 July 1999, a the full six years after the law's adoption, by assessing that Art. 11 to 
15 and Article 17 of the NBY Law were incompatible with the FRY Constitution. 18 As a 
result, the aforementioned articles were repealed and so the NBY was left without a 
collective governing body. The entire NBY management was left in hands of only one 
person - the NBY Governor - thereby exacerbating the likelihood of both, a discretionary 
monetary policy and of political influence. This decision was made in the aftermath of 
the NATO bombing campaign, which raises suspicions about the judicial motivations in 
asserting protection of the constitutional order. The severity of the economic crisis itself 
(see Section 3.3.2) indicates that the political authorities might have been tempted to try 
to revive the economy by relying on monetary instruments and means (exclusively).
18 Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 50/99; the Decision included remarks as those quoted by FRYP (1993).
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At a more general level, this analysis suggests that the most senior legal act, i.e. 
the constitution, should include provisions on the position of the national central bank as 
well as articles about its governing bodies and their functional independence. Herein, it is 
of utmost importance that the constitution envisages the existence of the central bank's 
collective decision-making body, so as to prevent one single person from being 
responsible for the complex and demanding task of managing a central bank, as well as to 
protect it from the likely political pressures. In view of Goodhart's (1993) argument 
about the goal independence, we do not believe that the constitution should also explicitly 
refer to the central bank's objective(s). Rather, we propose that the central bank's 
objective(s) be unambiguously stated in the central bank's legislation. This conclusion is 
of special importance for Serbia, which is currently in search of political consensus for its 
new constitution (see Section 5.4.1), and for which this result is obliging.
In relation to personal independence, as seen already, the importance lies in the 
legal provisions dealing with the appointment and dismissal procedures of the governing 
bodies, as well as provisions stipulating their qualifications. In this respect, the Law on 
the NBY of 1993 offered hardly any clarifications. This law only stipulated the 
Governor's responsibilities his daily operations and NBY management. 
Appointment and dismissal procedures were not specified and the law remained silent on 
the professional qualifications of the governor. However, the FRY Constitution 
prescribed that the Governor was to be elected for a five-year term with the possibility of 
reappointment (Article 114(3)). The Federal Parliament was given the authority to 
appoint the Governor (Article 78(7)) upon the recommendation by the FRY President and 
the opinions of the republican presidents (Article 96(4)), as well as to dismiss him.
Once again, the example of the FRY's constitutional provisions relating to the 
central bank requires a more general conclusion to be drawn. As already explained, the 
solution by which the position of the central bank governing bodies is defined by the 
constitution should, in principle, be welcomed. But, the idea of providing constitutional 
protection to a single person and, at the same time, exposing him to political pressures is 
untenable. In other words, this constitutional inconsistency was unsustainable and 
counterproductive in the application of the principle of the personal independence of a 
single central bank governing body.
With regards to financial independence, the Law on the NBY of 1993 stipulated 
in Article 14 that the NBY's financial plan was to be adopted by the Council. Thus, once 
this article was deleted in 1999, the governor resumed this responsibility (Article 70(2)), 
thereby preserving the NBY's financial independence as the determination of the 
financial plan remained in the hands of the central bank. However, this positivistic 
approach to financial independence diminished due to the lack of control of the 
financial operations of the NBY, implying a shortage of the NBY's accountability. Also 
related to this was the requirement of the law to use the NBY's realised profits to ensure 
resources for the: (1) 'common spending' of the NBY employees, (2) fixed assets fund, 
and (3) special reserve fund (Article 68(2)). What remained was considered as part of 
federal budget's revenue (Article 68(3)), whereas any excess of expenditures over 
revenues were ultimately covered from the federal budget (Article 68(4)).
Nonetheless, the NBY was obliged to finance the FRY government and 
republican governments. This was done through the following: (1) the acquisition of 
governments' securities on the primary market (Article 26 (3)), (2) the purchasing of 
shares issued by public enterprises (Article 26(4)) after being guaranteed by the FRY or 
one of the constitutive republics, and (3) direct credits for the alleviation of temporary 
liquidity problems of the federal or republican budgets of up to 10 per cent of planned 
annual budget revenues at an interest rate that may be lower than the NBY discount rate 
(Article 34). The law also envisaged that the NBY should, exceptionally, during 1993 and 
1994 (i.e. during hyperinflation years), extend short-term credits to the FRY and to the 
republics to help them maintain the liquidity of their budgets of up to 30 and 20 per cent 
of the planned annual federal/republic budget revenues, respectively (Article 92).
The variety of methods by which the NBY was obliged, under this law, to lend to 
government(s), represents a clear confirmation that the NBY was not legally independent 
from the executive branch of government in the period 1993-2003. Pairing this with the 
finding of Arsic (2001) that from 1994 to 2000 the money supply was exogenous 
(see Section 4.4.1), we come to conclude that the NBY did not benefit from 
independence in this period either. The consequences were severe, as it was during this 
period that the NBY lost its credibility. The effects remain present today, and are evident 
in the high euroisation of the economy (see Chapter IV).
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Was the NBY Governor held accountable for this disastrous record? Formally, the 
NBY was required by Article 22(1) to submit to the Federal Parliament for 
an annual report about its performance and achieved results. Also, as per Article 22(3) the 
Governor was obliged to the Federal Parliament of his planned monetary policy 
programme for the coming year. Moreover, by Article 22(2) the National Bank and thus 
not the Governor personally had to to the Federal Parliament, on demand, but at 
least twice a year, a report on the state of its monetary policy and on the state of banking 
and the overall financial system. Finally, the annual NBY financial statement was to be 
the Governor and the parliament (Article 70(1)).
Questions such as what happens if parliament does not confirm the annual report, 
or what does the parliament do with the submitted monetary policy program or reports, 
were left unanswered. Furthermore, as with the previous law, this one did not contain 
provisions on the appearance of the NBY governor before parliament, including the 
possibility of the governor being heard by the members of parliament upon their request. 
Overall, the relationship between the highest (and only) NBY governing body and the 
elected representatives of the people was, by the Law on the NBY of 1993, vaguely and 
inconclusively set. Interestingly, however, this was not the case with the provisions that 
regulated the cooperation between the Federal Government and the NBY. Namely, 
Article 23 of the law prescribed that the NBY was to cooperate with the Federal 
Government on the establishment of the basic objectives of the economic policy and was 
to support, within the scope of its responsibilities, the implementation of those goals.
In reality, we observe some very symptomatic developments. Firstly, just twenty 
days after the promulgation of this law, Vuk Ognjanovic, the then-Governor who happen 
to propose the law to the parliament, was relieved from duty and was replaced by Borisav 
Atanackovic. However, only three months after the appointment Mr. Atanackovic left 
and so the NBY did not have a governor for the following four and half months. Only on 
2 March 1994, after the adoption of the anti-inflation programme, Professor Dragoslav 
Avramovic was appointed the new NBY governor, a position he held for about two years. 
After the dismissal of Governor Avramovic the NBY again did not have a governor for 
an entire year. Only on 26 June 1997 Dusan Vlatkovic was appointed but, not 
surprisingly, did not hold a full mandate, as he was dismissed on 27 November 2000.
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Such a high rate of turnover suggests a very low independence of the 
central bank (see also Section 5.3.3), but could also serve as an indication of 
central bank accountability in cases in which the central bank is headed by a single 
person. 19 We believe, however, that this hypothesis can only hold if the dismissal 
procedure for the governor is legally well-defined and transparent. Having in mind that 
the Law on the NBY of 1993 did not include such provisions, one cannot exclude the 
possibility that the high turnover rate of governors in the observed period reflects the 
effective exercise of political influence over NBY governors and not the level of their 
accountability. To speak further to this point: in the absence of formally defined 
procedures for the dismissal of a Governor, the answer to the question about the 
accountability of NBY's Governor also depends upon the politicians' that stand 
behind any dismissal decision. This would be a difficult undertaking in the best of 
circumstances, much less in those concerning a secretive government.
The assessment of this particular NBY law must also be made in view of the 
critical hyperinflationary state of the economy. We think that the institutional framework 
of the NBY of 1993 largely facilitated such developments. In particular, the delays in the 
institutional adjoining of competencies in the monetary sphere contributed to the 
excessive money supply and the NBY's loss of control over money creation (see Chapter 
III). Furthermore, the fact that the authorities did not use the new NBY law, introduced 
during the period of hyperinflation, to assign to the NBY a single explicit objective over 
the stability of prices, also supports our conclusion. Finally, all other solutions adopted as 
part of the law, such as low personal and financial independence, illustrate our argument.
The Law on the NBY of 1993, however, brought to an end a decentralised system 
of central banks, which existed in SFRY for years, by transferring the rights and 
obligations of the national banks of Yugoslavia (for the territory of FRY), Serbia, 
Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija to the 'new' NBY (Article 89(1)). 
This way, a 'unified monetary system' of central banks of the SFRY, ceased to exist and 
a new single monetary authority of the FRY was established.
19 According to De Haan, Amtenbrink and Eijiffmger (1998), one feature of the central bank accountability 
concept includes the final responsibility for monetary policy (see Section 2.5.2). This responsibility 
depends, among other things, on the dismissal procedures for the governor.
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5.2.3. Proposal of the Law on the NBYof2002
According to Bruno (1993, p. 269), the establishment or bolstering of central bank 
independence is an important component of stabilisation and structural reforms that aim 
at achieving internal and external balance. How is it, then, that the FRY did not initiate 
the adoption of a new central bank law as part of a stabilisation plan, the implementation 
of which resumed in December 2000?20 Instead, having in mind that a new law was 
adopted only in July 2003, the reformist leadership of the NBY continued operating 
under the NBY law of 1993 throughout the stabilisation period. Only in late 2002 was the 
Proposal of the Law on the NBY submitted to the FRY parliament, which sought to 
introduce some modern approaches into the everyday operations of the NBY and to 
increase its independence. At least, this is what the NBY officials, who proposed this law, 
claimed at the time.21
Before we start scrutinising this Proposal, one other element should be 
commented upon. Specifically, we refer to the fact that the NBY Law of 1993 was 
applied throughout very heterogeneous sub-periods: (1) a period of hyperinflation and 
subsequent slowdown in economic activity, as registered from 1993 to end-2000, and (2) 
a period of stabilisation and re-birth of transition and structural reforms taking place from 
2001 to mid-2003. Several conclusions emerge. Firstly, inadequate (vague, extensive or 
inexistent) provisions of the NBY Law of 1993 relating to the NBY's objectives, 
appointment and dismissal procedures, professional qualifications, lending to government 
and other issues, allowed for diverse interpretations to be used at different times 
depending on who was heading the NBY and who appointed that person. This leads to 
the second conclusion, that the institutional credibility of the NBY was weak or even lost 
and that it was occasionally substituted by the personal credibility of governors. In other 
words, we claim that all stabilisation efforts in FRY in the period 1993 to 2003 relied on 
'borrowed credibility' and that the NBY during that entire decade lacked institutional 
credibility. The implications of these findings are considerable and require some 
normative response; thus, we shall turn to those issues at a later stage.
20 We assume that monetary stabilisation resumed after the appointment of the NBY governor Mladan 
Dinkic on 28 November 2000, following the 'bulldozer revolution' of 5 October 2000 (see Chapter III).
21 See Minutes of meeting held on 24 June 2003 between the NBY and the Ministry of Finance of the RS.
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One possible reason that the reform package did not include the NBY law at the 
outset of stabilisation is that many within the ruling DOS coalition insisted on the 
establishment of a new Serbian Constitution, which supposedly needed to regulate the 
position of the National Bank of Serbia and its governing bodies differently than the FRY 
Constitution.22 Also, after the signing of the Belgrade Agreement in early 2002, the work 
on the Constitutional Charter of SCO resumed and stretched over entire 2002 (see 
Section 3.1), offering the possibility for the removal of existing constitutional constraints.
However, as the tensions between the then-governor and the late Serbian Prime 
Minister Zoran Djindjic intensified (due to reasons explained below), the Federal
Government suddenly decided to adopt the new NBY law. The proposed law was never 
enacted by the FRY parliament, but we find that it is still important for our thesis as it: (i) 
unveils the intentions of the ruling coalition and their maturity in relation to the role of 
the NBY in the Serbian society, and (ii) provides an insight in the central bankers' 
reasoning, taking into account that the NBY drafted the proposal.
Even though it was based on the same FRY Constitution (re. Article 114) as the 
previous NBY law, this proposal unequivocally stipulated the 'achievement and 
maintenance of price stability' (Article 3) as the NBY primary objective. One can argue, 
however, that such a narrowly defined policy objective is too stringent given other 
macroeconomic objectives, which often accompany the primary objective, such as is the 
case with the ECB (Article 2 of the ESCB Statute). However, the proposal also included 
a provision by which the NBY was obliged to support the government's policy 
without prejudice to its primary objective and to cooperate with the government in 
formulating that policy (Article 77).
22 One should bear in mind that Montenegro began building its own independent monetary system in 1999 
by adopting the Regulation on the use of the German mark as a means of payment in Montenegro (see 
Official Gazette of the RM, No. 41/99 and 22/00). The Regulation instituted a parallel currency system in 
Montenegro, which operated until January 2001 when the German mark became the single legal tender; in 
June 2002 marks were replaced by euros (see Fabris 2004, p. 30). The Law on the Central Bank of 
Montenegro was adopted in October 2002 (see Official Gazette of the RM, No. 52/00, 53/00 and 47/01).
23 It is important to note that the then-NBY governor Mladan Dinkic and the then Deputy Prime Minister of 
the Federal Government Miroljub Labus have belonged to the same think-thank which became a 
political party in mid-2003. Also significant is that the Federal Government at the time (2000-2002) did not 
have a Prime Minister and that Mr Labus was Acting Prime Minister.
Besides functional independence, the proposal also envisaged institutional 
independence for the NBY. Notably, Article 4 of the proposal prescribed that the NBY 
would be held responsible for the formulation and implementation of monetary and 
exchange rate policy, foreign reserve management, etc. With regards to legal status, the 
proposal re-instituted the NBY as a separate legal person (Article 5(1)) and went even 
further by proclaiming the NBY's statutory independence (Article 2(2)). Additionally, 
even though the economic literature has not unambiguously answered the question of 
whether the central bank has to be held solely responsible for the formulation of the 
exchange rate policy (Dvorsky, 2004, p. 57), the proposal gave the NBY exclusive 
competence over the determination of exchange rate policy and the exchange rate regime 
without an obligation to consult with the government (Art. 4 and 38(1)). On the other 
hand, the proposal indicated that the NBY would cooperate with the Federal Government 
and with other public institutions in the implementation of its functions, undertaking 
measures that would contribute to the enhancement of that cooperation (Article 10)24 .
Regarding personal independence, the proposal re-established the Governor as a 
single person responsible for the overall NBY functioning. Of course, there existed a 
clear constitutional constraint to introduce a collective decision-making body at the NBY. 
But, then, the question remains why did the Federal Government and the NBY officials 
insist on a new NBY law just a few months before the existing Constitution was to be 
replaced by the Constitutional Charter (adopted on 4 February 2003)?
The Governor was to be appointed, in line with the relevant constitutional 
provisions, for a term of five years, with the possibility of reappointment (Article 12(2)). 
In relation to the governor's professional qualifications, Article 13 stipulated that only a 
person of recognised standing and with over ten years of professional or academic 
experience in banking and finance, could be appointed as Governor. The Governor was 
also given the right to nominate his deputy and to nominate vice governors (Article 
17(3,7)), make decisions about the acquiring and use of NBY assets (Article 86), special 
reserve fund (Article 80(2)), the NBY financial plan (Article 81(3)), and the selection of 
auditor (Article (82)), all of which point to a significant governor's autonomy.
24 This runs against the explicit prohibition for the ECB or any of the national central banks of the EU 
Member States, i.e. members of their decision-making bodies, to seek or take instructions from Community 
institutions or bodies, from any Member State's government or any other body (Article 7 of ESCB Statute).
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It should be noted, though, that the proposal did foresee another NBY body - the 
NBY Supervisory Board - that was assigned an oversight function (Article 21). 
Considering the given constitutional constraints, this body was given quite numerous 
responsibilities as per Article 23(1,2). These included discussing issues, expressing 
views, formulating positions and proposing them to the governor. Also important was its 
role in informing the parliament in cases in which it perceived omissions in NBY 
management that led to a failure in achieving the primary objective (Article 23(4)). 
Nevertheless, the new NBY body was not given any competencies in the formulation and 
implementation of monetary policy and thus we shall not analyse its status and 
composition in detail. We note, though, that the proposal assigned to the Governor to 
recommend three out of five Board members, whose main task was to oversee his work.
As for the dismissal procedure, the proposed law (Article 15(1)) prescribed that 
the Governor could be released from duty prior to the expiration of his mandate only in 
the following events: (i) at his own request, (ii) if the Supervisory Board assesses that 
large omissions prevented the fulfilment of the NBY's primary objective, (iii) if 
convicted of a crime, (iv) serious illness, and (v) submission of a false statement about 
the incompatibility clause described in Article 18. 25 Article 15 prescribed that parliament 
would - upon receiving the information from the Supervisory Body about the Governor's 
misconduct - form a commission that would hear the governor's views. And, only if the 
commission assesses that reasons for dismissal exist, it would inform the parliament, 
which would then decide about governor's dismissal. Even though in itself the possibility 
of a governor appearing before a parliamentary commission is a sign of greater central 
bank accountability, it is not clear whether this solution is also consistent with the law.26
25 Therein, Article 18 envisaged that the governor, deputy governor, vice governors, members of the 
Supervisory Board and the entire managing staff of the NBY could not be members of federal/republican 
parliaments or governments, nor could they be members of managing or supervisory boards of banks, other 
financial organisations, auditing firms or any other institutions otherwise controlled by the NBY. Likewise, 
the article prescribed that they could not have shares or founding stakes in the above stated institutions . 
They were also required to submit a written statement to the Federal Parliament upon appointment. The 
proposed law also envisaged the so-called 'cooling-off clause by which the governor, once dismissed from 
duty, could not be employed by a bank or any other financial institution operating at the territory of the FR 
Yugoslavia in a period of one year following his dismissal.
26 It is not accordant to the comparative parliamentary best practices to prescribe by a law the establishment 
of a parliamentary commission when parliament already has a committee for financial affairs, whose task 
should be to oversee the work of the central bank. Besides, issues remain open such as the composition of 
such a commission (representative of ruling political parties, opposition parties, etc.), deadlines, 
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Having in mind that the NBY governor is a single-person decision-making body, 
one needs also to assess whether such a degree of autonomy for the Governor is balanced 
by his accountability. On this point, the economic literature asserts that such vast central 
bank independence is only sensible if counterbalanced with enhanced central bank 
accountability (see Padoa-Schioppa, 2000). The proposed law explicitly stipulated in 
Article 12(3) that the governor would be held accountable by the Federal Parliament 
(statutory accountability); but, the actual appearance of the governor before parliament 
was required only in the context of a possible dismissal. No appearance before parliament 
was envisaged concerning the governor's regular duties or for the presentation of the 
monetary policy annual report and the report on the state of banking and on the overall 
financial system for the previous year (Article 76)27 .
Likewise, the obligation to publish these reports was not stipulated, pointing to a 
low level of NBY transparency. Moreover, the law did not regulate mutual participation 
in meetings with government or, more importantly, the publication of a rationale behind 
the Governor's decisions. This last point, we find, is of particular concern, given that 
there was no collective decision-making body in the NBY at the time and that some 
mechanism was needed that would enable control over the governor's work. Therefore, 
the conclusion appears that the proposed law regulated control of the NBY's 
conduct only in a vague and unsatisfactory manner.
In addition to the above-mentioned governor's autonomy relating to the so-called 
'budgetary independence', the proposal also prescribed that potential NBY losses were to 
be covered from the federal budget. Concerning lending to government, Article 33 of the 
proposal prescribed that the NBY could extend credits for the purpose of alleviating a 
budget's temporary liquidity problems. Interestingly, this was the only article in which 
the Federal Government was not explicitly mentioned, suggesting that credits could have 
been extended also to the republican governments. Similarly, the NBY was given the 
possibility to acquire government securities on the primary market as per Article 28(1): 
"the NBY conducts open market operations by buying and selling securities". This may 
be related to the acquisition of public sector securities, as well.
27 In the case of the EU, it is the ECB President who has to present those reports to the European Parliament 
even though Article 15(3) of the ESCB Statute does not explicitly say so. This article, however, is based on 
Article 113(3) of the Treaty, which obliges the ECB President to present the reports himself.
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The analysis discloses a number of points. Firstly, it identifies a tendency on the 
part of the NBY's officials who drafted the law to fully exploit all the conceptual and 
practical expressions of a central bank's independence. To put it differently, we uncover 
a strong pro-independence bias on the part of the NB Y officials. At first, this may seem 
usual, but it is not necessarily so given the level of propensity for independence not 
detected in the NBY law of 1993 that was also drafted by the NBY. We are, however, 
aware of the possible methodological inconsistency deriving from the fact that the Law 
on the NBY of 1993 was actually adopted by the parliament, whereas the Proposal of the 
Law on the NBY of 2002 did not. Thus, it could have been difficult to distinguish 
between the intentions of the NBY officials and the legislature, having in mind that any 
proposed law may be substantially altered in the course of parliamentary debate. Our 
conclusion here, therefore, is based on the investigation of the Proposal of the Law on the 
NBY of 1993, which was drafted by NBY staff.28 Analysis confirmed that the proposed 
version did not differ considerably form the enacted version, thereby substantiating our 
assessment.
Secondly, the incorporated NBY accountability clauses proved to be an 
inadequate counterbalance to the NBY's substantial independence. In this, the NBY's 
accountability should only be considered within the given NBY governing model. The set 
context, a rather peculiar one, as given by the Law on the NBY of 1993, establishes the 
governor as the sole source of policy. This fact - although deviant from standard central 
bank managerial models in which a collective governing body exists - illuminates 
another, unelaborated expression of central bank independence. In particular, the one in 
which the need arises to either limit the central bank independence, or to strengthen the 
central bank's accountability - because of the existence of a single-person central bank 
governing body. To put it differently, it may be that a Walsharian-type principle-agent 
contract would appear ineffective in overcoming the observed central bank propensity 
towards exploiting the allotted independence in case of a single-person central bank 
governing body at the cost of public accountability.29
28 See the NBY letter to the FRY Assembly dated 26 May 1993 (Ref. X/402/93).
29 Nothing conclusive can be said about the susceptibility of FRY's legislators towards such approach in 
case of this particular law proposal, as one cannot assume to what extent the FRY parliament would have 
modified the proposed NBY law. But, there may be other cases were this idea would need to be followed.
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5.2.4. Concluding remarks
The conducted analysis substantiates the universality of postulates relating to 
central bank independence, demonstrating that Serbia is not a 'special case'. What was 
special about the country in terms of its central banking business is the persistence of a 
democratic deficit originating from the highest state act - the Constitution (27 April 1992 
- 4 February 2003). 30 This act placed constraints relative to central bank governance in 
that it stipulated the existence of a single-person source of policymaking, i.e. Governor.
The implications of such a solution are potentially devastating, both in legal and 
real terms, as was evident from the example of the National Bank of Yugoslavia Law of 
1993. The Yugoslav monetary experience in the period 1993-2000, as well as certain sub- 
periods characterised by hyperinflation, supports this claim. On the other hand, however, 
the period of macroeconomic stabilisation registered from 2001 to mid-2003, during 
which the NBY continued operating under the aforementioned law, demonstrates the 
existence of a fallacy concerning central bank independence, as observed by McCallum 
(1995). This points to the fact that central banks need not always exploit inflationary 
expectations. To resolve this conflict a simple solution should be adopted, namely the 
delegation of authority for monetary policy to a collective policymaking body.
Also indicative is the pattern by which changes in political preferences influence 
the monetary policy conduct, regardless of the institutional changes of the central bank 
framework. The example of Serbia's successful stabilisations of 1994 and 2001-2003 
during which, as we found, moderate central bank independence existed, may serve 
to illustrate the point. We conclude that, ultimately, the behavioural characteristics of 
central bankers and their policy preferences (not those of politicians) are the most 
important critical factor that determines the inflation record. The individual credibility of 
persons holding positions of prominence in a central bank is what decisively determines 
the monetary policy demeanour. How this individual credibility can be translated into 
long-lasting institutional central bank credibility is a question seeking attention.
30 Here, we refer to the FRY Constitution because it provided the legal basis for the Law on the National 
Bank of Yugoslavia of 1993 with monetary competencies extending to the Republic of Serbia. By this law 
(Article 91), the National Bank of Serbia was established as a branch of the NBY and did not have 
monetary sovereignty. Thus, our analysis relates to the NBY and FRY Constitution. We shall, however, 
analyse the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia of 1990 in the next section.
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The degree of central bank independence (CBI) has increased worldwide in the 
past few decades (see Dvorsky, 2004). In this, the transition economies have been no 
exemption, demonstrating a great inclination for increased central bank independence. 
This is evident from numerous works dealing with the subject (see, for example, 
Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti, 2000; Dvorsky, 2000). The reason behind such 
occurrences is rooted in the belief that central bank independence is beneficial for 
macroeconomic stability and, in particular, for price stability (see Cukierman, 1992). 31
The case for increased legal central bank independence in the transitional 
economies of Central and South East Europe has additionally been strengthened by the 
prospective of EU membership. Chapter IV presented the main requirements in the area 
of Economic and Monetary Union, which also include the provisions on central bank 
independence. Clearly, any country wishing to join the EU has to align its central bank 
legislation with those requirements prior to accession. This fact has been the main driving 
force for the transitional economies to adapt their central bank legislation with that of the 
EU, which eventually resulted in increased legal central bank independence in those 
economies. Obviously, the countries that joined the EU on 1 May 2004 have already 
completed this task, whereas the Western Balkans countries still have a way to go.
As a result, our analysis is primarily based on the assessment of the degree of 
legal harmonisation with the EMU requirements on central bank independence in the case 
of Serbia. Additionally, we shall calculate the Cukierman index and CBI, 
which is in some aspects stricter and in some ways weaker than the EMU requirements. 
Such evidence still does not exist for Serbia, as the country was typically excluded from 
such studies (see, for example, Cukierman 1998). The rationale behind this 
exercise is to place Serbia into the broader context of transitional countries with which 
then it can be compared. Therefore, the combination of those two approaches will 
provide an empirical foundation for a discussion about the state of monetary governance 
in Serbia, which has so far largely been based on political grounds.
31 Alessina and Summers (1993), as explained in Chapter II, found that legal central bank independence is 
almost perfectly negatively correlated to the countries' inflation record. This study, however, only relates to 
a sample of industrial countries.
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Law on the NBS of 2003
The law on the National Bank of Serbia enacted in mid-July 2003, which is 
currently in implementation in the Republic of Serbia (without Kosovo and Metohija), is 
of special interest to our study for several reasons. Firstly, it gave back to Serbia its 
monetary sovereignty which the country had lost in 1920. As a consequence, this law
placed the National Bank of Serbia into a broader historical context. Secondly, the law 
endowed the National Bank of Serbia with a high degree of independence, which it had 
never had before (see Dugalic, 2003; Sevic, 1996). Thirdly, it brought Serbian central 
banking practices much closer to EMU requirements, although additional alignments will 
be necessary. The analysis that follows corroborates our claims.
Still, the professional and general public will most probably remember this law 
because of the protracted political disagreement between the Serbian Prime Minister and 
the NBY governor on the one hand, and between the Serbian Minister of Finance and 
Economy and the NBY governor on the other, which accompanied the process of 
adoption of this law. 33 Those political quarrels greatly blurred an objective assessment of 
the economic concepts embodied in the law. So far, the law has been judged mainly on 
political grounds, which we find inappropriate. We thus offer an alternative approach by 
placing the discussion within the context of the actual institutional circumstances in 
which this law was born. Namely, with the adoption of the Constitutional Charter of the 
SCO and the accompanying Implementing Law on 4 February 2003, the constitutional 
restraints that existed in the FRY Constitution in relation to the central bank were 
removed. Consequently, the new constitutional reality prevailed.
32 Dugalic (2003, pp. 24 and 27) explains: "The National Bank was constituted by the act of adoption of its 
Statute at the constitutive session of 29 February 1884, and so that date should be celebrated as the date of 
the Bank's establishment. [...] The explained organisational scheme of the National Bank was kept until the 
end of the World War I. Then, the reconstruction of this issuing institution was done and its transformation 
into the central bank of the newly formed state dates from 1 February 1920 when it was turned into the 
National Bank of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In 1929 it becomes the National Bank of the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. After World War II it becomes the National Bank of the FNRY [Federal People's 
Republic of Yugoslavia, auth. remark], then the National Bank of the SFRY, and as of 1992, the National 
Bank of the FRY. After almost 119 years, on 4 February 2003 [...] it becomes the National Bank of Serbia 
[...]". The date 4 February 2003 is, however, debatable and it will be explained later on.
33 At the time, the Serbian Prime Minister was Dr. Zoran Djindjic, the Minister of Finance and Economy 
was Mr. Bozidar Djelic, whereas the NBY^ governor was Mr. Mladan Dinkic. After 12 March 2003, when 
Mr. Djindjic was assassinated, Mr. Zoran Zivkovic took the position of Prime Minister, but disagreements 
with the Governor continued. See No. 153/154, 28 April 2003 and No. 160 dated 16 June 2003.
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The Implementing Law stipulates that the National Bank of Yugoslavia (as well 
as some other former FRY institutions) shall continue operating as the institution of the 
Republic of Serbia from the date of enforcement of the Constitutional Charter, in 
accordance with the legislation by which it was constituted and which will remain 
applicable in Serbia until replaced by new legislation (Article 13(1)). Thus, the National 
Bank of Yugoslavia was to retain its legal status until the adoption of a new Law on the 
National Bank of Serbia, due to the fact that the NBY Law of 1993, which was to remain 
in force, established it as the National Bank of not as the National Bank of 
However, in the spirit of Serbia's traditional penchant for intricacy, the following 
Article 14(4) of the Implementing Law refers to the NBY as to the National Bank of 
Serbia by specifying: "The function of the payment agent shall, on behalf of the member 
states, be performed by the National Bank of Serbia and the Central Bank of 
Montenegro". Expectedly, the relevant provisions of the Implementing Law were 
interpreted differently and, consequently, political tensions rose again.34 We, 
nevertheless, tend to believe that the National Bank of Serbia was established on the day 
of the adoption of the Law on the NBS on 18 July 2003 and will thus refer to this date in 
our further analysis.
Once the FRY Constitution was abolished, the legal basis for the adoption of the 
central bank law in Serbia was to be found in the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia35 . 
In particular, the Serbian Constitution stipulates that the Republic of Serbia has a 
National Bank (Article 107(1)), and that the status, organisation, management and 
conduct of the National Bank is regulated by law (Article 107(2)). Such modest 
provisioning is based on the fact that the Serbian Constitution was adopted in 1990, while 
the FRY Constitution was still in effect and that, at the time, the National Bank of 
Serbia36 had only been a branch of the National Bank of Yugoslavia.
34 See, for example, the letter sent by the Republican Secretariat for Legislation to all government members 
(dated 20 February 2003) in which the Secretariat express its opinion: "Regarding the paragraph 4 of 
Article 14 of the Law [Constitutional Charter Implementing Law, auth. remark], we stress that the 
mentioned provision (as well as the paragraph 1 of the same Article) does not have the transitory character, 
but substantive [...]. Therefore, it [the provision, auth. remark] relates to the period following the 
constitution of the bodies of Serbia and Montenegro, i.e. after the adjustments of monetary regulations of 
the member state Serbia with the Constitutional Charter".
35 Official Gazette of the RS, No. 1/90.
36 The National Bank of Serbia ceased to exist on 16 July 1994 by adoption of the Law on Repealing of the 
Law on the National Bank of Serbia (Official Gazette of the RS, No. 45/94).
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Nevertheless, the Serbian Constitution provided a firm legal basis for the adoption 
of a new NBS law. This time, however, the new law on the NBS was not drafted by the 
NBS's staff, but by the Serbian Ministry of Finance and Economy, i.e. the government, 
which later on proposed the law to parliament. This point, in combination with a high 
degree of NBS independence (see the analysis below), demonstrates the reformist 
character of the Serbian parliament and government in the period 2001-2003. If we recall 
from Chapter III that during this period overall macroeconomic stabilisation was 
achieved (not only monetary stability), we can presume that pro-reformist governments 
tend to delegate more autonomy to their central banks than less-reform oriented ones.
As soon as the circumstances allowed, i.e. once the new constitutional framework 
was set and the Republic of Serbia formally took over the responsibility for monetary 
policy, the Serbian government decided to reform the central bank's legal framework as 
proscribed by Article 20(4) of the Implementing Law. The adoption of new National 
Bank of Serbia legislation in the second half of 2003 also was part of the financial sector
1*7
structural benchmark agreed with the IMF under the Extended Arrangement. At that 
point, the main aim was to bring legislation on the central bank in line with the EMU's 
principles and requirements as much as possible. A restraining factor in this exercise was 
the actual (fragile) state of the economy, banking and entire financial sector.
In contrast to previous Serbian central bank legislation, the new law ensures the 
NBS's functional independence. In particular, Article 3(1) explicitly stipulates that the 
primary objective of the NBS is to achieve and maintain the price stability. Additionally, 
Article 3(3) introduces a secondary objective, that is, support to the implementation of 
the government's economic policy, on the condition that it does not jeopardise the 
fulfilment of the primary objective and only if it is based on the principles of a market 
economy. Yet, in view of the unreformed financial system, Article 3(2) envisages that the 
NBS "besides its primary objective, also has the maintenance of financial stability as its 
objective". Dvorsky (2004) notes that such a formulation may create a potential conflict 
between the objectives. We, however, think that the primacy of the price stability 
objective is guaranteed by the actual wording ('besides its primary objective').
37 See Letter of Intent on Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies for Serbia and Montenegro 
under the Extended Arrangement (Annex D) of 11 July 2003 [Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np 
/loi/2003/yug/01/ 040103.pdf].
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In relation to institutional independence, again, more then any previous central 
bank law in Serbia (Yugoslavia), the NBS Law of 2003 delegated authority over 
monetary policy to the NBS. Several provision s speak to this assertion. For example, 
Article 5(1) establishes the NBS as a legal entity clearly separated from other government 
institutions and bodies. Likewise, in the introductory provisions of the law, Article 2(2) 
clearly institutes the NBS as autonomous and independent in the conduct of its functions, 
thereby securing the NBS's statutory independence. Moreover, in line with European 
standards, the law prohibits the NBS to take or seek instructions from "government 
bodies or other persons" (Article 2(3)). The formulation might look slightly ambiguous as 
it refers to 'other persons'. However, the original Serbian version reads 
which in Serbian legal jargon includes not only individuals but also legal 
entities What is missing, although it might as well be assumed, is the shield 
from the exertion of different forms of influence (see Section 5.4.2) and the prohibition to 
take or seek instructions from parliament. In addition, as will be explained later, the 
protection against the possible influence of the EU institutions or bodies should as well 
be envisaged in view of the future E(M)U membership.
Also related to institutional independence is the authority of the central bank to 
formulate and implement a country's monetary policy. Thus, the NBS Law of 2003 
formally prescribes the responsibility to design and implement Serbia's monetary policy 
to the NBS (Article 4). Even though the functions of the NBS are explicitly listed and 
precisely defined by the law, the Bank is left with the possibility to perform other tasks if 
these are not contrary to its primary objective (Article 34(11)). As regards the selection of 
an exchange rate regime and the conduct of an exchange rate policy, the situation is less 
clear-cut. Namely, Art. 4(2) and 43 envisage the NBS's autonomous command of the 
dinar exchange rate but prescribe that the dinar exchange rate is to be 
determined with the government's consent. Thus, it is difficult to say anything conclusive 
about the NBS independence in this respect. One possible interpretation is that the NBS, 
in fact, has obtained independence over exchange rate management, as the role of the 
government in this is largely consultative. On the other hand, our interviews with the high 
NBS officials revealed that such a solution diminished the NBS's ability to adhere to its 
primary objective by prompt changes in the exchange rate regime.
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The situation concerning the role, status and composition of the highest governing 
bodies and their personal independence shows great improvements in comparison to the 
NBY Law of 1993. Most importantly, the NBS Law of 2003 introduced a collective 
policy-making body - the Monetary Board (Article 12(1)) - whose members are the 
governor and vice governors of the National Bank of Serbia (Article 13). 38 Additionally, 
the law establishes the NBS Council (Article 12(3)) as a supervisory-type board, which 
consists of five members (the president of the Council and four other members). 39
The selection procedure assumes the appointment of a Governor by the Serbian 
parliament for five-year term, with the possibility of a renewed mandate (Article 16). At 
the same time, although it is usual practice for the government to nominate at least some 
of the members of the highest governing body of a central bank (see Dvorsky, 2004, p. 
57), the entire authority was in this case delegated to the Governor, who was to propose 
all Vice Governors (Article 19(2)). Additionally, the Vice Governors are to be appointed 
by the NBS Council (Article 19(2)), which is in itself an uncommon practice.40 The 
reasoning behind such an approach may be found in the legislature's readiness to 
relinquish more authority to Governor in choosing his closes associates and its 
willingness to only indirectly influence his choice by appointing the Council members 
(Article 23(2)). Besides, having in mind that the professional requirements, which apply 
to the (Vice) Governor also apply to the members of the Council (Article 23(3)), it is 
likely that the Serbian parliament in this way wanted to 'import' the necessary expertise 
needed for the personnel selection of an adequate Monetary Board. Those requirements 
are given in Article 16(2) and relate to: (i) fulfilment of general employment 
requirements, (ii) possession of university degree, (iii) working experience in the fields of 
economy, finance and banking, and (iv) a recognised academic or professional reputation.
38 According to Article 19(1), the National Bank of Serbia has three to five vice governors.
39 The Council was not termed a Supervisory Board for two reasons mainly: (i) as to avoid any association 
with the corporate structure of enterprises, and (ii) not to create misleading impressions about the functions 
of the Council, which also have other roles apart from those relating to the supervision.
40 A comparative analysis of the central bank laws of Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and 
Slovenia, shows that vice governors were indeed in most cases appointed by parliament. The analysis 
includes the following laws: Article 12 of the Law on the National Bank of Bulgaria (1997), Article 72 of 
the National Bank of Macedonia (2002), Article 14 of the Law on the Central Bank of Montenegro (2000), 
Article 34 of the National Bank of Romania (1998), and Article 36 of the Law on the Bank of Slovenia 
(2002). In contrast, the inspection of Article 10 of the Law on the National Bank of Poland (1997) and 
Article 7 of the Law on the National Bank of Slovakia (1992) reveals that vice governors are appointed and 
recalled by President.
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The Law on the NBS of 2003 is peculiar in its governor nomination procedure. 
Namely, due to the constitutional restraint by which the President of the Republic of 
Serbia does not have the responsibility to nominate Governor, the legislature opted for a 
solution by which the governor is appointed by the Serbian parliament upon the proposal 
of the Parliamentary Committee for Financial Affairs. A similar solution, for example, 
exists in Croatia.41
Regarding the criteria for being removed from office, Dvorsky (2004, p. 59) 
writes that "legislated reasons have to be unrelated to central bank policy and limited to 
exceptional circumstances clearly defined by the law". The same author, however, 
observes that by 31 October 2004, none of the SEE central banks were fully compatible 
with such requirements. This relates to Serbia, too. Namely, as a result of prolonged 
hyperinflationary periods and frequent periods of high inflation during the 1990s (see 
Chapter III), and the finding that such episodes were the result of the central bank's 
immense engagement in 'printing money', those provisions were strengthened in the 
2003 NBS Law.
In particular, causes for dismissal are numerous and the same for all members of 
the Monetary Board and the Council. They include criminal offence, misconduct, false 
statements, professional incompetence, and inability to perform one's duties (Article 30). 
Additionally, the dismissal procedure for the Governor assumes that the Council will 
affirm the existence of any of the reasons for dismissal and will initiate the procedure 
before the Parliamentary Committee for Financial Affairs (Article 31(1)). In the phase of 
the assessment of those reasons, the parliamentary committee has to hear the Governor's 
statement (Article 31(2)). If the committee judges that causes for dismissal exist, it 
informs the parliament, which decides on the Governor's dismissal (Article 31(3)). So, on 
the one hand, the law lists more than the necessary potential reasons for the governor's 
dismissal which may decrease his personal independence but, on the other hand, 
establishes a balance by giving the governor the right to appear before the parliamentary 
committee and by ensuring that those reasons are not subject to discretionary judgments.
4l ln particular, Article 40(1) of the Law on the National Bank of Croatia (adopted on 5 April 2001) 
prescribes that governor of the Croatian National Bank shall be appointed by Croatian parliament upon 
proposal by the Administrative Parliamentary Committee and with the accompanying opinion of the 
Parliamentary Committee for Finance and State Budget.
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In the case of vice governors, pretty similar mechanism exist. Notably, Article 
31(4) prescribes that governor determines whether there exist reasons for the initiation of 
dismissal procedures for vice governors and informs the NBS Council of his findings, 
which rules on the matter. It should be added that the law also provides for a "cooling- 
off period of one year following the date of expiry of the governor's , vice governors's 
and the Council members terms during which they cannot exercise any function at banks 
and other financial organisations (Article 33). Had the NBS been given the oversight 
authority over the insurance companies at the time of this law's adoption, the 
aforementioned provision would, most likely, have included a "cooling-off' period for 
insurance companies.42 Interestingly, however, even though such specification does not 
represent a formal EMU requirement, it has been incorporated in several SEE central 
bank laws (see Dvorsky, 2004).
Also, for the first time in history, the NBS Law of 2003 regulated in considerable 
detail the so-called 'incompatibility clauses'. Those incompatibility clauses are generally 
welcomed as they prevent the exercise of political influence and the emergence of 
conflict of interest. The NBS law, thus, proscribes that the members of the Monetary 
Board and NBS Council cannot be: parliament and government members, high political 
party officials, local government and trade union members, company managing or 
supervisory boards' members, external advisors to banks, other financial organisations 
and auditing firms or any other legal entities which the National Bank supervises or with 
which it cooperates in the performance of its functions (Article 28). Article 85 goes even 
further by setting forth that all employees of the NBS as well as Council Members cannot 
be guided by their political beliefs in the conduct of their jobs.43
Even though rather strict and detailed, these incompatibility clauses still 
somewhat clash with EMU standards44 in that they still do not preclude the members of 
the National Bank of Serbia's highest decision-making bodies (the Monetary Board and 
Council Members) to engage in some other gainful or non-gainful activities and would 
thus need to be adjusted.
42 The NBS was given the authority to supervise the insurance companies on 29 May 2004 by the adoption 
of Amendments to the Law on the National Bank of Serbia (see Official Gazette of the RS, No. 55/04).
43 In this, it should be noted that governor and vice governors are full-time employees of the National Bank 
of Serbia (Article 22), whereas the Council members are external specialists (Article 27).
44 See Article 11(1) of the ESCB Statute, which refers to members of the ECB Executive Board.
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Before moving to an analysis of different aspects of the financial independence of 
the NBS under the current law, it is necessary to assess the appointment procedure of the 
NBC Council members. Article 92(3) envisages a staggered appointment procedure for 
the Council members implying a varying length of term for each of the Council members. 
The Council President is to be appointed for a term of five years, whereas the other four 
members are to be appointed for a term of four, three, two and one year, respectively. In 
this way, the legislature additionally strengthened the resistance of the Council members 
to possible political influences by one parliamentary majority the separation of 
Council members' length of terms (1-5 years) from the regular electoral cycle (4 years).
In the field of the central bank's financial independence, the NBS Law of 2003 
brought some significant improvements, but also failed to fully align all provisions with 
the highest EMU standards. It is worth nothing, however, that those standard options 
were considered, but rejected on the following two grounds: (1) the financial and 
budgetary position of the country was such that it did not allow for the absolute 
prohibition of government lending from the NBS (no single treasury account was 
established, not all budgetary revenues were fully consolidated, the market for 
government securities was fully developed, etc.), and (2) an assessment was made that 
the central bank also needs to be reformed (cut in the number of employees, containment 
of salaries, etc.).
Therefore, in the search for solutions, the legislature opted for limited 
direct central bank credit to the government for the purpose of covering temporary budget 
liquidity difficulties. Those direct credits are restricted to 5 per cent of the average budget 
revenues of the past three years, whereby the total outstanding credit cannot exceed the 
tripled amount of minimal proscribed capital and asset reserve fund of the NBS (Article 
39). Regarding the prohibition against the acquisitions of government securities on the 
primary market, Dvorsky (2004, p. 61) finds that those are left unregulated. We, 
however, point to Article 36 stipulating that the NBS implements open market operations 
(i.e. primary and secondary market operations) by trading the assorted securities which it 
deems appropriate (based on quality, maturity, etc). Even though the NBS did not 
conduct such operations in the period mid-2003 to mid-2005 (as stated by the NBS vice 
governor in our interview), it is by the law not forbidden to do so.
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Nonetheless, the securities issued by the Republic of Serbia in January 2005, 
based on the Law on the Settlement of Obligations of the Republic of Serbia to the 
National Bank of Serbia45 , were to the National Bank of Serbia. Namely, the 
aforementioned law (Article 2) stipulates that securities are to be issued against: (1) old 
NBY's purchases of government bills worth 17 billion dinars, (2), old NBS's purchases 
of the public electricity company's shares equalling 1,899 billion 
dinars, and (3) old credits and associated interest arrears (cut-off date 31 December 2004) 
that the NBS extended to the Republic Commodity Reserves Fund in the amount of 802 
million dinars.
This act, in its substance, represents the acquisition of government securities on 
the primary market, but as it is based on some extended credits it takes the 
form of debt rescheduling. Also, one should bear in mind that exactly this transaction 
enabled the NBS to start operating repurchase operations, giving a momentum to the 
development of the Serbian financial market for government securities. Altogether, this 
one-off operation should be treated as exclusive and should thus not be considered as a 
demonstration of government influence over the central bank independence.
With regards to another aspect of the NBS financial independence, it should be 
noted that the NBS Law of 2003 introduced an unusual form of control of the 
NBS's financial plan. In particular, Article 24(1) stipulates that the NBS financial plan is 
to be adopted by the NBS Council upon the governor's proposal. At first, it seems that 
the financial independence of the NBS has been secured due to the fact that the NBS 
body was entitled to determine its expenses and revenues autonomously (see Dvorsky, 
2004). Nevertheless, having in mind that the Council members are in fact external 
experts, one may question the NBS's genuine independence the rules guiding 
the management of the central bank's budget. Similarly, the provisions on the NBS's loss 
coverage by the issuance of government debt securities (Article 77(5)) are questionable 
and incompatible with the Treaty (Dvorsky, 2004, p. 62). Equally, the transfer of realised 
revenues to the state budget as envisaged per Article 77(4) is inconsistent with the EMU 
requirements, as it is seen as a form of central bank lending to government. On the other 
hand, the governor's right to manage the special reserve fund (Article 78) is welcomed.
45 Official Gazette of the RS, No. 135/04.
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To counterbalance the increased NBS's independence, the NBS Law of 2003 also 
strengthened its accountability. The most profound difference introduced by this law, as 
compared to previous central bank legislation, concerns the mutual participation in 
meetings. Notably, Article 45(6) envisages that the Finance Minister participates in the 
Monetary Board meetings, though without a voting right. Also, Article 72(1) gives the 
governor the possibility to attend government sessions if the agenda includes issues 
related to the implementation of the NBS's objectives and the performance of its 
functions. Moreover, Article 10 stipulates that the NBS cooperates with the government 
and the rest of the state apparatus within the limits of its competencies. Although this 
provision resembles that of Article 86(2) of the NBY Law of 1989, which we criticised, 
the context in which this clause appears in the NBS Law of 2003 is rather different; 
notably, it specifies this cooperation by the above-mentioned articles.
Besides, a wide set of mutual consultations is envisaged by Article 72(2,3) 
according to which the Finance Ministry sends its draft laws and by-laws, including the 
draft Budget Law and the draft memorandum on budgetary, economic and fiscal policy to 
NBS experts for their opinion. Contrary to the previous NBY laws, the NBS was not 
given the possibility to directly propose regulations to the Serbian parliament, but was 
instead given the right to initiate the adoption of laws relating to the implementation of its 
functions by suggesting to the government that it propose those laws to parliament 
(Article 72(4)).
Also related to the central bank's accountability are its reporting requirements. 
The current NBS law proscribes the following reporting obligations:
The Governor submits to the Council a report on monetary policy conduct, 
issuance and withdrawal of banking licenses, and bank supervision, at least a 
week before each Council meeting (Article 18);
The Council submits to parliament a report on its performance at least once a year 
(Article 26);
- The NBS submits to parliament its monetary policy programme for the following 
year, for information purposes only, by 15 December of the current year, which is 
to in the Official Gazette within a month (Article 71(1,5));
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The NBS submits to parliament a report on the conduct of its monetary policy, 
including the explanations of all factors which have influenced it, by 30 June of 
the following year (Article 71(2));
- The NBS submits to parliament an annual report on the situation in banking and 
overall financial sector by 30 September of the following year (Article 71(3)); and 
The Council submits to parliament the NBS annual report together with an audit 
report by 30 June of the following year, which is to be in the Official 
Gazette within a month (Article 79(2,3)).
This quite extensive list largely matches EMU requirements.46 One particular 
provision, however, was criticised by Dvorsky (2004, p. 66) on the grounds that 
coordination on the monetary policy programme between the central bank and the 
parliament [...] may jeopardize CBI". We nevertheless argue that, as long as the monetary 
policy is to be submitted to parliament for 'information purposes only', there does not 
exist 'coordination' and, a risk of parliament influence. Moreover, if one takes 
into account the general character of the monetary policy programme, which traditionally 
has been used to proclaim the NBS's targets and goals without any detailed elaboration 
about the means to achieve them, the scope for potential political influence additionally 
narrows.47
The analysis largely supports our initial claim that the NBS Law of 2003 gave the 
National Bank of Serbia greater independence. We tend to believe that this observation is 
even more important having in mind the adverse collective and institutional experience 
from the 1990s, involving the misuse of central bank operations for political purposes. At 
the same time, however, we argue that the uncovered conservatism, as reflected in the 
conference of greater independence to the NBS, has also been a reason for the cautious 
approach to the central bank's accountability that is detectable in the current law.48
46 See Article 113(3) of the Treaty and Article 15 of the ESCB Statute.
47 See, for example, the Decision on Monetary Policy in 2003 (Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 71/02).
48 This is evident in the several fields: introduction of a secondary objective (maintenance of the financial 
stability), variety of reasons for removal from office, existence of cooling-off provisions, staggered 
appointment procedure for the Council members, limited central bank lending to government (although not 
prohibited), quasi-ex control of the NBS financial plan, inability of the NBS to propose laws directly 
to parliament, dynamic coordination with the government and parliament, substantial reporting, etc.
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It is interesting to compare this with our earlier findings. Namely, the analysis of 
the results of monetary and exchange rate policy in Serbia during the past 15 years has 
already made us conclude that society in Serbia perceives an approach to monetary 
management as if that approach is also (see Section 4.4.2). 
Rogoff s (1985) theory implies that an institutional response to such a situation should 
include high central bank independence. The analysis here reveals that such a motive 
indeed existed at the time of adoption of the current NBS law. Our analysis, however, 
also unveils that the opportunity to fully exploit the concept of central bank 
independence, i.e. an opportunity to assign to the NBS even higher autonomy, did not 
materialise. One can argue that this is because of the Serbia's degree of democratic and 
economic development and that more independence will only be assigned to the NBS 
once the overall political and economic state of affairs in Serbia improves.
In principle, the conferred central bank independence is considered beneficial as it 
is expected to affect the rates of expansion of money and credit. But, that the legally 
independent central bank cannot by itself suppress negative macroeconomic tendencies is 
confirmed by Serbia's somewhat weaker economic performance, which was registered in 
2004 (see Chapter III) when this law was already in effect. Clearly, close coordination 
with other policies is needed if the macroeconomic (monetary) stability is to be 
sustainable as well. It cannot be excluded, though, that this point may simply represent a 
reflection of Cukierman's (1992) conclusion that time is needed for legal central bank 
independence to be translated into actual independence. The period of implementation of 
this law is too short to allow any conclusive statement to be made at the time of writing.
Also, some of the solutions applied in this law collide with the formal EMU 
requirements and would thus need to be further harmonised. However, in this, one should 
have in mind that De Haan (1998) found the ECB, which is entirely compatible 
with the EMU requirements, to have a rather low level of democratic accountability. 
Thus, we argue that the inspected increased accountability of the NBS policy-making 
bodies the highest elected body is well-balanced given the country's economic 
strength and democratic development. Still, though, the final assessment on the 
appropriateness of the applied approaches can only be made after an empirical 
measurement of the legal and actual NBS independence is conducted.
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It is easy to believe that the central bank's independence does not 
correspond fully to the central bank's independence as demonstrated in practice. 
This is a result of the fact that no central bank law can take into account all possible real- 
life contingencies. High legal central bank independence, nonetheless, ensures that the 
risk of any of these contingencies realising is reduced. It is, therefore, important for a law 
to contain provisions securing a high degree of central bank independence. Herein, 
independence should not be mistaken with the authority of the central bank's decision- 
making bodies to do whatever they please, but it should assume that the central bank has 
autonomy to pursue its price stability objective independently from other branches of 
government (see Cukierman, 1992, in Chapter II).49
central bank independence is difficult to calculate because it depends not 
only on legal independence but also "on a myriad of other less structured factors such as 
informal arrangements between the bank and other parts of government, the quality of the 
bank's research department, and the personalities of key individuals in the bank and other 
economic policymaking organs like the Treasury" (Cukierman, 1992, p. 369). As a result, 
most efforts to quantify CBI have focused largely or exclusively on the measurement of 
central bank independence. 50 Our decisions to compute the NBS's legal 
independence is motivated by the fact that Serbia was excluded from the existing studies 
so far. The availability of such data would enable comparison with other (transition) 
countries and would point to improvements, which took place since the 1980s when the 
first such index was calculated by Cukierman (1992) for the NBY.
49 The two notions are quite often mistaken in Serbia, even among governors. For example, governor 
Dinkic had claimed on several occasions during the first half of 2003 that the government had been drafting 
a law that was to drain away his independence as a governor. The analysis of the NBS Law of 2003 has 
shown that this was not so and that the NBS independence was not in any way diminished. In fact, we 
argue that quite the opposite happened; that the central bank was granted even more independence then 
before. The misunderstanding, possibly, also derived from the fact that this law introduced a collective 
NBS decision-making body as opposed to the previous situation in which only the governor was deciding 
about everything as a single-person governing body of the National Bank of Serbia. Besides, we believe 
that the concept of central bank was confused with the concept of central bank 
in this particular situation as well because the NBS's increased accountability was interpreted as loss of the 
NBS independence.
50 See, for example, Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), Curierman (1992), Cukierman, Miller and 
Neyapti (2001), Dvorsky (2000).
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Our analysis will be based on the codification system for measuring legal central 
bank independence developed by Cukierman (1992), making it compatible with the data 
presented in earlier studies on former socialist economies (Cukierman, Miller and 
Neyapti, 2000) and Dvorsky (2000)51 . As any other calculation of CBI, this analysis 
cannot, by any means, be absolutely secluded from subjective assessments and 
judgements about certain legal provisions related to the construction of the CBI index. 
This subjective element enters the process of the measurement of CBI in the part relating 
to interpretations about the legislature's intensions. It should be stressed, however, that 
those interpretations also differ due to translation and that, occasionally, the spirit of the 
law is lost unintentionally. It is thus important to note that in this particular case the index 
will be constructed based on the original, of the law and that the 
assignment will lean on existing knowledge about the real intensions behind the formal 
provisions of the law. 52
The Cukierman index comprises 16 coded variables (based on legal descriptions), 
which are split into four groups: (1) chief executive officer, i.e. governor, his 
appointment and dismissal procedure, term of office and incompatibility clauses 
(code=CEO), (2) policy formulation, including competence to formulate policy, central 
bank participation in the budget process and potential conflict with government 
(code=PF), (3) central bank objectives (code=OBJ), and (4) limitations on lending 
(code=LL). The definitions of legal variables and their coding are presented in Appendix 
I. In this, each of 16 variables is assigned a numerical code (scoring) between 0 and 1, 
where 0 corresponds to the smallest level of independence and 1 to the highest level of 
independence. This analysis covers 15 years (1989-2003). The time span is divided into 
three groups: (1) 1989-1992, the period during which the NBY Law of 1989 was in 
effect, (2) 1993-2002, the period of application of the NBY Law of 1993, and (3) 2003- 
2005, the period of implementation of the NBS Law of 2003. For the sake of comparison, 
we shall also calculate the CBI index for the Proposal on the NBY Law of 2002, but this 
should be treated with caution as this Proposal was never adopted by the parliament.
51 Dvorsky (2000) used a combined methodology, but we believe that results can be used for comparison.
52 The author was a member of the Ministry of Finance and Economy Working Group which drafted the 
law on the National Bank of Serbia in 2003 and is aware of the rationale behind some provisions. This, 
however, does not imply that some other information, besides those contained in the NBS law, will be used. 
On a contrary, we shall rely on information given by the law, as suggested by Cukierman (1992, p. 371).
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The overall index for each sub-period is obtained by computing: (1) an un- 
weighted mean (LVAU), and/or (2) weighted index (LVAW). Data obtained are 
presented in Table 5.1. The most sensitive part of this exercise is the one relating to the 
assignation of numerical codes to actual legal provisions. As most other aspects of this 
assignment, it is relatively subjective because it relies on individual interpretations of 
certain legal provisions. For all those legal provisions where dilemmas existed about 
which code to assign to it, we feel obliged to offer explanation and additional comments. 
For the rest of legal variables, which are found to be straightforward, no detailed 
elaboration is needed.
VARIABLE
Chief executive officer (CEO)
Policy formulation (PF)**
Central bank objective (OBJ)
Limitations on lending (LL)
Index 1 (LVAU, un-weighted)
Index 2 (LVAW, weighted)
NUMERICAL CODINGS
1980- 
1989
0.3325*
0.25
0.25
0.83
0
0.033*
0
0.2
0
0.400*
0.40
-
0
NA
0
0
0.25*
NA
0
0.25
0
0.13
-
1989- 
1992
0.3325
0.25
0.25
0.33
0
0
0
0
0
0.400
0.40
-
0
0
0
0.33
0.25
NA
0
0.25
0
0.16406
-
1993- 
2002
0.4575
0.50
0.50
0.83
0
0.250
1
1
0
0.400
0.40
-
0.66
0
0.66
0.33
0.310
0.33
0.66
0.25
0
0.38343
0.50187
2002 
Proposal
0.625
0.50
0.50
0.50
1
0.250
1
1
0
1.000
1
-
0.66
0
1
1
0.270
0.33
0
0.75
0
0.90437
-
2003- 
2005
0.625
0.50
0.50
0.50
1
0.333
1
1
1
0.600
0.60
-
0.66
0
0.33
1
0.5175
0.66
0.66
0.75
0
0.50818
0.62337
Author's calculations; the rest in that column provided by Cukierman (1992). NA 
** For weights used in the construction of index see Cukierman (1992, pp. 379 and 
Source: Author; column for 1980-1989 is based on Cukireman (1992, pp. 396-411).
- no account. 
380).
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In relation to the NBY Law of 1989, we decided to assign a code 0.33 to the 
dismissal variable even though the FRY Assembly did not itself have a jurisdiction 
over the governor's dismissal. Although it seems that Article 78(2) envisages dismissal 
based only on policy reasons, the next paragraph (Article 78(3)) stipulates that the FRY 
Assembly could, based on 'political control', propose to a republic's parliament to 
dismiss the governor (Article 78(3)). We, therefore, assigned code 0.33 relating to 
"unconditional dismissal possible at legislative branch's discretion", as 
ultimately the legislative arm had the last say in the dismissal procedure. In relation to 
authority over the resolution of conflicts we assigned code 0 based on Article 
81(4), but also having in mind Art. 66(3) and 55(3). As regards the central bank's 
objective we assigned 0, as price stability objective appears only implicitly, as do a 
number of other NBY objectives, task and functions (see, for example, Article 75). In 
relation to terms of lending we assigned code 0 on the grounds of Article 52(1) 
implying that terms of credit are set by a federal law. Similar provisions exist also in 
Article 55(3). As for the type of limit we used NA as there is no account of 
relevant provisions in the law. However, equally, the code could have been 0 in view of 
the fact that the lending limit did not exist at all. Concerning the maturity of loans 
the code is 0 based on Article 52(1) and not 0.66, although in Article 52(2) the maturity 
of loans is limited to one year. The reasoning behind such decision is that Article 52(2) 
applies only in "exceptional circumstances".
In relation to the NBY Law of 1993, we chose to allocate 0.83 to the dismissal 
procedure instead of 1, which relates to situations in which there are no dismissal 
provisions, because the Governor can be dismissed for non-policy reasons (i.e. 
incapability or violation of law) on the basis of a labour code (Article 79). We assigned 
numerical code 1 to the variable on final authority although Cukierman's 
description does not fit perfectly in the part concerning "clearly defined in the law as CB 
objectives" simply because the law does not define those objectives clearly. Regarding 
type of limit code is 0.33 and not 0.66 even though in Article 34(2) the limit 
relating to central bank liabilities existed, because during 1993 and 1994 the NBY could 
extend credits without limits. In the case of interest rates we assigned 0.25 despite 
Article 34(4) stipulating that interest rates may be lower then the NBY's discount rate.
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Finally, with regards to the NBS Law of 2003, we chose to assign code 0.50 for 
dismissal procedure as we treated the false statement as a law violation. We applied 
the same reasoning in relation to professional qualifications. the central bank's 
advisory role in the formulation of the government's budget we assigned code 1 
based on Article 72(3) and by analogy to Cukierman (2000)53 who assigned 1 to 
Poland based on the Law on the National Bank of Poland54 from 1997 (Article 23(1)), by 
which PNB was given the possibility to issue opinion on government budget. In relation 
to advances we assumed these to include only direct credits and thus assigned code 
0.66 to this variable and code 0 to the variable on securitised lending For the type of 
limit the selected code was 0.66, because the limit given as percentage of NBS 
capital has primacy over other limit, which is set as percentage of government revenues 
(Article 39(2)). Concerning interest rates the code is 0.75 based on Article 41(5) 
assuming that this article also regulates advances to government.
The results obtained are telling. A cross-sectional (i.e. over time) evaluation of 
those results reveals a steady increase in legal central bank independence in Serbia 
(Yugoslavia) over the last 25 years. In this, the smallest improvement in legal CBI is 
registered in 1989, in comparison to the preceding period (1980-1989). This implies that 
the legislature was unwilling to delegate more power to the National Bank of Yugoslavia 
at that time. Having in mind that the NBY Law of 1989 was a part of the overall reform 
package, this finding places doubts on how genuine the intentions of political actors was 
to transform the country and to fight high inflation.55 We recall from Chapter II that 
1989/1990 marked the period of the beginning of transition in SFR Yugoslavia. The code 
of 0.16 of the CBI's legal NBY independence in the early years of transition in 
comparison to a mere 0.13 for the period 1980-1989 reinforces our earlier finding (see 
Section 5.2.1) that introduced institutional central bank changes did not bring any 
substantial improvements in terms of the NBY's independence.56
53 See Table Al in Cukierman (2000, p. 33).
54 Published in No. 140/1997 (item 938).
55 According to Petrovic and VujoSevtf (2000, p. 499), "The former Yugoslavia [SFRY, auth. remark] 
experienced high inflation in the 1980s, which slowly built up through mid-1980s and surged after 1987 
from a 118% annual rate to as much as 1256% in 1989, reaching monthly rates of 50% in the last quarter of 
1989 and thus, according to Cahan (1956), entering hyperinflation". See also Chapter II. 
56 Even though the indices used reflect the legal CBI of different central banks, the NBY of the SFRY and 
the NBY of FRY, we allow for the comparison based on Cukierman (2000, p. 14).
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The NBY Law of 1993 adopted during the period of Slobodan Milosevic's ruling 
shows substantial advancement in terms of legal CBI. However, it should be noted that 
this high increase in legal CBI came mainly from Serbia's low initial position. In 
particular, the LVAU index indicates increase from 0.16 to 0.38. Interestingly, when 
compared to other transitional countries, the LVAW index of 0.50 for Serbia 
(Yugoslavia) corresponds to the LVAW index of, for example, Albania (based on law 
from 1992, LVAW=0.51), Bulgaria (law from 1991, LVAW=0.55), the Kyrgyz Republic 
(law from 1992, LVAW=0.52), Latvia (law from 1992, LVAW=0.49), Mongolia (law 
from 1996, LVAW=0.55), Russia (law from 1995, LVAW=0.49), and to the average 
legal CBI in transition economies after central bank reforms (LVAW=0.52). 57 As far as 
the international comparison is in question, we find that the legal CBI index LVAU of 
0.38 generally matches with the LVAU index (median) of 0.33 from a sample of 68
Q
developed and less developed (LDCs) countries during the 1980s. Simplified, this 
means that Serbia in the period until 2003 had a level of CBI independence as developed 
and LCDs had in 1980s, indicating that the central bank reform in the country was 
delayed for at least a decade, if not for two decades.59
However, that this index of the central bank's legal independence does not fully 
illustrate the actual situation is evident from our previous analysis, which pointed to the 
existence of hyperinflation in the period 1992-1994. This also shows that the legal CBI 
may not necessarily always be exploited and that some other, less structured factors, also 
play a role, as noted by Cukierman (1992). One should not forget, though, that in the 
period of enforcement of this law (from mid-1993 to mid-2003) Serbia also experienced a 
period of successful stabilisation (2001 to mid-2003). The existence of those temporal 
variations in inflation in the period of enactment of this law does not conform to 
unaltered legal central bank independence. Consequently, we may extend the conclusion 
by Curkierman (2000, p. 4) - that central bank reform and the consequent higher 
legal central bank independence are unrelated to inflation - to Serbia, too. However, 
additional studies will be needed to empirically confirm the absence of this relationship.
57 Data from Cukierman (2000, p. 8), see Table 1.
58 See Cukierman (1992, p. 380).
59 This is so having in mind that during 1980s when the average legal CBI index LVAU stood at 0.33, the 
SFR Yugoslavia had twice smaller CBI (i.e. LVAU was 0.13).
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As evidence suggests, the Law on the National Bank of Serbia adopted in mid- 
2003 conferred substantial legal independence to the Serbian central bank. The legal CBI 
index LVAU of 0.51 shows a fine improvement in comparison to the NBY Law of 1993 
for which this index stood at 0.38. Such a degree of legal central bank independence 
happens to be fully in line with the rest of the transitional experience. Notably, the 
LVAW index of 0.62 corresponds to the average LVAW index of 0.63 for transitional 
countries (Cukierman 2000, p. 9), as registered after the second round of the central 
bank institutional reform that took place in the second half of the 1990s. However, such a 
result does not match with the general tendency of latecomers to transition to enact laws 
with higher levels of independence (see Cukierman 2000). Once again, we believe 
that this stems from the fact that Serbia had a very low starting position and that the state 
of the economy was rather poor as a result of 1990s' mismanagement. An obvious 
consequence is that the NBS could not have been given too much autonomy.
In comparison with other transitional countries, it appears that Serbia 
(LVAW=0.62) currently holds the same rank that Slovenia (LVAW=0.63) and Slovakia 
(LVAW=0.62) did before they introduced final changes into their central bank laws in 
order to fully align with the EMU in the last few years. Also noticeable is that 
Serbia is above the SEE regional average that stood at 0.48 (excluding Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) based on central bank laws that were in effect in those countries up to 1998 
when this index was calculated.60 On the other hand, Serbia is lagging behind the ex- 
socialist countries that became EU members on 1 May 2005 and that had already well 
before the actual EU membership (at least 5 years before) largely aligned their legal CBI 
with that of the ECB. Their average LVAW index, calculated on their central bank 
legislation introduced until 1989, stood at 0.70 (Cukierman 2000, pp. 36 and 37).61 
This pattern demonstrates that the prospect of EU membership, which is open for Serbia 
too, encourages politicians to give more independence to the central banks.
60 For Albania LVAW=0.51, for Bulgaria LVAW=0.55, for Croatia LVAW=0.44, for Macedonia 
LVAW=0.41, and for Romania LVAW=0.34 (Cukierman 2000, pp. 36 and 37). It should be noted, 
though, that in a number of SEE countries, the same central bank laws are still in effect. See, for example, 
the Law on the Bank of Albania (effective from 23 December 1997). Available at: www.bankofalbania.org
61 In this, only Latvia with the LVAW index of 0.49 was well below the average, whereas Slovenia and 
Slovakia, which we already mentioned, as well as Hungary with the LVAW of 0.67 stood below the 
average. For the rest of countries in this sample LVAW was 0.73 for the Czech Republic, 0.78 for Estonia, 
0.78 for Lithuania and 0.89 for Poland (Cukierman 2000, pp. 36 and 37).
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The inspection of specified legal variables of different laws, which existed over 
the last 15 years, demonstrates that the legislature in Serbia has traditionally been 
reluctant to delegate more independence to the central bank's Governor (CEO in 
Cukierman's terminology). Thus, we only register a slight, although, steady improvement 
over the years. A similar situation is observable for a variable that measures the terms of 
central bank lending to government, which indeed doubled in mid-2003, but from a very 
low base. In order to additionally improve the NBS's independence, issues such as an 
explicit prohibition of the central bank to lend to the government or to purchase 
government securities at the primary market will have to be regulated by the NBS law. 
On the other hand, it seems that the idea of leaving a central bank solely responsible for 
autonomous formulation and implementation of policies has finally matured in Serbia, as 
MPs allotted full autonomy to the NBS with the latest changes of the law in 2003. In 
relation to the definition of the central bank objectives, the analysis reveals that there has 
been considerable confusion. We believe that this reflects society's changing preferences, 
as well as constitutional alterations, but that also it can be attributed to the transition from 
one socio-economic setting towards another one. That the transition in Serbia decisively 
resumed after October 2000 is also confirmed by these alterations.
Relatively modest improvements in some areas of legal central bank 
independence over the last 15 years once more point to conservatism, which has 
remained ingrained in Serbian society over the years. The only exemption from this rule 
is detectable in the Proposal of the Law on the NBY of 2002. An extremely high index of 
legal CBI (LVAU=0.90) in comparison to other transition countries' indices measured in 
2000, point to the unbalanced approach toward the central bank independence. According 
to Dvorsky (2000, p. 80), only Poland had a higher index of legal CBI (LVAU=0.91), 
whereas all other 'fast reformers', that is, the Czech Republic (LVAU=0.69), Hungary 
(LVAU=0.78), Slovakia (LVAU=0.68) and Slovenia (LVAU=0.60) had a lower CBI 
index than the one proposed for the NBY in 2002.62 As this law was never enacted, 
however, the results should be treated with reserve. The analysis, nonetheless, confirmed 
the existence of inherited central banker's propensity for greater autonomy.
62 It should be noted that indices are not entirely comparable as Dvorsky (2000, p. 79) applied the rationale 
of the Maastricht Treaty wherever national legislation did not clearly fit into any of Cukierman's (1992) 
category. However, this does not diminish our conclusion; on a contrary, it only strengthens it.
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Returning to the above-noted conservatism, it appears in the case of Serbia that 
not only the actual monetary and exchange rate policy-making has been constrained by 
the conservative attitude, but also the central bank institutional framework has been also. 
Whether the two are related is not entirely clear. The heterogeneous inflation record of 
the 1993-2003 period suggests that they are not; relatively modest legal central bank 
independence was coupled both with high inflation and hyperinflation (1993-2000), and 
with the inflation stabilisation (2001-2003). Moreover, the period of stabilisation and 
exchange rate fixity continued under a more independent central bank (mid-2003 to 
2005). This occurrence may be attributed to the 'historical' obligation to keep inflation at 
a low level, which in turn ties the hands of central bankers by constraining the 
prioritisation among different macroeconomic objectives at given times.63
This is entirely in line with economic theory, which suggests that delegation or 
fixed policy rules are the devices through which governments signal their adherence to 
sound, i.e. credible, policies (see Keefer and Stasavage, 1998). But how is it then that 
central bank independence matters less for economic outcomes then one would expect? 
Keefer and Stasavage (1998, p. 20) claim that:
"[...] monetary delegation is only a potential solution to credibility problems when political 
institutions provide for multiple veto players with different preferences. [...] the combined effect 
of the presence of multiple veto players and monetary delegation is much stronger in countries 
with higher levels of polarization, and much lower in countries with significant rates of 
replacement of crucial government decision markers".
This analysis leads to two conclusions. First, that governments cannot 
automatically transpose credibility to monetary and exchange rate policy conduct 
increased legal central bank independence. And, second, that, ultimately, monetary policy 
conduct depends on the degree of (de)centralisation of political power among the political 
players within the country. In this, the central bank laws can only establish a level 
playing field, whereas the rest depends on the persons appointed to perform the functions 
in the highest central bank policy-making bodies and those who appoint them, i.e. the 
MPs. Therefore, we now turn to measuring the rate of turnover of governors, which 
indicate the central bank's actual independence.
63 We assume that this prioritisation does not run against the central bank primary objective of achieving 
and maintaining the stability of prices.
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3.3. Assessing the actual CBI in Serbia in period 
Since the Cukierman (1992) study, the turnover rate of governors has been used 
as an approximation for actual central bank independence. Cukierman (1992), however, 
was not extensive. He explained that the indicator is defined as the actual average term of 
office of central bank governors in a given country and that the threshold turnover most 
likely lies between 0.20 and 0.25, which corresponds to an average tenure of four to five 
years. This threshold in most countries equals to the electoral cycles as it does in Serbia 
where the electoral cycle is set at four years. Herein, Cukierman (1992, p. 383) 
presupposes that above the given threshold, "a large turnover of CB [central bank, auth. 
remark] governors indicates a lower level of CB independence". Finally, he finds that for 
the LDCs, the turnover rate of governors most likely represents a solid proxy of the actual 
central bank independence.
We chose to use this measure for practical reasons. Cukierman (1992, p. 384) has 
calculated the turnover rate of central bank governors in the case of Yugoslavia for a 
rather long period of 39 years (1950-1989), obtaining a rate of 0.23. Dvorsky (2004, p. 
69), quite recently, re-calculated this rate for the period November 2000 to October 2004 
(in the case of Serbia) and obtained a rate of 0.75. We, however, feel that this enormous 
drop in actual independence is artificial, notwithstanding the disastrous NBY's inflation 
record during the 1990s. Therefore, we posed two questions; first, on the basis of what 
parameters this latest indicator of 0.75 was obtained and, second, what are the reasons 
behind such low actual NBS independence.
In relation to the first question, we believe that the reference period used by Dvorsky 
(2004) is not entirely appropriate for the calculation of this index. Furthermore, the 
explanation offered by the author does not seem to be the most accurate. Namely, 
Dvorsky (2004, p. 70) claims to have applied the same reasoning to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia, by taking "the start of operations of the 
newly established central bank as the starting point of the respective reference period". 
Although November 2000, as a chosen date for Serbia, brought significant changes to 
Serbian central banking as any revolutionary event would, this date has certainly not 
marked the beginning of the work of the "newly established" Serbian central bank.
So as to avoid a discussion about the historical evidence of the long experience of 
central banking in Serbia, we shall only note that a simple analogy could have been used 
in determining the reference dates. If, in the case of Croatia and Macedonia (both of 
which are former FRY republics, as is Serbia)64 , the starting date used was the date of the 
appointment of the first post-FRY governor, then this logic should have been applied for 
Serbia, too.65 Since this was not the case, the results obtained for Serbia are not quite 
comparable to those calculated for other countries. Moreover, as noted by the author 
herself, the results are highly sensitive to changes in either the numerator (number of 
governors) or denominator (tenure of reference period). We, therefore, argue that the 
result of 0.75 for the turnover rate of governors in Serbia is misleading, in so far as it is a 
product of the very short selected reference period of 4 years, rather than the credible 
proxy of actual central bank independence. To ensure that the results are indeed as 
relevant as those for other countries, we chose to recalculate the index for Serbia, based 
on more appropriate reference periods.
Respecting Cukierman's (1992) measurement dynamic, which offered an index 
for the period up to 1989, we calculated the turnover rate based on reference period (A) 
since 1989. (More specifics can be found in Table 5.2) This first index (A) enables us to 
place the issue of actual NBS independence into a historical context. The second index 
(B) is calculated on the basis of another reference period (B) starting in July 1992, which 
follows the logic applied by Dvorsky (2004). This allows us to perform a cross-country 
analysis and to locate Serbia within the transitional milieu. Additionally, having in mind 
that Dvorsky (2004) suggests that no 'acting governors' are taken into account, which is a 
factor affecting the numerator, we applied the same rationale to the denominator by 
shortening the reference periods (A) and (B) for a relevant number of years and months 
during which the central bank of Serbia did not have a governor. By this, we obtain a 
turnover rate (Al) and (Bl) for respective reference periods. Altogether, we believe to 
have obtained a more accurate measurement of actual central bank independence in 
Serbia over the relevant period.
64 Although Bosnia and Herzegovina is also included in the study, the reference period was determined by 
the appointment of Peter Nicholl, the first post-Dayton governor.
65 Starting date of the reference period in the case of Croatia is January 1992 and in Macedonia December 
1993. In this case, the corresponding date for Serbia would be July 1993 (see Table 5.2).
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5.2. 
(Country) 
GOVERNOR
Date of appointment
Reason for appointment
Date of dismissal
Reason for dismissal
Length of 
term
SFR Yugoslavia
Dusan Vlakovic
FR Yugoslavia
Vuk Ognjanovic
Borisav Atanackovic
Dragoslav Avramovic
Dusan Vlatkovic
Mladan Dinkic
State Union SCG
Mladan Dinkic
Kori Udovicki
Radovan Jelasic
REFERENCE PERIOD
(A)
Turnover rate (A)
Turnover rate (Al)*
REFERENCE PERIOD
(B)
Turnover rate (B)
Turnover rate (Bl)**
29 November 1945
1 June 1986
-
27 April 1992
15 July 1992
Constitutional change
16 July 1993
New law enactment
2 March 1994
-
26 June 1997
-
28 November 2000
'bulldozer revolution'
4 February 2003
4 February 2003
Formality reasons 
(see above)
23 July 2003
New law enactment
26 February 2004
Repeated appointment 
procedure
17 June 1989
Date of enactment of the 
new NBY Law
26 April 1992
14 July 1992
Constitutional change
3 February 2003
15 July 1993
New law enactment
20 October 1993
Incapacity
15 May 1996
Dismissal 
(political reasons)
27 November 2000
'bulldozer revolution'
3 February 2003
Formality reasons 
(see below)
date
22 July 2003
New law enactment
25 February 2004
Appointment irregularities
date
-
17 June 2005
Cut-off date 
for the study
16 years
0.50
0.55
3 July 1993
Date of enactment of the 
new NBY Law
17 June 2005
Cut-off date 
for the study
11 years, 11 month, 14 days
0.63
0.66
6 years 
1 month 
14 days
1 year
3 months 
4 days
2 years 
2 months 
13 days
3 years 
5 months
See below
2 years 
8 months
7 months
1 year 
3 months 
19 days
Average 
length of 
term
26.33 
months
Average 
length of 
term
19.57 
months
* Turnover rate of governors (Al) is calculated on the basis of a reference period, which excludes 
sub-periods when the central bank did not have a governor; this reference period is thus shorter 
then the reference period used to calculate the turnover rate of governors (A) and it equals to 14 
years and 6 months.
** Turnover rate of governors (Bl) is based on a reference period, which equals to 10 years and 6 
months.
National Bank of Serbia official website [www.nbs.yu]
The data obtained shows that for both reference periods the turnover rate of 
governors, which equals to 0.50 and 0.63 respectively, is substantially lower then the 
figure provided by Dvorsky (2004), i.e. 0.75. The results are, nevertheless, worrying 
because they are still well above the threshold level of 0.20-0.24, suggesting that the 
actual independence of the Serbian central bank has been rather low in both observed 
periods, 1989-2005 and 1993-2005. If the denominator is corrected for a number of 
months during which there was no governor to head the central bank in Serbia, an even 
gloomier picture appears. The corresponding figures are 0.55 and 0.66 for respective 
reference periods (A) and (B).
In comparison to the turnover rate of 0.23, which the former-Yugoslavia had in 
period 1950-1989, the results here illustrate a clear deterioration in actual central bank 
independence. However, the low turnover rate may on the other hand imply that the 
governors are subservient to governments, which most likely was the case for post-World 
War II Yugoslavia. It is also indicative that the index of 0.23 perfectly matches the 
established threshold of 0.20-0.24, revealing that the governors' tenures in this period 
(1950-1989) perfectly fit with the parliamentary electoral cycle. Taking into account the 
natural role of the central bank in the socialist economic setting to plainly accommodate 
production plans (see Chapter II), we can conclude that the Curierman index also carries 
information about underlining economic systems in which the central banks operate.
For those reasons, we believe that the indices of 0.50 and 0.63 are somewhat 
higher then they would otherwise be had there not been so many constitutional changes in 
the post SFR Yugoslavia. Namely, we detect a pattern by which every constitutional 
change is followed by the adoption of the new central bank law and consequently by the 
appointment of a new governor. Out of eight66 governors in the period 1989-2005, at least 
five of them were appointed or dismissed due to the constitutional (institutional) changes 
(Vlatkovic, Ognjanovic, Atanackovic, Dinkic, Udovicki). One can, however, argue also 
that Jelasic, who came to replace Udovicki after the repeated appointment procedure 
which followed the adoption of the new law, should also be included.
66 The calculation included governor Mladjan Dinkic only once, although formally he was governor of the 
NBY at the time of the FR Yugoslavia and governor of the NBY at the time of the State Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro, because his mandate was uninterrupted despite formal change taking place.
It cannot be excluded that those laws would have been adopted even in the 
absence of constitutional alterations, but the fact remains that the adoption of a new 
central bank law has been the safest way for the politicians in Serbia (Yugoslavia) to 
release a governor from duty. The picture somewhat changes with respect to the other, 
shorter reference period (1993-2005) where one can notice that out of seven, three 
governors were either appointed or dismissed for non-institutional reasons (Atanackovic, 
Avramovic, Dinkic). In particular, Atanackovic left due to poor health, whereas Dinkic 
came to serve his term following the revolution, which in itself was a big social and 
political event. Only Avramovic was released from duty on purely political grounds, as 
he opposed to obey to requests of the ruling political Additionally, it appears 
that also the 'formal irregularities' on the basis of which governor Udovicki was 
dismissed are questionable (see Llorente, 2004), implying that the political reasons may 
have stood behind her short mandate.
Whatever the reasons for the high turnover rate of governors, the fact remains that 
the index measuring actual central bank independence in Serbia is very low in 
comparison to transitional experiences elsewhere. In particular, Dvorsky (2004, p. 69) 
finds that corresponding turnover rate is only 0.07 in Romania, 0.14 in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 0.27 in Macedonia, 0.29 in Bulgaria, and 0.31 in Croatia. Only Albania has 
a turnover rate which is similar to that of Serbia (0.50). However, if reference period (B) 
is considered (1993-2005), even this departures from the NBS index (0.63) substantially.
To conclude, we point to the evidence collected throughout our study signifying 
that even in an environment of moderate (limited) central bank independence, as existed 
in Serbia in period 2001-2005, the central bank may achieve good (inflation stabilisation) 
results. This, in a way, contradicts Cukierman (2000, p. 1) who claim that "legal 
CBI, no matter how high, contain the powerful inflationary impact of wide scale 
liberalisation of formerly controlled prices". The first, preliminary assessment of Serbia's 
stabilisation performance indicates that, in fact, even a moderate CBI restrain the 
initial inflationary impact of transition. This, however, does not necessarily mean that 
either legal or actual CBI is the only determinant of inflation stabilisation.
67 See Dinkic (2000, pp. 286-292)
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3.4. Concluding remarks
When discussing central bank's independence, it is important to understand its 
true meaning first. In Serbia, this basic postulate has often been neglected and so 
independence has often been confused with accountability. Independence does not 
provide the central bank's governing bodies with the autonomy to act disjointedly from 
other institutions within the system. It does assume, however, that central bankers have 
the authority to implement policies designed for achieving its primary objective, that of 
price stability, which unequivocally should be proscribed by a central bank law.
It appears from our analysis that this lesson had not been fully embraced and that 
only in 2003, with the adoption of the new National Bank of Serbia Law, has the focus on 
the stability of prices sharpened. To be able, however, to achieve this objective, the NBS 
should also be given full personal and financial independence. Our analysis has 
illuminated parts of the NBS institutional framework, which need to be additionally 
strengthened. A good guide in this could be found in the provisions set by the European 
Monetary Union, but also in the tradition of cooperation among various institutions, such 
as exist in the European Union. The comprehensive overview of the genesis of central 
bank legal reform in Serbia over the last 15 years also points to the necessity of 
adequately positioning the NBS within the broader constitutional framework, so as to 
reduce (preclude) any contingencies relating to its status and its role.
Together, those qualities should enable the NBS to gain more independence, 
which currently hovers around the average for transitional economies. The evidence on 
the NBS independence is, however, the most worrying as it is substantially lower 
than the SEE average. Governors in Serbia hold their office only slightly longer then one 
year and a half. It is thus understandable that it is less likely that a long-term anti- 
inflation policy can be pursued. As a consequence, we found that the personal credibility 
of governors was one of the key factors in several stabilisation episodes. The institutional 
credibility of the NBS can only be repaired if actual NBS independence is increased 
(allowing governors to concentrate on pursuing long-term counter-inflation monetary 
policy) if the NBS actively engages in raising public awareness about monetary 
policy issues. The next section sketches some reflections about the aformentioned issues.
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Central bank autonomy, as explained in Chapter II, does not mean that all short- 
term disturbances in an economy should be disregarded along with all short-term 
economic developments. Goodhart (1993) argues that it is the level of the central bank 
credibility that determines the capacity of monetary policy to accommodate the short- 
term shocks. It follows that the more credible and independent central bank with a longer 
record of low inflation has a higher capacity to act as a shock absorber in the short run. It 
is also important to recall that the central bank's credibility can only be obtained if there 
exists a wide political consensus supporting the long-term counter-inflationary monetary 
policy and general public's understanding of monetary policy issues. We claimed earlier 
that the NBS lacks genuine credibility. This view is supported by Serbia's poor inflation 
record over the last 15 years (Chapter III) as well as by the data we have obtained 
pointing to the NBS's modest level of legal and actual independence (see Section 5.3). 
Therefore, the question arises as how can this credibility be restored and what are the 
necessary steps which need to be taken?
The purpose of this section is to draw attention to several possible policy 
actions.68 The focus shall be on Serbia, but we nevertheless hope that some of those 
recommendations will be instructive to some other Western Balkan countries. As 
constitutional considerations have played a great role in the modern Serbian central 
banking history (1989-2005), during which period the NBS practically lost its credibility, 
we will look into the prospects of the new Serbian constitution first. In addition, being 
aware of the fact that each constitutional change in Serbia so far has led to the 
establishment of a new central bank framework, we will try to highlight the aspects of the 
current NBS law which requires improvement. Having in mind that the alterations in the 
NBS legislation will be taking place in the context of EU membership, we will use EMU 
requirements as a yardstick in this analysis and will build on what was said already in 
Chapter IV. Finally, the section will conclude with some practical suggestions about how 
to increase the NBS's accountability and transparency and, ultimately, its credibility.
68 Herein, we shall apply a deductive methodology, starting from more general and conclude with some 
specific issues.
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5.4.1. The new Serbian constitution
The public and political debate about the new Serbian Constitution begun in 
earnest after the October 2000 democratic changes. The consensus about the final content 
and the wording of the new Constitution has not been found yet, despite the fact that the 
current Constitution has been perceived as "the most serious institutional obstacle for a 
full democratic transformation of Serbia" (Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2004, 
p. 34). However, until this consensus is found, the Republic of Serbia, i.e. its institutions, 
shall continue operating on the principles laid down in the September 1990 Constitution 
of the Republic of Serbia69 . The current Constitution was adopted at the time of existence 
of the FR Yugoslavia, when Serbia was one of its federal units.70
The current Constitution contains very reserved provisions relating to the Serbian 
central bank. As explained already, only two articles regulate the status of the central 
bank and its Governor: Article 107 proclaims that the Republic of Serbia has the National 
Bank and stipulates that the status, organisation, management and conduct of the National 
Bank are regulated by the law, whereas Article 73 prescribes that the Serbian parliament 
is to appoint and dismiss the governor of the National Bank. Clearly, such modest 
provisioning does not guarantee the institutional stability of the National Bank of Serbia 
and it thus needs to be rewritten. How this is to be done is our main question here. We 
shall restrain our analysis on the official government version of the Draft Constitution of 
the Republic of Serbia (thereafter: Draft Constitution)71 , which it submitted to the 
parliament at the beginning of June 2004, and on the proposal72 made by Djordje Djukic, 
the leading Serbian central banking expert (see Box 5.1).
69 Official Gazette of the RS, No. 1/90.
70 In February 2003, the FRY ceased to exist and Serbia became a member state of the State Union of 
Serbia and Montenegro. By adopting the Constitutional Charter of the State Union Serbia and Montenegro, 
the Republic of Serbia undertook the obligation to align its Constitution with the Constitutional Charter 
within the six-month period. This deadline expired in August 2004. See Article 65 of the Constitutional 
Charter and Article 20(2) of the Constitutional Charter Implementing Law.
71 Government text of the new Constitution is based on the parliament's Decision on Proceedings to the 
Adoption of the New Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Official Gazette of the RS, No. 35/04. 
Accessible at the official website of the Government of the Republic of Serbia [www.srbija.sr.gov.yu]
72 As published in the article 'Strengthening the Independence' published by the 
magazine No. 263, 6 June 2005, pp. 15 and 16.
Article 93
The National Bank of Serbia is the central bank of the Republic of Serbia, which is 
autonomous and subordinated to the supervision of the National Parliament to which is responsible.
The National Bank of Serbia is managed by the governor, who is appointed by the National 
Parliament for a six-year term at the proposal of the President of the Republic.
A law is to be adopted on the National Bank of Serbia.
Article 95 (4) 
The National Parliament [...] appoints and dismisses the National Bank of Serbia's governor [...].
Article 102 (2)
By majority vote the National Parliament [...] appoints and dismisses the National Bank of Serbia's 
governor [...]
Article 104 (2)
The Ombudsman and the National Bank of Serbia have the right to propose laws within its field of 
competencies.
The National Bank of Serbia is the central bank of the Republic of Serbia, which is 
independent in its work and responsible for the value of the domestic currency.
The governing body of the National Band of Serbia is the Monetary Council composed of the 
president and six members. The President and the members of the Monetary Council are appointed by 
the National Parliament for a six-year term at the proposal of the President of the Republic.
For its work the National Bank of Serbia is responsible to the National Parliament.
Status, responsibilities and other particularities, which relate to the National Bank of Serbia are 
regulated by law.
To institute the NBS as an autonomous legal entity;
To confer the NBS independence in formulation and implementation of policies aimed at the
fulfilment of its primary objective, which is to be unequivocally stipulated by the NBS law (i.e.
achievement and maintenance of the price stability);
To institute a collective decision-making body as the highest governing organ of the NBS,
which is to be accountable to the National Parliament;
To ensure that the governor is appointed by the National Parliament, at the proposal of the
President of the Republic, for a term of at least five years;
To ensure that the governor is dismissed by the National Parliament only if he no longer fulfils
the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been found guilty of
crime;
To secure that the NBS governor presents to the National Parliament a report on the activities
and results of the NBS at least once annually;
To ensure that the status and organisation of the NBS are regulated by an NBS law;
To give the NBS the constitutional right to propose laws within its field of competencies.
Government of the Republic of Serbia (2004, pp. 16 and 18); No. 263, p. 15.
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What is striking about the Government's proposal is that it contains a 'systemic 
error' by instituting a single-person decision-making body as the highest NBS organ 
(Article 93(2)). We have seen from our earlier analysis of the FRY Constitution and 
earlier NBY laws that such a solution carries with it many potential costs for the society. 
In respect to that, the second proposal seems more appealing as it presupposes the 
existence of a collective decision-making body in line with international and European 
practice. The explanation offered by Djukic (2005) is that the specification of the number 
of the Monetary Council members in the new Constitution would eliminate the possibility 
for any future ruling coalition to manipulate the monetary authority by changing the 
number of Council members according to their own interests by simply adopting a new 
NBS Law. We, however, find this observation too rigorous and argue that the 
composition of the NBS governing body should be regulated by the NBS Law and not by 
the Constitution, so as to leave enough flexibility for the legislature to propose the most 
adequate model of NBS organisation. After all, the parliament is composed of 
democratically elected representatives of political parties, who won their votes on the 
basis of their legitimate policy programmes - the implementation of which may, at times, 
require changes in the institutional organisation of the National Bank of Serbia (including 
a change in the number of the NBS's governing body).
Interestingly, an analysis of the two drafts reveals another confusion, which arises 
from the concept of central bank independence. Namely, the government's Draft 
Constitution envisages that the NBS is which translates as "autonomous". 
Some authors indeed use the terms 'autonomous' and 'independent' as synonyms (see 
Goodhart, 1993). But, a distinction should be made. In legislative terms, autonomy 
implies the institutional freedom of the central bank to function as a separate institution 
within an overall system as a separate legal entity. In economic terms, as explained 
already, the central bank's independence entails the liberty of the central bank to define 
and implement the policies needed for achieving its primary objective. We note that each 
draft refers only to one concept; the first to 'autonomy', and the second to 
'independence'. We thus propose that the new Serbian Constitution include both notions 
so as to ensure the constitutional independence of the National Bank of Serbia, but also 
its constitutional right to be established as an autonomous legal entity.
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Also very important is that the new Constitution recognise the NBS as 
independent in terms of the formulation and implementation of its primary objective. It is 
equally surprising that the government's Draft Constitution remains silent about this 
issue, and that the second proposal contains a reference to the NBS's accountability 
regarding the "value of the domestic currency" (paragraph 1). If anything is clear from 
the economic literature on the functioning of a market economy to which Serbia is 
adhering, is that the market sets the value of goods and services as well as the value of 
the national currency. It is, therefore, of the outmost importance for all those who engage 
in the drafting of the new Serbian Constitution or the new NBS Law to apply the 
difference between the concepts of the 'currency value' and 'price stability'.
We also point to the necessity of distinguishing between the NBS's accountability 
for achieving its primary objective (which may as well be the stability of prices) and the 
NBS's independence to define and implement its primary objective. Whereas we find it 
appropriate for the new Serbian Constitution to include a provision on the former 
(formulation and implementation of monetary policy), we believe that the later (primary 
objective) should be defined by the NBS Law. Presumably, the achievement and 
maintenance of the stability of prices will remain the primary objective of the NBS in 
future times, especially having in mind the prospective of EU membership73 . However, 
one cannot exclude the theoretical possibility that, for example, the reduction in 
unemployment or maintenance of financial stability, be chosen as the primary objective 
in line with the preferred policy outcomes at a given future period.
Also ambiguous is the end-wording of Article 93(1) of the Draft Constitution 
which in Serbian reads which literally translates as "to which it 
responds". We suppose that the government had in mind the following meaning when 
proposing such article: that is, "to which it is accountable". If this 
were the case, the wording should be adjusted to the intended meaning so as to preclude 
any misinterpretations. Similarly, the Djukic proposal (paragraph 3) stipulates that the 
NBS for its work i.e. "responds" to the National Parliament. If clarity is to 
be secured, then the proposal should read that is, "is accountable".
73 See Article 105(1) of the Treaty and Article 2 of the ESCB Statute.
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More substantially, we point to the necessity of coupling the (rightly) envisaged 
NBS accountability towards the National Parliament with the obligation for the Governor 
to present to the parliament an annual report on the NBS's activities and results.74 Not 
only would such an approach exemplify the modality by which the aforementioned 
accountability would be achieved, but it would additionally increase the NBS's 
independence in relation to other branches of government. Namely, by having the 
opportunity to address the parliament, the Governor is given the right to explain what 
factors have influenced the conduct of monetary policy over which the NBS does not 
have authority. In this way, the NBS would only be held accountable for the achievement 
of its primary objective up to the point in which the achievement of that objective 
depends on factors that the NBS can control. This is in line with the economic theory 
saying that the achievement of a central bank objective is also determined by factors 
outside the scope of monetary policy (for example, large budget deficits).
Finally, we note that both draft versions propose that the term of office of the 
highest NBS governing body be set at six years. 75 This solution is entirely in line with 
European practice, by which the governors of the national central banks of the EMU 
Member States should be assigned mandates of at least five years. 76 It is, in any case, 
important to ensure that the governor's office term exceeds the regular, four-year 
electoral cycle. In order to secure the personal independence of the governor, the new 
Serbian Constitution may include, in addition, a provision relating to the governor's 
dismissal procedure, which should be based exclusively on non-policy reasons, such as is 
the case in the European Union.77
The analysis makes us conclude that there are a number of considerations which 
need to be taken into account if one wishes to avoid systemic errors from the past and to 
embrace high contemporary European standards. Instead of engaging in the drafting of 
the actual constitutional provisions, which would only be relevant for Serbia, we have 
proposed a set of guiding principles that have a more general character (see Box 5.1)
74 The similar solution exist in the Hungarian Constitution (Article 32D(3)).
75 The proposals envisage that the governor is appointed at the proposal of the President of the Republic of 
Serbia. This is a welcomed and common solution that ensures checks and balances between the different 
government branches and limits government's appointment powers (see Dvorsky, 2004).
76 See Article 14(2) of the ESCB Statute.
77 
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Law on the NBS: Fulfilling the E(M)Urequirements
It was during Summer 2003, when the NBS law was in preparation, that Serbia 
had an excellent chance to increase the public's awareness about the relevance of the 
NBS's independence and about the causality that exists between this independence and 
the central bank's results. Due to a fierce political debate that surrounded the drafting, 
adoption and implementation of the NBS law enacted in mid-July same year, this 
opportunity was wasted. The substance of the law and the constructive discussions were 
over-shadowed by the political disputes between the NBS governor, the Prime Minister 
and the Finance Minister. One would expect that - although the public awareness has not 
been increased - at least the political elite would have understood the significance of 
these issues. Our previous analysis of the Draft Serbian Constitution discloses that this is, 
unfortunately, not so. More worrying, however, is that not much of an academic 
discussion (if any) has taken place or been initiated about the current institutional status 
of the NBS and the particular features embodied in the current NBS Law since its 
instauration. Our intention here is to initiate that debate and to de-couple it from political 
interference. The analysis will build on what was already said about the NBS law, but 
will be deepened so as to disclose the provisions that need to be further aligned with the 
EMU's requirements in view of the prospective EU membership. A similar study has 
already been done by Dvorsky (2004), who analysed the independence of central banks in 
SEE countries in view of their future EU accession. We shall lean on this work but will, 
nevertheless, try to be more specific, focusing only on Serbia. Our contribution will also 
include some reflections on Cukierman's (1992) formulation of central bank 
independence, which in some areas is stricter than the EMU-related 
According to Article 105(1) of the Treaty and Article 2 of the ESCB Statute, the 
primary objective of the ESCB is to maintain price stability, while the secondary 
objective is to support the general economic policies of the European Community, 
without prejudice to the objective of price stability. According to Dvorsky (2004), who 
bases his view on the ECB's convergence report, the statutes of the national central banks 
of the new EU Member States should have price stability as their primary objective from 
the date of their EU accession.
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Dvorsky (2004, p. 55) also claims that the NBS law will require adaptation, as the 
objective of the "maintenance of financial stability" may be seen as being in tension with 
price stability. Although we believe that the primacy of the price stability objective is 
ensured by the actual wording of the current NBS law (see Section 5.3.1), it is likely that 
Article 3(2) of the NBS law will need to be rewritten so as to unambiguously reflect the 
letter of the Treaty. Instructive in this respect may be Article 4 of the Bank of Slovenia
78Act , adopted in July 2002 in the course of alignment with the EMU 
In order to further strengthen the NBS's institutional independence and to ensure 
full compatibility with Article 108 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the ESCB Statute, 
Article 2(3) of the current NBS law will possibly need to be extended so as to include 
other external forms of influence (other's points of view, instructions, decisions, etc.) At 
this juncture, the afore mentioned article of the NBS law refers only to 'instructions'. 
Besides, the new drafting will have to prescribe the same obligations for each individual 
member of the NBS decision-making body. Regarding the NBS's independence to 
formulate and implement policy, we find that this is secured by Article 4(1) of the NBS 
Law, including the determination of the exchange rate regime upon the government's 
consent (Article 4(2)). Our conclusion is based on provisions contained in Article 111(1) 
of the Treaty which as well require close ECB involvement in the formulation of the 
exchange rate regime, but also on Article 105(2) of the Treaty and Article 3(1) of the 
ESCB Statute relating only to the ECB's obligation to "conduct foreign exchange 
operations consistent with the provisions of Article 111".79
It should be noted that part of personal independence derives from limits to the 
government's influence in nominating the members of the NBS's policy-making bodies. 
The current solution, by which the Governor is nominated by the Parliamentary 
Committee for Financial Affairs is not unique, although some authors imply that it is.80 
Nevertheless, we support the idea that the President of Serbia be given a constitutional 
right to propose the NBS governor, upon adoption of the new Serbian Constitution.
78 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 58/02. See also Article 3(3) of the ESCB Statute.
79 See also Goodhart (1993, p. 7) who claims: "Despite awarding an unusual degree of independence to the 
ESCB, the framers of the Maastricht Treaty kept exchange rate decisions in the hands of the politicians".
80 Dukic No. 623, p. 16) refers to the "solutions, which the world does not recognise". 
However, according to Dvorsky (2004, p. 58), the laws on the central banks of Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Macedonia and Romania also have similar provisions.
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Although neither the Treaty nor the ESCB Statute contain provisions on the 
appointment of officials of the national central banks, they do regulate the dismissal 
conditions for national central bank governors (Article 14(2) of the ESCB Statute), 
stipulating that "a governor may be released from office only if he no longer fulfils the 
conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of serious 
misconduct". Dvorsky (2004) argues that none of the SEE central bank laws is 
compatible with those provisions. We, however, point that the relevant provisions 
contained in Article 30 of the NBS law are compatible in principle with the EMU 
requirements, but that they may need some fine-tuning.
the governor's term of office, which is by Article 14(2) of the ESCB 
Statute set at 5 years for the national central banks' governors, we find that NBS law 
(Article 16) is fully EMU compatible. Although Dvrosky (2004) claims that a renewal of 
governor's mandate is not welcomed, as neither the Treaty nor the ESCB Statute include 
any provisions relating to the reappointed of the national central bank's governors. Thus, 
a renewal provision is assumed to be compatible with the EMU Nevertheless, full 
NBS independence with respect to this would only be achieved if the governor were 
prohibited from holding another mandate (see Cukierman, 1992). Regarding the 
incompatibility clauses, these would need to be modified so as to reflect the provisioning 
of Article 11(1) of the ESCB Statute requiring the ECB Executive Board members not to 
engage in any occupation that creates conflict of interest.
In relation to budgetary independence, we may say that the NBS is independent as 
the NBS Council adopts the NBS financial plan at the Governor's proposal (Article 24(1) 
of the NBS Law), without prior government approval. However, in relation to financial 
lending to the government, major modification will be needed; in particular, Art. 36, 39 
and 77(4,5,6) of the NBS law, which are incompatible with Art. 101(1) and 102(1) of the 
Treaty and Article 21(1) of the ESCB Statute. In order to align the NBS law with these 
provisions, the legislature will have to adopt solutions by which any form of lending to 
the government (securitised or non-securitised), will have to be Also, 
the allocation of net NBS revenues and the coverage of NBS losses the issuance of 
interest-bearing government papers would need to be prohibited, too. In this, it should be 
noted that the Treaty does not contain provision of indirect central bank credit either.
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5.4.3. A case for a transparency hike and increased NBS accountability
Creating a new legislative framework is a first decisive step in central bank 
reform. The next, consecutive move relates to the practical implementation of the newly 
established rules. These two reform actions have drawn much attention in the literature 
on the economics of transition, but scholars seem to be less drawn to an equally important 
aspect of central bank reform - improving the central bank's image. In the words of 
Hilbers (1993, p. 20): "The central bank not only has to abandon old activities and gain 
experience in new ones, but also has to change its image". We believe that the concept of 
transparency, as given by Winkler (2000), can be used in the case of Serbia to improve 
the image of the National Bank of Serbia. It should be noted, though, that the notion of 
transparency in monetary policymaking entered the sphere of academic discourse only 
recently and that existing studies do not focus on the issue of transparency in transition 
economies. On the contrary, having in mind that a consensus about the desirability of 
transparency in monetary policy matters has not yet been reached (see Geraats, 2002), the 
literature is still restricted to general arguments about various aspects of central bank 
transparency, motives that derive from these aspects, and to measurement problems (see 
Chapter II).
We, however, believe that these deliberations should also consider a specific 
dimension of transparency, typical for transition economies. Namely, while Posen (2002) 
assumes that there exists trust and goodwill in the ongoing relationship between a central 
bank and its general public (including financial markets), we claim that this is not the 
case in the transition economies. Whereas in developed economies there are no 
fundamental misunderstandings about a central bank's commitment to low inflation (see 
Posen, 2002), this situation does not reflect the actual state of affairs in transitional 
economies, including that of Serbia. Therefore, we argue that the assumption of the 
existence of such a frank relationship between the central bank and the general public in 
transition economies cannot be made, as the central bank priorities in transition change 
(see below). Consequently, the central bank's transparency in transition should include 
another, rather elementary aspect of transparency: raising the public's awareness about 
what monetary policy can and cannot do in general.
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One can argue that if a relationship between the central bank and the general 
public about the central bank commitment to low inflation does not exist, the opposite 
can be assumed, i.e. that a central bank has a strong inflation bias and that it is 'soft on 
inflation'. This indeed may be so, but we are pointing to the fact that, by definition, the 
transition process is about policy preferences and attitudes, including a central 
bank's responsiveness to inflation. As a result, two questions appear relevant: (1) how 
quickly a central bank in transition changes its policy preferences, and (2) how (quickly) 
the general public is learning about those changes. In relation to the first question, we 
tend to believe - based on the realisation of stabilisation results in transition countries 
(including Serbia) - that the central bank improves relatively fast, although the issue 
about the actual degree of a central bank's 'dryness' inflation remains.
With regards to the second question, the following consideration is relevant. 
Chapter IV disclosed that the general public in Serbia perceives the monetary policy 
largely non-credible (e.g. high euroisation), thereby tying the hands of the NBS in view 
of short-term economic disturbances. In order for the general public to be able to grasp 
the central bank's changing policy preferences from 'soft' to 'hard', an active 
engagement of the NBS's officials in developing their 'presentation skills' (see Goodhart, 
1993) is imperative. Existing central bank transparency conceptual frameworks (see, for 
example, Winkler, 2000; Geraats, 2002; Posen 2002) should be used as a starting point in 
this exercise. Herein, we propose that a broader definition of transparency - "as a 
measure of genuine understanding and successful communication" (Winkler, 2000, p. 26)
- be used instead of its narrow definition. In other words, we believe that the focus 
should be on several practical dimensions of transparency: openness, clarity, common 
understanding and honesty. In fact, we argue that the central bank's aggressive 
engagement in the presentation of the monetary policy issues based on these postulates 
may greatly increase its accountability and the overall general public's perceptions about 
the changes taking place in the monetary sphere. This is not to say, however, that a long- 
term counter-inflationary policy could be replaced by those measures, but that these may 
adequately supplement it.
81 Winkler (2000, p. 26) notes that "the academic literature on transparency in monetary policy making has, 
of course, given precision to the term "transparency", which is defined narrowly with the release of 
information or the inverse of noise and uncertainty within a particular class of models".
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In practical terms, a number of solutions can be applied. For example, we already 
proposed that the new Serbian Constitution include a provision on the NBS governor's 
obligation (and his right) to personally present the NBS's annual report to parliament 
once a year. If one is to classify such activity, it would have to be treated as a measure 
relating to the central bank's accountability because of its character. 82 However, 
we argue that a presentation of the central bank's annual report to parliament by a 
governor personally also includes important elements of a central bank's transparency. 
Namely, if, as is the case now, the NBS merely submits its annual report to parliament, 
the parliament may or may not choose to debate it. Even if the MPs (i.e. members of the 
Parliamentary Committee for Financial Affairs) do decide to scrutinise the report, this 
activity will not be transparent and the public will not be given the opportunity to join in 
the debate.
Therefore, given Serbia's weak parliamentary practices, it is important that such 
activity be institutionalised, as this will boost both the NBS's accountability and 
transparency. Having in mind that parliamentary sessions are broadcasted live on the 
Serbian National Television, the practical implications of this measure are: (1) NBS 
governor will be given the opportunity to address the parliament and explain all factors 
that influenced the achievement of the NBS's primary objective, (2) MPs will be given a 
chance to ask questions and engage in a learning process, (3) the general public will be 
involved in this learning process, too, and consequently, (4) the transparency and 
accountability of the NBS will increase. Ultimately, this simple exercise may help the 
NBS increase its credibility, under the assumption that this 'public reporting' is 
accompanied by a low-inflation record. We also believe that this is one way by which the 
credibility of the NBS can be institutionalised - in contrast to the actual situation in 
which the NBS's credibility depends primarily on the personal credibility of its governor. 
This is, however, not to say that society can hedge against the possible misuses of a 
central bank exclusively on the basis of a legal central bank framework. On the contrary, 
society also has to engage actively in selecting the candidates for the highest central bank 
positions by insisting on their personal and professional credibility and reputation.
82 Castellani (2002) argues that in contrast to accountability, which is seen as political scrutiny of 
central bank's deeds, the central bank transparency represents a set of decisions about the central 
bank communication and presentation actions.
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5.4.4. Concluding remarks
This analysis unveils one alarming fact: that Serbia's political elite is ignorant of 
the far-reaching, negative consequences of a constitutional solution by which the 
National Bank is headed by a single person - the governor. Such ignorance may emanate 
from two different sources: lack of knowledge or a detrimental political deliberation. 
Whatever the case, it is our duty to point to the fact that in the context of a single-person 
NBS governing body, none of the central bank's concepts (independence, transparency, 
accountability and credibility) can be fully realised. As a result, Serbia may continue 
lagging behind the prominent reformer countries in terms of central bank reform (and 
other reforms), as was the case during the 1990s.
In an attempt to prevent that from happening, we have singled out the main 
guiding principles which are to be followed in drafting the new Serbian Constitution. 
These include the necessity to establish the NBS as an autonomous legal entity, 
independent in formulating and implementing its policies aimed at achieving its primary 
objective (presumably price stability) with a collective policymaking organ as the highest 
NBS body whose members would be accountable to the National Parliament. 
Furthermore, in order to secure the NBS governor's personal independence, we suggested 
that the governor be appointed by the Parliament after being nominated by the President 
of the Republic, for a term of at least five years, and that he be dismissed the non-policy 
reason only. Under the assumption that these principles will be respected and that Serbia 
will in the foreseeable future be faced with the more complex task of aligning its central 
bank legislation with that of the EU, we also examined specific provisions of the current 
NBS legislation that requires modifications. These appear to be few, although critical.
Lastly, we concluded that the NBS may benefit from a systematic engagement in 
pedagogical activities, trying to explain to the general public its new role in a changing, 
transitional environment. By increasing its transparency a simple annual presentation 
of the NBS's activities to parliament in person, we found that the NBS governor may 
contribute to a better understanding of monetary policy issues. Consequently, it appears 
that the NBS will also strengthen its accountability towards general public and will 
ultimately, although gradually, restore its credibility.
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5.5. 
Nominally, the transition in Serbia (i.e. Yugoslavia) began with central bank 
reform, as suggested by the economic theory (see Bruno, 1993). The analysis of the NBY 
Law of 1989 conducted here, however, discloses that this law did not bring any 
substantial increase in the central bank's independence and that the introduced changes 
were more cosmetic then real. The reasons behind this occurrence were purely political. 
This was a time with a high incidence of political pressures stemming from the republics 
which sensed the dissolution of the country and thus refused to delegate more power to 
federal institutions and their delegates, including the NBY. This finding is fully in line 
with our earlier conclusion reached in Chapter III that political consensus is a prerequisite 
for any successful transition, and that it extends to central bank reform in particular.
The second wave of central bank reform in Serbia took place in 1993. It was, 
however, more a result of a delayed institutional defining of a newly-formed country (the
FRY) and an opportunity to replace an inadequate cadre , than a serious attempt to 
establish a solid institutional central bank framework and to fight hyperinflation. It 
appears, nevertheless, from the evidence we provided, that the measured NBY 
independence during this period was twice higher than that assigned by the NBY law of 
1989, although it was still rather moderate in comparison with other countries. Having in 
mind a devastating, long record of high inflation during the most of the period of this law 
implementation, we conclude that (moderate) legal central bank independence may not 
necessarily be conducive to low inflation. On the other hand, the period of successful 
inflation stabilisation that followed the political changes in October 2000 indicates that 
moderate legal central bank independence may be sufficient for the central bank to 
contain inflation. The analysis of these two laws illuminates the sombre fact that 
central bank independence, at least if it is below a certain threshold, appears ineffective in 
slowing inflation on its own. The political and personal motives of governors and 
politicians that appoint them seem to weight considerably more.
83 Vuk Ognjanovic, a Montenegrin residing in Serbia, was the NBY governor from 15 July 1992 to 15 July 
1993. Formally, he was dismissed from the position of the NBY governor because of the adoption of the 
new NBY Law, but we found out while conducting interviews that he was, in fact, dismissed so as to be 
replaced by the Serbian cadre.
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As legal independence matters little (if anything), whereas the personal behaviour 
of a central bank governor is decisive to the overall central bank conduct, it follows that it 
is impermissible to only institute a governor as the sole policymaking organ of a central 
bank. We believe that this is so even in the case of the appointment of a conservative 
central banker. Namely, one could think of numerous ways in which the political elite 
may apply pressure on governor under the circumstances in which he appears to be the 
only decision-maker. The opposite may be conceived as well, since a central bank 
governor may equally successfully manipulate a government. That the potentials for a 
conflict are real is proven by Serbia's experience in 2003. One interesting line for further 
research would be to investigate the effects of those conflicts on the conduct of monetary 
policy and exchange rate movements (if any), or to search for the optimal balance 
between central bank independence and accountability in circumstances in which a 
governor is the only source of policy formulation and implementation. In any case, this 
finding further stresses the need to constitutionally establish a collective decision-making 
body as the highest central bank governing body.
The evidence presented also reveals that, despite a common belief that the NBS 
Law of 2003 reduced the central bank's independence, the NBS was provided with more 
independence than ever before. We also found that the degree of current CBI is in 
line with the rest of transition countries, suggesting that Serbia is currently on the right 
track, even though it experienced a substantial initial delay of about a decade. Our 
analysis also demonstrates that many provisions of the current NBS law are in line with 
the highest European standards, but that equally, there exist a number of provisions 
which will require further harmonisation with the EMU (These provisions that 
would need intervention prior to EU membership are listed in Section 5.4.2).
Certainly, more alarming is the result that we obtained in relation to NBS 
independence, as this result appears to be well below the regional average. Dvorsky, 
however, (2004, p. 92) finds that "the results on turnover rate of governors do not truly 
reflect the degree of actual CBI". Does this mean that no reactions to these poor results 
should take place in Serbia? Although we agree that the index should be taken with 
reserve, we believe that the NBS, as well as the other branches of government in Serbia, 
should consider the issue of how to improve the actual CBI with great seriousness.
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Our initial reflections made us nominate the concept of transparency in the 
presentation of the NBS's monetary policy strategy and in other tasks as a possible 
solution to this problem. However, as explained already, we do not necessarily imply that 
the NBS should increase transparency in monetary policy conduct per se, as there is no 
enough evidence on its conduciveness to monetary policymaking (see Geraats, 2002). 
The NBS, nevertheless, may wish to do it anyway. We believe that greater engagement of 
the NBS' high officials in educational activities focusing on explaining what monetary 
policy can and cannot do in general - both to the general public and to the political actors 
- may contribute to strengthening the NBS's reputation and credibility. A useful guide in 
this exercise may be the practice developed by the ECB, whose credibility the NBS 
would hopefully, eventually, be in a position to import. Initially, this process will occur 
gradually the adoption of the EMU and later on considerably faster, as Serbia 
joins the EU as a full-fledged member.
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This work was inspired by the vast literature on the economics of transition and our 
great personal interest in institutional and operational central banking issues. The 
greatest challenge of this research was to join these two arcs of inspiration together, 
answering the question of the role of central bank reform in the transition from a 
socialist to a market economy. An additional complexity derived from the fact that a 
central bank is an institution that itself must be transformed during this same 
transition. The literature review, presented in Chapter II, reveals that the answer to our 
question depends primarily on the inherited macroeconomic conditions of the ex- 
socialist economies and the passive role that money and credit had in the central- 
planning environment. As a consequence, the transition had to start with the sharp 
macroeconomic stabilisation of macroeconomic variables, which imbalances derived 
from repressed inflation and unsustainable fiscal and external deficits. This was so 
because these two were seen as the main sources of the excess demand of socialist 
economies.
The transition began with a liberalisation of administered prices and trade, 
producing a large monetary overhang resulting from a sudden rise in the measured 
average price level. Both theory and practice has shown that countries that applied 
exchange-rate based stabilisation programmes - with the exchange rate as a nominal 
anchor - were more successful in bringing down inflation even when faced with 
immense fiscal deficits and sluggish structural reform processes. It follows from this 
that the central bank had a great role in the early years of transition, being responsible 
for inflation stabilisation and the design of a new monetary strategy by which 
stabilisation was to be achieved. We were interested to see whether Serbia followed 
the same pattern and whether there were any particularities in relation to the role of 
the National Bank of Serbia in this process, having in mind the country's complex 
constitutional and political background.
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Chapter III revealed that Serbia, as a part of larger country, i.e. the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was the first country in Eastern Europe to start the 
transition. A comprehensive anti-inflationary programme launched on 18 December 
1989, two weeks before the widely debated Polish stabilisation programme, was 
proposed by the President of the SFRY Federal Executive Council, a reformist Croat 
Ante Markovic, by whom this programme will be remembered. Nominally, the reform 
plan included the components of what later became known as the "transition 
blueprint", i.e. a wide set of measures designed to address the following issues: 
inflation stabilisation, fiscal and financial system consolidation, price and import 
liberalisation, the establishment of a new business environment, the privatisation of 
state- and socially-owned enterprises, the regulation of new labour relations, the 
establishment of a social safety-net, etc. Seemingly, the SFRY had every chance to 
become a prominent reformer.
The stabilisation programme, however, was to be implemented in a situation of 
inherited severe macroeconomic imbalances resulting from the years of socialist 
mismanagement. We recall that, the SFRY had been using since the beginning of 
1950s its own type of "market socialism" and that it had failed to secure sustainable 
growth and macroeconomic stability of the economy. After an initial post-World War 
II period of central planning, followed by fifteen years of self-management and 
economic growth that lasted until 1965, and subsequent marked-oriented reforms, the 
country fell into an economic crisis in the early 1980s. The beginning of this period 
was marked by the country's recognition that it could no longer finance its debt 
obligation. Although the external position was stabilised relatively quickly, the 
economy recorded low levels of investment, which at first turned into stagnation and 
later on into an overall decrease in economic activity and growth. By the end of the 
1980s, the quasi-fiscal deficit that existed among various enterprises had mounted, 
and were monetised largely through excessive wage demand, thereby fuelling 
inflation. In such circumstances, the exchange rate and credit risks were born by the 
National Bank of Yugoslavia, which acted as the lender of last resort. Consequently, 
the annual inflation rate registered in 1989 reached 1,256 per cent, entering a state of 
hyperinflation.
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The crux of the problem was, nevertheless, political. An increase in nationalist 
feelings and a corresponding unwillingness of the federal units (republics and 
autonomous provinces) to participate in the re-distribution of political power back 
toward the federal state led to disagreements and, eventually, to the dissolution of the 
country in 1991. Our analysis revealed that a lack of political consensus was the main 
stumbling bloc for a successful implementation of the 1989 transition package. This 
was reflected also in the central bank legislation of 1989, which conferred a 
symbolically higher independence to the NBY in comparison to the previous law. 
Thus, an unreformed central bank, without a clearly stated objective of achieving and 
maintaining the stability of prices, was unable to contain inflation longer than it did.
On the more strictly economic front, the Markovic reform programme was 
criticised on the grounds that it had delayed the implementation of stabilisation 
measures prior to the realisation of hyperinflation. Although hyperinflation was 
suppressed for some months following the implementation of the anti-inflation 
programme, it surged again in 1992, calling for stabilising measures. The "spectacular 
intrusions" into the monetary system by the republic National Banks, which by then 
represented only the branches of the NBY, definitely marked the end of the Markovic 
programme. For reasons related to the military conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Croatia during the early 1990s and the dissolution of the SFRY, the transition was 
quickly interrupted.
The hyperinflation which from 1992 to 1994 reigned Serbia is now studied as 
the second highest (after the Hungarian hyperinflation, 1945-1947) and the second 
longest (after the Russian hyperinflation, 1922-1924) hyperinflation ever recorded in 
global monetary history. It was accompanied by an enormous reduction in GDP and 
productivity levels by up to 60 per cent. The authorities of the newly established 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia intervened, however, only in January 1994, initiating 
the so-called Avramovic programme. The programme was implemented against the 
background of an extensive regime of (non-)economic sanctions that were imposed on 
Serbia by the international community throughout the 1990s. The programme was 
again exchange-rate based, but represented a currency board arrangement as 
all new money issue was fully backed by foreign exchange reserves.
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Interestingly, the next wave of institutional central bank reform took place only 
in mid-1993 as a part of the belated institutional defining of the FRY. Our study did 
not discover any evidence pointing to the fact that this reform was a result of a 
conscious and deliberate act, although this law gave the NBY twice as much legal 
independence than it had under the previous law. The actual inflation record, 
however, made us conclude that this moderately high legal central bank independence 
was indeed insufficient to hold inflation from increasing further, on its own merits. 
Other policies, such as fiscal policy, were needed to sustain these negative economic 
tendencies. Also lacking was international support. As a result, the programme - 
which leaned more on personal credibility of Governor Avramovic and the 
affectionate public support he had, than on a harmonised policy approach to transition 
and reforms - managed to bring down inflation in the first half of 1994. The second 
part of this programme, which began in summer 1995, and which was supposed to 
deal with trade liberalisation, increased competition and privatisation, was quickly 
abandoned and Governor Avramovic was dismissed in May 1996.
In the following couple of years, the FRY economy was characterised by a 
reduction in the scope of production, import and export levels, and levels of 
investment and employment. The NATO bombing campaign, which lasted from 24 
March until 9 June 1999, greatly added to the severity of crisis. Economically 
speaking, the losses were huge, as NATO targeted, in addition to military bases, some 
very important infrastructure objects (roads, bridges, airports, refineries, factories, 
etc.). The direct costs were estimated to amount from USD 1.2 billion to USD 11.7 
billion, whereas the indirect costs were estimated at USD 30.3 billion, based on 
unrealised GDP for the period 1999-2010. Additionally, the FRY registered a full 18 
per cent drop in GDP compared to the previous year, as well as a drastic decline in 
international trade of 36.5 per cent. At the same time, the unemployment rate 
by 27.7 per cent. Clearly, the transition was entirely suspended in this 
period and only resumed after the democratic overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic's 
regime in October 2000. The conclusion nevertheless remains that without firm 
internal policy consensus international support, no transition can be successful.
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As of 2000 onwards, Serbia continued its transition by initiating an all- 
encompassing process of macroeconomic stabilisation, enterprise and banking system 
consolidation, restructuring and privatisation. International financial and political support 
largely eased this process, enabling Serbia to employ and direct its human and other 
potentials towards the common goal of transforming its society. Already in 2001, the 
FRY re-activated its membership in many international organisations and financial 
institutions (UN, OSCE, IMF, World Bank, etc.). Especially important for the country 
was the financial and political support of the European Union, which established a 
number of mechanisms to help the country overcome accumulated economic and other 
problems. Trade with the world intensified again and the first good results started being 
registered already in 2002. The analysis of this period points to the fact that even the 
events outside the scope of the fall of communism may act as a catalyst for an immense 
reform agenda, as suggested by Balcerowicz's argument of "extraordinary politics". The 
FRY's experience, however, also confirms that this period is limited, as the political 
capital gathered at such extraordinary time fades in line with increasing reform costs.
The first signs that there were problems in the implementation of the reform 
programme began appearing in 2003, when the debate about the fixity of the dinar 
exchange rate and about an ever-increasing current account deficit opened. This debate 
made us analyse a wide range of macroeconomic and other reforms such as price and 
trade liberalisation, balance of payment situation, fiscal and tax reforms, labour market 
and wage dynamics, as well as monetary, exchange rate and banking sector reform. The 
analysis showed that during the initial stabilisation phase (2001-2002), the NBS kept the 
nominal dinar exchange rate fixed, while the real exchange rate appreciated for 95 per 
cent. Such a huge dinar appreciation wiped out the possibility that Serbia's economic 
policy would focus on achieving sustainable growth. Instead, the focus was placed on 
short-term objectives, notably, on full exchange rate stabilisation and rapid disinflation. 
Already in 2003, it become clear that such a policy mix was dangerous in the sense that it 
tied the hands of the NBS to use the exchange rate depreciation as an instrument in 
settling external imbalances. On a strategic level, this meant that contemplation about the 
macroeconomic Maastricht criteria in Serbia is largely constrained by a more immediate 
need to contain domestic spending and real wage growth below productivity levels.
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Our analysis, thus, points to the fact that the National Bank of Serbia will most 
probably continue targeting the exchange rate, as it had done traditionally. On a 
conceptual level, this indeed seems to be the preferred policy option at least until 
prolonged macroeconomic stabilisation is achieved. In this, however, the decision about 
the adequate degree of exchange rate flexibility must allow for a change of priorities, 
away from rapid disinflation to the resolution of existing external imbalances and 
increased competitiveness. The interviews that were conducted with the highest NBS 
officials, however, reveal that there may be different views and that the NBS may in the 
future engage more heavily in inflation targeting. Our analysis has revealed that the NBS, 
besides the fact that it targets the exchange rate, also targets inflation. Inflation targeting, 
however, appears to be the NBS's implicit monetary strategy. The literature review, as 
well as anecdotal evidence, suggests that the existing monetary framework is confusing 
both to the business community and to scholars. It is our view that this situation must be 
changed and cleared.
We strongly argue, though, that the decision about the new monetary policy 
framework cannot be formed intuitively by the NBS's management, or made in 
accordance with other countries' experience, without looking at the specificities of 
Serbia's economic milieu. In an attempt to underline the complexity of the monetary 
strategy formulation process, we devoted the entire Chapter IV to an analysis of the 
factors influencing this choice. Our main conclusion is that a comprehensive assessment 
of these factors and their relationship should be conducted before any further progress 
can be made. In doing so, it is likely that the NBS would require some technical 
assistance, which should most naturally come from one of the EU Member States' central 
banks or the European Central Bank itself. In the meantime, the NBS should try to 
gradually redefine its role in the financial market from a major player to a regulator of 
that market. An immediate challenge for the NBS would be to define its operating target 
interest rate and to restrain itself from daily interventions on the forex market. Instead, 
the NBS should find ways to encourage commercial banks to engage in the interbank 
market and to conduct operations among each other a lot more than they do atpresent. For 
this to be possible, an analysis should be done so as to detect the reasons for current 
banks' disengagement from mutual lending.
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To be able to actively respond to the remaining transitional tasks, however, the 
National Bank of Serbia needs to restore its credibility. For that purpose, the legal NBS 
framework needs to be additionally strengthened. In order to assess the scope of 
anticipated changes in the NBS's institutional framework, we measured its and 
independence. The evidence obtained enabled us to perform cross-country and 
temporal analyses which revealed that the current NBS legislation - adopted following 
the constitutional change in February 2003, i.e. the establishment of the State Union 
Serbia and Montenegro - is in line with the transitional average, but that real NBS 
independence represents a cause for concern. Paradoxically, we also found that there is a 
tendency of the NBS to import personal credibility of the governors, although the 
evidence points that the rate of turnover of governors in Serbia is well below the 
threshold established by Cukierman (1992). We thus inquired into how this credibility 
can be restored and institutionalised.
We proposed that the matter be resolved by a new Serbian Constitution, arguing 
that a NBS governing body be established. Our proposal derives from an 
analysis of the NBY/NBS legal framework in the period 1989 to 2005 and the 1992 FRY 
Constitution, which was the legal basis for these laws. So as to prevent the inclusion of a 
"systemic error" into the new Serbian constitution - by which a single person (i.e. the 
governor) is the sole source of monetary policymaking - the study proposes several 
principles which may guide the drafting process. These include the necessity to establish 
the NBS as an autonomous legal entity, independent in the formulation and 
implementation of policies aimed at fulfilling its primary objective (presumably price 
stability), accountable to the National Parliament, and to ensure that the governor be 
dismissed by the parliament only for non-policy reasons. Also, we proposed that the 
status and organisation of the NBS be regulated by a law and that the NBS be given a 
constitutional right to propose laws in its domain. Only if these principles are respected, 
we believe, could the NBS's institutional credibility be restored. This, however, does not 
necessarily imply that all other mechanism ought to be neglected and that the general 
public may hedge against monetary misconduct by undertaking constitutional 
precautionary measures. We do argue, on the other hand, that a solid institutional basis 
for the NBS represents a precondition for full reparation of its credibility.
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Furthermore, so as to underline the importance we attach to the NBS's own 
engagement in gaining public confidence, we proposed that the new Serbian constitution 
includes a provision regulating the mandatory presentation of a report on the activities 
and results of the NBS at least once annually to the National Parliament by the NBS 
governor. This simple exercise should allow the general public to actively engage in a 
discussion about monetary policy issues and to learn about what monetary policy can and 
cannot do in general. In turn, this learning process should introduce another quality in the 
conduct of the central bank's operations and its overall existence by ensuring that the 
central bank is held accountable only for those factors which it can influence. To put it 
differently, the aim of our proposal is to safeguard the central bank and its long-term 
credibility from short-lived popular government actions that bring immediate benefits to 
society, but which undermine the ability of central bankers to pursue a sustainable anti- 
inflation policy over the long term.
Moreover, this thesis analysed the provisions of the current NBS Law which 
would need to be brought in line with the EMU's We see the process of legal 
harmonisation with EU legislation as an additional opportunity for the National Bank of 
Serbia to improve its credibility. Apart from harmonisation with EMU provisions, we 
proposed that the NBS also replicate some of the practices developed by the ECB, such 
as greater engagement in presentation and pedagogical activities. Namely, we believe that 
a greater engagement of NBS high officials in educational activities focusing on 
explaining what monetary policy can and cannot do in general, both to the general public 
and to the political actors, may contribute to the strengthening of the NBS's reputation 
and credibility. Thus, we nominate the concept of transparency in the presentation of the 
NBS's monetary policy strategy and other tasks as a possible solution to this problem. A 
strong and clear constitutional and legal background, accompanied by a more practical 
and transparent presentation activities of the National Bank of Serbia, we believe, will 
allow for a shift from personal to collective policy preference, so crucial for further 
reforms. This is especially important when one takes into account the finding disclosed 
by this study - that an understanding about the E(M)U requirements in Serbia is still 
abstract and that the process of European integration is often overlooked and 
oversimplified. If Serbia is to join the EU, this will need to change.
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Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 1/92
Law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia Official Gazette 
of the FRY, No. 32/93
Law on Banks and Other Financial Organisations 
Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 32/93
Foreign Trade Law Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 
46/92 [...], and 73/00
Customs Tariff Law Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 23/01 and 40/01
Law on Foreign Exchange Transactions Official Gazette of the 
FRY, No. 23/02 and 34/02
Low on the Foreign Credit Relations Official 
Gazette of the FRY, No. 42/92
Decision on the Assessment of the Constitutionality of Provisions of Articles 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 
and 17 of the Law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia 
Official Gazette of 
the FRY, No. 50/99
Decision on Monetary Policy in 2003 Official 
Gazette of the FRY, No. 71/02
Law on Public Enterprises Official Gazette of the FRY, No 6/91
6) Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia legal sources
Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
Official Gazette, No. 9/74, 38/81 and 70/88
Law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia and on the Uniform Monetary Operations of the 
National Banks of the Republics and the National Banks of the Autonomous Provinces 
Official Gazette of the SFRY, No. 34/89, 88/89, 96/91 
and 16/93
Federal Law on Transfer and Disposition of Socially-Owned Capital 
Official Gazette of the SFRY, No. 84/89 and 46/90
Law on the Basis of the Transformation of Socially-Owned Capital 
Official Gazette of the SFRY, No. 29/96
Other legal sources
Law on the National Bank of Poland, No. 140/1997 (item 938) 
Law on the Bank of Slovenia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 58/02
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Group
CEO
Definition of
variable
Term of office of
CEO in years
Who appoints the
CEO?
Provisions for
dismissal of CEO
Is CEO allowed to
hold another office
Variable Levels of independence and their meaning
l./oo>8
2. 8 > 6
3. 
4. 4
5. 
1 . CEO appointed by CB board
2. CEO appointed by council composed of members from executive and
legislative branches as well as from CB board
3. CEO appointed by legislative branch (Congress, king)
4. CEO appointed by executive branch (council of ministers)
5. CEO appointed trough decision of one or two members of executive
Branch (e.g., prime minister or minister of finance)
1 . No provision for dismissal
2. Dismissal possible only for nonpolicy reasons (e.g., incapability
or violation of law)
3. Dismissal possible and at discretion of CB board
4. Dismissal for policy reasons at legislative branch's discretion
5. Unconditional dismissal possible at legislative branch's discretion
6. Dismissal for policy reasons at executive branch's discretion
7. Unconditional dismissal possible at executive branch's discretion
1 . CEO prohibited by law from holding any other office in government
2. CEO not allowed to hold any other office in government unless
authorized by executive branch
3 . Law does not prohibit CEO from holding another office
Numerical
codings
1
0.75
0.50
0.25
0
1
0.75
0.50
0.25
0
1
0.83
0.67
0.50
0.33
0.17
0
1
0.5
0
A4. (continued)
Who formulates 
monetary policy?
1. CB alone has authority to formulate monetary policy
2. CB participates in formulation of monetary policy together with government
3. CB participates in formulation of monetary policy in an advisory capacity
4. Government alone formulates monetary policy ____
Government directives 
and resolution of conflict
1. CB given final authority over issues clearly defined in the law as CB objectives
2. Government has final authority only over policy issues that have not been 
clearly defined as CB goals or in case of conflict within CB
3. In case of conflict final decision up to a council whose members are from CB, 
legislative branch, and executive branch
4. Legislative branch has final authority on policy issues
5. Executive branch has final authority on policy issues, but subject to due 
process and possible protest by CB
6. Executive branch has unconditional authority over policy_____________
Is CB given an active role 
in the formulation of 
government's budget?
1. Yes
2. No
0.66
0.33
0
1 
0.8
0.6 
0.4
0.2 
0
1
0
Price stability mentioned as the only or major goal, and case of conflict with 1 
government CB has final authority to pursue policies aimed at achieving this goal
2. Price stability mentioned as the only goal 0.8
3. Price stability mentioned along with other objectives that that do not seem to conflict
with price stability (e.g., stable banking) 0.6
4. Price stability mentioned with a number of potentially conflicting goals
(e.g., full employment) 0.4
5. CB charter does not contain any objectives for CB 0.2
6. Some goals appear in the charter, but price stability not one of them___________ 0
Legal variables and their codings 
Limitations on 
advances
Limitations on securitized 
Lending __
Who decides control 
Of terms of lending?3
How wide is the circle of 
potential borrowers from CB?
Tipe of limit when 
such limit exists
Maturity of loans
Restrictions on 
interest rates'3
Prohibition on lending 
in primary market
Advances to government prohibited
2. Advances permitted but subject to limits in terms of absolute cash amounts or to other 
types of relatively strict limits (e.g., up to 15% of government revenues)
3. Advances subject to relatively accommodative limits (e.g., advances can exceed 15% 
of government revenues or are specified as fractions of government expenditures)
4. No legal limits on advances; their quantity subject to periodic negotiations between 
government and CB ________
Specification of levels identical to those for advances
1. CB controls terms and conditions of government borrowing from it
2. Terms of CB lending specified in the law, or CB given legal authority to set these terms
3. Law leaves the decision about the terms of CB lending to government to negotiations 
between CB and executive branch
4. Executive branch alone decides the terms of CB lending to government and imposes 
them on CB
1. Only central government can borrow from CB
2. Central and state governments as well as all political subdivisions can borrow from CB
3. In addition to the institutions mentioned under 2 public enterprises can borrow from CB
4. CB can lend to all of the above as well as to the private sector______________
1. Limit specified as an absolute cash amount
2. Limit specified as a percentage of CB capital or other liabilities
3. Limit specified as a percentage of government revenues
4. Limit specified as a percentage of government expenditures
1. Maturity of CB loans limited to a maximum of 6 months
2. Maturity of CB loans limited to a maximum of one year
3. Maturity of CB loans limited to a maximum of more than one year
4. No legal upper bounds on the maturity of CB loans_________
1. Interest rate on CB loans must be at market rate
2. Interest rate on CB loans to government cannot be lower than a certain floor
3. Interest rate on CB loans cannot exceed a certain ceiling
4. No explicit legal provisions regarding the interest rate on CB loans
5. Law stipulates no interest rate charge on government's borrowing from the CB
1. CB prohibited from buying government securities in primary market
2. CB not prohibited from buying government securities in primary market
0.66
0.33
0
1
0.66
0.66
0.33
0
(1) Computerized legal data files on CB charters from the Central Banking Department at the IMF, (2) Aufricht (1961, 1967), (3) Eight European central banks (1963),
and (4) Effors (1982). These sources were supplemented by updates of various laws from the IMF legal library files.
a. Terms of lending concern maturity, interest, and amount of loans subject to the relevant legal limits.
b. The rationale for the classification of this variable is that minimum rates are likely to have been devised in order to discourage borrowing at the CB while maximum rates
are probably meant to facilitate borrowing at the CB. But the requirement of a minimum rate is classified below "market rates", since minimum rates, when they exist, are
usually lower than market rates.
Cukierman (1992, pp. 373-376)
